Bairbre de Brún is one of my constituency MEPs; she's a member of the party Sinn Féin in Ireland, and sits with the United Left group in the European Parliament. In the European Parliament she sits on the Environmental Committee (ENVI) and is part of the European Parliament's delegation to the Copenhagen conference. She agreed to an email interview with me; so a big thanks to her for taking the time out during such a busy period to answer my questions. Here's the interview:
1. The European Parliament's Environment Committee might not feature strongly in the public's imagination when it comes to the COP15 Conference, the main image of which consists of heads of state and government. What role had the Committee played in the run up to the Conference? Has it done enough?
I believe the Environment Committee, and before it, the Temporary Committee on Climate Change, has played an important role in the run up to Copenhagen.
Legally, of course, the governments and the Commission are kings but the European Parliament has succeeded in applying pressure for them to go further than they would have otherwise. The EP passed last month an ambitious albeit imperfect resolution which called for a legally binding deal at Copenhagen and action on emissions reductions and finance: the resolution stated ‘that recent scientific data indicates that an emission reduction of at least 40 % is required; calls for those reductions to be domestic;’ However, it stopped short of repeating recent calls for a long-term reduction target of 80-95% and instead ‘ recalls that a long-term reduction target should be set for the EU and the other developed countries of at least 80 % by 2050 compared to 1990 levels". It also stated that ‘the collective contribution of the EU towards developing countries' mitigation efforts and adaptation needs should not be less than €30 billion per year by 2020’.
This type of political pressure is important and it also gives citizens a yardstick by which they can measure the achievement of the summit. The EP can also help pave the way for an ambitious deal through its contacts and visits with legislative bodies in China and the US for example. This role goes back a long way and was important also in Poznan and Bali and before.
2. It looks like a binding deal at COP15 is impossible, or at least highly unlikely. If a binding deal can't be reached, should the EU commit to a 30% reduction in emissions in any case?
The EU should not use the excuses of others as an excuse not to forge ahead by itself if necessary. The European Parliament has recognised ‘ that recent scientific data indicates that an emission reduction of at least 40 % is required; calls for those reductions to be domestic’
The science is clear that we need to cut emissions now! A global deal is the preferable way for all to do so but in its absence blocs like the EU have a responsibility to continue on the road to where we know we need to go regardless of the reluctance of others.
Even from an economic point-of-view an EU which progresses towards the green economy of tomorrow will be in the medium- and long-term in an extremely advantageous situation compared to those who cling on to the old dirty economy of yesterday too long.
We must also continue to push for a legally binding deal in Copenhagen, one that is strong enough to tackle the challenge of climate change while being just and fair to developing countries.
3. The US Congress has proven to be very slow and conservative on reaching agreement on a climate change bill. As a member of the Environment Committee, do you sense that the Committee and Parliament as a whole are willing to take the necessary legislative action to live up to the EU's green rhetoric?
The US needs to be part of any global deal and having recently travelled there as part of an official European Parliament Environment Committee delegation I can say categorically that there has been a change in attitude since the Obama administration took over. However the complexities of the US lawmaking process mean that much may remain unclear about the exact figures the US will commit to for both emissions reductions and for financing at Copenhagen. The House of Representatives has passed climate legislation but the Senate now looks unlikely to do so before the end of the year.
To date my experience has been that the EP and the environment committee in particular has been the most progressive institution out of the three bodies (Council and Commission being the other two) when it comes to environmental legislation. Therefore I think it is necessary to ask the question of the governments: are they ready to back their rhetoric.
Having said that the European Parliament could also go further than it has in my view.
4. There have been rumblings over a possible EU environmental tax policy (concerning VAT). What would be your position on changing the VAT rules to make VAT a "greener" tax?
Sinn Féin opposes EU control over taxation as the ability to set the rates of taxation is a core element of sovereignty. Therefore if any new proposal amounted to increased EU powers over taxation we would be opposed.
Notwithstanding the above, the party is supportive of the introduction of some form or forms of revenue neutral (ie intended to engineer changes in behaviour, and ensuring that the state does not become reliant on them as a source of public funds) environmental taxation so long as these have progressive features (ie do not have disproportionate impact on those least able to pay or least able to change their behaviour), together with other simultaneous or advance supports for behavioural change.
5. Developing environmental industries and projects seems to require a lot of assistance or intervention from the state, and the Commission has promised to use the Social Fund to fight the recession in a “Green” way. Is the Commission doing enough? Should the Social Fund be increased or expanded to invest in Green projects? Should the European Investment Bank take up the task instead, or as well, if at all?
The EIB does have a role to play in providing credit to eco-innovation, and the environment is one of the EIB priorities.
The Commission has also taken some initiatives but the transition to a ‘green economy’ must be much more centre stage. This will involve the Structural Funds but must also involve a green skills and green jobs strategy. Member States must also play their part.
R+D will be crucial in the time ahead. There needs to be structured and co-ordinated review of how the ‘green economy’ will be integrated across the range of policy measures and instruments.
6. What are your ambitions for environmental legislation during this parliamentary term?
I would expect further legislation regarding climate change to deal with the post-Copenhagen situation and also to deal with adaptation within the EU. It will also be important to see further measures on biodiversity and ecosystems. In the immediate term timely and proper implementation of existing legislation will be crucial.
I also expect further measures in terms of sustainable transport, although these may involve a number of European Parliament committees.
It's encouraging to hear such a strong call for binding targets, especially after the leaked Danish Text came to light. While I think the EU should forge ahead with tougher emissions cuts whatever the outcome at Copenhagen, I have spoken with people who believe in holding back on more extensive cuts for a better bargaining position (either for Copenhagen itself or, if a good deal isn't achieved, for the follow-up talks). I wonder what the opinion is out there on what the EU's strategy should be?
Showing posts with label summits. Show all posts
Showing posts with label summits. Show all posts
Wednesday, 9 December 2009
COP15 Interview with Bairbre de Brún MEP
My lastest post on the Think About It platform is an email interview with MEP Bairbre de Brún on the role of the European Parliament in the climate change talks and on where the EU should go when it comes to climate change policy. You can read the post on the Th!nk2 platform here.
Tuesday, 24 November 2009
Van Rompuy, European Council President
A few days ago, Van Rompuy was a little known, everyday, average Belgian Prime Minister... but now he's the President of the European Council! Ok, so it's not all that dramatic, and thank god it isn't.
Despite my first impression, really, I can't complain too much with this appointment: though I'd have preferred Freiberga or Juncker, I have argued for a low-key Presidency, and that the Council itself is the legitimate electoral college for the choice (though of course that in itself wouldn't stop me from disagreeing with the choice). Van Rompuy has a good record as a consensus builder, and has proven able to hold the linguistically divided country together; surely good experience for the role of a chairman steering the Council agenda to some sort of workable conclusion. He's very unlikely to claim much of the media's attention, which is both good, in that it will defuse the chance of a conflict between the Council Presidency and the Commission Presidency (and probably even with that of the High Representative); but perhaps also bad in that the clear constitutional separation will mean that the media will have little inclination to highlight the different positions between the Council and Commission. Hopefully it will still lead to a bit more of a clearer representation of the differences between the Commission, Council and Parliament in the media, though I'm not sure I'd be willing to put money on it.
Still, the first few days have revealed a certain potential for controversy - particularly over Van Rompuy's opposition to Turkish EU-membership and his support for the idea of an EU tax. Controversies probably won't arise too often, since Van Rompuy is likely to stick to his brief and just represent the decisions reached by the Council publicly, though he could prove to be influential on issues such as Turkey (could France and Germany try to use his opposition as a front to deflect criticism for any anti-Turkish moves on their part?). In any case, Van Rompuy needs to be careful, since his statements will colour the impression of the EU both within and without: it is, at its heart, the most diplomatic post in the EU.
In any case, with the European Council Presidency in safe enough - and dull - hands, the High Representative, Baroness Ashton, will be even more interesting.
Despite my first impression, really, I can't complain too much with this appointment: though I'd have preferred Freiberga or Juncker, I have argued for a low-key Presidency, and that the Council itself is the legitimate electoral college for the choice (though of course that in itself wouldn't stop me from disagreeing with the choice). Van Rompuy has a good record as a consensus builder, and has proven able to hold the linguistically divided country together; surely good experience for the role of a chairman steering the Council agenda to some sort of workable conclusion. He's very unlikely to claim much of the media's attention, which is both good, in that it will defuse the chance of a conflict between the Council Presidency and the Commission Presidency (and probably even with that of the High Representative); but perhaps also bad in that the clear constitutional separation will mean that the media will have little inclination to highlight the different positions between the Council and Commission. Hopefully it will still lead to a bit more of a clearer representation of the differences between the Commission, Council and Parliament in the media, though I'm not sure I'd be willing to put money on it.
Still, the first few days have revealed a certain potential for controversy - particularly over Van Rompuy's opposition to Turkish EU-membership and his support for the idea of an EU tax. Controversies probably won't arise too often, since Van Rompuy is likely to stick to his brief and just represent the decisions reached by the Council publicly, though he could prove to be influential on issues such as Turkey (could France and Germany try to use his opposition as a front to deflect criticism for any anti-Turkish moves on their part?). In any case, Van Rompuy needs to be careful, since his statements will colour the impression of the EU both within and without: it is, at its heart, the most diplomatic post in the EU.
In any case, with the European Council Presidency in safe enough - and dull - hands, the High Representative, Baroness Ashton, will be even more interesting.
Saturday, 14 November 2009
You shouldn't get to vote for the President of the European Council
The Foundation Robert Schuman is running an online poll on the 5 candidates for the post of President of the European Council (via Grahnlaw and Joe). It's important that there's a debate over the candidates - whoever's elected to the office will represent the institution of the European Council in the EU (like the EP President represents the European Parliament), and on the global scale the President will represent the EU (though probably in a largely ceremonial fashion, since the High Representative will have the most influence over foreign policy - in fact, the E.C. President's claim to represent the EU as a whole will largely rest on being able to speak for the consensus between the states).
But we need to distinguish the right to transparency from the right to vote.
There have been calls for the post to be directly elected - some Eurosceptic condemnation of the Lisbon Treaty was based on the fear that it created an unelected executive President of the EU, rather than the occasional chairman/woman role that it will actually be. If the office had really been an executive post, then the outrage at the lack of direct elections would have been understandable - after all, the electoral college that elects the President is made up of the governments of the member states, and though they have legitimacy as directly or indirectly elected bodies themselves, having an executive post elected by a twice-removed indirect method would have been too much. But then that's the point - it's not an executive President.
So, no, you shouldn't have a vote on who gets the job. Just as the President of the European Parliament shouldn't be directly elected (MEPs elect the post), so it is justified that the European Council elects its chairman. Direct elections for such an office would be pointless - why focus on making what is essentially the "Speaker of the Upper House", who doesn't even have a vote, directly electable, when increasing the accountability of the Commission and participation through the European Parliament are the real, substantive challenges?
That's not to say there are problems with the selection process; ideally the candidates would apply for the post, and be subject to an open and transparent debate in the European Council and/or an open interview before the European Council. Though there may be some diplomatic hang-ups about this level of openness in what is an intergovernmental institution (note that this means you can't always apply the same rationales to it as you can to the supranational institutions!), I don't think the argument that the selection process should be secretive and elitist can be justified:
This assumes that former and current government leaders form the only qualified group that you can draw on to fill the post, so you mustn't scare them off by opening the process so much that candidates risk losing face by not getting picked. While it's true that openness and transparency isn't likely to excite Europeans into caring about European politics (I don't see the performance of Barroso during Commission President's Question Hour being poured over each month on the news, do you?), and direct elections aren't likely to do better (after the novelty value wears off, and people realise that the post isn't executive, do you think that its election will even manage the turnout of the EP elections?), arguing that opagueness is "good" is just ridiculous. There may not be a cause to directly elect the President, but open discussion and debate of the roles and politics of the candidates and the institution itself has its own value.
We should be concerned about holding the European Council to the principle of transparency, not arguing for the vote when there's no firm ground for doing so.
But we need to distinguish the right to transparency from the right to vote.
There have been calls for the post to be directly elected - some Eurosceptic condemnation of the Lisbon Treaty was based on the fear that it created an unelected executive President of the EU, rather than the occasional chairman/woman role that it will actually be. If the office had really been an executive post, then the outrage at the lack of direct elections would have been understandable - after all, the electoral college that elects the President is made up of the governments of the member states, and though they have legitimacy as directly or indirectly elected bodies themselves, having an executive post elected by a twice-removed indirect method would have been too much. But then that's the point - it's not an executive President.
So, no, you shouldn't have a vote on who gets the job. Just as the President of the European Parliament shouldn't be directly elected (MEPs elect the post), so it is justified that the European Council elects its chairman. Direct elections for such an office would be pointless - why focus on making what is essentially the "Speaker of the Upper House", who doesn't even have a vote, directly electable, when increasing the accountability of the Commission and participation through the European Parliament are the real, substantive challenges?
That's not to say there are problems with the selection process; ideally the candidates would apply for the post, and be subject to an open and transparent debate in the European Council and/or an open interview before the European Council. Though there may be some diplomatic hang-ups about this level of openness in what is an intergovernmental institution (note that this means you can't always apply the same rationales to it as you can to the supranational institutions!), I don't think the argument that the selection process should be secretive and elitist can be justified:
"The bottom line is surely this: if the EU sees any merit in having big, serving figures given these big new jobs, then opacity is the price to pay."
This assumes that former and current government leaders form the only qualified group that you can draw on to fill the post, so you mustn't scare them off by opening the process so much that candidates risk losing face by not getting picked. While it's true that openness and transparency isn't likely to excite Europeans into caring about European politics (I don't see the performance of Barroso during Commission President's Question Hour being poured over each month on the news, do you?), and direct elections aren't likely to do better (after the novelty value wears off, and people realise that the post isn't executive, do you think that its election will even manage the turnout of the EP elections?), arguing that opagueness is "good" is just ridiculous. There may not be a cause to directly elect the President, but open discussion and debate of the roles and politics of the candidates and the institution itself has its own value.
We should be concerned about holding the European Council to the principle of transparency, not arguing for the vote when there's no firm ground for doing so.
Thursday, 24 September 2009
Copenhagen and my first Think2 Post
I've just taken part in the Th!nk2 launch event in Copenhagen, which was brilliant - talks, travel, discussing climate change, meeting fellow bloggers, and whiskey, all compressed into 2 and 1/2 days. The first day took place mainly in the Bella Centre, where the COP15 conference will take place in December, and the second took place in Dyssekilde, where there's an "eco-settlement", which has been gradually built up over 20 years to be as sustainable and as environmentally friendly as possible - though they still have to pay tax, as some were disappointed to discover.
We also recorded the first official Th!nkCast, which I took part in, though it still has to go through the editing process.
So the new Th!nk blog is up, suitabily redesigned for the climate change theme, and I've entered my first post on the Emissions Trading Scheme and yesterday's court judgment. Link.
We also recorded the first official Th!nkCast, which I took part in, though it still has to go through the editing process.
So the new Th!nk blog is up, suitabily redesigned for the climate change theme, and I've entered my first post on the Emissions Trading Scheme and yesterday's court judgment. Link.
Tuesday, 14 July 2009
The G8... and other minor issues
This may be the first blog post I've written about a G8 meeting (and a late one at that), but it is probably a waste of time, judging from the media coverage of the summit and the well-deserved cynicism that summitry in general tends to meet with these days. One of the few blog posts I've read on the G8 L'Aquila summit had the blunt title "G8 - Waste of Space?". The G8 focused on 3 main areas last week; the financial crisis, climate change and food and aid for the developing countries, though they also discussed issues like the Iranian elections, intellectual property, etc. You can find the summit documents here.
Overall it was quite underwhelming: the major achievement as far as climate change goes was getting an agreement to reduce emissions by 80% by 2050 and so prevent the rise in temperatures beyond 2 degrees Celsius. Before the summit, this had been Barroso's stated aim, but, though achieved, a political and non-binding agreement with no detail to have something done in 41 years time is hardly an impressive or ground-breaking achievement. The talks will have been useful in preparing the ground for Copenhagen in December; it's a weak diplomatic weapon, but the agreement could be used to urge greater action this winter. There will also be an institute to look at carbon capture: the "Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute", which will be based in Australia. I don't know any of the details behind it: budget, remit, etc. and it's likely that all of that is still to be finalised; still, it doesn't take too much imagination what sort of stuff it will be doing.
The lack of action an real targets has led to a rubbishing of the G8's conclusions - even Ban Ki-Moon, the low-key Secretary-General of the UN had some strong words:
When it comes to the financial crisis, it doesn't look as if there's much new here: just a commitment to getting credit flowing again and to try to make the Doha round of trade talks a success - since I haven't heard of any country taking the opposite line, this doesn't especially strike me as an impressive diplomatic victory. The G8 also considered the issue of food security and aid, and Obama has spoken about Africa being self-sufficient. This has resulted in a promise for $20 billion (around €10 billion) to be invested in rural aid over the next 3 years in developing countries, though, again, there will be the small matter of following up on the promise now that the leaders have left L'Aquila.
As for the significance of the G8, I'm torn. On on hand, it has become obvious that power in the world has shifted so that the G8 can no longer be expected to come up with the solutions to the problems of the day anymore. This can be seen from the simple fact that the G5 were invited along to attend. On the other hand, there is a value in a group of (mostly) like-minded countries coming together to discuss various issues at the highest level. It helps grease the wheels of diplomacy (though I suppose, depending on the leader, the foreign affairs officials may see that differently), and could help co-ordination and lead to better achievements at more specific summits. It may be the end of the G8's significance, but that doesn't mean that it's the end of the G8's usefulness.
Overall it was quite underwhelming: the major achievement as far as climate change goes was getting an agreement to reduce emissions by 80% by 2050 and so prevent the rise in temperatures beyond 2 degrees Celsius. Before the summit, this had been Barroso's stated aim, but, though achieved, a political and non-binding agreement with no detail to have something done in 41 years time is hardly an impressive or ground-breaking achievement. The talks will have been useful in preparing the ground for Copenhagen in December; it's a weak diplomatic weapon, but the agreement could be used to urge greater action this winter. There will also be an institute to look at carbon capture: the "Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute", which will be based in Australia. I don't know any of the details behind it: budget, remit, etc. and it's likely that all of that is still to be finalised; still, it doesn't take too much imagination what sort of stuff it will be doing.
The lack of action an real targets has led to a rubbishing of the G8's conclusions - even Ban Ki-Moon, the low-key Secretary-General of the UN had some strong words:
"“The policies that they have stated so far are not enough, not sufficient enough,” Mr Ban told reporters. Referring to the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), he said: “This is the science. We must work according to the science. This is politically and morally imperative . . . for the future of humanity.”"
When it comes to the financial crisis, it doesn't look as if there's much new here: just a commitment to getting credit flowing again and to try to make the Doha round of trade talks a success - since I haven't heard of any country taking the opposite line, this doesn't especially strike me as an impressive diplomatic victory. The G8 also considered the issue of food security and aid, and Obama has spoken about Africa being self-sufficient. This has resulted in a promise for $20 billion (around €10 billion) to be invested in rural aid over the next 3 years in developing countries, though, again, there will be the small matter of following up on the promise now that the leaders have left L'Aquila.
As for the significance of the G8, I'm torn. On on hand, it has become obvious that power in the world has shifted so that the G8 can no longer be expected to come up with the solutions to the problems of the day anymore. This can be seen from the simple fact that the G5 were invited along to attend. On the other hand, there is a value in a group of (mostly) like-minded countries coming together to discuss various issues at the highest level. It helps grease the wheels of diplomacy (though I suppose, depending on the leader, the foreign affairs officials may see that differently), and could help co-ordination and lead to better achievements at more specific summits. It may be the end of the G8's significance, but that doesn't mean that it's the end of the G8's usefulness.
Monday, 22 June 2009
On last week's EU Summit
I haven't exactly been quick to blog about this summit, mainly because I wasn't sure what to add to what I previously wrote about the politics of Barroso's agenda and re-appointment. Julien Frisch has a good Barroso overview here, and Tony Barber has written about the possible effects of the Slovenia-Croatia border dispute, which is still trundling on.
EUX.TV has a good video overview of the state of play:
Again, Barroso's comments on excluding politics from the selection of the Commission is a blow to anyone who wants to see the EU to be made more democratic, the Commission more accountable, and for the EU as a whole to be more open to proper debate on the policy issues they so often tell us effect us in our everyday lives. This attitude alone, and the implications for the role of the European Parliament, is enough reason to oppose his re-appointment in my opinion.
There's been anger at the decision from the PES (as I think they're still called that for now) and the Greens - but the EP may face an uphill struggle in asserting itself, with no real alternative candidate and a fractured Parliament.
Sarkozy, meanwhile, will make a speech on EU reform on Monday (later today), and has called for a strong Commission President and for institutional balance. I doubt he envisages a relative reduction in Council power (as the Council's the most powerful EU institution), but it will be interesting to see how many people he can annoy at once. The Commission does need reform; I might post about that later.
You can read the European Council's conclusions here.
In other news, a Bill on Ireland's membership of the European Defense Agency is being formulated. It's likely that it will pass (and ensure Ireland's continued membership) - as far as I know, only Sinn Féin and the Greens are against membership, and Fianna Fáil (senior governing party) is for membership, as well as the main opposition party, Fine Gael.
EUX.TV has a good video overview of the state of play:
Again, Barroso's comments on excluding politics from the selection of the Commission is a blow to anyone who wants to see the EU to be made more democratic, the Commission more accountable, and for the EU as a whole to be more open to proper debate on the policy issues they so often tell us effect us in our everyday lives. This attitude alone, and the implications for the role of the European Parliament, is enough reason to oppose his re-appointment in my opinion.
There's been anger at the decision from the PES (as I think they're still called that for now) and the Greens - but the EP may face an uphill struggle in asserting itself, with no real alternative candidate and a fractured Parliament.
Sarkozy, meanwhile, will make a speech on EU reform on Monday (later today), and has called for a strong Commission President and for institutional balance. I doubt he envisages a relative reduction in Council power (as the Council's the most powerful EU institution), but it will be interesting to see how many people he can annoy at once. The Commission does need reform; I might post about that later.
You can read the European Council's conclusions here.
In other news, a Bill on Ireland's membership of the European Defense Agency is being formulated. It's likely that it will pass (and ensure Ireland's continued membership) - as far as I know, only Sinn Féin and the Greens are against membership, and Fianna Fáil (senior governing party) is for membership, as well as the main opposition party, Fine Gael.
Tuesday, 24 February 2009
King of the Summit
Summits are a vital part of the European system, a simple fact that underlines the powerlessness of the Commission and European Parliament in times of crisis (and since the EU is always in crisis...). However there is an art to summitry: the main goal is to agree on a direction and move everyone together along it towards a goal (which need not be clearly defined). A bit like the EU as a whole.
But to move everyone along, everyone needs to be a part of it - and feel like a part of it. After Sunday's mini-summit in Berlin, which is ahead of the EU summit on March 1st, several countries are reportedly irked that they weren't invited to the party to decide that something must be done. What exactly? Well, it was decided at Berlin that the global financial and economic system should be fixed.
I know, I'm disappointed too; when will Berlusconi reveal his Marxist plans?
So what was the summit about really? There were more than the EU G20 countries there, so it wasn't just to decide on a common position for the summit in London in April; could it also be aimed at deciding a common position at the EU summit in March? Perhaps to ensure that the "west" (though not all of it) have a common position as well as the "east" which will have a summit of its own?
And where does this leave the countries left over?
All this summitry is turning poisonous.
In other news, a group of experts will probably announce that there should be a new EU bank watchdog. Common sense, right? Especially after the revelations that banking business in the past has lead to the situation where an eastern European collapse could bring down a lot of the west's banking system with it - illustrating the enormous flows of money between member states. But... member states might not be able to agree on it? Maybe a summit is needed...
But to move everyone along, everyone needs to be a part of it - and feel like a part of it. After Sunday's mini-summit in Berlin, which is ahead of the EU summit on March 1st, several countries are reportedly irked that they weren't invited to the party to decide that something must be done. What exactly? Well, it was decided at Berlin that the global financial and economic system should be fixed.
I know, I'm disappointed too; when will Berlusconi reveal his Marxist plans?
So what was the summit about really? There were more than the EU G20 countries there, so it wasn't just to decide on a common position for the summit in London in April; could it also be aimed at deciding a common position at the EU summit in March? Perhaps to ensure that the "west" (though not all of it) have a common position as well as the "east" which will have a summit of its own?
And where does this leave the countries left over?
All this summitry is turning poisonous.
In other news, a group of experts will probably announce that there should be a new EU bank watchdog. Common sense, right? Especially after the revelations that banking business in the past has lead to the situation where an eastern European collapse could bring down a lot of the west's banking system with it - illustrating the enormous flows of money between member states. But... member states might not be able to agree on it? Maybe a summit is needed...
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