Blogging about Cancún

An agreement has just been reached in Cancún, which has produced another political agreement, but with no legally binding force over emissions. It's not an event I have been following closely over the last few days - I've been caught up in JHA and the excellent Bloggingportal.eu conferences/events - but I've noticed that one of my local MEP's Twitter account lit up.

Bairbre de Brún is a United Left MEP (Sinn Féin) who was part of the EP's delegation to COP 16, and was part of last year's delegation to COP 15 in Copenhagen. Normally Northern Ireland's MEPs' (and candidates') Twitter accounts are fairly inactive, only showing some life around election times, though I've seen some more activity from NI political figures recently. For the trip, de Brún also started to write a blog on the negotiations, talking about some of the issues and the negotiating styles at Cancún.

Environment is an area that is frequently mentioned as something that impacts at local, national, European and international levels, and it's a policy area particularly important in the EU - as Gawain Towler pointed out in the Bloggingportal conference yesterday, the EU affects the light bulbs you can buy, so it does effect people's lives. While lightbulbs might be too small an issue to hold much political or media attention, COP 16 is an example of important events were the EU's politics and position matters, and could be newsworthy. But then perhaps reporting on the negotiations of delegates and the differing positions of other countries and regions is too detailed to be newsworthy. Is blogging a better medium for covering these kinds of big negotiations?

COP15 Interview with Bairbre de Brún MEP

My lastest post on the Think About It platform is an email interview with MEP Bairbre de Brún on the role of the European Parliament in the climate change talks and on where the EU should go when it comes to climate change policy. You can read the post on the Th!nk2 platform here.

Bairbre de Brún is one of my constituency MEPs; she's a member of the party Sinn Féin in Ireland, and sits with the United Left group in the European Parliament. In the European Parliament she sits on the Environmental Committee (ENVI) and is part of the European Parliament's delegation to the Copenhagen conference. She agreed to an email interview with me; so a big thanks to her for taking the time out during such a busy period to answer my questions. Here's the interview:

 

1. The European Parliament's Environment Committee might not feature strongly in the public's imagination when it comes to the COP15 Conference, the main image of which consists of heads of state and government. What role had the Committee played in the run up to the Conference? Has it done enough?

I believe the Environment Committee, and before it, the Temporary Committee on Climate Change, has played an important role in the run up to Copenhagen.

Legally, of course, the governments and the Commission are kings but the European Parliament has succeeded in applying pressure for them to go further than they would have otherwise. The EP passed last month an ambitious albeit imperfect resolution which called for a legally binding deal at Copenhagen and action on emissions reductions and finance: the resolution stated ‘that recent scientific data indicates that an emission reduction of at least 40 % is required; calls for those reductions to be domestic;’  However, it stopped short of repeating recent calls for a long-term reduction target of 80-95% and instead ‘ recalls that a long-term reduction target should be set for the EU and the other developed countries of at least 80 % by 2050 compared to 1990 levels". It also stated that ‘the collective contribution of the EU towards developing countries' mitigation efforts and adaptation needs should not be less than €30 billion per year by 2020’.

This type of political pressure is important and it also gives citizens a yardstick by which they can measure the achievement of the summit. The EP can also help pave the way for an ambitious deal through its contacts and visits with legislative bodies in China and the US for example. This role goes back a long way and was important also in Poznan and Bali and before.

2. It looks like a binding deal at COP15 is impossible, or at least highly unlikely. If a binding deal can't be reached, should the EU commit to a 30% reduction in emissions in any case?

The EU should not use the excuses of others as an excuse not to forge ahead by itself if necessary. The European Parliament has recognised ‘ that recent scientific data indicates that an emission reduction of at least 40 % is required; calls for those reductions to be domestic’

The science is clear that we need to cut emissions now! A global deal is the preferable way for all to do so but in its absence blocs like the EU have a responsibility to continue on the road to where we know we need to go regardless of the reluctance of others.

Even from an economic point-of-view an EU which progresses towards the green economy of tomorrow will be in the medium- and long-term in an extremely advantageous situation compared to those who cling on to the old dirty economy of yesterday too long.

We must also continue to push for a legally binding deal in Copenhagen, one that is strong enough to tackle the challenge of climate change while being just and fair to developing countries.

 

3. The US Congress has proven to be very slow and conservative on reaching agreement on a climate change bill. As a member of the Environment Committee, do you sense that the Committee and Parliament as a whole are willing to take the necessary legislative action to live up to the EU's green rhetoric?

 

The US needs to be part of any global deal and having recently travelled there as part of an official European Parliament Environment Committee delegation I can say categorically that there has been a change in attitude since the Obama administration took over. However the complexities of the US lawmaking process mean that much may remain unclear about the exact figures the US will commit to for both emissions reductions and for financing at Copenhagen. The House of Representatives has passed climate legislation but the Senate now looks unlikely to do so before the end of the year.

To date my experience has been that the EP and the environment committee in particular has been the most progressive institution out of the three bodies (Council and Commission being the other two) when it comes to environmental legislation. Therefore I think it is necessary to ask the question of the governments: are they ready to back their rhetoric.

Having said that the European Parliament could also go further than it has in my view. 

4. There have been rumblings over a possible EU environmental tax policy (concerning VAT). What would be your position on changing the VAT rules to make VAT a "greener" tax?

 

Sinn Féin opposes EU control over taxation as the ability to set the rates of taxation is a core element of sovereignty. Therefore if any new proposal amounted to increased EU powers over taxation we would be opposed.

Notwithstanding the above, the party is supportive of the introduction of some form or forms of revenue neutral (ie intended to engineer changes in behaviour, and ensuring that the state does not become reliant on them as a source of public funds) environmental taxation so long as these have progressive features (ie do not have disproportionate impact on those least able to pay or least able to change their behaviour), together with other simultaneous or advance supports for behavioural change. 

5. Developing environmental industries and projects seems to require a lot of assistance or intervention from the state, and the Commission has promised to use the Social Fund to fight the recession in a “Green” way. Is the Commission doing enough? Should the Social Fund be increased or expanded to invest in Green projects? Should the European Investment Bank take up the task instead, or as well, if at all?

 

The EIB does have a role to play in providing credit to eco-innovation, and the environment is one of the EIB priorities.

The Commission has also taken some initiatives but the transition to a ‘green economy’ must be much more centre stage.  This will involve the Structural Funds but must also involve a green skills and green jobs strategy. Member States must also play their part.

R+D will be crucial in the time ahead.  There needs to be structured and co-ordinated review of how the ‘green economy’ will be integrated across the range of policy measures and instruments.

 

6. What are your ambitions for environmental legislation during this parliamentary term?

 

I would expect further legislation regarding climate change to deal with the post-Copenhagen situation and also to deal with adaptation within the EU.  It will also be important to see further measures on biodiversity and ecosystems. In the immediate term timely and proper implementation of existing legislation will be crucial.

I also expect further measures in terms of sustainable transport, although these may involve a number of European Parliament committees.

 

 

It's encouraging to hear such a strong call for binding targets, especially after the leaked Danish Text came to light. While I think the EU should forge ahead with tougher emissions cuts whatever the outcome at Copenhagen, I have spoken with people who believe in holding back on more extensive cuts for a better bargaining position (either for Copenhagen itself or, if a good deal isn't achieved, for the follow-up talks). I wonder what the opinion is out there on what the EU's strategy should be?

Meanwhile, in Brussels, Climate Change legislation rumbles on...

I return once again to the glamorous world of citizen-legislative-journalism with a new Think2 post on energy efficiency. You can read it on the Think2 platform here, where there's also lots of interesting coverage of the COP15 conference that's now taking place in Copenhagen.

The appearence of the Danish Text has caused outrage in Copenhagen, and rightly so (I can only hope that it's some sort of diplomatic tactic to concentrate minds and help spur on alliances in order to push a good deal through). Meanwhile, in that other famed *ahem* hotbed of politics, the Council of the European Union (also known as the Council of Ministers - think of it as the Senate of the EU system), the recasting of building regulations was up for consideration.

Does this matter? Behind every good summit stands an army of bureaucrats rolling their eyes at the paperwork: boring as it may be, these directives and regulations are the much desired practical follow-up and implementation of the lovely political rhetoric we get to hear on climate change.

The proposals themselves aren't overly ambitious, though their aims may sound ambitious: the aim is to recast regulations of the building sector on its energy performance (PDF) in such a way that combines several political objectives. The proposals should increase the energy performance of new buildings and renovated buildings, boost the building sector with some new work through these requirements, help reduce the energy costs of citizens, help to reduce carbon emissions and so help member states meet their international and European commitments on climate change. It would be great if it really had this effect, but though it aims to restrict state aid to building work that doesn't comply with the requirements under the directive (eventually), market forces are still the central element here: the regulation is trying to direct the market in such a way that it dovetails with climate change goals. However, even if the law encourages more building work and economic activity, I doubt that there will be a such a great level of economic activity in this area now (or member state intervention) that the differences made by this law would approach a considerable scale, but it's still a step in the right direction.

It's also important to have action in this area because:

"The buildings sector – i.e. residential and commercial buildings - is the largest user of energy and CO2 emitter in the EU and is responsible for about 40% of the EU's total final energy consumption and CO2 emissions. The sector has significant untapped potential for costeffective energy savings which, if realized, would mean that in 2020 the EU will consume 11% less final energy.

Since the law would be a directive, member states have can choose exactly how to transpose it into their national legal systems (directives require member states to pass national laws giving effect to them, rather than the EU just passing a law and it being law across the EU automatically [though it can do that as well]). This means that the process will be quite slow. The measure was proposed in January 2007 (which perhaps explains the greater faith in the market to some degree), and it still hasn't passed. When it does, member states will have until 31st December 2010 to transpose the law and until 31st January 2012 to fully implement it. Though it's better to get it done right than to have a sloppy law, it hardly gives the same impression of urgency as the rhetoric of the politicans. Considering that the Commission thinks that only 22 member states have implemented the original measure fully, it will probably be a lot longer than 2012 before the law is sorted out properly."

As residential buildings aren't covered by the Emissions Trading Scheme, it would fill a gap in the EU's climate change/emissions strategy.

Still, it reads better at the moment than the state of play at COP15...

The Polluter Pays - but only if they can easily afford it.

I've posted a new article on Th!nk About It on the polluter pays principle, asking how far can - and should - it apply to countries, both between the developed and developing world(s), and between the western and eastern EU member states. I've cross-posted the article below, but if you've any comments, please post them on the Th!nk2 website.

At the European Council Summit at the end of October (a gathering of the heads of state and government of the EU), EU leaders failed to agree on firm figures for the financial side of a climate change agreement - the best they could produce was a series of vague estimates.

One of the most interesting aspects of the agreement (or lack of agreement), was the concession to the eastern states that payments into any EU wealth transfer fund to the developing countries would be take the ability to pay into account, rather than having payments heavily weighted according to the level of a member state's carbon emissions (a topic that we briefly considered at the end of the latest Chasing Brussels podcast*). While the principle of "the polluter pays" has been a key concept in Green politics - and the underlining rationale justifying Green taxes - the principle applies less to countries. There are good reasons for this: developing countries have a right to develop, preferably in as Green a way as possible, but development inevitably lends to an increase in greenhouse emissions. But how far can this principle of social justice be stretched? The eastern EU member states may be poorer compared to the western ones, but they still belong to one of the most developed regions in the world - how poor is "poor enough" to escape the demands of paying for pollution?

The western EU member states chief concern about the concession (apart from having to pay more themselves, of course), was that making the ability to pay count heavily in contributing to the global climate change fund on an EU-scale would weaken the developed world's argument that developing countries should contribute to such a fund as well. Poland's PM, Donald Tusk, responded with a surprisingly federalist-sounding counter-argument:

 

"We're not interested in how various Chinese provinces or US states are going to achieve their climate goals," he told reporters after the summit. "It's the EU as a whole that is important and what we are doing is at the forefront of that fight. I don't see any conflict between the two positions."

 

I doubt that developing countries will be content to leave it as a purely internal EU affair if they can extract a diplomatic advantage from it (though with the failure of a legally binding agreement widely expected by officials themselves, perhaps it won't emerge too strongly as an issue in December).

Still, how far can we excuse developing countries of the obligation to pay for pollution?** Without penalties and duties arising from pollution, how motivated will the governments of developing countries be to develop as greenly as possible? Would the temptation be just to invest in green technology and development only to the extent that the rich North is willing to pay for it?

It's obviously a sensitive political issue, given the recognised right of developing countries to be given the space to develop without the more onerous constraints that the developed world should bear. There's also a question of how far enforcing global payments would take away from investing in (green) development at home. Perhaps a graded approach would be the best one - one that properly took into account the level of emissions, which took into account the level of wealth in the contributions, yet maintaining "the polluter pays" principle at the forefront of the fund?

Is there a workable, practical solution that maintains this principle, or is it a mistake thinking that it should be applied to countries?

 

 

*For a specialised podcast on EU climate politics and policy, check out the Th!nkCast by Waldo, Joe & I.

**Assuming that we get the developed world to pay properly for its own pollution, of course.