There's a great new site on The Guardian: Europa. It's a joint project with a few other European newspapers to tackle European affairs. Hopefully it will generate some good analysis and debate on what's going on - and help us to debate a bit more across borders. The article on the EU budget is good, though I hope it moves on from the articles on stereotypes to more, well, news.
Definitely worth keeping an eye on.
Tuesday, 31 January 2012
The Fiscal Stability Treaty
We've got our new Fiscal Stability Treaty (which you can read here). Frankly, it's hard to know how to approach it, given the fact that I've posted about it when it came out and on the problem it poses for the European left. Not much has changed in terms of the general aims and principles of the compact. Also there's a great summary of the text over at the European Union Law Blog:
I agree. We already have the Stability and Growth Pact part of the EU treaties, and the "6-pack" of legislation passed at the end of 2011 essentially tightened up the Economic and Monetary Union - which is already having an effect on national politics and budgetary policy in Belgium. Apart from enforcement mechanisms, the treaty offers little that is new: no Eurobonds, no expanded role for the ECB, nothing on investment - coordinated or otherwise - or any firm kind of economic strategy that would back up the vague mentions of growth as a goal. Good thing the treaty has the cumbersome title of "Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union" - if they'd called it a treaty on fiscal union they might as well have tied their credibility up in a bag and drowned it in a well.
This treaty does nothing to address the crisis, and it's only preventative in the sense that it aims to ensure that Member States don't continuously rack up debt. While this might prevent a future Greece/Italy crisis, it would be totally useless in an Irish-style crisis where budgets were balanced or in surplus before the crash and collapse in tax receipts. "Stability" is the key word. The treaty is designed to maintain the stability of a currency union which is made up of members who have joined having met the criteria and stuck to the criteria once inside the club. It does nothing to provide a mechanism for resolving crises, but rather the deficit correction ethos is directed towards isolating any crisis and protecting the stability of the currency union as a whole. It won't work, and it's hard to see how it could be politically attractive without being balanced with more fiscal solidarity - a transfer union. That's not to say that some budget discipline isn't necessary to promote stability in the good times and to build trust between Member States, but without a true fiscal union this trust isn't reciprocated and so the treaty is of questionable political and economic value.
Institutional politics and the UK
It's clear from the treaty that the Commission and ECJ will be involved under the treaty. The European Parliament and national parliaments will be involved via some sort of meeting with representatives of their relevant committees - how this works in practice is simply not mentioned - and the European Parliament president will be invited to talk at some EuroSummits. The President of the EuroSummits (yes, a president will be elected for the same 2.5 years as the European Council presidency currently held by Van Rompuy) will organise the summits (held 2x a year and after European Council summits) and report back to the European Parliament.
Clearly the European Parliament only has a slight consultative role, and it's demands for policies for economic growth have been ignored. Given that it's new president has made fighting for the EP's position under these issues a key part of his presidency, the Parliament might reject the treaty and try to weaken political support for it.
The treaty also leaves Cameron in an odd position. I've written about the strangeness of the British demands regarding the single market before, but we should be clear about one point: nothing in this treaty (or in the possible treaty within the EU) affects the single market legally. If the treaty had have been part of the EU treaty system is wouldn't have changed the single market legally. The British concern for national influence and the financial market is essentially about political and institutional influence.
The UK won't block the use of EU institutions - Cameron has confirmed this, though he points out that he will be on the look out to ensure that there is no abuse that would damage the British national interest. I have no idea what practical policy or action this would refer to as all single market legislation has to be voted on within the EU structures. One possibility would be that the UK would try to ensure that the Eurozone countries didn't discuss single market issues in their meetings, but it would be a bit hard to enforce in practice as ministers and heads of state and government could discuss these issues at the meetings without having them on the official agenda. However, the UK is helped by the fact that EuroSummits will take place after European Council summits, so this limits their potential as a platform for countries to agree and discuss issues in advance without the UK. On the other hand, as it isn't a signatory to the treaty, the UK won't have a right to be involved in the EuroSummits unlike other non-Euro participating countries.
Overall the UK hasn't gained anything by using it's veto,* and hasn't lost out legally from using it either. It's in good will, influence and future participation in negotiations and debates that it has lost. How big of a loss depends on the future of the Fiscal Stability Treaty...
*And using it prematurely at that, given that denying use of the EU treaty system would be a bigger threat later on in negotiations - it's hard not to get the impression that Cameron doesn't know the first thing about the practical aspects of negotiation...
"The provisions are intentionally vague in order to avoid any conflict with the enhanced powers of the EU post-Lisbon. The only meaningful instrument is the sui generis infringement procedure in case a participating Member State has failed to apply the automated deficit correction mechanism. However, this procedure is substantially weakened by the fact that Member States, and not the European Commission, must petition the ECJ. This will happen only in extraordinary circumstances and with great unease.
In addition the provisions on economic coordination are totally bland. I fail to understand how these texts may enhance economic policy coordination – they are restating existing opportunities in EU law."
I agree. We already have the Stability and Growth Pact part of the EU treaties, and the "6-pack" of legislation passed at the end of 2011 essentially tightened up the Economic and Monetary Union - which is already having an effect on national politics and budgetary policy in Belgium. Apart from enforcement mechanisms, the treaty offers little that is new: no Eurobonds, no expanded role for the ECB, nothing on investment - coordinated or otherwise - or any firm kind of economic strategy that would back up the vague mentions of growth as a goal. Good thing the treaty has the cumbersome title of "Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union" - if they'd called it a treaty on fiscal union they might as well have tied their credibility up in a bag and drowned it in a well.
This treaty does nothing to address the crisis, and it's only preventative in the sense that it aims to ensure that Member States don't continuously rack up debt. While this might prevent a future Greece/Italy crisis, it would be totally useless in an Irish-style crisis where budgets were balanced or in surplus before the crash and collapse in tax receipts. "Stability" is the key word. The treaty is designed to maintain the stability of a currency union which is made up of members who have joined having met the criteria and stuck to the criteria once inside the club. It does nothing to provide a mechanism for resolving crises, but rather the deficit correction ethos is directed towards isolating any crisis and protecting the stability of the currency union as a whole. It won't work, and it's hard to see how it could be politically attractive without being balanced with more fiscal solidarity - a transfer union. That's not to say that some budget discipline isn't necessary to promote stability in the good times and to build trust between Member States, but without a true fiscal union this trust isn't reciprocated and so the treaty is of questionable political and economic value.
Institutional politics and the UK
It's clear from the treaty that the Commission and ECJ will be involved under the treaty. The European Parliament and national parliaments will be involved via some sort of meeting with representatives of their relevant committees - how this works in practice is simply not mentioned - and the European Parliament president will be invited to talk at some EuroSummits. The President of the EuroSummits (yes, a president will be elected for the same 2.5 years as the European Council presidency currently held by Van Rompuy) will organise the summits (held 2x a year and after European Council summits) and report back to the European Parliament.
Clearly the European Parliament only has a slight consultative role, and it's demands for policies for economic growth have been ignored. Given that it's new president has made fighting for the EP's position under these issues a key part of his presidency, the Parliament might reject the treaty and try to weaken political support for it.
The treaty also leaves Cameron in an odd position. I've written about the strangeness of the British demands regarding the single market before, but we should be clear about one point: nothing in this treaty (or in the possible treaty within the EU) affects the single market legally. If the treaty had have been part of the EU treaty system is wouldn't have changed the single market legally. The British concern for national influence and the financial market is essentially about political and institutional influence.
The UK won't block the use of EU institutions - Cameron has confirmed this, though he points out that he will be on the look out to ensure that there is no abuse that would damage the British national interest. I have no idea what practical policy or action this would refer to as all single market legislation has to be voted on within the EU structures. One possibility would be that the UK would try to ensure that the Eurozone countries didn't discuss single market issues in their meetings, but it would be a bit hard to enforce in practice as ministers and heads of state and government could discuss these issues at the meetings without having them on the official agenda. However, the UK is helped by the fact that EuroSummits will take place after European Council summits, so this limits their potential as a platform for countries to agree and discuss issues in advance without the UK. On the other hand, as it isn't a signatory to the treaty, the UK won't have a right to be involved in the EuroSummits unlike other non-Euro participating countries.
Overall the UK hasn't gained anything by using it's veto,* and hasn't lost out legally from using it either. It's in good will, influence and future participation in negotiations and debates that it has lost. How big of a loss depends on the future of the Fiscal Stability Treaty...
*And using it prematurely at that, given that denying use of the EU treaty system would be a bigger threat later on in negotiations - it's hard not to get the impression that Cameron doesn't know the first thing about the practical aspects of negotiation...
Wednesday, 25 January 2012
Happy Birthday Bloggingportal.eu!
The EU blog aggregating website Bloggingportal.eu is 3 tomorrow. Since it was launched the number of blogs being aggregated has ballooned to 904, with over 250 posts being generated over the past week. The Euroblogosphere is definitely more vibrant than when Bloggingportal started out, and Bloggingportal is still the top aggregation site for EU blogs - I'm not aware of any others.
I've been a voluntary editor with Bloggingportal for much of the last 3 years (it's been around 2 1/2 years now) - it's only staffed by volunteer Eurobloggers, and it's very much reflected in how the site's operated. The layout and look of the website hasn't changed much, though there's been lots of discussion about changing this and adding functionality, progress has been limited by the voluntary nature of the site, the small number of editors with the magical combination of free time and technical know-how, and the problems with coming up with a way of reconciling the need for a different role structure (at least partially) to make Bloggingportal.eu more useful with the dependence of the site on the motivation and goodwill of sufficient editors.
That said, Bloggingportal has become a focal point in the Euroblogosphere, with the Hungarian Presidency opening the presidency up more to Bloggingportal and the Euroblogosphere in general (when we had launched a blog action against the Hungarian media law), and editor's picks being linked to by the Guardian's CiF Europe site. Perhaps unsurprisingly for bloggers, we've been most successful with doing, well, blogging stuff on Bloggingportal - the "Week in Bloggingportal" posts that summarise what's been going on in the EU according to the editor's picks, and the blogging actions (like the action over the European Citizens' Initiative) are still where there is the most editor engagement and where Bloggingportal positively interacts with the Euroblogosphere.
The scope for positive engagement with the rest of the Euroblogosphere is extremely limited, as we try to remain neutral and to separate out what we do in our blogs (and what we might want to do in common through our blogs) and what is right for Bloggingportal's independent position. (Do you think we've managed to maintain Bloggingportal as a neutral aggregation site for the Euroblogosphere?) But we've also hosted physical events (such as an event in London in December 2010), and represented Bloggingportal at other blogging events. I think these physical meetings are important, particularly given the diverse and geographically spread nature of Euroblogging (though a lot of editors tend to end up in the London-Brussels-Berlin triangle at some point), which would encourage a feeling of community that would help sustain citizen blogging and can build more connections (I agree with Mathew Lowry that specialist blogs will be a fundamental part of a Euroblogosphere, but I think that non-specialist, citizen blogs are the connective tissue between them, or should be).
So we need to be more connective: connecting more blogs and bloggers online through offering a site that provides easy access to specialist Euroblogs and that has some limited level of real world presence that provides a small social boost to those outside the Brussels Bubble. Achieving any of this to even a modest level would require a lot of changes, though, and Bloggingportal changes slowly: it's a bit surprising that the rapidly changing Euroblogosphere hasn't been able to evolve anything better so far, so maybe we can work something out.
What do you want from Bloggingportal.eu? What would make you want to use it more?
I've been a voluntary editor with Bloggingportal for much of the last 3 years (it's been around 2 1/2 years now) - it's only staffed by volunteer Eurobloggers, and it's very much reflected in how the site's operated. The layout and look of the website hasn't changed much, though there's been lots of discussion about changing this and adding functionality, progress has been limited by the voluntary nature of the site, the small number of editors with the magical combination of free time and technical know-how, and the problems with coming up with a way of reconciling the need for a different role structure (at least partially) to make Bloggingportal.eu more useful with the dependence of the site on the motivation and goodwill of sufficient editors.
That said, Bloggingportal has become a focal point in the Euroblogosphere, with the Hungarian Presidency opening the presidency up more to Bloggingportal and the Euroblogosphere in general (when we had launched a blog action against the Hungarian media law), and editor's picks being linked to by the Guardian's CiF Europe site. Perhaps unsurprisingly for bloggers, we've been most successful with doing, well, blogging stuff on Bloggingportal - the "Week in Bloggingportal" posts that summarise what's been going on in the EU according to the editor's picks, and the blogging actions (like the action over the European Citizens' Initiative) are still where there is the most editor engagement and where Bloggingportal positively interacts with the Euroblogosphere.
The scope for positive engagement with the rest of the Euroblogosphere is extremely limited, as we try to remain neutral and to separate out what we do in our blogs (and what we might want to do in common through our blogs) and what is right for Bloggingportal's independent position. (Do you think we've managed to maintain Bloggingportal as a neutral aggregation site for the Euroblogosphere?) But we've also hosted physical events (such as an event in London in December 2010), and represented Bloggingportal at other blogging events. I think these physical meetings are important, particularly given the diverse and geographically spread nature of Euroblogging (though a lot of editors tend to end up in the London-Brussels-Berlin triangle at some point), which would encourage a feeling of community that would help sustain citizen blogging and can build more connections (I agree with Mathew Lowry that specialist blogs will be a fundamental part of a Euroblogosphere, but I think that non-specialist, citizen blogs are the connective tissue between them, or should be).
So we need to be more connective: connecting more blogs and bloggers online through offering a site that provides easy access to specialist Euroblogs and that has some limited level of real world presence that provides a small social boost to those outside the Brussels Bubble. Achieving any of this to even a modest level would require a lot of changes, though, and Bloggingportal changes slowly: it's a bit surprising that the rapidly changing Euroblogosphere hasn't been able to evolve anything better so far, so maybe we can work something out.
What do you want from Bloggingportal.eu? What would make you want to use it more?
Friday, 20 January 2012
A stronger, more active European Parliament?
Martin Schulz, the former leader of the Socialists and Democrats Group in the European Parliament has been elected the President of the Parliament for 2.5 years.* He's set out his stall for parliamentarianism: that he'll stick up for the EP within the EU's institutional triangle and in the ongoing negotiations for the New Fiscal Compact (acceptance speech [PDF]):
So there are two political goals here: for the Parliament's resolution on the fiscal and stability union to be incorporated in some way into the New Fiscal Compact, and for the EP to have a seat at European summits (probably for the EP president who currently only reports on the Parliament's view to the European Council, but is not part of the European Council - while the Commission President is a member). Interestingly, Proinsais de Rossa, an Irish MEP who is stepping down soon, has claimed that the European Parliament might reject the new treaty. This wouldn't block the treaty - it won't be part of the EU treaty system - but it could politically damage the ratification process, especially if Ireland holds a referendum on the pact.
Polscieu has picked up on Schulz's line on first reading agreements - agreements between the Council and Parliament on a draft of legislation so it can be passed quickly. If Schulz's "re-thinking" of the issue leads to fewer first reading agreements, then we're likely to see more parliamentary debates on legislation and a strengthening of the Parliament's political voice and profile. Since the EP is now equal to the Council as a legislator in almost every area (that the EU has competence in) but foreign policy, the loss in profile by first reading agreements is self-inflicted. That's not to say that first reading agreements don't have their place, but it's hard to see why the statistic of 72% of legislation passed by co-decision (now called "ordinary legislative procedure") being decided under such agreements in the last parliament (2004-9) should be repeated again for this parliament.
If Schulz makes progress on all three counts, then the EP's public profile should increase - particularly if the EP gains a bigger role at European summits, given that most of the media attention is focused on these "zero-sum game" events. We'll see what his record is by the next European elections.
*The first 2.5 years of the Parliament presidency was held by Jerzy Buzek (EPP) - the two biggest political groupings traditionally make a pact to share the presidency between them during the life of the Parliament.
"The intergovernmental agreement on a new fiscal union will be the first test. In the negotiations, representatives of our Parliament initially failed to secure support for their call to combine budgetary discipline with measures to foster growth and employment. But it is just such a sensible compromise that the citizens of Europe want! For this reason as well, we must have a seat at the table at European summits."
So there are two political goals here: for the Parliament's resolution on the fiscal and stability union to be incorporated in some way into the New Fiscal Compact, and for the EP to have a seat at European summits (probably for the EP president who currently only reports on the Parliament's view to the European Council, but is not part of the European Council - while the Commission President is a member). Interestingly, Proinsais de Rossa, an Irish MEP who is stepping down soon, has claimed that the European Parliament might reject the new treaty. This wouldn't block the treaty - it won't be part of the EU treaty system - but it could politically damage the ratification process, especially if Ireland holds a referendum on the pact.
Polscieu has picked up on Schulz's line on first reading agreements - agreements between the Council and Parliament on a draft of legislation so it can be passed quickly. If Schulz's "re-thinking" of the issue leads to fewer first reading agreements, then we're likely to see more parliamentary debates on legislation and a strengthening of the Parliament's political voice and profile. Since the EP is now equal to the Council as a legislator in almost every area (that the EU has competence in) but foreign policy, the loss in profile by first reading agreements is self-inflicted. That's not to say that first reading agreements don't have their place, but it's hard to see why the statistic of 72% of legislation passed by co-decision (now called "ordinary legislative procedure") being decided under such agreements in the last parliament (2004-9) should be repeated again for this parliament.
If Schulz makes progress on all three counts, then the EP's public profile should increase - particularly if the EP gains a bigger role at European summits, given that most of the media attention is focused on these "zero-sum game" events. We'll see what his record is by the next European elections.
*The first 2.5 years of the Parliament presidency was held by Jerzy Buzek (EPP) - the two biggest political groupings traditionally make a pact to share the presidency between them during the life of the Parliament.
Thursday, 19 January 2012
Debate on Hungary in the European Parliament
Hungary's Prime Minister addressed the European Parliament today in the debate on Hungary's new constitution and Fidesz's actions in power. Earlier, in the debate on the Danish presidency, Danish PM Thorning-Schmidt signaled her support for the Commission's legal action against Hungary, side-stepping the question of using Article 7 TEU against Orban's government if Fidesz doesn't make sufficient changes.
Viktor Orban repeated his defence of the new constitution to the EP: that it was the final part of the transition from Communism to democracy. EPP group leader Daul continued along the same line, agreeing with Orban's assessment that it was part of the transition to democracy, while also signalling support for any changes that might be required under EU law. This is a shameful balancing act by the EPP leadership - both the Hungarian government and the Commission are linked to the European People's Party: Fidesz is part of the EPP and the Commission is dominated by the EPP. Since the legal action that can be taken by the Commission is limited to narrow breaches of EU law, rather than the separate procedure for breaches of the EU's values under Article 7 TEU, Daul is essentially making it known that the EPP in Parliament will block any motion to initiate the Article 7 procedure against Hungary. Zbigniew Ziobro (Europe of Freedom and Democracy group) came out in full support of Orban, denouncing EU interference as interference in a sovereign state, and praising Orban for standing up for Hungary.
Guy Verhofstadt (leader of the liberal ALDE group) attacked the direction of Hungary's government and brought up the issue of Article 7:
A parliamentary report finding a breach of EU values would be the basis for a reasoned opinion which would be part of an EP motion for an Article 7 action. While Hannes Swoboda, the new leader of the Socialists and Democrats group, was very critical of the Orban government and the authoritarian culture surrounding it (pointing out that if Croatia had adopted the same rules it wouldn't be given EU membership) and mentioned the question of starting the monitoring step for Article 7 (though not as stongly as Verhofstadt). He also urged the EPP to hold Orban to account. Daniel Cohn-Bendit gave an impassioned speech for the Greens against Orban and his line on his government's anti-Stalinist motives.
Since the United Left and European Conservatives and Reformists groups were also critical of Hungary, it might be possible that the Parliament will flex its political muscle by starting the Article 7 procedure. Even if it does, it would take 4/5s of Member States voting for the motion for it to be passed, which is extremely unlikely given the dominance of the EPP in the Council, but such a clear and determined action by the EP would send a powerful political signal and keep this issue in the spotlight.
Viktor Orban repeated his defence of the new constitution to the EP: that it was the final part of the transition from Communism to democracy. EPP group leader Daul continued along the same line, agreeing with Orban's assessment that it was part of the transition to democracy, while also signalling support for any changes that might be required under EU law. This is a shameful balancing act by the EPP leadership - both the Hungarian government and the Commission are linked to the European People's Party: Fidesz is part of the EPP and the Commission is dominated by the EPP. Since the legal action that can be taken by the Commission is limited to narrow breaches of EU law, rather than the separate procedure for breaches of the EU's values under Article 7 TEU, Daul is essentially making it known that the EPP in Parliament will block any motion to initiate the Article 7 procedure against Hungary. Zbigniew Ziobro (Europe of Freedom and Democracy group) came out in full support of Orban, denouncing EU interference as interference in a sovereign state, and praising Orban for standing up for Hungary.
Guy Verhofstadt (leader of the liberal ALDE group) attacked the direction of Hungary's government and brought up the issue of Article 7:
"What is necessary is to check the conformity of the Hungarian Constitution and cardinal laws with the European values: democracy, the rule of law, the freedom of religion, the freedom of expression, equality also.
I think, besides the infringement procedures, this House, should take its responsibility.
I call on our colleagues of the LIBE committee to make a report on the basis of article 71 TEU. Stating YES or NO if there is a clear risk of a serious breach of our values. That is what we have to do."
A parliamentary report finding a breach of EU values would be the basis for a reasoned opinion which would be part of an EP motion for an Article 7 action. While Hannes Swoboda, the new leader of the Socialists and Democrats group, was very critical of the Orban government and the authoritarian culture surrounding it (pointing out that if Croatia had adopted the same rules it wouldn't be given EU membership) and mentioned the question of starting the monitoring step for Article 7 (though not as stongly as Verhofstadt). He also urged the EPP to hold Orban to account. Daniel Cohn-Bendit gave an impassioned speech for the Greens against Orban and his line on his government's anti-Stalinist motives.
Since the United Left and European Conservatives and Reformists groups were also critical of Hungary, it might be possible that the Parliament will flex its political muscle by starting the Article 7 procedure. Even if it does, it would take 4/5s of Member States voting for the motion for it to be passed, which is extremely unlikely given the dominance of the EPP in the Council, but such a clear and determined action by the EP would send a powerful political signal and keep this issue in the spotlight.
Wednesday, 18 January 2012
What legal action is the Commission taking against Hungary?
The Commission has announced that it will be taking legal action against Hungary, but only so much can be done under EU law. While people point out that:
...the Commission doesn't have the jurisdiction (and neither does the European Court of Justice) to take Orban's government to task over all these issues. The Commission has decided to focus on the areas of the independence of the judiciary, the independence of the central bank, and the independence of Hungary's data protection authorities: probably because the EU legal case is strongest here. Let's look at some of the reasons behind the legal action:
"1) Independence of the national central bank
The outcry over what is going on in Hungary has been very political - in the sense that it's been about the high politics of rights and what makes a fair democracy - and rightly so. The Commission's response reveals the nature of the EU's power when it comes to protecting these key rights: as an organisation of sovereign Member States, the EU can only act where the Member States have contravened EU law. The EU treaties don't define a specific governing structure that Member States have to have, such as a presidential or parliamentary system or how their judiciary is organised (though it does set human rights and democratic tests for candidates to pass before they join), so the points of EU law can be quite narrow. This is especially obvious when it comes to the Commission's action over the judiciary laws - the action focuses on the unfair dismissal of serving judges, rather than the general separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive. The press release references these wider questions and demands answers, but whether or not there will be further legal action depends on whether or not the measures breach EU law.
The Commission (and the EU) is therefore not well placed to become a crusader for liberal democracy in its Member States, so there's a limit to what we can expect. The EU can, however, remove Hungary's EU voting rights via Article 7 TEU as a last resort, but this would require a super-majority. The Commission should investigate the changes to the electoral system and judiciary with an eye to using Article 7 if Hungary refuses to reverse any abuses. While the EU and the Commission's power might be limited (and we need to bear this in mind when Hungary claims it has changed its judicial rules in line with EU requirements), we should demand that all Member States live up to minimum democratic standards if they want to stay in the EU.
Today the European Parliament will be debating the Hungarian situation.
"Viktor Orbán's regime combines the extreme centralisation of economic assets (including the expropriation of the private pension funds, of several public foundations and the forthcoming centralisation of the municipal government's assets) and the monopolisation of power in a single party that intends to dominate every aspect of social and private life, turning citizens into subjects. The improvised nature of many of the new laws creates a wide margin for arbitrary decisions that increase dependence and insecurity.
In addition to a frontal attack on civil liberties, the government has redistributed economic assets (particularly through the tax system and investment allocations) in favour of interest groups close to Fidesz and a restricted layer of the well-to-do. This group zealously defends the party's power and executes its guidelines.
At the same time – through the unilateral rewriting of the labour code, the restriction of union action and collective bargaining rights, the radical dismantling of social welfare nets and independent social care institutions – the government exposed the most vulnerable social groups (the poor, the unemployed, Roma, pensioners, sick and handicapped) to the unfolding economic crisis. Life is precarious for those who live on wages and have no reserves or additional revenue."
...the Commission doesn't have the jurisdiction (and neither does the European Court of Justice) to take Orban's government to task over all these issues. The Commission has decided to focus on the areas of the independence of the judiciary, the independence of the central bank, and the independence of Hungary's data protection authorities: probably because the EU legal case is strongest here. Let's look at some of the reasons behind the legal action:
"1) Independence of the national central bank
"The Commission has identified several breaches of primary law, notably breaches of Article 130 TFEU stipulating full independence of the central bank and of Article 127(4) TFEU requiring consultation with the ECB "on any draft legislative provision in its field of competence".
•Article 130 TFEU states that: “neither the ECB, nor national central bodies, from bank … shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or any government of a Member State or from any other body”.
•Article 127(4) TFEU stipulates that "the ECB shall be consulted […] on any draft legislative provision in its field of competence"
Moreover, 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB as well as Article 4 of Council decision (98/415/EC) on timely consultation of the ECB were not respected. On a number of elements, the Commission has invited the Hungarian authorities to provide clarification.
The infringements identified in the letter of formal notice concern both the MNB law ('Magyar Nemzeti Bank') but also the new constitution.
Under the MNB law, the Minister can participate directly in the meetings of the Monetary Council, offering to the government the possibility to influence the MNB from the inside. Similarly, the agenda of MNB meetings needs to be sent to the government in advance, thus impeding its capacity to hold confidential discussions. Also, changes in the remuneration scheme for the Governor are made again immediately applicable to the incumbent, while they should apply only as of a new term to avoid using salaries to put pressure on the MNB. Finally, the Governor and the members of the Monetary Council have to take an oath (of fidelity to the country and its interests) whose text is problematic given that the Governor of the MNB is also a member of the General Council of the ECB.
The Commission has doubts on the rules of dismissal for the Governor and the members of the Monetary Council which are prone to political interference (even the Parliament can propose to dismiss a member of the Monetary Council) and possible misuse. Also the frequent changes of the institutional framework of the MNB raise doubts, for instance via the increase in the number of Monetary Council members together with the possibility of increasing the number of deputy governors without due consideration of the MNB’s needs.
Moreover, a constitutional provision regulates the possible merger of the MNB with the financial supervisory authority. While the merger is not a problem as such, the MNB Governor would become a simple deputy chairman of the new structure, which would structurally encroach on his independence.
2) Independence of the judiciary
The infringement case affecting the judiciary focuses on the new retirement age for judges and prosecutors and relates to Hungary's decision to lower the mandatory retirement age for judges, prosecutors and public notaries from 70 years to the general pensionable age (62 years) as of 1 January 2012.
EU rules on equal treatment in employment (Directive 2000/78/EC) prohibit discrimination at the workplace on grounds of age. Under the case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU, an objective and proportionate justification is needed if a government decides to reduce the retirement age for one group of people and not for others. This principle was affirmed when the Court ruled on 13 September 2011 that prohibiting airline pilots from working after the age of 60 constitutes discrimination on grounds of age.
In Hungary's case, the Commission has not found any objective justification for treating judges and prosecutors differently than other groups, notably at a time when retirement ages across Europe are being progressively increased and not lowered. The situation is even more legally questionable because the government has already communicated to the Commission that it intends to raise the general retirement age to 65.
As regards the independence of the judiciary, the Commission is also asking Hungary for more information regarding new legislation on the organisation of the courts. Under the law, the president of a new National Judicial Office concentrates powers concerning the operational management of the courts, human resources, budget and allocation of cases. There is no longer collegial decision-making of the operational management of the courts or other appropriate safeguards. One person alone now makes all important decision on the judiciary, including as regards the appointment of judges. In addition, the mandate of the former president of the Supreme Court, who was elected for six years in June 2009, was prematurely terminated at the end of 2011. In contrast, other former judges of the Supreme Court continue their mandate as judges of the new Curia, which has replaced the Supreme Court. The Commission expects detailed answers of the Hungarian authorities to be able to decide whether further infringement proceedings are needed.
3) Independence of the data protection supervisory authority
The case on the data protection supervisor relates to Hungary's recent decision to create a new National Agency for Data Protection, replacing the current Data Protection Commissioner's Office as of 1 January 2012. As a result, the six-year term of the Data Protection Commissioner currently in office, who was appointed in 2008, will be prematurely put to an end. There are no interim measures until the term of the current Commissioner's term ends in 2014.The new rules also create the possibility that the prime minister and president could dismiss the new supervisor on arbitrary grounds.
The independence of data protection supervisors is guaranteed under Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In addition, EU rules on data protection (Directive 95/46/EC) require Member States to establish a supervisory body to monitor the application of the Directive acting in complete independence. This has been confirmed by the Court of Justice. In its ruling in a case concerning Germany (C-518/07 of 3 March 2010), the Court underlined that data protection supervisory authorities have to remain free from any external influence, including the direct or indirect influence of the state. The mere risk of political influence through state scrutiny is sufficient to hinder the independent performance of the supervisory authority's tasks, the Court ruled."
The outcry over what is going on in Hungary has been very political - in the sense that it's been about the high politics of rights and what makes a fair democracy - and rightly so. The Commission's response reveals the nature of the EU's power when it comes to protecting these key rights: as an organisation of sovereign Member States, the EU can only act where the Member States have contravened EU law. The EU treaties don't define a specific governing structure that Member States have to have, such as a presidential or parliamentary system or how their judiciary is organised (though it does set human rights and democratic tests for candidates to pass before they join), so the points of EU law can be quite narrow. This is especially obvious when it comes to the Commission's action over the judiciary laws - the action focuses on the unfair dismissal of serving judges, rather than the general separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive. The press release references these wider questions and demands answers, but whether or not there will be further legal action depends on whether or not the measures breach EU law.
The Commission (and the EU) is therefore not well placed to become a crusader for liberal democracy in its Member States, so there's a limit to what we can expect. The EU can, however, remove Hungary's EU voting rights via Article 7 TEU as a last resort, but this would require a super-majority. The Commission should investigate the changes to the electoral system and judiciary with an eye to using Article 7 if Hungary refuses to reverse any abuses. While the EU and the Commission's power might be limited (and we need to bear this in mind when Hungary claims it has changed its judicial rules in line with EU requirements), we should demand that all Member States live up to minimum democratic standards if they want to stay in the EU.
Today the European Parliament will be debating the Hungarian situation.
Ireland's Euro-diplomacy (and Debate)
Last night's Tonight with Vincent Browne debated the Irish government's (and Taoiseach Enda Kenny's) ability to negotiate in the EU. Key to this was an exchange in the Dáil where Michael Martin (the Leader of the Opposition) questioned Kenny's approach at the December summit for not meeting with David Cameron. Kenny replied that he'd been at the EPP pre-summit meeting in Marseilles, and he'd spoken to him by phone.
It was a very strange point to make - that Kenny was incompetent at negotiations because he didn't meet with Cameron, when it's Cameron who's opted out of the EPP (which controls the Council, Commission and is the largest party in the European Parliament), and that Cameron's own skill in negotiations has been seriously questioned since the December veto. The implication seems to be that a clever Irish premier would have been able to steer the British PM right and keep him in negotiations (though if having the pro-EU Lib Dems and a Deputy with plenty of personal European connections couldn't keep Cameron in negotiations, it's hard to see how Kenny could have).
Much more serious is the sense that the Irish government has no European vision or policy because it's absorbed in questions over the EU/IMF/ECB deal. There has been some debate in the media over Ireland's European direction (including the suggestion that Ireland should consider focusing less on aligning itself with a Britain that's flaky on European issues), but politicians haven't been able (or willing) to take up the debate on what kind of Eurozone/EU they want. This really goes for the opposition as well as the government, because the opposition has been focusing on criticising the government for this lack, while not coming up with much itself.
It's a serious defect in our politics that we've not been willing to have a robust debate on the kind of EU and Euro that we want. Do we want Eurobonds and a transfer union? Would we be willing to be major contributors to other Member States under those same conditions in any future crisis 30 years down the road? If we argue for investment-tempered austerity, we should ask ourselves the question: would we be willing to loan billions to, say, Slovakia, in order to invest in its infrastructure to revive its economy and reduce its deficit? Under what conditions, and with what common political institutions?
Without politicians (and enough citizens) taking up this debate, we'll probably find ourselves voting in a referendum a few months from now on the new fiscal compact, rushing ourselves through a low-quality debate and being asked to decide on a fundamental question of Ireland's European direction...
It was a very strange point to make - that Kenny was incompetent at negotiations because he didn't meet with Cameron, when it's Cameron who's opted out of the EPP (which controls the Council, Commission and is the largest party in the European Parliament), and that Cameron's own skill in negotiations has been seriously questioned since the December veto. The implication seems to be that a clever Irish premier would have been able to steer the British PM right and keep him in negotiations (though if having the pro-EU Lib Dems and a Deputy with plenty of personal European connections couldn't keep Cameron in negotiations, it's hard to see how Kenny could have).
Much more serious is the sense that the Irish government has no European vision or policy because it's absorbed in questions over the EU/IMF/ECB deal. There has been some debate in the media over Ireland's European direction (including the suggestion that Ireland should consider focusing less on aligning itself with a Britain that's flaky on European issues), but politicians haven't been able (or willing) to take up the debate on what kind of Eurozone/EU they want. This really goes for the opposition as well as the government, because the opposition has been focusing on criticising the government for this lack, while not coming up with much itself.
It's a serious defect in our politics that we've not been willing to have a robust debate on the kind of EU and Euro that we want. Do we want Eurobonds and a transfer union? Would we be willing to be major contributors to other Member States under those same conditions in any future crisis 30 years down the road? If we argue for investment-tempered austerity, we should ask ourselves the question: would we be willing to loan billions to, say, Slovakia, in order to invest in its infrastructure to revive its economy and reduce its deficit? Under what conditions, and with what common political institutions?
Without politicians (and enough citizens) taking up this debate, we'll probably find ourselves voting in a referendum a few months from now on the new fiscal compact, rushing ourselves through a low-quality debate and being asked to decide on a fundamental question of Ireland's European direction...
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