Of Red Cards, Democracy and Subsidiarity

When UK Foreign Minister William Hague made his Koenigswinter speech in Germany last week, his Red Card idea caught the media's attention. Currently if enough national parliaments get together, they can give a draft EU bill a "Yellow Card", which sends it back to the Commission to reconsider it on the grounds of subsidiarity (on whether or not the substance of the draft law is appropriate to be decided on the EU level or not). The Red Card idea is essentially an extention of this, with national parliaments being able to block draft legislation for proportionality and subsidiarity reasons.

So is it a good or bad idea? If it means each individual national parliament being able to block EU legislation, then obviously it's ridiculous. You cannot have national vetos for everything - the Single Market Act introduced qualified majority voting to make the project realistic in the first place. Indeed, the poor quality of the legislation from that period, with Member States adding on caveats, exceptions and exemptions to nearly everything means that it's practically much better that the EU operates in a more open and parliamentary manner than before.

Going back to national vetos will increase the emphasis on backroom deals and lead to poor legislation drafted more by diplomats than democrats. But I don't think that's what Hague was going for (after all, all his talk of furthering the single market would flounder in the face of 28 national vetos); it's more likely that he meant that it would take a number of national parliaments to block draft legislation. I both agree and disagree with Hague on the Red Card idea.

Here's a bit of what he said in his speech:

"The European Parliament plays an important role in holding European institutions to account. It can play a very positive role, as it has along with Commissioner Damanaki in the current reforms to the Common Fisheries Policy. But if the European Parliament were the answer to the question of democratic legitimacy we wouldn’t still be asking it

I think instead that the solution lies in promoting the role of national institutions in European decision-making – because ultimately it is national governments and national parliaments that are accountable to our electorates. They are the democratic levers voters know how to pull. I want to offer some thoughts on how we might do that in a moment

This idea of the right balance between national and European decision-making, and respect for the concepts of proportionality and subsidiarity, brings me to my third key challenge. How can we build a European Union that acknowledges and respects the diversity of its Member States? One that recognises that our national approaches to and ambitions for the European Union may sometimes differ?

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We should explore whether the yellow card provision could be strengthened or extended to give our parliaments the right to ask the Commission to start again where legislation is too intrusive, and fails the proportionality test. And we should think about going further still and consider a red card to give national parliaments the right to block legislation that need not be agreed at the European level."

First of all, I disagree with him that strengthening national parliaments is the only way that democratic legitimacy can be increased (bear with me, I will get to the "agree" point eventually). The Eurozone crisis is a key example of this, with political battles going on within national parliaments, but little pan-European structures in which to express these political differences, debate them, and come to a majority approach while honing the policy to take account of criticism, you end up with an incoherent approach.

For the Cypriot bail-out, it was a clash of national parliaments and national leaders. Much of the resentment can be found in the ad hoc nature of the bail-outs, and how the battles are fought along national battle-lines, with little opportunity to be heard on an equal stage, and with no equal and systemic policy that applies fairly to all. This feeling of political inequality, the lack of political leadership at a European level, and the inability to properly debate and influence the central policy is the fundamental basis of disillusionment with the EU (at least in the Eurozone).

You cannot fix the democratic issues with the EU by adding more institutional complexity and blocking mechanisms. To have political accountability, you need a political space that you can influence to create policy that is accountable to voters. The European Parliament and the Commission, if tied closely to the Parliament, would be the best place to start, because it would give a focal point for debating and making policy that can be influenced via direct elections (even with the Council and national parliaments having checks on them).

Because greater instituional complexity and more blocking mechanisms in the system really leads to greater inefficiency and an inability to reach decisions. If the EU cannot make decisions, then that would lead to even greater disillusionment. (And the next European elections can be a good starting point for debating and influencing the big issues with the EU today - see this article by Simon Hix and Christophe Crombez).


That said, increasing the power of the national parliaments can increase democratic legitimacy in the EU when it comes to "...build[ing] a European Union that acknowledges and respects the diversity of its Member States...". At the moment subsidiarity is hard to define - not the idea that power should be exercised as closely to people as possible, but the day-to-day practice of it. The Yellow Card system was a great idea, but it needs reform (a longer time period for national parliaments to object, and national parliaments need to organise greater communication between them to make better use of the procedure).

A "Red Card" system - with, say, a majority or qualified majority of national parliaments being able to block draft legislation - could be a good way of developing a culture of subsidiarity. When the Commission analyses draft laws for subsidiarity and proportionality, it considers the arguments, but there isn't a clear and objective answer to the question, and nor can subsidiarity be effectively defined in a day-to-day way by the courts. There needs to be a political culture of subsidiarity, based on an understanding between national parliaments (and citizens) and the Commission (and the rest of the Union legislature) about what should be done at the EU level and what should be done at a national or more local level. This can really only be done through political debate and contest, and a Red Card system could give national parliaments the tools to start marking that space.

Of course there will be clashes and debates between the EU institutions and the Member States/national parliaments over this - that's the point! But it's a more effective way of building an accepted idea of subsidiarity and decentralisation in the EU over time than relegating the question to impact assessments and wonkish policy documents.


(As a side-note, here's a graphic explaining how EU laws are made [via Kosmopolit]).

European Citizens' Initiative and Let Me Vote!

At the start of the month the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) turned one year old. The Commission has claimed it a success - Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič noted that:

"The Commission has received requests for the registration of 25 proposed citizens' initiatives, of which 16 initiatives were registered; two of these have since been withdrawn which means that we currently have 14 ongoing initiatives. The 8 initiatives that were refused did not meet the condition for registration in that they covered areas that fall outside the powers of the Commission. One request for registration is still under analysis.

Contrary to initial concerns, no – to speak with the language of the ECI Regulation – "abusive, frivolous or vexatious" ECIs have been submitted."

However the experiences of the Right2Water campaign may highlight the difficulties of running such campaigns under the "geographical balance" criteria and a variety of national rules on signature collection. As the Commissioner noted:

"So far, just one initiative, Right2Water, has managed to reach the goal of one million signatures – and well within a year, clear indication that it can be achieved with the right support and marketing. They are still collecting signatures, however, because they still need to meet the geographical balance required by the ECI regulation, and I wish them well with also reaching this target in due course."

Justin Stares has written over at Public Service Europe about the difficulties Right2Water faced:

"In Belgium, they have to give their date and place of birth plus their full address - meaning they have to write down their home country twice. If an individual fails to do so on the grounds that repetition must surely be redundant, there is a chance his or her signature will be invalidated. "If the authorities are very strict when checking our signatures then we can throw away half of them," says Sanchez. "If you write Stoke instead of Stoke-on-Trent they could say no, but there is pressure on the commission to be flexible." Requirements should be standardised across the EU, he says.

Country signature thresholds are based on a formula that produces sometimes bizarre if not outright ridiculous results: around 9,000 signatures are required in both Lithuania and Denmark, despite Denmark having a much larger population."

I'd recommend you read the full article.

The ECI legislation will be up for review in two years time. Despite the problems with the ECI, I hope people will keep campaigning and putting pressure on the Commission and European Parliament to consider their proposals. Without the pressure and voices of the campaigners, it may be difficult to push for reform of the problems with the system when the review is launched.


Stephen Spillane has highlighted on of the ECIs currently collecting signatures, Let Me Vote! This ECI is a campaign for EU citizens to be given the right to vote in the national elections of the Member State that they are resident in, giving them a voice in the policies of the country where they pay their taxes. Stephen will be looking at other ECIs over the next while too.

Economic Union and Cyprus

The crisis flared up in a shocking manner this week as Cyprus, long on the list of potential bail-out countries, found itself at the centre of the Eurocrisis after the controversial bail-out deal was rejected by the Cypriot parliament. The ECB has extended its emergency credit to the Central Bank of Cyprus until Monday, giving the country some more time to find a Plan B. Cyprus is increasingly looking to Russia for support (Russia has already loaned Cyprus some money), and there is a media battle over the rights and wrongs of the bail-out conditions. The decision to tax bank depositors as a one-off was always going to have a knock on confidence, and the confusion over who decided what is increasing with a PR war over the decision to extend the tax to depositors with accounts of under €100,000.




The head of the Euro Group, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, was in the European Parliament today to answer questions on the crisis, and European Council President Van Rompuy and Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič were grilled by the Parliament yesterday. The deposit tax was attacked from across the political spectrum:

"My question is: how come all of a sudden small savings and depositors are no longer protected? This is a dangerous precedent. It takes years to recover trust by depositors. Why hit the small savers? The crisis in Cyprus has sounded an alarm bell. We have to speed up the regulation of financial markets. Above all, we need a European solution to the Cyprus problem, not a Russian one." - Corien Wortmann-Kool, vice chairwoman of the centre-right European People's Party.



"The European law is very clear: all deposits below €100,000 must be guaranteed in case of bank failure. We urged the Cypriot government and the European authorities to come up with an alternative solution that protects the savings of ordinary citizens. The EU has made huge progress on strengthening the stability of the eurozone with the recent agreement to set up a single European supervisor to oversee the banks, and the new rules on capital requirements for banks (the so-called 'CRD IV' package). We need to do more by setting up a European resolution mechanism in case of bank failures." - Elisa Ferreira, S&D spokesperson for economic and monetary affairs.



"A banking union must protect the bank customers, especially the ordinary depositors rather than the bond holders and creditors. Nor does the decision do anything to break the link between banks and sovereigns. It is totally incomprehensible and undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the EU and its new financial structures to restore stability." – Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the Liberal ALDE group.



“While it is clear that a bailout is necessary to protect Cyprus from eventual bankruptcy, the tax on bank deposits will risk destabilising the complete structure of the Cypriot banking system, and is an aggressive gesture by the Eurogroup to the population of Cyprus.” - Monica Frassoni, European Green Party co-Chair.

The shambolic approach to bail-outs highlights again that the EU is operating in a piecemeal way to the crisis and has little coherence to its responses. The demand for a deposit tax doesn’t sit well with bank deposit guarantees, the aim of protecting depositors or breaking the link between sovereigns and the banking system as was agreed at the European Council summit in June.



Ironically yesterday the Commission unveiled further plans on economic and monetary union to increase co-ordination on important economic policies including the areas of “competitiveness, employment, market functioning, tax systems, financial stability and fiscal sustainability”, as well as further developing this contractual approach to financial assistance in the form of “Convergence and Competitiveness Instruments” (CCIs). These proposals aren’t yet legislative proposals, but they underline the technocratic approach:

“What would the ex-ante coordination process look like?

A Member State would provide information on a major economic reform plan in its National Reform Programme (on economic policies for the coming year) or at another time during the year. The Commission would assess the plan and deliver an opinion on it. The Commission's assessment would cover the extent to which the reform tackles the specific policy challenges and how it would improve competitiveness and adjustment capacity. The Commission's assessment would pay particular attention to the impact the reform would have on the functioning of the euro area and possible spillover effects on other Member States. These plans will then be discussed by the Council of Ministers and the Eurogroup. The Commission and the Council can suggest modifications to the national reform plan where they could be justified by the expected effects on other Member States and the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union.”

Without oversight and accountable political decision-making at the European level to decide on what kind of Eurozone we want in the first place, the coordination and the negotiation of the CCIs will be based on a technocratic vision of the Eurozone. If the CCIs are to form a pillar of Eurozone economic and social policy, shouldn’t there be a Eurozone framework drawn up by the European Parliament that identifies economic and social priorities regularly to guide this, rather than technocratic priorities being enshrined? Currently bail-out deals seem to be ad hoc and unprincipled, with disastrous results for policy making.

Return of the Currency Commissioner?

The Commission has just launched a blueprint for Economic and Monetary Union (PDF). I haven't had time to read it yet, but from the EUObserver article, it looks like the idea of a Currency Commissioner has returned:

"This time frame would also see "further budgetary coordination (including the possibility to require amendments to national budgets or to veto them)," says the paper.

[...]

Other steps to consider would be giving "clear competence for the EU level to harmonise national budgetary laws and to have recourse to the Court of Justice in case of non-compliance." Final steps to full economic and monetary union would only be taken in the "longer term" and would require "major treaty reform" suggests the paper.

This would likely include a possibly large central budget with stabilisers – meaning money would be transferred to member states in trouble.

“As a final destination it would involve a political union with a central budget as its own fiscal capacity and a means of imposing budgetary and economic decisions on its members.”"

Back in October Germany's Finance Minister, Schaeuble came up with the idea of a currency commissioner that would be able to veto national budgets. It was wrong then, and it's wrong now - federalism does not mean this sort of centralisation. As I wrote last month:

"You cannot "depoliticise" the fundamental matter of national budgets, because you cannot pretend that budgets and economic issues are simply matters of technical wizardry, with expert options being implemented for desired outcomes - desired outcomes are political matters, and deserve a meaningful airing in a publically accountable body: the national parliament. While there is an argument for certain budgetary contraints on Eurozone Member States to ensure the functioning of the common currency - in exchange for solidarity between Member States, it should be stressed - at the end of the day Member States should be able to set their own budgets.

Rather than trying to come up with tighter and more rigid and better enforced rules for the Eurozone, we should be working to divorce banks from the sovereigns to make banking a European matter within the Eurozone, and creating a system where Member States can go bankrupt, without endangering the system and with some support for recovery after bankruptcy. A flexible and politically accountable system would work much better than Schaeuble's approach - there needs to be political accountability for national budgets at the national level, and at the European level for those elements of European solidarity."

This idea should be killed off, and killed off quickly.

Blairite Europe

Yesterday former British PM Tony Blair made his big speech on Britain and the EU at the Business for New Europe event. You can read the speech in full here. So after writing at length about Labour and the EU on Monday, is there anything in the Blairite vision of the EU?


Eurocrisis

On the Eurocrisis, I partly agree with him.

"...the flagship policy of Europe is listing dangerously. As I have said before, to save it, I believe, requires a kind of ‘Grand Bargain’ approach rather than incremental steps, in which Germany agrees, effectively, to some form of mutualisation of debt; the debtor countries carry out profound structural reform; and the ECB stands fully behind the bargain. There are some signs this may happen. But even if it does, Europe will suffer for some time to come."

There have been calls for some form of debt mutualisation for a while now (and some Parliamentary amendments pushing for it), and it's hard to see how the current bailouts - which in Greece's case have led to the country's debt ballooning to 190% GDP rather than falling - actually help solve the fundamental problems of the Eurozone rather than  helping the balance sheets of creditors.


Narrative

Blair pushed for a change in the narrative away from peace towards power:

"...the truth is the rationale for Europe today is stronger not weaker than it was back 66 years ago when the project began. But it is different. Then the rationale was peace. Today it is power. Then it was about a continent ravaged by war in which Germany had been the aggressor and Britain the victor. Today it is about a world in which global geo-politics is undergoing its biggest change for centuries. Power is shifting West to East. China has emerged, with its economy opening up, one which will grow eventually to be the world’s largest. Its population is three times that of the whole of the EU. India has over a billion people. Brazil is two times the size of the largest European country, Indonesia three times and there are a host of countries including Russia, Turkey, Mexico, Vietnam, the Philippines and Egypt larger today than any single EU nation.

What is more, as technology and capital become globally mobile, in time there will be a re-alignment of GDP and population i.e. the larger your population, the bigger your economy. The USA remains extraordinarily strong, its military easily the largest and best equipped but the time when it has been the world’s only superpower, is passing."

The speech was clearly intended as an argument for Britain's membership of the EU, and as an attack on Euroscepticism in the UK, so the speech doesn't offer much in terms of the direction that Britain should go within the EU. He restated the case for membership based on economic advantage and global power. In a sense I agree - on Monday I was arguing that collective European decision-making should give the people and the Member States more opportunity to decide their economic and social future - but Blair's vision is almost completely dominated by the terms of international power relations.

It's a vision with some truth to it, but little appeal. Most Britons aren't as concerned with Britain's global position as Blair is - indeed, Blair's premiership isn't exactly an encouragement for British global involvement. The message, without much on sharing the economic and social power democratically among citizens, and the messenger, who comes across as being more concerned with the power of great office-holders than anything else, does not make a convincing narrative and is not really one that the left should or could adopt.


Euroscepticism

If it doesn't quite live up to being a bankable European narrative, it is good to have a public figure talk publicly about the advantages of EU membership, although many pro-Europeans on the left, myself included, will not enthusiastically welcome a Blairite vision of Europe. When it comes to the EU, there needs to be a place for political families of the right, left and centre. The pro-European voices from these families will inevitably conflict, but the Eurosceptic voices from the same families will have their own arguments and will need to be engaged with on their own terms. Yesterday Blair couched his argument in terms of the national interest, and the basic pro-European argument may need to be made there, but it's limited in providing a narrative that goes beyond the balance sheet approach.


Tony Blair for president?

There's been some speculation about whether Blair still wants to get a position in the EU, and he launched a Twitter account yesterday dedicated to his views and work on Europe. (There was also an unconnected website (mockingly) advocating him for the European Council presidency). I wasn't a fan of the idea the first time 'round...

Co-decision, European democracy and speed

European legislation is not famed for its speed. The EU's institutional triangle of the Commission, Member States in the Council, and the European Parliament means that agreement has to be made both within and between these institutions before draft laws can be passed (where the Parliament is a co-legislator with the Council).

In the "turf war" over the banking union, reported here by EUObserver, an EU diplomat said:

"The debate will be tense. It is not because Council defends its turf, but because MEPs take so long. We simply cannot lose another year."

The banking union will centre on two pieces of legislation: one empowering the ECB as a banking regulator, and the other redefining the role of the London-based European Banking Authority. While the European Parliament has a say over the EBA, the ECB legislation is dealt with by a unanimous Council vote with the Parliament only consulted.

I think the Parliament's right to treat the two drafts as part of the same package. The banking regulation recently put in place fell under areas where the Parliament had a right of co-decision, and the Parliament should get some say over how the new regime will operate before it gives its go ahead to the EBA being changed to fit in with the new rules. It's also about how democracy is valued within the EU system: the European Council gets to set the pace of political debate, and, as we've seen in the past year with the Fiscal Compact, it's not adverse to re-hashing existing law in new, extra-EU treaties for its own political ends. The banking and Eurozone legislation is complex and controversial; we've seen this with the debate over the Fiscal Compact (a treaty that got both the causes and solutions to the crisis wrong), and the place and power of the ECB is an important issue.

This deserves democratic debate and scrutiny. The idea of the Parliament simply being a roadblock to crisis management is just plain wrong. The Council does not have the monopoly over economic or institutional wisdom (let's face it, 3 years of European Council summitry have done little to solve our current predicament), and opening debate up from diplomatic discussions and deal-making enhances the quality of decision-making by opening up the problems and solutions to scrutiny. The idea that the European Council can deliver down commandments and expect to have the Parliament either follow them or be easily ignored is insulting. As we can see from the Council opportunistically changing the legal basis of the Schengen area to exclude the Parliament, the Council is often more about protecting itself and its own interests than about creating common solutions.

And if the ECB is to be both independent as a central bank and have the power of banking regulator, there should be some democratic control and scrutiny. The Parliament may not have a strict legal right to this piece of legislation, but it has some say over financial regulation and should not be expected to stay silent while regulatory responsibility is passed to another, independent, institution.

While speed is important, having an open and more democratic debate is an important core value that shouldn't be overlooked, and which will help us come to better decisions.

Trichet's Political Union

Former ECB President Jean Claude Trichet has written a bit about the kind of political and economic union he'd like to see:

"[After considering the Fiscal Stability Treaty and moves towards banking union:]

But none of this is enough. Instead of imposing fines on countries that transgress rules and ignore recommendations, as the SGP was supposed to do, the European Commission, the European Council, and – this is essential – the European Parliament should decide directly on measures to be immediately implemented in the country concerned. Fiscal and certain other economic policies should be subject to activation of a eurozone “federation by exception.”

The idea that sharing a single currency also means accepting limitations on fiscal sovereignty is not new. A “federation by exception” merely draws the logical consequences from the ineffectiveness of the fines envisaged by the SGP, and is fully consistent with the concept of subsidiarity that has been applied since the SGP’s introduction: as long as national economic policy complies with the framework, there are no sanctions.

Perhaps the most important element of the “federation by exception” would be its strong democratic anchor. Its activation would be subject to a fully democratic decision-making process, with clear political accountability. More precisely, decisions to implement measures proposed by the Commission and already approved by the Council would require a majority vote by the European Parliament – that is, those representatives elected from the EU’s eurozone members.

In such exceptional circumstances, the parliament of the country concerned should have the opportunity to explain to the European Parliament why it could not implement the recommendations proposed, while the European Parliament could explain why the eurozone’s stability and prosperity are at stake. But the final word would belong to the European Parliament.

In the past, I have suggested establishing a eurozone finance ministry, which would be responsible for activating economic and fiscal federation when and where necessary, and for managing new crisis-management tools like the European Stability Mechanism. It would also be responsible for overseeing the banking union, and it would represent the eurozone in all international financial institutions and informal groupings.

But, most important, “federation by exception” would ultimately cease to be an exception. The finance minister would be a member of the EU’s future executive branch, together with the other ministers responsible for other federal departments."

This turns the idea of the democratic deficit on its head. The problem of the EU has been that it needs to be made more democratic and accountable to citizens, and that national electoral mandates have not provided that democratic legitimacy. There may be a need for a proper economic union to create a sustainable Eurozone, but if there needs to be some common policies, they should be, well, common policies rather than a selective intrusion into Member States. The kind of political union proposed by Trichet would bring a democratic deficit into Member States: those elected on a European mandate should make decisions on common European policy and not on national policy.

While economic union means that common policies are set, it is up to the Member States to decide for themselves on their economic policies. The aim of a common European economic policy is for the Eurozone to work as a currency area, not for the European institutions to set national policies in detail. So while by being part of the Eurozone Member States have to act in the common interest of the Euro so it isn't threatened or destabilised, it's up to the Member States to decide on their economic policies and how they will invest and pay down debt. Not only is Trichet's plan politically unacceptable, but it wouldn't work - if the national parliament is unable to meet the conditions of loans or of Eurozone membership, then it's because there isn't the political will within the Member State to take the necessary actions and drafting in another elected body to take those decisions won't be effective either, since it would lack democratic legitimacy and since the national administration is of course under the control of the national parliament and other state institions.

It takes a pretty strange concept of subsidiarity to propose the European Parliament standing in for the national parliament...

Europarty Congress Season and a Third Term for Barroso

There have been some comments in favour of Barroso winnning a third term as Commission President. It's interesting that the comments come from Reding, who was considered one of the front-runners for the race in 2014. However it's not an idea I'd warm to exactly - I'm not the biggest fan of Barroso - but it does raise an important question for the European conference season: how will the Europarties approach the next European elections and the election of the next Commission President?

The Commission President is nominated by the European Council (by Qualified Majority Voting), but it's the European Parliament that elects the Commission President, and later the President elect's nominated College of Commissioners. Since the Parliament elects the Commission, the European Council nominates a candidate from the same Europarty as the one that won the election. The European People's Party endorsed Barroso for the presidency in 2009, and the Party of European Socialists failed to make any nomination so the presidency wasn't an election issue. The centre-left PES governments of the UK, Spain and Portugal backed Barroso, preventing a common PES candidate, but the PES has committed itself to picking a candidate for the post in the future, and will hold primaries for deciding its candidate. The vote adopting these procedures will take place during its September Congress:

"The European Socialist Party is due to vote to change its party statute on 29 September. The plan is to have national parties put forward a candidate for commission president. The final socialist nominee is then expected to be unveiled in February 2014, just ahead of the June elections"

EUObserver reports that ELDR, the liberal Europarty, also intends to consider procedures for selecting a candidate:

""We will be making a recommendation to our party congress this autumn on what the procedure should be for the selection of a liberal candidate for the president of the commission. And we would see that process taking place in the autumn of next year," Graham Watson, leader of the European Liberals, told this website.

He said it is the first time the party has ever tried to set down rules for the procedure. Previously names "sort of emerged" from a "conclave of liberal leaders."

The European People's Party is likely to discuss the possibility of candidate selection as part of its election strategy at its conference.

Being able to vote for a policy platform and for candidates for the Commission presidency is essential if the EU is to become more democratic and open. This Congress season will be an important early test to gauge the commitment - and ability - of the Europarties to present alternatives when it comes to election time. It's not enough to blame the Commission and the Member States from the Parliament Chamber: Europarties have to be able to present and fight for alternatives if they're to pass themselves off as political parties.

The PES Congress will take place at the end of the month in Brussels, the EPP's will be held in October in Bucharest, and the ELDR Congress will be held in early November in Dublin.

ECB lending to buy time for... what?

The European Central Bank's announcement that it would buy Eurozone government bonds is a massive boost to the Eurozone, but a lot remains to be done before we can say that the Eurozone is starting on its path out of the crisis. The banking union legislation will be a key part of the agenda over the next months (the Commission should publish a draft law on banking union next week), and it is vital in separating the link between national banks, which have grown as part of an EU-wide financial system, from national governments, many of whom are simply too small to support such large financial sectors.

However like most initiatives banking union focuses on preventing similar problems next time - in order for it to have an appreciable effect on today's crisis there would need to be a deal on old banking debt that has been taken on by national governments, in particular Spain and Ireland. (The Fiscal Stability Treaty, the six pack and the yet-to-be-passed two pack share this weakness too). Could this be agreed? Would there be joint liability for debt already generated and taken on by national governments (that the ECB pressured the protection of banks to ensure the stability of the system means that there was also a European interest in these national financial systems from early on in the crisis too)? It's a highly political area and the Irish government - and no doubt Spain too - are eager to reduce their debt as far as they can while avoiding austerity.

But it's not just in Ireland and Spain's banking case that the debt question is posed (though they raise the spectre that rigid application of public debt rules bear little relation to the ability to weather economic crises), since debt and economic growth is a European question. So what is the ECB buying time for: for an agreement on economic union? How far should economic union be extended? If debt needs to be shared to ease the burden and to provide breathing room for reforms and recovery in the most crisis-hit countries what kind of institutions do we need, and how do we make them accountable?

Merkel has signalled that she wants a convention by the end of the year to decide on the future of the EU, and apparently France and Germany are moving closer together on political union. Barroso has also called for a EU Treaty "renewal". There's very little detail on what is meant by different people about economic or fiscal union, so it's hard to get a debate going it. It's likely that the only debate we'll get is on the results of a convention - hardly a good way to build such a union or to build support for it. In any case Barroso is supposed to put forward some ideas in his State of the Union speech on September 12th. If he does put some ideas on the table, it could be one of the few opportunities for civil society to study the up-coming integration debate.

Amartya Sen: Democracy, Austerity and Social Justice in Europe

I came across this interesting article by Amartya Sen via the CELS: "What happened to Europe?" It's a very broad article, but covers the connection between politics (and democracy) and austerity, social justice and European integration. An extract:

"That austerity is a counterproductive economic policy in a situation of economic recession can be seen, rightly, as a “Keynesian critique.” Keynes did argue—and persuasively—that to cut public expenditure when an economy has unused productive capacity as well as unemployment owing to a deficiency of effective demand would tend to have the effect of slowing down the economy further and increasing—rather than decreasing—unemployment. Keynes certainly deserves much credit for making that rather basic point clear even to policymakers, irrespective of their politics, and he also provided what I would call a sketch of a theory of explaining how all this can be nicely captured within a general understanding of economic interdependences between different activities (emphasizing in particular the fact that someone’s expenditure is another person’s income). I am certainly supportive of this Keynesian argument, and also of Paul Krugman’s efforts in cogently developing and propagating this important perspective, and in questioning the policy of massive austerity in Europe. 

But I would also argue that the unsuitability of the policy of austerity is only partly due to Keynesian reasons. Where we have to go well beyond Keynes is in asking what public expenditure is for—other than for just strengthening effective demand, no matter what its content. As it happens, European resistance to savage cuts in public services and to indiscriminate austerity is not based only, or primarily, on Keynesian reasoning. The resistance is based also on a constructive point about the importance of public services—a perspective that is of great economic as well as political interest in Europe.

THERE IS A CENTRAL ISSUE of social justice involved here—that of reducing rather than enhancing injustice. The public services are valued for what they actually provide to people, especially to vulnerable people, and this is something for which Europe had fought. Savage cuts in these services undermine what had emerged as a social commitment in Europe at the end of World War II, which led to the birth of the welfare state and the national health services in a period of rapid social change in the continent, setting a great example of public responsibility from which the rest of the world—from East Asia to Latin America—would learn.

In order to understand the inadequacy of Keynes as a guide to solving the European economic crisis, we have to ask: what kind of an economist was Keynes in terms of his vision of a good society? Keynes did say—famously, and accurately enough—that paying laborers to dig holes and then to fill them up can be a very good thing, because of its impact on increasing effective demand to combat a recession or a depression. This is fine as far as it goes, but Keynes had extremely little to say on what social commitments a state should have—what public expenditure should be for, other than for just strengthening market demand through state intervention."

 And:

"[...]

If we add to this economic argument the long-term concern in Europe about some form of social justice and the more immediate political worry about the undermining of the European sense of solidarity, we can see what a disaster the recent European financial policies have been. The case for resisting the savage cuts in public services can hardly be ignored. This is not because the commitment to social justice must always be paramount, but surely it must be a serious concern that cannot simply be discarded by bankers and financial leaders. There is, of course, always a need for rational scrutiny and examination of what a country can afford and what it cannot—taking into account all the relevant factors, including the changing age distribution of the population. But this is not the same question as checking what a country can afford with inefficient economic and financial management, with fuzzy thinking on exchange rates and market demands and economic competitiveness."

The first two pages are a bit of European integration history, and the substantive argument really gets going from page 3 onwards.

ACTA rejected in the European Parliament

A victory yesterday for the Parliament and the demonstrators across the continent who have been keeping up the pressure against the Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement: the treaty was rejected by 478 votes to 39, with 165 abstentions. A conservative amendment to send the treaty back to committee and wait for the ECJ judgment on the treaty's compatibility with EU law was also rejected leading up to the vote, resulting in right-wing MEPs abstaining from the vote - supporting the treaty, but afraid to nail their colours to the mast in the face of public controversy. Though 22 Member States have ratified the treaty, the approval of the EP was needed before it would come into force anywhere in the EU.

The public controversy and campaign against the treaty is now the model for using the Parliament to make the EU more democratically accountable. It was not just an online campaign, but included demonstrations all over Europe, and political pressure building through the national parliaments. It helps that the issue was one of online politics, with a constituency that would probably find it the easiest to mobilise across borders. Will we see other such European civil society campaigns? Digital and civil rights related issues will probably remain the most natural campaign issues. When it comes to the digital marketplace and the internal market, as well as crime and child protection on the internet, the EU is a main actor given that these technological developments have appeared and grown as parts of the economy during the internal market's existence, and since purely national regulations don't make quite as much sense as an approach here.

Direct campaigns on this scale are quite difficult to create and sustain, and generally seem to be best directed towards the rejection of a draft law or treaty, and don't often happen in many states. So will this help stimulate the opening up of the European Parliament? So far many of the Parliament's stands have centred mainly on its place in the institutional triangle with the Commission and Council. While there was some institutional self-interest in this case (the EP wants to be more involved in treaty negotiations), the political groups took their positions to garner public support. It was perhaps also an ideological battle since the right in the Parliament was broadly in favour of ACTA or an ACTA-like agreement, while the liberal and left wing groups were more ready to oppose it. Environmental and economic issues are also important and high on the public's agenda, but it is harder to build a campaign for such complicated policy areas for a positive change rather than rejecting proposals. Hopefully the ACTA case will spur political and electoral innovation by the Europarties and parliamentary groups by demonstrating that there is a politically aware public to tap into.

ACTA itself may be dead, but governments are likely to continue to try to push further and further on enforcement mechanisms for copyright without a reappraisal of copyright in a digital world. It's a very important debate, and it would truly be impressive if the European Parliament tried to take a lead in the debate on how to adapt copyright so creativity in the economy and the arts is encouraged and promoted, yet prevent the misuse of copyright in the courts and in society in a way that actually dampens creativity and could in some cases endangers free speech if badly enforced. It's not enough to halt the mindless and crude enforcement of a flawed system; we need to be proactive in adapting.

If the European Parliament is smart, it can capitalise on this and serve as a platform for an important 21st Century debate. And if they don't, we should force them: we've proven we can have an impact on the European stage.

Europe's soul is distinctly parliamentary

The European Council has stumbled from summit to summit over the course of this crisis, and the European Parliament, despite being the most democratically legitimate EU institution, has not been the site of the central debates about how to fix the Eurozone. Nosemonkey has just written a great article on the need for more democratic legitimacy in the EU, and the ability to finally make a decision. However, I disagree with him - and the German Christian Democrats - that a directly elected president is the answer. I don't think a presidency could work in practice because Europe's soul is distinctly parliamentary.

Out of the 27 (and soon to be 28) Member States, all but France and Romania are either parliamentary republics, or constitutional monarchies with a parliamentary system. Even France and Romania are only semi-presidential. Parliamentarianism is part of the political culture of the Member States, and part of European political culture generally. In the EU system, the European Parliament elects the Commission and the Commission President - who is nominated by the European Council on the basis of which Group in the Parliament won the election, which is reminiscent of the role of the monarch in many European constitutional monarchies.

Of course, the declining election turnout for the Parliament has caused a crisis of legitimacy for the institution. Without a clear platform for electing an executive, and because European elections are second-order elections, voters have few clear political options on the European stage. Europarty primaries and common campaigns centred around a Commission presidential candidate (read: prime ministerial) might eventually change that, but it's a long hard slog and is unlikely to give the boost in legitimacy needed overnight. In contrast to this, an elected president, usually seen as a directly elected European Council president or a combination of this role and the Commission President, is a relatively simple institutional tweak, a small treaty change, and it would establish a clear leadership position for election.

I don't think it would work culturally or institutionally.

Culturally, a presidential system would present too clear of a binary choice in a continent used to coalition-building on the national level. I don't necessarily just mean the Member States used to coalition government (though many of them are), since even in parliamentary systems where there is a single-party government, parties tend to be broad churches. It also provides for a strong government, which I  believe is culturally embedded across the continent, but not government that is simply built around one person, despite the growing presidentialisation of the parliamentary system (France is a bit of an exception here, although with a strong president, there is a strong executive). Parliaments provide a space for ideological debate between political factions, and a government based on a coalition of support across a majority of society as represented in parliament. While a directly elected president may have a strong mandate on paper, I think that this would be culturally undermined by the suspicion that the presidency's interests and loyalties are too narrow, and not sufficiently representative.

A presidency would also be quite weak institutionally, since he or she would sit in the European Council as head of an institution in which he or she had no power base. Sure, whoever is elected would have greater legitimacy than the national leaders in the context of the European Council, but those leaders represent important and valid electoral interests, and will not - and should not - simply bow to a European President. The president would also lack a power base in the European Parliament, and could be politically different to the Parliament's majority. It's hard enough for cohabitation to work in France or the US without trying at the same time to build up a profile and confidence in an elected EU president. Without a natural power base around which to build coalitions or majorities for proposals, the presidency would likely dash electoral hopes raised in the election due to the inability to honour his or her manifesto. This goes back to my point about the culture for strong government: weak elected governments rarely win a second term, institutionally weak systems are rarely respected. And who would vote for an institution that cannot deliver? Is that not the argument for the declining European election turnout?

I have the personal bias of believing in parliamentarianism, but it seems to me to be the only system that could possibly work on the European level. There needs to be a broad coalition which a majority can not just buy into at the time of a momentary choice between two candidates, but generally as well. This is best done by a parliamentary coalition comprising of a majority of opinions, not a single individual. The Commission could evolve into a cabinet with a Prime Minister figure at its head.

A lot of time and effort would need to be made to even attempt to deliver this, but a presidential system is the same old attitude of tinkering with the institutional set-up when you get down to it: real work needs to be done at the local level, and only political movements - parties - running for election on common platforms can provide the incentive and promise realistic results in order to sustain this work. Which is why I believe a working Europe could only ever be a parliamentary one.

"Greece could have had a referendum"

The Danish Minister for Economy and Interior Margrethe Vestager said that Greece could have had a referendum:

""No one else but the elected members of national parliaments can take the decisions when it comes to reducing the deficit, collecting more taxes or being more efficient in doing so."

[...]

Meanwhile, on the state of Greek democracy, where the idea to call a referendum on the second bail-out last year caused panic among EU leaders and led to Prime Minister George Papandeou's resignation and appointment of a technocrat premier, Vestager said: "I think they could have done that if they really wanted to."

"Each politician has to make up his or her mind, because these are very challenging times. People can recognise from their own lives that when you bring yourself in a situation where you have to take a huge loan in order to get things working - the one who's going to give you the loan will have conditions. It is not different on a European level.""

Formally, I think she's right: when Papandreou proposed a referendum, it could have been done, even if it had been quick to have the result before the next tranche of bail-out money was needed (at the time I favoured a general election since it would have given the Greek people a chance to change their government, whereas a referendum on which default to take might just be designed to bounce them into accepting the status quo). However Papendreou sprung this on his cabinet, who said no, and the Greek parliament lost confidence in him, so a caretaker government was elected by the parliament before elections could take place (elections that will take place in April).

Which is a second point: the technocratic governments. I'm not a fan of these technocratic governments and if they're ever put in place they should be quickly followed by an election, but the Greek and Italian governments weren't "imposed by Brussels" - rather it was the economic pressure of the market/debt situation and the lack of political confidence in the Prime Minister and government that led their parliaments to remove them and replace them with technocratic caretakers. (Notably this also happened to the Czech government when they held the rotating presidency back in 2009). Rather the democratic disconnect is the lack of democratic political power at a level that could respond effectively to the economic pressure applied by markets - in other words at the EU level, which has so far only delivered ineffectual summits, bad bail-outs and a Fiscal Stability Treaty that solves nothing and repeats legislation already passed by the European Parliament.

Eurocrisis, Democratic Deficit and the Re:New Conference

Throughout the Re:New Conference references were made to that most European of monsters: Merkozy. Yesterday Sarkozy spoke, and today Merkel has spoken in the Bundestag about Europe and the Eurozone. While European integration - and a new treaty - was held up to be necessary, Merkel rejected Eurobonds as expensive and unconstitutional. At the same time, the European Parliament has passed a resolution, declaring that it should have equal powers with the Council over any new features of economic union (such as an EU Finance Minister) so that there is sufficient democratic oversight.

The same day Sarkozy, in Gaullist mode, firmly signalled that any further changes would be purely intergovernmental:

""The reform of Europe is not a march towards supra-nationality," Sarkozy said. "Europe will reform itself by pragmatically drawing the lessons of the crisis. The crisis has pushed the heads of state and government to assume greater responsibilities because ultimately they have the democratic legitimacy to take decisions."

"The integration of Europe will go the inter-governmental way because Europe needs to make strategic political choices.""

At first sight the battle between Merkozy and the EP might seem to be a foregone conclusion: the duo have sidelined the EU institutions so far in the Eurocrisis and Treaty change is itself intergovernmental, so how much power can influence can the Parliament, with falling turnout numbers, and the Commission, which has hardly been bursting with energy, bring to bear. However, intergovernmentalism favours secretive processes and large countries over transparency and smaller countries. I've written before about the faultlines dividing the European debate, and these will spur some Member States to fight for more supranationalism.

In the long run intergovernmentalism will be a mistake as is disempowers citizens and promotes a cynical them-and-us culture between the rest of us and the Paris-Berlin duopoly that is unhealthly for European politics and damaging to democracy. But it's also damaging in the short term - by going for intergovernmentalist solutions, the suspicion and anger with the Franco-German concentration of power will crystalise: should this summitry with France and Germany at the top - which has hardly worked wonders during this crisis - be not just for crises, but for life? Without QMV, Commission oversight and Parliamentary input, the majority of the Eurozone and Non-Eurozone states and citizens are threatened with the prospect of being marginalised within the EU structure. So far we've been working ad hoc, pretty much outside of the treaties. Now we're talking about committing ourselves to these governing structures by treaty.

That's not to say that the European Parliament is a great cure for this democratic deficit: though over last weekend I saw a PES that spoke like an opposition and proposed a different vision for the EU, as an opposition the PES, and other Europarties, remain too detached from citizens and even their national parties. It seems to me that supporters of a more democratic EU need to focus more energy on reforming the Europarties so that they can seriously propose new policies and debate them in public. This requires not just some autonomy on the part of the Europarties - you could argue they have autonomy at the moment since the national parties don't pay much attention to them for policy matters - but commitment from the national parties to help shape, debate and campaign on these policies.

With the PES in opposition almost everywhere in the EU, this should be easier for them to achieve. Could a basic common platform not provide a voice for the centre-left during the crisis both in Member States and at the EU level? The divisions between national parties and the protection of national party autonomy from European commitments are great and understandable, but it's hard to see how the centre-left - the opposition - can effectively put forward their own narrative and solutions if they cannot build a European coalition, even on a basic level, that can make their visions at a national level sound realistic. Given that pan-european crises of this scale are - thankfully - rare, I wouldn't expect much progress to happen in this area, which is why I hope a contest between Europarties for the Commission Presidency would push politics further along this path. But that's too long-term, and this crisis is progressing too rapidly.

I'm not a member of a political party, but if I believe in promoting democracy at a European level, then perhaps I should become one and add my voice, in whatever small way, to the need for a better European politics. Because we can't just hope that it will simply emerge to inspire a demand for it; rather those of us who want it should demand it, and demand it loudly. Despite my criticisms of the lack of policy at the PES Conference, I did see some vision there. If we want to have an inclusive EU rather than a concentrated summitry, then we'll have to strengthen our Europarties so they can represent us better.

Papandreou's Gamble: a tale of two defaults

It's clear that Papandreou's decision to hold a referendum on the latest Eurozone agreement, without even informing his cabinet of his decision, is a massive political gamble to restore his authority. The further reduction of the government's parliamentary majority, and the firing of the entire chiefs of staff reveal the instability of the government.

On the European level the problem with the referendum is not so much that people are being given a say - though there are probably elements that argue that, there needs to be a democratic buy-in of the Greek people into any plan for it to work properly - rather that it crystalises the issue. When presented with the referendum the Greek people will be asked to say yes or no to the deal: a yes would mean buying into the process so far and imply support for however it evolves; a no would mean the end to the loans, complete default (along with the instant austerity that the inability to fund the deficit implies) and probable exit of the Eurozone.

While this could be a clever move by Papandreou to bounce the electorate into supporting the government in a choice between two defaults, for the Eurozone it raises the spectre of a non-negotiatable stance, and a toxic debt fallout that will force a decision over Italy. Though Greece probably needs more haircuts over time and a plan for growth so it can service its remaining debts and rebuild its economy, this slow evolution of the Greek Crisis (though not necessarily inevitably moving in that direction) has been short-circuited by the referendum announcement. A "No" would mean that Greece would be dropped so the Eurozone could deal with Italy.

There has to be a real buy-in by the Greek people in the solution to the crisis: with all the strikes and the uncollected taxes, Greece can't recover unless there is a majority for reforming the state and the economy. With, as EUObserver reports:

"Polls over the weekend put Greek popular opposition to the new EU deal at 60 percent and the viability of the government is under threat from rolling general strikes and frequently violent protests that reach almost every quarter of the country.

At the same, polls put support for retention of the euro at 70 percent."

the binary choice of default within or outside the Eurozone might pass, and offer the Greek public to decide whether or not they want to be part of the Eurozone deal - and how much they want to be part of the Eurozone. But in the absence of a real debate about other options - however workable - that a parliamentary election might allow (essentially forcing the government and opposition to set out their alternatives), it's hard to see how much a "yes" vote would signal acceptance of the Eurozone's direction, and how much it would constitute a democratic buy-in by the Greek people.

It may turn out to be a masterstroke by Papandreou: giving the people a greater say and building a wider consensus in society, or it could backfire, either as a No, or as a Yes with no real substance to it. In any case, the Greek people are caught in a tale of two defaults, with an unenviable decision.

Edit: While I'm slightly sceptical of the referendum because of its limited choice, Polscieu has written a great post in favour of it.

Citizens will have to drag Europe closer to them

There's an interesting article in the New York Times (hat-tip Grahnlaw), "E.U. Elites keep the Power from the People", reporting on criticism from Habermas and others on the EU's democratic deficit:

"“The process of European integration, which has always taken place over the heads of the population, has now reached a dead end,” Mr. Habermas said at a forum hosted by the European Council on Foreign Relations. “It cannot go any further without switching from its usual administrative mode to one of greater public involvement.”

The political elites “are burying their heads in the sand,” he said, adding, “They are doggedly persisting with their elitist project and the disenfranchisement of the European population.”

Those who agree with Mr. Habermas often cite the behavior of José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, the Union’s executive, and Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council, which represents the 27 member states.

During these past months, both have failed to explain to a wider public what is happening to Europe and the euro. When they give interviews, they tend to address an elitist audience. Neither reaches out to citizens. “I doubt if they ever thought of doing town-hall meetings,” said Pawel Swieboda, director of DemosEuropa, an independent research organization in Warsaw.

“They don’t bother to do such meetings because they don’t have to stand for election,” added Reinhard Bütikofer, a German and leader of the Greens in the European Parliament."

I agree. However, the solution seems to be changing the Treaties, and this doesn't really address the problem. While Treaty change can help (for example, giving the Parliament the sole respobsibility for electing the Commission without Council input, and severing the national backgrounds of Commissioners from national nominations), the biggest and most urgent challenge has nothing to do with institutional tinkering.

The EU is already formally democratic. The Parliament is directly elected and has almost equal power with the Council, the weakness being mainly in the area of foreign affairs. This is real power, with US Vice President Joe Biden making the trip to implore the Parliament to pass the SWIFT Agreement between the EU and US last year. The Parliament elects the Commission (just like the government is in many national parliamentary systems), which is nominated by the Council. The Council consists of the elected national governments, and the European Council - the Member States' heads of government - direct general policy. So in all the main legislative institutions, offices are either directly or indirectly elected.

But despite this, the main focus on EU politics is the summitry that takes place every few months or to combat crises - an increasingly common event. Summits are the face of the remote decision-making that's going on. Member States gather together, not all with an equal say in practice, and hammer out compromises based on haggling over national interests, instead of working out what would be the best solution for the EU or Eurozone as a whole. If this sidelines the Commission, then it definitely sidelines the Parliament: after all, how can they reject emergency agreements made at a European Council summit? These summits could even be sidelining the ECB, which has been one of the most influential players in the crisis so far.

If the EU is formally democratic, then the problem is that it isn't functionally democratic. The addage that in democracies the electorate get the government they deserve doesn't quite apply as there hasn't been much political competition yet at the European level. That might change at the next election, with the PES considering running a primary to select a candidate for the Commission Presidency. Political competition is what's necessary to bring the EU closer to citizens. The EU can't be sold or airbrushed into people's lives: people need to be engaged on European issues, and we have to talk about these issues from the perspective of arguing for EU or Eurozone policies.

We're in the middle of a massive crisis, but when it comes to the solutions, we are talking about national solutions to European problems. When Irish politicans talk about Eurobonds, they're thinking of the next five years and Ireland's interest rates, not how to make the Eurozone work - without even thinking about what fiscal union means, and how it should be run, how can it be properly debated or sold to an electorate? These conversations with ourselves mean that we're talking past each other on a European stage, rather than properly discussing what are our best collective options. Which is why working on giving substance to the Europarties is much more important than institutional tinkering. Citizens need to be engaged with the issues - using citizens' assemblies would be a good way of involving people and informing them on the options ahead.

Oddly, institutional tinkering is the sexy and glamorous side to ideas to tackle the democratic deficit. Hard graft within political parties and outside them in civil society to make them more responsive to European issues - and to make them fulfil their political function as a way of enabling citizens to influence policy - is a much more substantial task, even if it doesn't yet the attention of another constitutional treaty.

Where exactly are the Europarties?

The Europarties are supposed to be forums for political debate and participation in the EU - that's very much the theory, anyway. So during the Euro crisis (and particularly during today's summit), what have the Europarties been up to?

The Socialists and Democrats.

The S&D have been somewhat active. There was a conference recently in Barcelona that resulted in the "Barcelona Declaration" (designed to make Social Democrats electable to take power in the EU by 2014):

"In the "Barcelona Declaration", Socialists and Democrats say they will:

•WORK for fair and progressive financial recovery focused on job creation and the protection of the welfare state;
•PROMOTE inclusion and integration in the face of populism and xenophobia;
•BRING more representation into the democratic system through new ways of participation; and
•STRENGTHEN the EU based on solidarity and combating growing nationalisms and euroscepticism."

The Declaration itself (which you can read here [PDF] in French) pretty much says the same thing, but it pads it out to fill the page. Sadly it's all too vague to really mean anything - and this during a major economic crisis! Even though it's aimed at 2014, how can the second biggest political force have no ideas or strategy at this stage? That the PES's campaigns on the Financial Transaction Tax and on Eurobonds haven't even got a mention simply demonstrates that the PES's leadership can launch internet campaigns separate from the actual power structure in the party without any impact.

The S&D group has endorsed the European Trade Union's day of action in Luxembourg, and points to anternet campaign Change for Europe (I assume it's cross-party with the Greens). While there are a few noises about transaction taxes and shifting the taxation burden, it's not clear that this is leading anywhere other than a party-political endorsement of the Parliament's aim of some own resources (read: taxes) for the EU.

The S&D is, on the surface, in a difficult position as its member parties are engaged in different levels of austerity while its European leadership calls for less austerity and more investment. However, it's not a massive gap, as its member parties also want this too, at least in general. With the S&D* opposition pretty much across Europe, they should really be doing more to throw their political weight around - after all, they don't have enough voices in Council or the Commission, so surely they should want to create a more vocal public response if possible?

Of course, it's not quite that simple as there are divisions between the member parties and within them. But a greater effort to have a common platform is necessary, particularly if they want to be electable in the face of a European culture of austerity.

The PES has announced that it has collected the signatures of 1,000 elected MPs of their member parties for a transaction tax - why not try to make use of this to establish an effective pan-European position?

*The PES ("Party of European Socialists") is the actual party, but in the EP they're known at the S&D. Poor branding, but what can you do?


European People's Party.

The EPP is "in government" in the EU, with a big majority in the Commission and Council, and as the biggest party in the EP. It's been enjoying a period of huge electoral success and it hasn't needed a common programme, and it shows. The party seems to be obsessed with finishing their articles with a "note to the editor" about the EPP's dominance in whatever institution features.

I'm happy to be corrected, but it doesn't look like the EPP has done much in the way of stating policy decisions that haven't been an initative of the (EPP-run) Member States. The EPP acts as a pro-government party for whatever the Council or Commission puts in front of it, unless it was proposed by the S&D side or there's an EP interest against it.

Update: Reuniting Europe has a blogpost on the EPP summit before the European Council summit.


European Liberal Democrats. (Which are part of the ALDE Group).

I'm pretty sure this says it all:

"Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck MEP, President of the European Liberal Democrats re-iterated her views on the need for the European People's Party (EPP) to take a more pro-active approach towards developments in Greece, "the EPP needs to shoulder responsibility and help bring about relief to the Greek situation given that some of the main political actors in this scenario belong to its European political family"."

While the S&D may be more active, as the opposition, the onus is on them to be more active and creative than the incumbant party(ies) - and, in an ideal world, actually effective as an opposition. Reforming Europarty structures to make them more coherent could go a lot further than changing the EP electoral system. What's the point of having "more European" elections if the parties refuse to campaign publically on pan-European issues?



[I just quickly dashed off this post - feel free to bombard me with info on what the parties want to do or what the issues are with their internal structures].

Now Lisbon's in force, Parliament has nowhere to hide

1st December 2009, and the Lisbon Treaty is in force (well, it has amended the two treaties that make up the constitution of the EU, anyway). It's biggest innovations were the extension of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council and the increase of Parliamentary power - the two are pretty much in step. The European Parliament wasn't powerless before, but now it is virtually an equal to the Council, except in areas of unanimity, such as foreign affairs.

So now there's nowhere for Parliament to hide - it has to prove that it's deserving of these powers; that it's willing to go further in holding the to account, in staking out it's own position more clearly from the Commission and Council, and it must go further in transparency - both from itself, and from the Council and Commission. The Commission President's Question Time needs to become more focused as well: now MEPs have more power, they should prove themselves able to get a good handle on the different issues and ask the awkward questions - this doesn't mean ranting on about political points (I'm looking at you, Martin Schulz), but digging around and making sure you put Barroso and other Commissioners on the spot to open up the Commission to real scrutiny.

The hearing of the Commissioners in the run up to the vote in January must be rigorous, revealing, and truly testing for the Commissioners-designate. In particular, Baroness Ashton's positions on Iran, Russia, the Middle East peace process, energy policy, the Eastern Partnership, etc. must be made clear. Likewise, Oettinger needs to be pushed on how he wants to see the EU's energy policy develop; it's an important portfolio, and one that the Commission has proven quick to move on in Barroso I, with important energy market reforms and the implications of climate change politics - is Oettinger up to the job? The Parliament needs to be willing to reject the Commission if it doesn't correspond to its political views; it shouldn't just rely on there being someone who can be easily recognised as objectionable even through a lazy media glance - a list of good policy reasons should be enough. There doesn't need to be a rejection of the Commission just to ritually assert the Parliament's position, but they should make sure the opportunity to shape it doesn't pass them by.

Finally, and as a greater task, all the parties in the Parliament should work to make their mark outside the Brussels Bubble in the public's minds. Better Parliamentary debates help, and will hopefully entice the media to report on them more, but the parties need to make their presence felt more in the mainstream media and at grassroots level. The Citizen's Initiative could be an excellent way of doing this if done right: a campaign for a certain policy for the media to report on, co-operation across borders with common campaigns, engaging people in European politics ("We need your support! This is what we're trying to do for you in Parliament and the EU!") and it builds up at least some recognition of the Euro-parties (or at least the position of the national parties on European issues, which will be helpful in any case come election time).

The Citizen's Initiative requires 1 million signatures across borders, and the Euro-Parties are supposed to help express cross-border political debate. The link and the logic should be obvious, and the party to latch on to it and to runs campaigns well - and follow them up in Parliament effectively - would be laying good groundwork for the 2014 elections.

Now that Lisbon's in force, we deserve a better working Parliament - more transparency, scrutiny and engagement. There are no more excuses for not trying.

You shouldn't get to vote for the President of the European Council

The Foundation Robert Schuman is running an online poll on the 5 candidates for the post of President of the European Council (via Grahnlaw and Joe). It's important that there's a debate over the candidates - whoever's elected to the office will represent the institution of the European Council in the EU (like the EP President represents the European Parliament), and on the global scale the President will represent the EU (though probably in a largely ceremonial fashion, since the High Representative will have the most influence over foreign policy - in fact, the E.C. President's claim to represent the EU as a whole will largely rest on being able to speak for the consensus between the states).

But we need to distinguish the right to transparency from the right to vote.

There have been calls for the post to be directly elected - some Eurosceptic condemnation of the Lisbon Treaty was based on the fear that it created an unelected executive President of the EU, rather than the occasional chairman/woman role that it will actually be. If the office had really been an executive post, then the outrage at the lack of direct elections would have been understandable - after all, the electoral college that elects the President is made up of the governments of the member states, and though they have legitimacy as directly or indirectly elected bodies themselves, having an executive post elected by a twice-removed indirect method would have been too much. But then that's the point - it's not an executive President.

So, no, you shouldn't have a vote on who gets the job. Just as the President of the European Parliament shouldn't be directly elected (MEPs elect the post), so it is justified that the European Council elects its chairman. Direct elections for such an office would be pointless - why focus on making what is essentially the "Speaker of the Upper House", who doesn't even have a vote, directly electable, when increasing the accountability of the Commission and participation through the European Parliament are the real, substantive challenges?

That's not to say there are problems with the selection process; ideally the candidates would apply for the post, and be subject to an open and transparent debate in the European Council and/or an open interview before the European Council. Though there may be some diplomatic hang-ups about this level of openness in what is an intergovernmental institution (note that this means you can't always apply the same rationales to it as you can to the supranational institutions!), I don't think the argument that the selection process should be secretive and elitist can be justified:

"The bottom line is surely this: if the EU sees any merit in having big, serving figures given these big new jobs, then opacity is the price to pay."

This assumes that former and current government leaders form the only qualified group that you can draw on to fill the post, so you mustn't scare them off by opening the process so much that candidates risk losing face by not getting picked. While it's true that openness and transparency isn't likely to excite Europeans into caring about European politics (I don't see the performance of Barroso during Commission President's Question Hour being poured over each month on the news, do you?), and direct elections aren't likely to do better (after the novelty value wears off, and people realise that the post isn't executive, do you think that its election will even manage the turnout of the EP elections?), arguing that opagueness is "good" is just ridiculous. There may not be a cause to directly elect the President, but open discussion and debate of the roles and politics of the candidates and the institution itself has its own value.

We should be concerned about holding the European Council to the principle of transparency, not arguing for the vote when there's no firm ground for doing so.

Apathy breeds Apathy

Or: "Be an Active Citizen.... please?"

All political systems tend to be characterised as distant and out-of-touch at times; especially the European Parliament. There are many factors in this: structure of the political parties/EP party groups, media attention, institutional structure/power balance, etc. These all contribute to it, but we should remember that politics is what we make of it too, and it tends to be shaped by those who are active in the process. So, please be an active citizen, and vote, even if the European Parliament seems remote to you.

Politics can only be changed through engagement, and often that engagement needs to be long term. We need to make sure our voices are heard, and are effective in being heard. Not voting and expecting the system to be more responsive to your needs and wishes simply doesn't work.

First of all, candidates want the job (in most cases), and want to win the seat. That means running an effective campaign, and getting enough votes. This seems like an obvious statement, but think about the effects it has - obviously the most effective campaign will be the one that gets the most voters on its side - not the most people, the most voters. What, after all, is the point of going after people who aren't likely to vote and wooing them with your policies if they end up not voting? It's a big risk going after such voters when there are "dependable" voters out there who will actually vote (and may even be persuaded to vote for a particular candidate). If you want politicians to adopt policies closer to your preference, then you have to let them know that your vote is up for grabs (and, if possible, what policies you'd want to see). Time, lack of activists and financial constraints on political parties also lead to a prioritising in campaigning.

A few years back a student's union advised its members not to vote until candidates came up with student-friendly policies - instantly removing the threat of an organised student vote against any of the candidates, and removing the incentive to change policy; especially since students as a group vote in fewer numbers.

Second, if possible, talk to/contact the candidates. Obviously a lot of people don't have that much time, but it is worth finding out not only what they stand for, and if they'll be responsive to your needs and opinions. Naturally they won't (and shouldn't) be very ready to change their policies to suit you, since they need to be consistent in their policy choices and with their party platform (if they have one). Still, repeated messages from the public will filter through the party machinery: if there's a policy area, and it's in line with their political philosophy, and there's a market for it, then they will change their policy to become more responsive. Question candidates, and if you don't agree with them, tell them why. (How else will they ever learn...? ;-)).

Third: make your voice count more by expressing your needs to the electoral forum that the election concerns. I.e. if it's a local election, vote based on local issues and your views on how your area can best be served. By voting based on something that's happening at another level of government, your are making your voice less effective. Think local councillors are lazy? Maybe they can afford to be, because come election time it's the national issue that a significant number vote on. Hold them to their promises and make sure they do a good job. You can help make a democratic forum more effective and responsive by focusing on the issues that it deals with.

Fourth: yes, there is that "but I'm only one person" aspect to the whole exercise, and, yes, these things are long-ish term. But the obvious come back is: "well, where else can it start?". Voting behaviour does make an impact. If a person's friends and family aren't interested in voting, then they may be turned off voting by that. By voting and seeing value in voting, you (may) help persuade your friends that there's value in it too - and the more people there are involved, the more likely the system is to be responsive to the people at large.

You can't expect a responsive political system if you have unresponsive apolitical people....

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