Being European, or becoming European?

European identity is a complex one with many debates surrounding it (European nationalisms and identities is a particular interest of Josef's over at the Citizen-Europe blog), and identity, politics and culture fascinate me in how they interact at times. Still, on the question of European identity, I can only give a personal response.

So am I European, becoming European or is there any "European" for me to be anyway?

"European" to me is a lot of things. First, there's the mix of values that always gets mentioned when European identity is brought up; which is shown in a certain balance between individualism and the community and the welfare state. It's also a shared cultural and historical legacy that has shaped the continent and its nations, though sometimes in different ways.

Mostly, for me, being - or becoming - European is aspirational. When I think of Europe, I think of its diversity and its languages and its traditions, and I want to travel, explore and experience all of the little differences, while I still feel at home. To me it's not rootless cosmopolitanism, but a deep appreciation for many roots and a desire to feel a part of the different places and people that I meet.

Being European seems to be a process; of traveling, learning, meeting and experiencing, in places that feel to be familiar, but with added flavour. It's not something that I can really claim to be very good at - I have no natural gift at languages, though I try in my own way to learn more and practice (see my on-again-off-again German blog), and in many ways I'm very rooted locally: with my friends and family, and with my degree (and presumably career) path anchoring me home. I'm also a creature of habit. Though some factors mean that I cannot move as freely as some, I have met several people who I have found inspirational in their attitude.

For me, the European Ideal is in discovering and enjoying all that Europe has to offer. I doubt that many people could ever really "be" European - at least in the fullest sense of what I have in my head - but I think that the process of becoming is perhaps the major part of the thing itself. It's certainly one of the most enjoyable parts.

So am I European? Can you ever really say for yourself? Blogging has made me feel more European, and more connected, and has moved me to become a part of things like Th!nk2. If nothing else, I certainly want to be European - I've seen it, and I want to be part of it.

Do you think that a European identity could ever be inspirational (or aspirational)?

Happy Europe Day 2009!

A happy Europe Day to everyone who likes celebrating Europe (and to those who just like celebrating)!

The EU is hosting its open day for each of the institutions in Brussels to mark the day.

Interestingly, PES is the only European party to mention Europe Day at all on its website; they will be using it as an opportunity to campaign for the elections. The other European parties don't mention Europe Day at all (well, the EPP does, but only to point out the Brussels open day).

The Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) last considered the value of Europe Day in 2006.

Will anyone be doing anything for Europe Day this year?

Thoughts on Unionist Identity

Deviating from strictly European topics, this will be a post with a few musings on Unionist identity based on a few things I have read, since Josef has asked me to after my last blog on Northern Ireland.

Given that I still have a lot of reading and work to do on the subject (1880-1925), and the fact that it doesn't really fit on to my course (it was sort of tacked on: we haven't done much on identity or on politics in Ireland pre-1920s) this is very much a work in progress, and if you see were I've gone horribly wrong, don't be afraid to say.

Unionism has changed as a political force and an identity over time:

- 19th Century unionism: the Union was the best way to improve Ireland. The focus was mainly on the material and cultural benefits rather than on a separate identity, though there was an emerging "Ulster" or a Protestant identity, it wasn't as developed as it is today.
- 20th Century: as unionism developed its identity and thought, its argument changed to that of bad London government was preferable to good Dublin government. If government was to be determined by sentiment, then the growing unionist identity wanted to be governed from London.

Unionism was a status quo political position, so before 1885 there was no separate unionist political force at Westminster. However, a number of changes before 1885 created political pressure for unionism to be represented more separately, just as nationalism was in the Irish Parliamentary Party. Disestablishment of the Church of Ireland (1869), the National League, Land League, Ballot Act 1872 (weakened landlords' influence over their tenants' votes). Though it should be noted that economics could play a bigger part than Protestant identity at the time - an agricultural depression led to many Protestants in what is now NI joining the Land League, despite it being seen as a nationalist movement, and despite a campaign of counter-demonstrations by the Orange Order starting in November 1880 (unrest only ended by the Land Act 1880).

A unionist group developed in Westminster when the Irish Tories felt that the Conservative leadership was sacrificing its interests for in its dealings with the Liberals over the Redistribution Bill (which could weaken the Irish Tory and Liberal Unionist position in Ireland through franchise reform and electoral boundary revision). An alliance with local Liberal Unionists, though weak at first, strengthened its position. (Parnell's IPP had grown to the extent it was wiping out the Liberal party in Ireland).

This would be an electoral division between unionism and the rest of the UK, which one strand of unionism wanted to reverse under direct rule (and was unsuccessful).

Though the Home Rule Crises of 1886 and 1893 lead to the formation of several unionist groups, these generally didn't last long or have a big enough following to be rivals to the Orange Order or the Irish Unionist Alliance (unionists in Parliament). Though the Orange Order was far from having universal Protestant membership, it did shape a unionist identity - with Orange songs, festivals, etc. and a story of the Glorious Revolution where Ulster was a launching pad for taking back the rest of Ireland.

Unionist identity was divided, mainly between a landed (more southern) class, who favoured Anglicization yet also had an Irish-British identity (like a Scottish-British identity), and a more Ulster-based identity, which existed in the lower classes in Ulster. The Irish Tory/landed tradition had financial and political resources were allied with the numerically stronger Ulster-based group for much of the period 1880-1910, though there was a tension between the 2 identities.

It's hard to track unionist identity's development, as it mainly reacted to nationalism and worked within the political environment it found itself in (Conservative alliance, pro-Imperialist popular sentiment). Unionism's commitment to the Empire during the first 2 H.R. Crises may not have been the same as the Conservatives. 3 main unionist views of the Empire:

- Ireland's position must be maintained - at the moment it's part of a governing race, and shouldn't be reduced to colonials.
- The Empire provides the best (non-parochial) expression of Irish patriotism.
- The Empire is better than Home Rule, but Independence would be better than home rule also: based on the feeling that a British-backed Parnellite government would leave the minority with less chance to defend its interest than they would have under independence.

[I don't have much more time, so I'll just give a vague overview:]

- Mass democratisation (extension of the franchise) lead to a higher degree of politicisation of the lower classes (and increased the importance of the geographical spread/concentration of each identity, as electoral success depended increasingly on them).
- Removal of the Lord's veto in 1909 made Home Rule more likely, and increased the need for mass mobilisation. The political momentum behind nationalism at this stage and the playing of the Ulster card, led to the assertion of the Ulster unionist identity over the more pan-Ireland unionist identity - and support for partition.
- Partition and the border increased the separation both politically and identity-wise.
- The self-determination question and the concentration of unionists in the north-east meant that the Ulster-based identity laid claim to self-determination, arguing that there is no reason why the island should be a single political unit.


It's not a great post - didn't have much time to write it - and you'll [Josef] probably be more interested in more modern unionist identity (isn't UK nationalism a hard enough topic?). It's a very large and complex topic, so I clearly haven't done it justice, but hopefully that helped.

(The main book I've used is Alvin Jackson's The Ulster Party, but I'd also recommend the writings of Paul Bew and Patrick Buckland).

Hearts and Minds and Europe

There was a Euro-centred edition of Hearts and Minds on BBC 1 on Thursday (if you're in the UK you can watch it on BBC iPlayer while it's still up). Hearts and Minds is a political programme for BBC NI, and they will be interviewing the candidates for the European elections here over the next few weeks. It's on in NI at 11:45 pm on Thursdays, but you can watch it on iPlayer later (you can catch it in the Republic if you've got a good enough signal).

There were no Euro-candidates on this week; instead there was a panel of political commentators discussing the European elections in Northern Ireland. (See my general overview here). Again, the elections are not going to be very European, with the DUP turning the campaign into a "stop Sinn Féin topping the poll!" crusade (not that it matters where you come in the poll, as long as you get enough votes for a seat) and hoping to unseat their former party member and current MEP Jim Allister. Sinn Féin, on the other hand aims to up its vote (probably at the expense of the pro-Europe and PES-aligned SDLP).

And interesting detail that I missed in my last post was the question of intra-unionist transfers. I had focused on how the UUP's stance on Europe and alliance with the Tories could affect the number of transfers there may be between them and the nationalist SDLP. But the Jim Allister factor could again upset calculations here since he could attract transfers from the DUP which would have gone to the UUP's Jim Nicolson. Could the SDLP candidate slip in if the unionist vote is split? Could the race for 3rd place be more exciting than I'd previously thought?

Then there was a segment on the elections in Dublin, which is loosing a seat this election (going from four to three, as Ireland's share of seats drops from 13 to 12). Since Sinn Féin's Mary Lou McDonald just got came in 4th last time, she has to fight particularly hard to keep her seat, hoping that the government's unpopularity and the successful No campaign in the last referendum will be a boost to her. (McDonald ran in Dublin for a Dáil [national parliament] seat in the last general election but lost). De Rossa, the current Labour MEP for Dublin is set to win another term, and said that he's not hearing anyone on the doorsteps saying that the No last year was the right choice. Whether or not it actually came up that much seeing that the economy is the big issue is another story.

Particularly interesting was the final section, where Robert Ramsay - a former civil servant who knew Faulkner (last PM of NI before direct rule was imposed) and several other leading unionists - was calling for unionists to redefine themselves as a minority within Europe. At least, it's particularly interesting for me, since I have to do a presentation on Unionist identity and the legitimacy of NI (1880-1925) on Wednesday. He basically called on unionists to define themselves as an ethnic minority based on an Ulster-Scots heritage, pointing out that mainland Britain doesn't associate NI with itself in its national mental map, and that unionists will have to ensure their status, identity and interests can be defended in Europe in a way that is acceptable internationally in the 21st century. Redefined ethnically, because unionists are perceived in religious terms or other terms that wouldn't be widely acceptable or as defensible in today's world as a legitimate group identity.

He also said that British reluctance to embrace unionists and the Republic's open arms may mean that unionists will have to accept a position as a minority in Ireland in the future, so they should strengthen their position by joining a family of European minorities. (Although the Republic doesn't really want NI until it can afford it, the rhetoric of nationalism and unity may lead to reunification anyway if the majority of NI give their consent - perhaps much like the EU's rhetoric on enlargement?). Ramsay said that the Republic had seen reforms that would make it more acceptable to unionists, though it's still a way away from being a "happy house" for unionists.

I doubt that this view will gain much ground within unionism any time soon, but Ramsay's ideas are remarkably in line with those of former Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald (Fine Gael), a Europhile who felt that Irish reunification would be a lot easier and acceptable for unionists within a European context - it may be impossible to accept the authority of Dublin, but to accept the authority of both Dublin and Brussels, in a community of nations that includes Britain may be possible. So it's fascinating to see largely similar ideas being articulated by someone from a more unionist sympathetic point of view. He's published a book on the subject, "Ringside Seats", which could be interesting, if you like the subject of complex identities.


[As a side note, the next few weeks will be busy for me, so my stalled series on Sovereignty, Democracy and Legitimacy isn't likely to have much added to it anytime soon. But I am still thinking about it, and hope that I get back to it eventually.]

Nations, States and Sovereignty

[This is part 2 in a series about sovereignty, legitimacy and democracy in the EU (You know, just light reading). The contents page is here.]

When we think of states, we mainly think of nation states, and the question is: how far does identity have to be connected to the exercise of sovereignty (and vice versa), and how does the answer to this potentially impact on the idea of the freedom, or even the sovereignty, of the individual?

Nations and states:

Nationality is a shared identity between a usually large group of people. It is a modern, politically constructed identity; though this is not to take away from its value, as all identities are constructed in one way or another. But how far should the ideas of nationhood and statehood be combined?

Nation:

There is a bit of the chicken and the egg about nations and states: which comes first? The first nations arose as identities in pre-existing states and helped bind the population to it though a shared identity. Identities already existed at a local level - to local leaders or a sense of shared community - and in all of today's modern nations there would have been (and still are) many smaller local identities of varying strengths. There is a level of natural/popular selection and elite selection in what identities and political preferences when it comes to what identity becomes the "national" one: what is popular transmits well, but the elite sanction and promote an identity or aspects of several identities. So if we say that nations should ideally be sovereign, then which identities are deserving of the status of nation - and sovereignty? How should they be judged?

Do nations develop and then claim statehood - as we seem to see in our modern world? Or do pre-existing forms of state or semi-state pre-date national identities? Different legal/economic/etc treatment of groups of people based on local identity(ies) can raise some identities to the level of nationhood and lead them to stake a claim on statehood - so it can be argued that the exercise of power on a group of people due to the identity (or perceived identity) they have can provoke a political response where the identity takes on a more political tone in the popular imagination and demands a level of sovereignty. (E.g. in Ireland, even during 1801-1922, there was a separate administrative branch than in the rest of the UK - and despite a common parliament, Ireland was legislated for differently to the other parts of the UK - indeed, reforming acts in England and Wales were usually only introduced into Ireland after a time delay, and sometimes only after political pressure from Irish political parties).

National identities are political identities, but the state itself has important consequences for identity - which can sometimes be at odds with the idea of the nation.

Nationalism sees sovereignty as the ultimate goal for the expression of itself as an identity. In nationalism, the nation - as an abstract, politicised, notion of the people - is sovereign through the state, which should coincide with the boundaries of the nation. As a political identity, political ideas separate from most identities can be inserted into it, sometimes with the effect of a cultural deterrence of some political policies - e.g. socialism/welfarism is "anti-American". All identities by their nature exclude some ideas, and this goes for communal identities as well, but if we are to assign one the power that goes with sovereignty, then we should ask what that means for the individual. After all, nationalism implies that it's the group that matters, rather than the individual. It's one thing to say that there needs to be some form of shared identity to make shared decisions; it's another to say that all governing decisions should be made through the medium of one shared identity.

State:

The state imports, by its nature, ideas of individuality (the book, Democracy in Europe is very good on this). If the law applies to all equally, then at some level, everyone must be equal - this idea is expressed in terms of citizenship. Individuals have their own quality apart from their social status or function. Nationality can give a similar form of identity, but it is more geared towards communalism rather than individualism. The communalism and individualism of nationalism and the apparatus of the state can conflict, and is usually kept separate at some level - cultural norms don't have to be given the force of law, so that we can say that, for example, generally people of nation X have a ritual festival in May; but it doesn't have to follow that laws enforce participation in the ceremonies.

And Sovereignty?:

Well, going back to the idea of sovereignty, we need to ask whether we value a certain identity so much that it should be naturally vested with (or be the source of) sovereignty and that our governing decisions should (only) take place though that medium, or if we take the model that individuals are the source of sovereignty, and that power is delegated up only as far as is required to ensure effective decision-making, seeing identity as one factor among many, as important as it is.

Clearly I've a very liberal view on these matters - that the individual should form the basic building block of society and that the individual should be protected. There is a communalist approach, which I have no doubt neglected in explaining as fully (well, I'm writing blog posts, not essays, so a lot is left out), so you can follow that up if you wish. I just thought I should flag that up.

Hopefully next time I'll get around to more directly EU-related issues.