No Free Movement Rights for the Working Class?

The debate over the free movement of people is continuing to grow. It's worth remembering that EU citizens currently have the right to reside in another Member State for 3 months to look for work, with no obligation on the host Member State to provide benefits (Citizen's Directive, PDF). They can stay longer than 3 months if they are employed, self-employed, or have the resources to support themselves. When they're a worker (an employee), then they have access to the same social and tax advantages as the host country's nationals (Directive 1612/68).

In the UK, some Tories are calling for a 2 year period before EU citizens will have access to the welfare system. That's 2 years of living, working and contributing in a country without being able to draw on the same support open to other citizens. Given that so many supported by the welfare system are in work (an indication of how wages have stagnated and the worrying necessity to support those in work to ensure that they can actually make a living), such a long period would greatly disadvantage poorer people from exercising their Treaty rights in practice.

Labour appears to be thinking of controlling intra-EU migration for the skill levels of the migrant, as Chuka Umunna said on the BBC's Question Time last Thursday:

"Umunna said the EU should change its rules to prevent citizens from travelling to other member states in search of work, with a focus on banning highly skilled workers from less affluent EU members taking low-skilled jobs in richer member states.
[...]
He said this would revive the spirit of the EU's founding fathers, who wanted to encourage freedom of movement for highly skilled workers to highly skilled jobs."

I'm not sure what founding father he's talking about; he didn't quote any and I can't remember any famous quotes about Europe only being for graduates. Labour's position is very confusing. They seem to be talking about preventing movement to other countries to find work (so you'd already need to have a job before you move), preventing highly skilled workers from the new accession countries from taking lower-skilled jobs in the older Member States (which sounds like a bureaucratic nightmare to define and enforce, never mind getting all the Member States to sign off on it), and limiting the free movement rights to the highly skilled.

This last point, which seems to be the most likely, is an odd position for the Labour party. So the highly skilled (presumably also those from more privileged backgrounds) should have these rights but the less well skilled shouldn't (which is hard to define and probably just means "poor")? It's a sad state of affairs when the Labour party is for disenfranchising the poor in Europe rather than opening up more opportunity and creating work and security...

Even the Liberal Democrats have voiced support for limited access to benefits. Perhaps someone can explain the electoral rationale behind this move, because I can't see it. Nobody who wants a tough stance on immigration is going to vote for the Lib Dems over the Tories because of this. The net result is that there's no real political voice that is speaking out in defence of free movement rights.

It's widely reported, and accepted by supporters for tougher immigration controls such as Migration Watch, that EEA migrants claim less than locals, and contribute more to society and the economy than they receive in social welfare. The political weather has changed so much that even the politicians that make this argument are supporting a dilution of free movement rights. This political cowardice just lets the panic over immigration to grow. Without dissenting voices, the political culture as a whole shifts in an ever more anti-immigrant direction - you could say that it's a microcosm of the overall EU debate in the UK.

Political attitudes of the CSU in Germany are also hardening on this, though opinion polls suggest that a majority thinks that Germany has benefited from immigration and that it has benefited from EU membership overall.

Free Movement Night's Eve?

"Who cheats, flies", runs the campaign of the Christian Social Union in Bavaria. Fear of an influx of Romanians and Bulgarians seems to be at fever pitch, with Tory activists in the UK petitioning the Prime Minister to use an emergency clause to limit immigration and the new CSU campaign, which has angered its coalition partners (the CSU is part of Merkel's governing coalition). From tomorrow, the transitional restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian citizens from enjoying the full rights of EU citizenship will expire and they will be able to work across the EU under the same conditions as other citizens.

Counter arguments, that Germany and others benefit from migration, that migrants contribute more than they receive in benefits and that the freedom of movement is a two-way street, don't seem to have broken through. However that doesn't mean that anti-immigration arguments and rhetoric are necessarily well-received. The "Go Home" campaign piloted in Britain - where a van pulling a billboard urged illegal immigrants to contact the Home Office and "go home" - was a laughing stock, with people cheekily trying to use the contact number to ask the Home Office to arrange for their trip home across London. Similarly, the "Who cheats, flies" - Wer betruegt, der fliegt! - campaign was mercilessly ridiculed online, with pictures of prominent CSU ministers on planes appearing under the slogan.

And a recent poll in Britain suggests that integration rather than immigration is the crux of the concern, with a majority of people accepting of immigration if people play by the rules. This is probably why the clumsy attempts to tar groups of immigrants - actual or potential - with the same brush has struck such a hollow ring with people. In this day and age scapegoating a group of people is simply not acceptable. The concern is more over pressure on the welfare state, public services and integration into the local community. These are issues - and it's sad that evidence of migrants' contributions haven't had much traction yet - and they also seem to be tied up with the wider debate over the welfare state and who deserves help: the old concept of the deserving poor.

The image of people flying in just to cheat the system may be ridiculous, but in tougher economic times there is a fear of cheaters. Announcements to reduce and cut away at the welfare state are not just about austerity, but also tinged with suspicions that some are milking the system, even as demand for charitable services like food banks rise. But as the welfare system is made tougher, it's made tougher on everyone... The political battles over immigration and welfare will continue into the new year, with parties bidding to be tougher on immigrants and welfare "scroungers". Past experience with populist campaigns may have jaded the public to these stunts, but we are drifting towards a tougher society.

A Strong Europe?: What the Grand Coalition has in store

Two months after the German elections the Grand Coalition deal between Merkel's CDU (and their sister party, the CSU) and the SPD has been signed. It's not a done deal until the SPD membership has endorsed the coalition treaty, and there is some resistance to it given their anti-Merkel election campaign and the frequency with which Merkel's coalition partners have the political life sucked from them. Still, the SPD leadership are likely to have their way, and with a membership vote on the deal the coalition will have a firm foundation for the next 4 years.

The headline policies, such as the minimum wage and reduced pension age (SPD) and road tolls for foreigners (CSU) have tended to be driven by the junior partners of the coalition. It's been suggested that the leadership style of Merkel's CDU (focusing on her leadership rather than policy) may have worked well in the campaign, but was a weakness when it came to coalition negotiations. So how is Germany's Europe policy shaping up?

The coalition agreement can be read here (PDF - in German), with the European policy at pp.15, 156-167.


Eurozone and the Single Market

The big one and, despite the hopes that the SPD may have moderated the austerity-centric policy, there is really no change here. In fact the strongly conservative tone is startling - there's plenty of talk about reducing debt and deficits and working on competitiveness, but when you turn to the "social Europe" section the rhetoric is pretty much repeated: austerity is the only way to ensure a social Europe seems to be the message.

On banking union there is little new. Yes, there must be banking union, and, yes, private banking debt must be separated from public debt (with banks taking the hit first). However the deal underlines that releasing funds under the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or otherwise will remain subject to a vote by the Bundestag and emergency credit lines are a last resort only. The agreement both stresses that there will be no common liability at the European level since budgets are a national competence, and that budgets must be effectively overseen and co-ordinated at the European level. (It appears that the joined-up thinking demanded of Brussels has not similarly been applied here...). The SPD's leanings towards Eurobonds have apparently been stamped out altogether for the purposes of coalition.

On the future of emergency credit and the "reform contracts" that are supposed to accompany them, the German government supports the contract idea, though such deals must be "democratically legitimised". Presumably this means that the national parliament of the bail-outee will have to ratify the contract before being lent money.

Interestingly, the agreement states that there will have to be changes to the treaty basis of the currency union - a bit hint in favour of treaty change.

The new German government will support the completion of the single market, to which you can add the usual talk of both requiring further harmonisation to help create a level playing field and also ensuring the reduction of red tape, etc., etc., that always bolted on statements about the single market these days (and apparently copy-pasted here for emphasis). The stand out policy here is on posted workers, which should be "developed" to ensure that posted workers work under the same pay and conditions as nationals of the host country would.


Social Europe

Not much here at all. Under this heading the austerity rhetoric is repeated, perhaps on the basis that since times are tough austerity will have to stand in to reduce the number of policies, ironically causing a policy deficit in the process. There's not much here that isn't already long-standing policy at the EU level. Youth unemployment is bemoaned (the answer is held out to be structural reform and making free movement of this young educated workforce easier). Social and wage dumping are to be fought, and the new government will be supportive of tax harmonisation, which will have the alarm bells ringing from Dublin to Helsinki.

Money from the European Investment Bank has been promised for several types of projects and policy. Honestly, so many people have promised EIB money for so many things at this point that I'm starting to wonder if the next financial crisis will be when it collapses. It seems that when the EU budget is so small and you're cutting it, the answer is to promise to get the EIB to lend money for it. Just wait til the Europarty manifestos come out....


EU Democracy and foreign Policy

Enlargement, while supported, will face a tougher Germany: criteria must be more strictly applied, and Turkey's accession process won't "automatically" end in membership. Berlin also wants to beef up EU foreign policy through its humanitarian and development aid policies - and even military planning. It foresees a close cooperation between the EU and NATO here, which is probably something that would happen to a certain degree, directly or indirectly, though the neutral Member States may not be so happy with this.

When it comes to EU Democracy, there is nothing new: more education about Europe and supporting a more uniform electoral code seems to be the extent of the coalition's thinking here. There's not even a mention about how the 2014 elections can be used, never mind how they might affect the formation of the next Commission. Berlin will, however, want to see German on a more equal footing with French and English as a working language of the EU - it will be interesting to see how it pushes for this in practice.


Overall, very disappointing, if not entirely unexpected. For those of us on the left, the agreement's European paragraphs appear to contain no "social democratic handwriting". For those hoping for a change to Germany's Eurozone policy there is not only nothing, but a vigorous restatement of that nothing. For those looking for renegotiation there is an encouraging hint here, though the passage on social standards and the attitude towards the posting of workers will - or should - worry some British politicians who perhaps project too much of themselves into Germany's pro-single market outlook.

EU reaction to the NSA Affair

The fallout from the NSA Affair and Snowden's leaks continue, with revelations that Angela Merkel's mobile phone was hacked causing worldwide headlines (though there's been some criticism of Merkel for taking so long over these allegations, and indications that the NSA has been spying on German citizens, seriously, as Der Standard pointedly notes with the headline "Und ploetzlich ist es ein Problem" ["And suddenly it is a problem"]). The Guardian is reporting that the number of tapped heads of government is probably much higher, and the European Council has finally been roused too - it turns out that prime ministers don't like to be spied on. Now everything from the halting of data-sharing agreements to cancelling the free trade talks is on the table (after all, it's much harder to negotiate if you're being spied on).

The European Parliament has also signalled its displeasure, voting for a motion calling for the end of the SWIFT agreement. It's not binding, and the Commission has responded by stating that there is no indication of wrong-doing under the SWIFT Agreement (or "Terrorist Financial Tracking Programme" - PDF). Parliament's issues with SWIFT aren't new to the NSA revelations, however. After a troubled birth (the Parliament voted down the first agreement before passing the second after lobbying from Vice-President Joe Biden), last year the report before Parliament on the implementation of the safeguards in the agreement caused disquiet - it turned out that the full report wasn't even made available to MEPs to review. (Notably, the European Data Protection Supervisor had criticised some of the key provisions of the draft SWIFT Agreement).

The Commission has said that the agreement has effective safeguards, and that it's waiting on the response to a request for reassurances from the US. It's not planning to suspend the agreement.

Martin Schulz, the President of the European Parliament has also said that the free trade talks with the US should be suspended in the light of the spying affair.

The most notable moves, though, probably come over the draft Data Protection Regulation. The European Parliament has adopted its position on the law this week, which has hardened. The subject of intense lobbying, the biggest impact of the Snowden-leak was to reverse the watering down of the proposed law, with the security of citizens' data in the hands of US companies a key concern. The bill still has a long way to go, and it has to be agreed with the Council before it can be signed into law.

But what does this all add up to? At the end of this week the EU still transfers the same kind of data to the US as at the start, and there is little coherence in the EU's position. Most demands amount to the suspension of agreements or negotiations, and it will take a while to see what actually comes out of this. If we are ever going to see better data protection standards and a more regulated approach to intelligence and police work, we have to have clear standards and guidelines on how we shape these laws. When it comes to the EU, a proper regard for the necessity and proportionality of proposed security laws within the EU and agreements with third countries has to be stressed. And the Commission must drop its deference of the security services if it is to enforce and monitor agreements - or even draw up laws.

Breaking the link between Governments and the Banks: Tales from Statusquoland

The Irish Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, is in Brussels at the European Council with 2 aims: (1) ensure that Ireland has access to an emergency line of credit (the "Enhanced Conditions Credit Line") with as few conditions as possible to smooth Ireland's exit from the bailout programme, and (2) to have the European Council re-agree what they agreed back in June 2012.

That's right: a major win for Kenny would be the re-agreement of something that the European Council already agreed over a year ago! I'm not joking.

Back in June 2012, the European Council agreed that a Banking Union was the way forward (PDF). The banking debts had to be severed from sovereign debts because Member State governments cannot bear the cost of this most Europeanised of market sectors. The Banking Union should also create a way for banks to be re-capitalised or wound up on a Eurozone basis, so that the debt crisis would not happen again. The European Council even decided to review the case for breaking the link between sovereign debt and existing bank debt - something that would do wonders for the balance sheets of the Irish and Spanish governments and ease the burden on their people considerably

This outbreak of good sense didn't last very long. In September 2012, Germany, along with The Netherlands and Finland, declared that not only will past banking debt not be severed from sovereign debt, but the European Stability Mechanism would not recapitalise banks instead of governments. Instead the order for recapitalising banks in the future would be: private funds, then Member State governments, and only then would the ESM step in. So three Member States had decided to completely void European policy agreed between 27 countries just 3 months ago, and they completely ruined the idea of a Banking Union. Why should countries bankrupt themselves saving banks, for the Eurozone to help out the banks directly more than the countries? It would be pure madness.

So now Kenny wants to return to the June Agreement:

"Speaking at an event in the National Gallery in Dublin celebrating the 50th anniversary of charity group Chesire Ireland, Mr Kenny said he would again urge European leaders to fulfil their pledge to break the link between sovereign and bank debt.

“One of the failings or inadequacies of the European Council over the years has been an inability to actually complete programmes where decisions are made,” he said

“In this regard, I refer to the decisions that were made last year in respect of banking union. For Ireland and for other countries, it is absolutely critical that we follow those things through to completion before moving on to any other agendas.”"

It's a farcical position to be in and it shows how little progress is being made, and it shows that Merkel is perhaps the most conservative Chancellor ever: she literally does not want to change anything, and will only sanction limited change if its aim is to make sure things stay the same. Once, Merkel described the internet as Neuland - "New Land" - but even as  the digital agenda is being discussed in Brussels, it feels like Europe is stuck in the twilight of Statusquoland. Even the German powerhouse economy can only expect 0.5% of growth this year.

So as Ireland, the Eurozone's star pupil, is preparing to leave the bailout programme, it's hard to be optimistic. Austerity has hardly worked wonders on the Irish economy, with government debt higher than at the start of the progamme, and employment soaring after 5 years of cuts. Without even the rewards of agreed Eurozone reform, many question how worthwhile the status of "star pupil" really is.

Statusquoland: If at first you don't succeed, apply the same rules more strictly.

Bundestagswahl 2013 - Merkel stays in control

The big headline - that Merkel remains in prime position after the German federal elections - isn't a big surprise, for Germany or for Europe. The shape of the next governing coalition and the impact on German and European politics, however, it a more complicated matter. As a parliamentary election, the German media have been calling the election too close to call, despite Merkel's CDU (and sister party CSU) having a 17% gap from its nearest rival, the centre-left SPD. Still, the Christian Democrats are within a few seats of an overall majority by themselves, so they are clearly in the driving seat for the next parliamentary period.

The SPD have improved on their electoral performance since the last elections, but it was nowhere near enough to challenge the CDU, with the Christian Democrats also increasing their share of the vote (and by an even greater amount than the SPD). The Christian Democrats have done extremely well, particularly given the leftwards drift of German politics. Over the last parliamentary term, there has been Fukashima (which tarnished the image of the nuclear industry and caused Merkel to U-Turn on the issue by promising the phasing out of nuclear power), the end of conscription (something the opposition wanted, and which shocked CDU traditionalists), and a sharp increase in the inequality gap in Germany.

But for each of these issues, Merkel has moved into the territory of her centre-left opponents, and essentially prevented them from making political capital out of these issues. The CDU has even gone into the election supporting a minimum wage! When Merkel has come to embody prudent management (despite passing remarkably little of her programme over the last two governments), the opposition has to offer change to get in. And if Merkel steals their policies for change...?

The Left Party and the Greens have lost votes in this election. While the Left Party had been in decline throughout the last few years, the Greens had been riding high, having even taken the senior coalition partner position in the Baden-Wuerttemberg Land government. Controversy over their tax policies has played badly in the media despite their best efforts to explain them, and has been a factor in losing support.

The biggest losers though are the junior coalition partners of the current government: the market liberal FDP. They have not met the 5% hurdle necessary in order to get into the Bundestag. CDU voters have not given their second vote to the FDP to make a right-wing coalition possible. On the other hand, the Eurosceptic party, Alternativ fuer Deutschland, has done quite well, and might just make it into the Bundestag.


Coalitions and Political Courses

All this means that a centre-left government is not going to form. The SPD have not done well enough, and the Greens have lost support, making the opposition coalition-in-waiting without a majority. If they add in the Left Party, they could forma majority, but the Left Party, with its East German Communist roots, is still not trusted on the federal level by the centre-left parties. Peer Steinbrueck, the SPD candidate for Chancellor, has ruled a coalition with the Left Party out, confirming that the CDU will lead the next government.

Therefore the CDU/CSU will probably form a Grand Coalition with the SPD (without the SPD candidate for Chancellor serving in the government, but that's not such a big problem for the SPD). There is the possibility of a CDU/CSU coalition with the Green party, as the Greens have gone into coalition with the CDU in Hamburg before, and the SPD are wary of Grand Coalitions since their experience in the first Merkel government, with Steinbrueck sounding negative about the idea. I still think that a Grand Coalition is the more likely outcome, however.

So what will be the effect on German and European politics? On the Eurozone, the opposition were in favour of Eurobonds and more radical action, so this option may find more favour with the next German government, though strong conditions would no doubt be attached. Within the next coalition, this could cause problems with the Christian Democrats' right wing, and the (relative) success of the Eurosceptic AfD might encourage more backbench rebellions from the CDU/CSU's right. (Notably, the AfD has claimed to be the inheritors of the FDP's political space).

That said, the good performance of the AfD probably won't have the same impact on the German political scene as UKIP have had in Britain. First of all, the AfD have only gained around 5% of the vote, and secondly, the CDU/CSU have increased their share of the vote by more than that - and specifically for the reason of Merkel's leadership, which includes the Eurocrisis. Finally, small parties tend to have a tough time in Germany. Though the Greens have done very well in becoming established, the rise and fall of the Pirate Party, and the more obvious collapse for the FDP, shows for the CDU as a Volkspartei (broad-church type party), that they can wait small parties out.

Continuity will be the watchword in German politics. The coalitions may chance, but Merkel remains in control. she dominates the political scene, and has set the pace of European politics. Freed by this win the speed of EU institutional reform may speed up, but I don't expect much divergence from the Merkel plan.

Merkelpolitik remains.

SPD Manifesto: A different course for Europe?

It's no secret that the European left are depending on a victory in Germany in this year's federal election before there can be some change of course on the Eurocrisis. With French, Italian and German elections within 18 months of each other (though the Italian one was more unexpected), the hope must have been to capture the big 3 Eurozone Member States to change the currency's political direction. It's an uphill battle: Hollande is struggling in the polls, the Italian centre-left failed to win a parliamentary majority, and at the moment Merkel's CDU are ahead of the SPD in the polls.

John Palmer over at Social Europe Journal, has questioned whether the SPD really do have the policy prescriptions that might help the Eurozone. Are the SPD putting forward vague promises or a more substantive platform for Europe? The SPD has published its election manifesto (PDF in German), where you can find the relevant European sections on pages 21-23 and 89-92.

Miteinander fuer mehr Soziale Marktwirtschaft in Europa - Working together for a more social market economy in Europe (pp.21-23):

"Wir wollen kein Europa, das Spielball der Maerkte ist, sondern eines, das im Interesse der Menschen handelt. Nur geeint und im festen Zusammenschluss der Europaeischen Union hat Europa eine Chance im globalen Wettbewerb von Ideen und Werten, von Politik und Wirtschaft. Aus diesem Grund wollen wir die Politische Union Europas weiter vertiefen.

[We don't want a Europe that is a plaything of the markets, but one that works in the interests of people. Only with a united European Union does Europe have a chance to compete globally when it comes to ideas, values, politics and economics. For this reason we want to further deepen the political union - (Own translation)]"

 

The SPD essentially agree on the need for a Banking Union with the ECB as a regulator for the big banks (but with national oversight for the medium and small banks), and are for a Bank Fund, funded by the banks, that will deal with future financial crises. They also want more harmonisation when it comes to taxation (including corporation tax). The commitment to Social Europe is repeated, with support for investment through a European Investment Fund and a further strengthening of the European Investment Bank.

Finally, the manifesto sets out the SPD's support for a European Debt Fund to ensure the capacities of the Eurozone members, in return for a binding debt reduction and reform plan.


Ein anderes und besseres Europa - A different and better Europe (pp.89-92):

This section is mostly rhetoric setting out the SPD's European identity and credentials in comparison to the governing parties. The SPD supports the development of the Commission as the executive of the EU, but with a stronger role for the European Parliament in electing it and holding it to account. The manifesto also highlights the PES primaries for their Commission president candidate. I'm glad to see the SPD explicitly support creating a parliamentary tradition on the European stage ("Auch so wird ein Stueck Parlamentstradition die in den Mitgliedsstaaten selbstverstaendlich ist, auch auf die EU Ebene gebracht" - Thus will a part of the parliamentary tradition of the Member States be brought to the EU stage).

Strikingly, the SPD places a "competence division" at the heart of the reform process - though the manifesto clearly aims towards a more European economic policy, the possibility for the return of powers to the national level is left open. Cameron's renegotiation policy may find more success if the more federalist opposition is elected than if his ideological neighbour is.

The SPD calls for a strong European Social Union, and an European economic government subject to European Parliament control, but these concepts remain vague (no doubt leaving more room for negotiation if the other Eurozone Member States accept the idea).


Conclusion

A victory for the SPD-Green opposition this autumn is not going to be revolutionary: the SPD support a lot of what is already in place or what will be put in place in terms of the Banking Union, Financial Transaction Tax and the bail-outs. But it would signal to the rest of the EU that a second pillar could be negotiated alongside the rigid rules for fiscal rigour.

It's still quite a vague vision, and a limited one. No mention is made of the possibility of a Eurozone budget and a Eurozone Parliament (or part of the European Parliament) when it comes to economic government, so investment funds, bonds and banks are the vehicles for economic investment. This means that essentially additions to the institutional architecture are being envisaged rather than a more flexible (and electorally responsive) vision of a central budget subject to the European Parliament. The manifesto may be more realistic when it comes to winning electoral support, but the worry on the left must be that these new bonds and institutions may not generate enough investment to counter the depressive effect of fiscal rigour in a recession.

Victory for the German Opposition in Niedersachsen

The Social Democrats and the Greens won a very tight election in Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) last night. Together a Red-Green coalition would have 69 seats in the state parliament to the outgoing, Merkel-aligned government's 68. The election was built up as an early indicator for the federal elections, with the CDU's Prime Ministerial candidate, David McAllister, enjoying a lot of personal support, just like Merkel on the federal level. In the end the CDU lost support, though they're still the biggest party in the Landtag.

The biggest surprise was the results of the liberal FDP party. The FDP were the unpopular junior coalition partner with the CDU in Niedersachsen as well as federally, and there were fears that the party would not have enough votes to cross the 5% threshold needed to get into the state parliament. This crisis mirrors the unpopularity of the FDP federally, and one of Merkel's fears is that her coalition partners may disappear from the Bundestag, leaving the CDU with only the opposition parties as possible coalition partners. In the end the FDP got a boost in Niedersachsen, with 14% of the vote (some CDU voters may have switched to voting FDP to help save them this time around). It's unclear if this unexpected victory will help Philipp Roesler, the FDP's embattled federal leader who has several FDP leaders openly agitating for his removal.

In contrast to the FDP, the Left Party and the Pirate Party failed to get into the state parliament. Meanwhile the Greens doubled their support.

For the Social Democrats' candidate for Chancellor, Peer Steinbrueck, the win will also be a relief. After scandals over being the highest earning MP for extra-parliamentary work, and his poor position in the polls compared to Merkel, the SPD needed a win. Steinbrueck, however, accepted that the federal SPD didn't exactly help the Niedersachsen SPD by giving momentum to their campaign. Steinbrueck faces an uphill struggle himself for popularity. Maybe a lesson to be drawn from Niedersachsen is to promote the party as a whole more so that voters want a Red-Green government, even if they'd prefer Merkel as Chancellor.

With a Red-Green government in Niedersachsen, the opposition have won enough votes in the Bundesrat, the upper house of the German parliament which represents the Laender, to block or stall legislation.

Agreement to agree on maybe agreeing. Perhaps.

The European Council once again agreed to agree on a Banking Union. It says a lot about the state of EU politics that this is a positive sign. The Guardian commented:

"What we are left with is a political fix which remains vulnerable to the fiscal equivalent of the next extreme weather event to hit the eurozone. The ESM, if it ever opens, is a cash machine. It will not solve the underlying factors that caused the mounting debt in the first place. That extreme event could come from a halting Chinese economy or double-dip US recession. Or it could come from mounting social protest. Europe-wide protests will grow because it is now clear, even to those who proposed radical cost-cutting at the G20 summit two years ago, that austerity is not working. The amputated limbs of the euro economy are not growing back of their own accord."

It's right to point out the vagueness and vulnerability of the agreement, but I'd go further: it won't take an extreme economic weather event to throw the agreement into doubt. Where was the extreme weather when Germany, Finland and the Netherlands tried to bury the June Agreement in Koenigstedt.

Yesterday the Journal.ie reported that the Irish dimension to the June Agreement may be revived:

"TAOISEACH ENDA KENNY and the German chancellor Angela Merkel have issued a joint statement affirming that Europe remains committed to splitting Ireland’s banking and sovereign debts.

[...]

The two “reaffirmed” that deal, where heads of state told the 17 Eurozone finance ministers “to examine the situation of the Irish financial sector with a view to further improving the sustainability of the well performing adjustment programme”.

The statement said Ireland was recognised as “a special case”, given the circumstances under which Ireland was frozen out of the bond markets, and said the finance ministers would take this into account when examining how to improve the terms of Ireland’s bailout deal."

While this is welcome, it still represents a regression from the deal struck in June: what is the purpose of the banking union if it doesn't divorce sovereigns from the banking debt, and how can it help in the current crisis if it doesn't affect the banking debt of Spain and Ireland? That there was a need to negotiate to return to a partial form of an earlier agreement demonstrates the farcical depths to which European politics has fallen. How can Member States progress on solving the crisis if they now have to work hard to ensure that the deals made aren't unravelled by ad hoc groups of Member States?

The European Council was hardly a shining beacon of good decision-making before, but this naked and self-defeating display of national interest politics is simply something else.

Schaeuble's Currency Commissioner

German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schaeuble, floated the idea of a currency commissioner in the run-up to this week's European Council summit. The currency commissioner would be able to veto national budgets, and would be independent of the rest of the College of Commissioners (the Commission takes decisions by majority vote) to "depoliticise" the role.

This idea is clearly bonkers. You cannot "depoliticise" the fundamental matter of national budgets, because you cannot pretend that budgets and economic issues are simply matters of technical wizardry, with expert options being implemented for desired outcomes - desired outcomes are political matters, and deserve a meaningful airing in a publically accountable body: the national parliament. While there is an argument for certain budgetary contraints on Eurozone Member States to ensure the functioning of the common currency - in exchange for solidarity between Member States, it should be stressed - at the end of the day Member States should be able to set their own budgets.

Rather than trying to come up with tighter and more rigid and better enforced rules for the Eurozone, we should be working to divorce banks from the sovereigns to make banking a European matter within the Eurozone, and creating a system where Member States can go bankrupt, without endangering the system and with some support for recovery after bankruptcy. A flexible and politically accountable system would work much better than Schaeuble's approach - there needs to be political accountability for national budgets at the national level, and at the European level for those elements of European solidarity.

Even on the European level of accountability, Schaeuble's plan fails: an independent currency commissioner would be free of the restraint of the rest of the college of commissioners (and here the issue of the nationality of said commissioner would come into political focus), and the ability of the European Parliament to hold him or her to account is also muddied. Could the EP sack this independent commissioner or only as a part of the Commission as a whole? Where's the balance between independence and accountability here?

Schaeuble's approach here reveals an underlying philosophy that's plan wrong. Money and budgets are political, and there needs to be democratic accountability and participation both nationally, and Eurozone-wide for the Euro to work. Once Schaeuble and others take account of this basic fact we might get to see more realistic and workable plans being suggested.

Quote of the Week: The Other Moral Hazard

From The Economist:

"There is a cost to delay and prevarication. It is harder for countries to reform without hope that their agony will end. Germany’s unwillingness to act except in the most dire moments condemns the euro zone to one acute crisis after another. In the short term Mrs Merkel may thus find herself fighting for re-election next year with the euro zone back in flames. In the longer term a chronic crisis is already creating permanent damage: prolonged economic stagnation and depression in deficit countries, loss of confidence in the credibility of governments and the future of the euro, and increasingly poisonous politics. Germany may fear the “legacy” costs of past mistakes. But it should also worry about the legacy of its hesitation and inaction."

EMU fatally undermined by the Koenigstedt Declaration

Has all the progress over the last 6 months been undone? The painfully slow summitry of the European Council has proven to be an inadequate firefighter, but there had been some movement towards a banking union and a working economic union. The biggest criticism was that European leaders were putting in the safeguards against the next crisis rather than trying to deal with the crisis we're currently in, but in last June's Euro Area Statement, the European Council finally seemed to have got it (PDF):

"We affirm that it is imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.

[...]

When an effective single supervisory mechanism is established, involving the ECB, for banks in the euro area the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly."

Finally! Banking union and economic union are based on this logic: that the financial markets are too big for the Eurozone Member States to deal with on their own, and that there needs to be a common regulatory policy, and the means to deal with problems posed by the banks. The statement even signalled support for breaking the link between sovereigns and existing banking debt as a way of  lessening the debt burden for crisis-hit states (especially Ireland and Spain, who stuck to the Stability and Growth Pact criteria):

"The Eurogroup will examine the situation of the Irish financial sector with the view of further improving the sustainability of the well-performing adjustment programme. Similar cases will be treated equally."

However Germany, Finland and the Netherlands have not only set out to turn back the clock on this progress, but to fatally undermine the rationale behind banking union as a concept. In Koenigstedt the three countries declared not only that there will be no deal on existing banking debts that have been taken on by European sovereigns, but that national sovereigns will have to take on banking debt until they have reached their capacity before the ESM should step in to fund the banks directly:

"We agreed that the implementation of the European Semester, including budgetary discipline and targets, in all countries remains key to ensuring financial stability; the ESM and the other crisis mechanisms can only play a supplementary role to these policies that are decided at the national level.

[...]

 Regarding longer term issues, we discussed basic principles for enabling direct ESM bank recapitalisation, which can only take place once the single supervisory mechanism is established and its effectiveness has been determined. Principles that should be incorporated in design of the instrument for direct recapitalization include: 1) direct recapitalisation decisions need to be taken by a regular decision of the ESM to be accompanied with a MoU; 2) the ESM can take direct responsibility of problems that occur under the new supervision, but legacy assets should be under the responsibility of national authorities; 3) the recapitalisation should always occur using estimated real economic values; 4) direct bank recapitalisation by the ESM should take place based on an approach that adheres to the basic order of first using private capital, then national public capital and only as a last resort the ESM.

[Emphasis mine]"

 Far from breaking the link between banking debts and the sovereign, this reinforces it. It states that the order of debt responsibility in the Eurozone is: private, national sovereigns, then the ESM, creating an order for future crises that follows our current debt and banking crisis. Far from pointing towards a sustainable solution for the crisis and a workable Eurozone, this wilfully ignores the lessons of the past 4 years and tries to cement the current Eurozone order.

Why then should we have a banking union at all? The idea behind the banking union is that the financial sector is truly European (and global), and that it needs to be regulated and controlled in common - national authorities are too small and weak to deal with the sector own their own anymore. If it is to be a national responsibility for now and all time - the Konigstedt direction - then why bother with European regulation and oversight? Where is the added value or common purpose to this?

Why this step? Is it because of the ECB's open commitment to bond-buying, and the (current) creditor states want to seize back as much control and initiative as possible? Whatever the reason, it's hard to see this unilateral redirection of the Eurozone as any help for any sense of common purpose at European summits. What's the point of Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain waiting for summit time to try and shift the consensus constructively if other Member States start undermining the process of common negotiation? At this rate, they should start holding summits and economic seminars of their own to promote their alternative vision of economic union and crisis resolution - after all, Germany et al have shown their contempt for common decision-making.

It's truly mind-boggling to think how self-absorbed the ministers at this Koenigstedt meeting must be. Not content with vague signals and behind-the-scenes work, they've simply decided to wreck all agreement up 'til now. Diplomacy is not the word.

A much needed referendum debate

Sigmund Gabriel of the German opposition SPD (PES) has called for Eurobonds as a necessary part of the solution to the Eurozone crisis, and for the referendum required to permit German participation. Although Gabriel is just one of the Troika that heads the SPD (Steinbrueck and Steinmeier are the other two), the - increasingly frequent - judgments from the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe have made it clear that further integration may require a referendum. So there has been a bit of a debate lately on when and how a referendum should be held over Europe - notably coming from the Finance Minister.

The German Constitution can be changed by the German Parliament (which is why it could be argued that the independence of the Bundesbank from political interference and pressure is slightly mythical), but Karlsruhe has essentially stated in its Lisbon Treaty Judgment that at some point a referendum would be needed. So despite the outcry from the governing parties that the SPD are being irresponsible in backing Eurobonds:

"Merkel spokesman Georg Streiter said the a German referendum "lies a very long way in the future"..."

Any fiscal union will need explicit consent from the people of the Eurozone, and there has to be an open political debate about the alternatives with competing proposals. The step-by-step approach that has been taken so far (in Europe generally, but in Germany and by Merkel especially) has a corrosive effect on the confidence in national and European political leadership and ability, and in the idea that there is a solution. What we have now is a strategy that breeds cynicism, to the extent that it's hard to know if there is a strategy at all and we have to engage with a new type of Kremlinology centred entirely on the contents of Merkel's head! Without even a debate on the future of fiscal union, it's hard to see any political deal produced at the end of this process being accepted after all the suspicion and bickering that will likely continue for another 2 years, if not longer.

So the debate is necessary for any plan to have a hope of working. Speaking in favour of Eurobonds is not the same as making an open commitment to Eurobonds to be introduced as soon as possible (the SPD are still quite close to the government on conditionality, but with more solidarity); it needs to be part of a deal that covers conditions and democratic oversight. It cannot be a technical fix introduced at breaking point, but the product of an open political process. Utopian to hope for given all the summitry, but necessary if we're to have any hope of creating a workable compromise.

Note: Juergen Habermas' (et al) article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (here in German) has been linked to the SPD's move, and Habermas will be involved in the SPD's manifesto for the next German elections. Other interesting articles on the SPD's website on Eurobonds and meeting their Spanish counterparts here and here.

Waning German solidarity?

Yesterday Angela Merkel made it clear that the next German federal election will be fought on Europe, and that she would continue to fight for the current approach to the crisis (in more detail in German here). Not something to enthuse her many detractors and those who want to see more solidarity in Germany's approach to the Eurozone. But it's not only Europe - the Transfer Union is taking a bit of a knock in Germany too, as the state of Bavaria has taken a case to the German Constitutional Court to complain at the fiscal transfers it has to pay to the other German states.

"Bavaria is not really German", is something you might hear in Germany. The Freistaat Bayern certainly has a very distinct identity within the German federation - Merkel's party doesn't organise there, but allies with the separate sister party of the Christian Social Union, which is part of her governing coalition in Berlin. For now the Bavarian government remains unique in bringing its challenge before the constitutional court, with the other contributing states preferring to continue with negotiations with the recipients. The Bavarian Prime Minister Horst Seehofer (CSU) has been issuing complaints and threats over the Länderfinanzausgleich (clumsy translation: "Financial equalisation of the states") for a while, and has been a firm opponent of Eurobonds and further Eurozone integration. While the idea of banking union - and the move towards the separation of banks from the states - has been generally well received around Europe, Seehofer insists that the state ultimately remains liable for European support: something that contradicts Spain's preferred narrative and direction.

It will be interesting to see how the debate over fiscal transfers in Germany develops, and if it will impact on the wider European debate on the Eurocrisis. Tagesschau has already pointed out that though Bavaria is by far the largest contributor, it has also benefited a lot in the past from fiscal transfers. In any case, it serves as a reminder that German state politics have the potential to impact on the European debate, and that talk of any kind of European transfer union will be compared to the state of the German one domestically.

Choppy waters for the Fiscal Stability Treaty in the Bundestag

BY CC norbert_blech

It's interesting to see the politics of passing the Fiscal Stability Treaty in the German Bundestag over the last few weeks. Angela Merkel's government needs the opposition for the two thirds majority needed to pass the Treaty, and the opposition Social Democrats and Greens are trying to extract concessions on a growth agenda for Europe that echoes some of François Hollande's proposals.

The opposition wants:

- The strengthening of the European Investment Bank.
- Bonds for the indebted countries of the EU (I understand this to mean bonds that cover the debts in excess of the 60% of GDP-limit).
- Better use of the EU structural funds.
- Project bonds.
- A financial transaction tax.

(There is also an issue of how it will affect the Bundesländer, or the states, and local government).

The biggest clash lately has been over the financial transaction tax (FTT). Initially the government said that it would be impossible for an FTT to be brought in before the end of the legislative period, but now the Commission has come out contradicting the German government. The Süddeutsche Zeitung reports that it could be possible to pass a law on FTT by the end of the year, and collect the tax in 2014 (in the next German legislative period). If the FTT is to pass this year, it will be under enhanced cooperation between at least 9 Member States, given that taxation is still subject to the veto and the UK refusal to sign up to an FTT. Die Süddeutsche notes that the finance ministers of Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Finland, Belgium and Austria signed up to the principle of an FTT in February, though obviously there would be a lot of detail to hammer out between them, and there's no guarantee an FTT coalition will look the same when it comes to passing the law.

It's worth noting that the Süddeutsche also reports that the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, seems to be considering another extra-EU treaty if it would be a faster way of achieving an FTT. What could this mean for the talking point of the month, the Banking Union? If an FTT was seen as a way of financing support of the financial sector without burdening the taxpayer, then it could be dangerous for other Eurozone countries to sit out talks on this FTT if it could be expanded to fit into the Banking Union or be taken as a model for it. Another extra-EU treaty would be a bad direction to go in: the EU provides a procedure for further integration of a group of Member States, and circumventing the EU institutions further poisons the trust in the rules and procedures agreed to by all Member States being respected.

The Fiscal Stability Treaty is part of a piecemeal approach that is rightly open to criticism: it doesn't solve the crisis in itself, and without a comprehensive deal on what a fiscal union will look like, these half-measures will erode confidence in the ability of the Eurozone to get its affairs in order. Hopefully this initiative of the German opposition will help push a more balanced and fairer approach to the Eurozone crisis, but it would be better if the left started cooperating across borders on what it wants to see from a fiscal union.

Hup Hollande Hup!

Sunday was a big election day for Europe. France elected its first Socialist President in 17 years with Francois Hollande, and the Greek electorate looks like it has given the two main parties a huge kicking.

Hollande will add to the pressure for a change in direction in the EU when it comes to austerity, and Hollande has already set himself up to be the leader of counter-austerity Europe. Though he will undoubtedly clash with Merkel, in the end they’re likely to muddle through unless Merkel sticks to an absolutist vision of austerity Europe. With austerity failing in practical terms – S&P used its report on Spain to critique the front-loaded austerity programme and the EU’s general policy – and countries like Italy voicing the need for a better approach to growth (while endorsing austerity in general), the political winds look like they will shift the continent leftwards to a degree (Europe is still dominated by the centre-right EPP political family).

Within Germany there is more debate on Eurobonds, etc, than I think outside commentators give credit for, though there is still a lack of debate. The opposition Social Democrats and Greens are more enthusiastic on Eurobonds and deeper fiscal integration, but the rise of the Pirate Party makes the German political scene more unpredictable. Germany has been caught up in a lot of comment on the rise of Die Piraten: what exactly are they about? Do they have the kind of leadership structure or policy programme that makes them a credible force? If they remain so unstructured – and wedded to “fluid democracy” (crudely put, where policy is crafted online by activists and then represented in parliament by Pirate representatives) – could they ever be capable of coalition with the other parties?

Sunday brought an election in the Northern German Land of Schleswig-Holstein, where the Pirate Party gained 8.3%, and there was little between the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), even if the centre-left coalition is ahead - the rival Christian Democrats-Liberal bloc trial the Social Democratic-Green bloc 39% to 43.4%. It now looks like the Social Democrats will lead a coalition with the Greens and the Danish minority party SSW (which is not subject to the same 5% threshold as the other parties), that may have a majority of just 1. The Liberal FDP is unlikely to do as well at the federal level as in Schleswig-Holstein (honestly, after the bad year they’ve had, being kicked out of one state parliament after another, their 8.2% vote in S-H is a huge victory), but it just demonstrates how the sudden rise of the Pirates could splinter the political field further.

Muddling along will likely continue in Europe, except now the hope is that we’ll start to see a direction with more solidarity develop. The biggest shock to the system will be the Greek elections, where it could be very difficult indeed to form the next government. With the far-right getting into parliament and the collapse in the vote for the two main parties, political instability is going to dog Greece and the rest of Europe for a long time to come. France and Germany can’t afford to squabble for too long: Greece will be bursting back on to the agenda before we know it.

And the referendum in Ireland? I don’t know how much Hollande’s election will make a difference until – or if – he makes it clear if he is seeking another treaty to supplement the Fiscal Stability Treaty or a renegotiation. From what he’s said it looks like he wants an extra treaty – it’ll be easier to get this, as it will be easier for Merkel to agree to this without losing face – and Ireland might be in a difficult position if it rejects the treaty to push a joint cause with Hollande... and then have to re-run the referendum in order to get the second treaty too (though it should then be clear that enough’s changed to have a re-run at least). The vote’s not until the end of May, so there’s still some time to read the signals from the Élysée.

Merkel's Intervention

Merkel's intervention in the French elections yesterday - effectively attacking Hollande by stating that there will be no renegotiation of the Fiscal Stability Treaty - strikes me as bizarre. If she's hoping that this will discredit Hollande and lead to voters voting Sarkozy, I can't see how it will work (will those who voted for the far-right be more willing to vote for the candidate closest to German policy, or the candidate who is almost setting himself up as the leader of an anti-German leadership alliance?).

It's also starting to seem a bit desperate. Hollande's position isn't really so radical: no renegotiation of the treaty itself, but some new measures before it will be adopted. Since 90% the treaty is already EU law, Merkel's discipline provisions are in reality safe from Hollande. Even the Eurobonds Hollande is proposing aren't connected to mutualising debt, but for investment in infrastructure, etc. Calls for the remit of the ECB to also have encouraging growth and employment as part of its task will find a lot of sympathy in other states too. Is Merkel really going to set her face against all of this?

The Eurozone crisis is worsening day by day and the same austerity approach isn't working for anyone (even in Ireland there is talk that a second bailout might be needed - indeed, the Yes side in favour of the Fiscal Stability Treaty relies on this need for access to bailout funds to gain support for the treaty). While economic reforms are necessary, this extreme austerity is an insane way of going about it. The German government wants its fellow Eurozone states in a strange limbo of danger, where there is enough stability that the reforms can be implemented, but sufficient economic danger to ensure governments will enact these reforms.

While the German government may think it's the only way bailout states won't flush money down the drain, the political logic doesn't - and cannot - add up. The lack of a solution simply worsens the situation and spreads the crisis to yet more Eurozone states, while draining away the political support for the Euro in general, leaving people cynical that any of this mystic summitry the European Council engages in is a waste of time. All pain, no gain.

For Merkel to refuse even  Hollande's modest proposals would be disastrous. The political winds are starting to blow against austerity, and Germany's great adapter will have a very tumultuous EU on her hands if she decides she won't give an inch.

The Troubles of the New Fiscal Compact

Yesterday I wrote about the left and the new fiscal compact, and I've noted that the centre-left PES seems to be hoping that the French and German elections will help replace our current Merkozy with a PES version. EUObserver has reported that a majority of the French public (52%) are opposed to the (as yet undrafted) EU deal on fiscal union, largely following left-right lines. The Socialist challenger for the presidency, Francois Hollande:

"...announced that he would renegotiate the document.

"If I am elected president, I will renegotiate the agreement to put what it lacks today," he told RTL.

He said that he would “add what is missing”, mentioning he would push to include intervention from the European Central Bank, the creation of eurobonds and a financial relief fund.

“Finally, there must also be growth,” he added. “Without growth, we will not reach any of our objectives of deficit reduction.”

The Frenchman attacked the core concept of the new agreement, a ‘golden rule’, or balanced budget amendment that should be inscribed into constitutions, in effect preventing future governments from exercising expansionary fiscal policies.

Asked about the golden rule, the candidate said he would not vote for it “under this logic”."

While not all of the troubles fall along clearly drawn left-right battlelines, I think it's fair to say that it would be a mistake to read in a support for the UK negotiating position, as the issues seem to be based around the content of fiscal union rather than either the question of having a fiscal union or voting arrangements for regulating the financial services. Apart from the right-left divide is the concern of the non-Eurozone countries, like Hungary, that it would lead to tax harmonisation even outside the Eurozone. I don't know if this is being discussed (it wasn't mentioned in the deal produced last week), but it seems unlikely that there will be tax harmonisation even for the Eurozone, given so many Eurozone members are against it.

But the main issues will be those Hollande has highlighted: how much solidarity there should be in fiscal union. Merkel is kidding herself (or talking up the value of the deal for her domestic audiance) if she thinks that the deal on the table means political union - the greatest challenge to the deal will come from the push against the maintanence of the German sacred cows of retaining the ECB's current role and the ruling out of Eurobonds. However, it is doubtful that these ambitious goals could be won as well as removing the "golden budget rule" (who knows, maybe any financial relief fund would be sold as a counter-balance to national austerity brought about by the golden rule). The question is whether this pressure (and that of the markets) will force the negotiations to move further and further away from the starting points agreed on this month...

Eurocrisis, Democratic Deficit and the Re:New Conference

Throughout the Re:New Conference references were made to that most European of monsters: Merkozy. Yesterday Sarkozy spoke, and today Merkel has spoken in the Bundestag about Europe and the Eurozone. While European integration - and a new treaty - was held up to be necessary, Merkel rejected Eurobonds as expensive and unconstitutional. At the same time, the European Parliament has passed a resolution, declaring that it should have equal powers with the Council over any new features of economic union (such as an EU Finance Minister) so that there is sufficient democratic oversight.

The same day Sarkozy, in Gaullist mode, firmly signalled that any further changes would be purely intergovernmental:

""The reform of Europe is not a march towards supra-nationality," Sarkozy said. "Europe will reform itself by pragmatically drawing the lessons of the crisis. The crisis has pushed the heads of state and government to assume greater responsibilities because ultimately they have the democratic legitimacy to take decisions."

"The integration of Europe will go the inter-governmental way because Europe needs to make strategic political choices.""

At first sight the battle between Merkozy and the EP might seem to be a foregone conclusion: the duo have sidelined the EU institutions so far in the Eurocrisis and Treaty change is itself intergovernmental, so how much power can influence can the Parliament, with falling turnout numbers, and the Commission, which has hardly been bursting with energy, bring to bear. However, intergovernmentalism favours secretive processes and large countries over transparency and smaller countries. I've written before about the faultlines dividing the European debate, and these will spur some Member States to fight for more supranationalism.

In the long run intergovernmentalism will be a mistake as is disempowers citizens and promotes a cynical them-and-us culture between the rest of us and the Paris-Berlin duopoly that is unhealthly for European politics and damaging to democracy. But it's also damaging in the short term - by going for intergovernmentalist solutions, the suspicion and anger with the Franco-German concentration of power will crystalise: should this summitry with France and Germany at the top - which has hardly worked wonders during this crisis - be not just for crises, but for life? Without QMV, Commission oversight and Parliamentary input, the majority of the Eurozone and Non-Eurozone states and citizens are threatened with the prospect of being marginalised within the EU structure. So far we've been working ad hoc, pretty much outside of the treaties. Now we're talking about committing ourselves to these governing structures by treaty.

That's not to say that the European Parliament is a great cure for this democratic deficit: though over last weekend I saw a PES that spoke like an opposition and proposed a different vision for the EU, as an opposition the PES, and other Europarties, remain too detached from citizens and even their national parties. It seems to me that supporters of a more democratic EU need to focus more energy on reforming the Europarties so that they can seriously propose new policies and debate them in public. This requires not just some autonomy on the part of the Europarties - you could argue they have autonomy at the moment since the national parties don't pay much attention to them for policy matters - but commitment from the national parties to help shape, debate and campaign on these policies.

With the PES in opposition almost everywhere in the EU, this should be easier for them to achieve. Could a basic common platform not provide a voice for the centre-left during the crisis both in Member States and at the EU level? The divisions between national parties and the protection of national party autonomy from European commitments are great and understandable, but it's hard to see how the centre-left - the opposition - can effectively put forward their own narrative and solutions if they cannot build a European coalition, even on a basic level, that can make their visions at a national level sound realistic. Given that pan-european crises of this scale are - thankfully - rare, I wouldn't expect much progress to happen in this area, which is why I hope a contest between Europarties for the Commission Presidency would push politics further along this path. But that's too long-term, and this crisis is progressing too rapidly.

I'm not a member of a political party, but if I believe in promoting democracy at a European level, then perhaps I should become one and add my voice, in whatever small way, to the need for a better European politics. Because we can't just hope that it will simply emerge to inspire a demand for it; rather those of us who want it should demand it, and demand it loudly. Despite my criticisms of the lack of policy at the PES Conference, I did see some vision there. If we want to have an inclusive EU rather than a concentrated summitry, then we'll have to strengthen our Europarties so they can represent us better.

Happy 3rd of October!

It's Leiden's Ontzet and Germany's reunification day (or day of German unity). Have a great day!