Martin Schulz: Political, Left-wing and Federalist

Yesterday Martin Schulz, the President of the European Parliament, was announced to be the Party of European Socialists' candidate for the Commission Presidency.

So who is Martin Schulz? A former binder and book-shop owner, Schulz's only experience in political office outside of the European Parliament was at the local level as a councillor and then mayor of Wuerselen in Germany. He was elected to the European Parliament in 1994, was head of the PES/S&D group between 2004-2012 and has been president of the Parliament since 2012.

This experience is both a weakness and a strength. The current trend for Commission presidents is for them to be selected from the ranks of former prime ministers, and it's easy to see why. Name recognition, executive and diplomatic experience and (for members of the European Council) an understanding of national leaders. While Schulz doesn't have this, he clearly knows the EU institutions inside out and currently leads one. Speaking German, French and English and having lead a multi-national political group in the Parliament for 8 years, he should have a good grasp of EU political issues, how the institutions work (and how to work them) and how to build coalitions at the European level. Compared to a former prime minister who is offered the job, Schulz clearly sees the Commission presidency as the top job in his career and will probably be more politically ambitious in the role.

As a more openly political Commission president, a Commission lead by him would probably be more combative. Schulz sees wants the election to be a battle of ideas. As president of the European Parliament for almost 2 years, he hasn't actually voted on many of the most recent and controversial policies (as it's not the role of the president), but he has been a vocal president (no doubt with an eye on the upcoming campaign). In the last few months he's called for immigration reform (and wants Germany to take more refugees), supported pausing the trade talks with the US over the spying affair, supports a smaller Commission, sees the balance between large and small Member Sates shifting too much towards the larger ones, and is anti-austerity and wants Eurozone reforms (including a Currency Commissioner who chairs the Eurogroup). 

It's an open question how far he can take this combativeness from the Commission - the Commission still needs Council and Parliament approval to pass legislation. However, having an outspoken President could be a positive for small member states who want the Commission to do more to counterbalance the big countries, provided that they feel they can hang on to their Commissioners. Those who want an active Commission or to change the economic direction of Europe could see him as the man to pin their political hopes on, but Schulz will need to build broad support across Europe to get the votes he needs, and it might not be the biggest electorate in the world. Though with Eurosceptic parties established as the protest vote and rising in popularity, the PES probably can no longer simply rely on anti-incumbency sentiment to boost its vote. A more coherent anti-austerity vision may actually be the better than national parties simply going their own way. Politically and rhetorically, Schulz is to the left of several of the PES's member parties, though his main Eurozone and anti-austerity ideas are not too far outside the mainstream of the pro-integration centre-left.

How much Schulz's opinions will make it into the PES election manifesto remains to be seen, but Schulz has used the EP presidency to set out his leadership style: political, left-wing and federalist on the Eurozone and not afraid to annoy the bigger Member States. Whatever your political opinion, you can't accuse him of being another Barroso. Obviously this makes him an unlikely choice as the European Council's pick for the Commission, which makes electoral success all the more important for Schulz. He not only needs the PES/S&D to emerge as the winners of the election, but he has to be a visible and successful part of the campaign so that he can't be sidelined by the European Council. As I said yesterday, the lack of an open primary contest makes this more difficult.

Austrian Elections: The Grand Coalition lives on

As the results of the Austrian elections came in yesterday, it was clear that the Social Democrat-led Grand Coalition will live on, if a little battered. The result will come as a relief to the Party of European Socialists, and Werner Faymann who can look forward to continue to lead the Austrian government after having failed to unseat Merkel last week.

Grand Coalitions are practically an Austrian tradition, with the majority of governments consisting of the centre-left SPOe and centre-right OeVP carving up power and ministerial posts between them. (This was a reaction to the turbulent politics of the Inter-War period, when Austria was very ideologically divided). So a Grand Coalition is not really a surprising result.

More notably, the far-right Freedom Party (FPOe) has increased its share of the votes to 21.4%, in an election with asylum as a hot topic. This increase of 3.9% should be since in the context of the other far right party, BZOe, (set up by Joerg Haider splitting away from the FPOe) losing 7.1% of their vote, dropping to 3.6% (the BZOe have tried to become more liberal/libertarian recently). The new Liberal party, NEOS, did slightly better than the BZOe, while the Greens also increased their vote marginally. The biggest winner of the election is probably the businessman Frank Stronach who set up a political party ("Team Stronach") as his personal political vehicle, winning 5.8%. Team Stronach are an economically liberal, Eurosceptic party, though it's not focused on the immigration issue in the same way that the Freedom Party is.

The 4% threshold to enter parliament means that apart from the BZOe, all of these parties will get in. Despite the centre-left lead coalition, the right has grown in Austria, with various strains of populism doing well. Having continuous Grand Coalitions probably doesn't help: without a clearer contest in the centre ground, the political space in opposition is left more open to populist parties.

In the end this election brought even more of what the German election last week brought: continuity.

Bundestagswahl 2013 - Merkel stays in control

The big headline - that Merkel remains in prime position after the German federal elections - isn't a big surprise, for Germany or for Europe. The shape of the next governing coalition and the impact on German and European politics, however, it a more complicated matter. As a parliamentary election, the German media have been calling the election too close to call, despite Merkel's CDU (and sister party CSU) having a 17% gap from its nearest rival, the centre-left SPD. Still, the Christian Democrats are within a few seats of an overall majority by themselves, so they are clearly in the driving seat for the next parliamentary period.

The SPD have improved on their electoral performance since the last elections, but it was nowhere near enough to challenge the CDU, with the Christian Democrats also increasing their share of the vote (and by an even greater amount than the SPD). The Christian Democrats have done extremely well, particularly given the leftwards drift of German politics. Over the last parliamentary term, there has been Fukashima (which tarnished the image of the nuclear industry and caused Merkel to U-Turn on the issue by promising the phasing out of nuclear power), the end of conscription (something the opposition wanted, and which shocked CDU traditionalists), and a sharp increase in the inequality gap in Germany.

But for each of these issues, Merkel has moved into the territory of her centre-left opponents, and essentially prevented them from making political capital out of these issues. The CDU has even gone into the election supporting a minimum wage! When Merkel has come to embody prudent management (despite passing remarkably little of her programme over the last two governments), the opposition has to offer change to get in. And if Merkel steals their policies for change...?

The Left Party and the Greens have lost votes in this election. While the Left Party had been in decline throughout the last few years, the Greens had been riding high, having even taken the senior coalition partner position in the Baden-Wuerttemberg Land government. Controversy over their tax policies has played badly in the media despite their best efforts to explain them, and has been a factor in losing support.

The biggest losers though are the junior coalition partners of the current government: the market liberal FDP. They have not met the 5% hurdle necessary in order to get into the Bundestag. CDU voters have not given their second vote to the FDP to make a right-wing coalition possible. On the other hand, the Eurosceptic party, Alternativ fuer Deutschland, has done quite well, and might just make it into the Bundestag.


Coalitions and Political Courses

All this means that a centre-left government is not going to form. The SPD have not done well enough, and the Greens have lost support, making the opposition coalition-in-waiting without a majority. If they add in the Left Party, they could forma majority, but the Left Party, with its East German Communist roots, is still not trusted on the federal level by the centre-left parties. Peer Steinbrueck, the SPD candidate for Chancellor, has ruled a coalition with the Left Party out, confirming that the CDU will lead the next government.

Therefore the CDU/CSU will probably form a Grand Coalition with the SPD (without the SPD candidate for Chancellor serving in the government, but that's not such a big problem for the SPD). There is the possibility of a CDU/CSU coalition with the Green party, as the Greens have gone into coalition with the CDU in Hamburg before, and the SPD are wary of Grand Coalitions since their experience in the first Merkel government, with Steinbrueck sounding negative about the idea. I still think that a Grand Coalition is the more likely outcome, however.

So what will be the effect on German and European politics? On the Eurozone, the opposition were in favour of Eurobonds and more radical action, so this option may find more favour with the next German government, though strong conditions would no doubt be attached. Within the next coalition, this could cause problems with the Christian Democrats' right wing, and the (relative) success of the Eurosceptic AfD might encourage more backbench rebellions from the CDU/CSU's right. (Notably, the AfD has claimed to be the inheritors of the FDP's political space).

That said, the good performance of the AfD probably won't have the same impact on the German political scene as UKIP have had in Britain. First of all, the AfD have only gained around 5% of the vote, and secondly, the CDU/CSU have increased their share of the vote by more than that - and specifically for the reason of Merkel's leadership, which includes the Eurocrisis. Finally, small parties tend to have a tough time in Germany. Though the Greens have done very well in becoming established, the rise and fall of the Pirate Party, and the more obvious collapse for the FDP, shows for the CDU as a Volkspartei (broad-church type party), that they can wait small parties out.

Continuity will be the watchword in German politics. The coalitions may chance, but Merkel remains in control. she dominates the political scene, and has set the pace of European politics. Freed by this win the speed of EU institutional reform may speed up, but I don't expect much divergence from the Merkel plan.

Merkelpolitik remains.

SPD Manifesto: A different course for Europe?

It's no secret that the European left are depending on a victory in Germany in this year's federal election before there can be some change of course on the Eurocrisis. With French, Italian and German elections within 18 months of each other (though the Italian one was more unexpected), the hope must have been to capture the big 3 Eurozone Member States to change the currency's political direction. It's an uphill battle: Hollande is struggling in the polls, the Italian centre-left failed to win a parliamentary majority, and at the moment Merkel's CDU are ahead of the SPD in the polls.

John Palmer over at Social Europe Journal, has questioned whether the SPD really do have the policy prescriptions that might help the Eurozone. Are the SPD putting forward vague promises or a more substantive platform for Europe? The SPD has published its election manifesto (PDF in German), where you can find the relevant European sections on pages 21-23 and 89-92.

Miteinander fuer mehr Soziale Marktwirtschaft in Europa - Working together for a more social market economy in Europe (pp.21-23):

"Wir wollen kein Europa, das Spielball der Maerkte ist, sondern eines, das im Interesse der Menschen handelt. Nur geeint und im festen Zusammenschluss der Europaeischen Union hat Europa eine Chance im globalen Wettbewerb von Ideen und Werten, von Politik und Wirtschaft. Aus diesem Grund wollen wir die Politische Union Europas weiter vertiefen.

[We don't want a Europe that is a plaything of the markets, but one that works in the interests of people. Only with a united European Union does Europe have a chance to compete globally when it comes to ideas, values, politics and economics. For this reason we want to further deepen the political union - (Own translation)]"

 

The SPD essentially agree on the need for a Banking Union with the ECB as a regulator for the big banks (but with national oversight for the medium and small banks), and are for a Bank Fund, funded by the banks, that will deal with future financial crises. They also want more harmonisation when it comes to taxation (including corporation tax). The commitment to Social Europe is repeated, with support for investment through a European Investment Fund and a further strengthening of the European Investment Bank.

Finally, the manifesto sets out the SPD's support for a European Debt Fund to ensure the capacities of the Eurozone members, in return for a binding debt reduction and reform plan.


Ein anderes und besseres Europa - A different and better Europe (pp.89-92):

This section is mostly rhetoric setting out the SPD's European identity and credentials in comparison to the governing parties. The SPD supports the development of the Commission as the executive of the EU, but with a stronger role for the European Parliament in electing it and holding it to account. The manifesto also highlights the PES primaries for their Commission president candidate. I'm glad to see the SPD explicitly support creating a parliamentary tradition on the European stage ("Auch so wird ein Stueck Parlamentstradition die in den Mitgliedsstaaten selbstverstaendlich ist, auch auf die EU Ebene gebracht" - Thus will a part of the parliamentary tradition of the Member States be brought to the EU stage).

Strikingly, the SPD places a "competence division" at the heart of the reform process - though the manifesto clearly aims towards a more European economic policy, the possibility for the return of powers to the national level is left open. Cameron's renegotiation policy may find more success if the more federalist opposition is elected than if his ideological neighbour is.

The SPD calls for a strong European Social Union, and an European economic government subject to European Parliament control, but these concepts remain vague (no doubt leaving more room for negotiation if the other Eurozone Member States accept the idea).


Conclusion

A victory for the SPD-Green opposition this autumn is not going to be revolutionary: the SPD support a lot of what is already in place or what will be put in place in terms of the Banking Union, Financial Transaction Tax and the bail-outs. But it would signal to the rest of the EU that a second pillar could be negotiated alongside the rigid rules for fiscal rigour.

It's still quite a vague vision, and a limited one. No mention is made of the possibility of a Eurozone budget and a Eurozone Parliament (or part of the European Parliament) when it comes to economic government, so investment funds, bonds and banks are the vehicles for economic investment. This means that essentially additions to the institutional architecture are being envisaged rather than a more flexible (and electorally responsive) vision of a central budget subject to the European Parliament. The manifesto may be more realistic when it comes to winning electoral support, but the worry on the left must be that these new bonds and institutions may not generate enough investment to counter the depressive effect of fiscal rigour in a recession.

A Czech President and a Bulgarian Poll

Milos Zeman, a former social democrat Prime Minister, won the first direct elections to the office of Czech president at the weekend. The presidency in the Czech Republic is mostly ceremonial, though Vaclav Klaus used the position to great effect in his opposition to the Lisbon Treaty during the Czech presidency of the Council. Before this the President was indirectly elected.

Zeman led the polls in the first round of the election at 24.2%, followed by Karel Schwarzenberg's 23.4%. Schwarzenberg was foreign minister during part the Czech presidency of the EU. As the BBC reports:

"Mr Zeman is seen as a hard-drinking, chain-smoking politician, known for his witty put-downs of opponents.

[...]

[Schwarzenberg is] A titled prince, 75 years old but wildly popularly amongst young, urban voters, in the early 1990s, he worked as chancellor to the President Vaclav Havel, the leader of the Velvet Revolution that brought down Communist rule in 1989."

Both of them beat the eye-catching  university professor Vladimír Franz in the first round.

The final result was 54.8% to Zeman and 45.19% to Schwarzenberg. Both Zeman and Schwarzenberg are more pro-European than Vaclav Klaus.


While the Czech Republic was holding its first direct presidential elections, Bulgaria was running its first referendum since the end of the Communist era. The referendum was on whether to build the country's first nuclear power station (which would cost €10 billion), but the referendum failed to pass due to the very low turnout in the harsh wintry weather. The 20% turnout meant that the referendum didn't reach the 60% threshold to make the poll valid.

The left-wing opposition is celebrating the vote in favour of the nuclear power station as a victory, even if the vote is not binding.

Victory for the German Opposition in Niedersachsen

The Social Democrats and the Greens won a very tight election in Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) last night. Together a Red-Green coalition would have 69 seats in the state parliament to the outgoing, Merkel-aligned government's 68. The election was built up as an early indicator for the federal elections, with the CDU's Prime Ministerial candidate, David McAllister, enjoying a lot of personal support, just like Merkel on the federal level. In the end the CDU lost support, though they're still the biggest party in the Landtag.

The biggest surprise was the results of the liberal FDP party. The FDP were the unpopular junior coalition partner with the CDU in Niedersachsen as well as federally, and there were fears that the party would not have enough votes to cross the 5% threshold needed to get into the state parliament. This crisis mirrors the unpopularity of the FDP federally, and one of Merkel's fears is that her coalition partners may disappear from the Bundestag, leaving the CDU with only the opposition parties as possible coalition partners. In the end the FDP got a boost in Niedersachsen, with 14% of the vote (some CDU voters may have switched to voting FDP to help save them this time around). It's unclear if this unexpected victory will help Philipp Roesler, the FDP's embattled federal leader who has several FDP leaders openly agitating for his removal.

In contrast to the FDP, the Left Party and the Pirate Party failed to get into the state parliament. Meanwhile the Greens doubled their support.

For the Social Democrats' candidate for Chancellor, Peer Steinbrueck, the win will also be a relief. After scandals over being the highest earning MP for extra-parliamentary work, and his poor position in the polls compared to Merkel, the SPD needed a win. Steinbrueck, however, accepted that the federal SPD didn't exactly help the Niedersachsen SPD by giving momentum to their campaign. Steinbrueck faces an uphill struggle himself for popularity. Maybe a lesson to be drawn from Niedersachsen is to promote the party as a whole more so that voters want a Red-Green government, even if they'd prefer Merkel as Chancellor.

With a Red-Green government in Niedersachsen, the opposition have won enough votes in the Bundesrat, the upper house of the German parliament which represents the Laender, to block or stall legislation.

Dutch Elections: "The Political Centre is Back!"

The centre is back is the news out of The Netherlands today - from De Volkskrant:

"De PvdA en de VVD boeken vandaag allebei een enorme verkiezingsoverwinning. Samen met het CDA en D66 behalen de middenpartijen maar liefst 106 zetels. Het politieke midden is terug. En Europa is de grote winnaar van de avond.

[Own translation: 'Today Labour and the Party of Freedom and Democracy (right-wing liberals) have had a enormous election win . Together with the Christian Democrats and Social Liberals, the parties of the centre hold up to 106 seats. The political centre is back. And Europe is the biggest winner this evening.]"

At the time of writing with constituencies still to be declared, the results are (Europarty/seat change in brackets):

VVD (ELDR): 41 (+10). [This is the party of the outgoing Prime Minister Mark Rutte].
PvdA (PES): 39 (+9).
SP (GUE-NGL): 15 (0).
PVV (None): 15 (-9).
CDA (EPP): 13 (-8).
D66 (ELDR): 12 (+2).
GroenLinks (European Greens): 3 (-7).
Christen Unie (ECR): 5 (0).
SGP (EFD): 3 (+1).
PvdD (None): 2 (0).
50Plus (None): 2 (+2).

De Volkskrant is predicting a coalition of the centre and notes that the old coalition of VVD-CDA with support from Geert Wilders' anti-Islam and anti-Europe PVV  would not have enough seats to form a majority (now around 69 seats) and that governments of the left and right blocks are only "theoretically possible". Clearly despite the big gains for the centre right and left the Dutch political system is still quite fragmented. If a grand coalition is formed it will be interesting to see if the return to the political centre will continue, or if the extremes will grow in opposition. The head-to-head race between the VVD and PvdA with different outlooks on key policy areas has probably been a big factor in attracting voters to the political centre, and now compromises need to be made to form a government. 76 seats are needed for a majority.

The election confirms the centre-right liberals (VVD) as the dominant party of the right in The Netherlands, with the formerly dominant Christian Democrats (CDA) continuing to decline. On the left, Labour (PvdA) has not only retained its position, but the far-left Socialist Party has failed to make the inroads widely expected at the start of the campaign. The SP had been doing well in the polls, but a poor performance in the leaders' debates (which were widely seen to have been won by Labour's Diederik Samsom) meant that they couldn't keep up their electoral momentum.

The result is a big boost for the pro-European parties. Geert Wilders, who pulled the plug on the last government, wanted to make the election into a referendum on Europe (and against austerity and EU membership) and the SP were also Eurosceptic on the left (against further bail-outs).

The next challenge will be for the VVD and PvdA to form a coalition government.

Hup Hollande Hup!

Sunday was a big election day for Europe. France elected its first Socialist President in 17 years with Francois Hollande, and the Greek electorate looks like it has given the two main parties a huge kicking.

Hollande will add to the pressure for a change in direction in the EU when it comes to austerity, and Hollande has already set himself up to be the leader of counter-austerity Europe. Though he will undoubtedly clash with Merkel, in the end they’re likely to muddle through unless Merkel sticks to an absolutist vision of austerity Europe. With austerity failing in practical terms – S&P used its report on Spain to critique the front-loaded austerity programme and the EU’s general policy – and countries like Italy voicing the need for a better approach to growth (while endorsing austerity in general), the political winds look like they will shift the continent leftwards to a degree (Europe is still dominated by the centre-right EPP political family).

Within Germany there is more debate on Eurobonds, etc, than I think outside commentators give credit for, though there is still a lack of debate. The opposition Social Democrats and Greens are more enthusiastic on Eurobonds and deeper fiscal integration, but the rise of the Pirate Party makes the German political scene more unpredictable. Germany has been caught up in a lot of comment on the rise of Die Piraten: what exactly are they about? Do they have the kind of leadership structure or policy programme that makes them a credible force? If they remain so unstructured – and wedded to “fluid democracy” (crudely put, where policy is crafted online by activists and then represented in parliament by Pirate representatives) – could they ever be capable of coalition with the other parties?

Sunday brought an election in the Northern German Land of Schleswig-Holstein, where the Pirate Party gained 8.3%, and there was little between the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), even if the centre-left coalition is ahead - the rival Christian Democrats-Liberal bloc trial the Social Democratic-Green bloc 39% to 43.4%. It now looks like the Social Democrats will lead a coalition with the Greens and the Danish minority party SSW (which is not subject to the same 5% threshold as the other parties), that may have a majority of just 1. The Liberal FDP is unlikely to do as well at the federal level as in Schleswig-Holstein (honestly, after the bad year they’ve had, being kicked out of one state parliament after another, their 8.2% vote in S-H is a huge victory), but it just demonstrates how the sudden rise of the Pirates could splinter the political field further.

Muddling along will likely continue in Europe, except now the hope is that we’ll start to see a direction with more solidarity develop. The biggest shock to the system will be the Greek elections, where it could be very difficult indeed to form the next government. With the far-right getting into parliament and the collapse in the vote for the two main parties, political instability is going to dog Greece and the rest of Europe for a long time to come. France and Germany can’t afford to squabble for too long: Greece will be bursting back on to the agenda before we know it.

And the referendum in Ireland? I don’t know how much Hollande’s election will make a difference until – or if – he makes it clear if he is seeking another treaty to supplement the Fiscal Stability Treaty or a renegotiation. From what he’s said it looks like he wants an extra treaty – it’ll be easier to get this, as it will be easier for Merkel to agree to this without losing face – and Ireland might be in a difficult position if it rejects the treaty to push a joint cause with Hollande... and then have to re-run the referendum in order to get the second treaty too (though it should then be clear that enough’s changed to have a re-run at least). The vote’s not until the end of May, so there’s still some time to read the signals from the Élysée.

Democracy and the Eurozone Crisis

There will no longer be any referendum in Greece on the new Eurozone deal, and a technocratic-led national unity government will take over before elections can be held in February. (And a good thing that there will be elections - Greece needs to confront its economic future in a way that the Greek people will buy into the responsibility of the decisions that need to be taken). Now that the referendum has been called off, it's taken as a indictment of Europe that France and Germany could pressure Greece to drop the referendum by saying that the money will be withheld unless a referendum would return a positive result.

This is a very strange argument. Surely it wouldn't be taking Greek sovereignty and democracy seriously if the Eurozone continued to loan Greece money and expect them to implement austerity measures regardless of any referendum they held? And the implication that the Eurozone should be willing to loan money to Greece regardless of Greece's commitment to any deal suggests that the rest off the Eurozone deserves less of a say. While a partial default within a Eurozone deal or a total default outside any Eurozone loans isn't an attractive choice, Greece cannot change that choice by elections or referendums: democracy is when people come together to decide what to do in the situation in which they find themselves. Sadly, for Greece and the rest of the Eurozone there are no good options.

Fintan O'Toole has an article in The Irish Times about the disconnect between capitalism and democracy:

"And this isn’t just a simple matter of the Merkozy monster lording it over us little PIGS. For at this historic moment, even the German chancellor is little more than a cipher. She’s caught in the democratic crisis too. Remember this time last year when Angela Merkel started to make noises about bondholders sharing the pain of rescuing the banking system? She had to back down very quickly and make it clear that she didn’t mean present bondholders – heaven forbid. Even the German chancellor isn’t allowed to say certain things."

I don't entirely agree with him, but I do think that markets and globalisation has grown and proceeded to such and extent that it benefits us to make some market and economic decisions collectively in the EU. Yet the EU, despite the almost co-equal power of the European Parliament, has a huge democratic disconnect. With the Treaties unequipped to deal with the Eurozone crisis, the approach to solving it has been intergovernmental, which has caused tensions between small Member States and non-Eurozone states who have the most to loose politically from governing the Eruozone from the Eruopean Council, and big Eurozone Member States (primarily France and Germany) who are better placed to have the most influence.

It might take ages to finalise a new treaty to equip the EU institutions to better deal with fiscal union issues, but it is most likely to be produced after the major crises are solved (or stabilised, if we're lucky enough). European issues have never been so widely discussed in Europe than they are now: since the Euro and the future of the EU is such a major issue, and the European Parliament has gained more powers since the last election in 2009, it might be worth having another European election. It would provide an opportunity to involve citizens more directly in the debate over what needs to be done and can also focus on the Parliament's new power. Though the EP isn't in a prime position over the EFSF or future fiscal union, an election would give the Parliament (and the Europarties) a stronger mandate in their proposals, and could be a useful way of gauging (informed) public opinion before embarking on further treaty change.

Irish President Michael D

Last week Ireland elected its ninth president. Though the role is highly ceremonial, the election campaign was hard fought between 7 candidates: the widest choice in the office's history. At the end of the count, Michael D,* an academic, poet, and long-time elected politician, became the first "political millionaire", with over a million votes. He has a strong track record on fighting for human rights, and is a great orator.

Here's his acceptance speech (skip to 3:00 if you want to leave out the Irish language part and the thank yous):



As a resident of Northern Ireland, I didn't have a vote in the election (extending the franchise north of the border and to the Irish abroad will probably be considered as part of the political and constitutional reform agenda in Ireland). However, over the last 21 years the presidency has allowed Ireland to redefine itself and its identity in a very positive way - in terms of inclusion and the peace process - and Michael D clearly aims to continue this from his platform of inclusive and active citizenship. While people and the media complain that the post has little power, it's highly political role (despite being removed from daily politics and policy) that offers a powerful way for citizens to engage in what their identity is and what their republic means to them. Which is why I think this right to elect the head of state is an important and positive thing, why I take monarchists' claims of unity and symbolism with a certain amount of scepticism, and I look forward to Michael D's presidency.


* He will probably be called Michael Higgins/President Higgins abroad, but he's known by his middle initial in Ireland. What it stands for is a popular pub quiz question (Daniel, if you're wondering).

Finnish Election

Finland held its general election yesterday, with the right-wing populist True Finns breaking through to become one of the main parties in the Finnish parliament (Finland is unicameral, so it only has one chamber of parliament).

The BBC reports the predicted seats for the main parties (out of 200) as:

"National Coalition Party - 44

Social Democrats - 42

True Finns - 39

Centre Party - 35"

Percentage-wise, the True Finns will have gone from 4% to 20% of the vote. Their platform is eurosceptic and anti-immigration, with the bail-outs of Greece, Ireland and now Portugal helping to boost their popularity, as the idea of sending money over to other EU Member States doesn't seem to have been defended very well: it's a lot easier to sell a simple rejectionist message than explain the complex economic case for supporting other countries. That's not to tsay that there isn't a need to challenge the current approach to the European debt crisis - and the worrying signs of satisfaction at the measures taken so far. Though the methods and ideas so far haven't been far-sighted enough, going into reverse gear would make the situation worse.

"The party's candidates are a motley crew and amongst them there are distinct anti-immigrant views. Neither does the party leadership have much sympathy for a place for the Swedish language and Swedish teaching in Finland. Nor for development aid, climate policies and so on. The general impression is that of deep conservative values and a nationalistic spirit. The word extreme right is not used in Finland. The party's future shape depends however on which of the party's candidates finally win a place in parliament." - EU Observer.

Given how close the seat numbers arre for the 4 biggest parties, it is possible that the True Finns could even end up in government. Again, it's hard to know whether the best approach would be to freeze them out of coalition possibilities or not (which takes us back to the question of how to deal with such parties generally). I haven't been following Finnish politics closely enough to know how extreme the True Finns are in their rhetoric and policies, but from what I've read they seem quite extreme. I hope that the mainstream parties start digging in and re-vitalising their grassroots.

Irish General Election 2011: Some early thoughts

The first day of counting is over (Ireland uses the PR-STV system in its general elections), and at the time of writing the results for the 166 Dáil seats stand at: Fine Gael 68; Labour 35; Fianna Fáil 17; Sinn Féin 13; ULA 4; Others 13, so 147/166 seats have been filled. The election will have a big Irish political impact and an uncertain European impact, and it's unclear how this will work out.


In Irish Politics.

It looks pretty certain that the next government will be a Fine Gael-Labour coalition (in continental terms a Grand Coalition). It will be Labour's best result because they will now be the second biggest party in the Dáil after having been the third party for their entire history. There were concerns that their manifestos are too different on major economic issues to work together effectively, but I'm sure there are well established personal links between them and there will be large sections of the aging Labour front bench who will be eager to get into government at last.

For Fianna Fáil it's a complete disaster: only around 20 seats is an unthinkable result for the natural party of government. Their support base is aging and they have become "transfer toxic", so that they rarely won the last seat in any constituency, and there are few constituencies with more than one FF TD. It is a low support base to build form, and they will have trouble trying to distinguish themselves ideologically as they were always a broad-based, Gaulist-type movement whose main ideological componant was Irish Republicanism. In this regard Sinn Féin will be a threat since it can claim its ground on Republicanism and organises in Northern Ireland and in the Republic. FF may have recognised this threat and might be aiming to counter it by organising in Northern Ireland itself. It will be hard for FF to regain the Republican image after their government saw the IMF-EU bail-out deal, however.

A big boost to Fianna Fáil would be leading the opposition, which will give them a chance to feed on the anger of the electorate at the incoming government as it detoxifies. They could face challenges on this on two fronts.

Sinn Féin has done really well, and the party has a strong tradition for good constituency work that translates into votes, and they have more than doubled their representation this time around - a clear sign that all their base-building in the Republic is paying off. They wouldn't get as many seats as FF, but there is a danger for FF that they will try to form a technical group in the Dáil with the ULA and perhaps other left-wing independents to become the biggest opposition party. So it could be SF that robs FF of the "oxygen of publicity". SF will be aiming next time around to eat into Labour's support as the biggest left-wing opposition party. Though SF has become more transfer-friendly, if the economy does pick up I wonder if the rhetoric of opposition - and SF's plans seem quite unrealistic to me - will be able to attract even more votes, or if SF will need to moderate and broad its appeal? If they become more moderate the ULA (United Left Alliance) will be breathing down their neck to fill the protest vote gap.

There are some right-wing independents in the Dáil, most notably Shane Ross, who is reported to be trying to form a like-minded technical group of 8 TDs who could support a FG government and keep Labour out of power. FG is unlikely to take this option as ideological independents would be high maintenance, but it would be tempting in order to retain cabinet posts. In any case it will lessen Labour's bargaining hand.

FG's big election win means that it will be hard for Labour to influence government policy. The question is, should it try to influence it to benefit low and middle income families (its target voters), or become the leaders of the opposition and make Irish politics truly left-right? It sounds like Labour wants to be in government (a lot of rhetoric on government stability and a broad based government to deal with the crisis), but it has to be questioned whether it can influence government enough for it to be worth it. Labour is strong in Leinster and Munster, but very weak in the rest of the country, where SF has won seats. They would need to be wary of letting SF grow while it is in government, or it could fail to break out of the role of "the other party" of Irish politics. Both the alternative opposition allignments are threats to FF.


In European Politics.

There will have to be a renegotiation of the bail-out agreement, as Ireland simply cannot bear the burden of all the private debt in the system. Much of this private debt is made up of loans from German and British and other European banks, which raises the question of why the pain of dealing with bad lending should be concentrated in Ireland. Despite the moral arguments, any action has to be European-wide to be credible: we need money to fund the state and public services, and washing the debt back into the European system would restart the debt crisis which would be bad for the recovering Irish export industry without solving our own public funding crisis.

The problem is that strong negotiations need to be tempered by a clear vision and arguments for the compromises and changes that Irish, German, Dutch, etc, etc, people will have to make. For Eurobonds and bondholder burdening, we would be asking other people to take up the pain and burdens we have, and we need to sell that to them. Internally, we need to sell the pooling of sovereignty involved in Eurobonds and other forms of fiscal harmonisation - after all, we might be called on in the future to bail out other countries in the Eurozone, and we would want to make that as unlikely to happen as possible.

Compromise will be the other of the day, so the Irish government and the rest of the European Council needs to be exceptional in delivering a workable solution to the debt crisis, including economic governance, and at the same time sell it to the people - because all of this will need Treaty change.

If there is an agreement on the future shape of the Eurozone, then there will be a referendum in Ireland. What compromise would be realistic and acceptable to Ireland, and the other Eurozone members?

Irish Election Day Round-up 2011

It’s polling day! This is what the last few weeks have been all about, so good luck to all the candidates, but most of all good luck to the electorate!

NewsWhip,ie has an article on the Paper Protest against the lack of votes for those living abroad. The protest is designed to send a message without spoiling the ballot papers. They also report on a poll on Irish attitudes to gay marriage, which may be a sign of the cultural shift in the country over the last few years.

On banking, there has been successful bidding by two Irish banks for the loan deposit books of two state-owned banks, which has not received a warm welcome everywhere.

Maman Poulet reveals the message of Bertie Ahern to his old constituency. And given the talk of taxes and cutting, The Cedar Lounge Revolution has an article on the Tobin tax, and how it might be introduced at an EU level.

Stephen Spillane has been predicting the election on the airwaves, and The European Citizen also has a few thoughts on the election.

If you have any tips on election blogs or posts, you can contact myself or Stephen on Twitter via @EuropeanCitizen and @Spiller2.

A few thoughts on the Irish Election 2011

Tomorrow is the big day, where the next Dáil will be elected in Ireland. I had hoped to write more about the actual campaign, but sadly real life got in the way. So instead, here's the election boiled down to one badly-written post:


Trends and Strategy

Fine Gael, the centre-right party, looks set to win almost 40% of the vote, which could get them a single-party majority in the Dáil - something which hasn't happened in Ireland for decades. They'd a good campaign, deciding to hide their leader, famous for his poor media performance, while presenting a good team to fight the election battle on the airwaves. There were 4 leadership debates (and Enda Kenny only took part in three of them, which caused a bit of a fuss), where Enda simply had to not say anything incredibly daft and Fine Gael wouldn't be harmed.

Labour had a terrible campaign. The popularity of their leader, Eamon Gilmore, tempted them to run a presidential campaign with the slogan "Gilmore for Taoiseach" (Labour have never led a government in Ireland before). Given that Labour is the third party of Irish politics, it would have been hard to conduct a cabinet election since they had a more limited gene pool to draw on from their last Dáil cohort, which might explain the lack of a Plan B when the presidential campaign failed. Their finance spokesperson, Joan Burton, was disappointing on TV - the now famous outburst on Tonight with Vincent Browne damaged her image, and the strategy of selling a vision meant that in debates with her competitors she rarely got around to the detail (time limits and impatient presenters made sure of that): not a good position in a generally policy-dominated election. The "vision" point goes for all Labour performances: the party seemed more concerned about its brand than the policy. This changed after the first week and a half, with Gilmore doing well in the debates and trying to insert more substance, and Labour's poll ratings consolidated, but I wonder how much it will add anything to Labour's vote.

It should be said that Labour haven't had a good campaign in the light of their ambitions, but they will increase their vote and their seats. With a different strategy they could have done better yet.

Fianna Fáil probably had as good an election as they could have. In the last leadership debate, Micheál Martin was on the attack, and probably turned people off by talking over the other leaders, but it made clear that FF needs to consolidate its core vote. It seems to be around the 14-16% mark, which means that it's disasterous, but there was little that could be done about that after its record in government.

Sinn Féin and the ULA seemed to have done well for themselves with their messages of withdrawing from the IMF-EU bailout and insistuting a socialist economy with nationalised banks respectively. They will still be small parties, but it shows a fragmentation of the left, and it probably attracted support away from Labour.

The Greens look like they might be wiped out. I agree with Jason O'Mahony that this would be a pity, since they actually tried to achieve - and did achieve - some of their manifesto promises. that's not to say that they don't deserve punishment, but a wipe-out is a bit disproportionate in my opinion.

There are a record number of independents running this year, and around 17 could get elected (how votes split and transfer may decide this). There are still very localist independent who only care about constituency matters, but there are a new breed of independents who are campaigning on national issues, either from the left or the right. The phrase most often uttered by these independents is: "I will work with like-minded independents", to which my brain can't help muttering "what, you mean like in a party?". One of the tensions in democracy is between having independent-minded representatives, and the need to build broad coalitions to enact change. the party system has many faults, but I'm not convinced that independents will improve things much.


A European election?

Europe was a big issue in this election, but only in the limited sense of discussing what could be won from a renegotiation. There was no proper debate about what would need to be done about the entire Eurozone, though there was a brief mention (I counted 1 time during the campaign!) of Eurobonds being a good thing for Ireland. The level of tax harmonisation or budgetary convergence that might be negotiable in return for this and renegotiation of the bail out deal wasn't discussed, except to restate over and over that the coporation tax would not be for sale. In many ways it's natural that parties don't want to give away their negotiating position beforehand. However, these changes will require a referendum in Ireland, and perhaps in other Member States - we need to start speaking in a language of what is just for everyone in the Eurozone, and not simply "if it's good for us, it's good for everyone, because then we can pay some of the money back". The shape of the Eurozone will stay with us after we recover (however that happens, and however long it takes), so there should have been a more open discussion about this.


The Next Dáil

It's pretty clear from the poll trends that FG will near a majority on its own, and could form a government with the support of some independents. I'd like to see Labour stay out of government and lead the opposition. That would be a massive change in Irish politics as it would help solidify an opening left-right divide and end the old civil war political divide. Being in opposition and having that bigger gene pool (because Labour has done well in the election in that it will increase its seats, just not reach the huge ambitions it set itself in leading the next government) to construct a better alternative/shadow cabinet government. It could have big consequences for FF, who might not recover to lead a government in the forseeable future, and become the third party of Irish politics. Irish politics will be fluid in the future, so much depends on Labour's position over whether or not the civil war divide returns...

Irish Election Blog Round-up #14

We’re nearing the finishing line, and the polls seem quite steady at the moment, though there are still undecideds out there and the question of the transfers from independent candidates.

The blogosphere has been musing on the nature of elections in Ireland. Stephen Spillane has written about the election broadcasting moratorium that will kick in on Thursday, and PoliticalReform.ie looks at the Irish political culture and localism – as does Slugger O’Toole.

Irish Election discusses the possibilities for the next government and Fine Gael, and Maman Poulet looks at the independents in this election.

The banks are an ever present concern, so The Cedar Lounge Revolution examines the comments by Alan Dukes on the sector. Also in the spotlight is the idea of job creation over at IrishQuestion.ie.

Despite the innovations of Twitter, Facebook and blogging in this election, posters will always be with us at election time – but that doesn’t mean that they all have to be serious...

If you have any tips on election blogs or posts, you can contact myself or Stephen on Twitter via @EuropeanCitizen and @Spiller2.

Irish Election Blog Round-Up #12

We’re just a week from the big day when the votes for the crucial poll is cast, and it seems that we’re still in single-party government territory, which has drawn an interesting analysis from The Cedar Lounge on what this might mean for the Labour Party, and an eye-catching reaction from the Green Party.

Labour’s Eamon Gimore, it seems, has a personalised message for you. How has the Labour Party handled the internet campaign? A good move? Too manufactured? Or does it make any difference?

Political reform is the order of the day, so it’s good to see the blogosphere investigating the claims of the parties. PoliticalReform.ie examines the competing versions of proposed citizen’s assemblies.

And what do you think of the calibre of TDs in the Dáil? O’Keefe thinks that there are too many intellectuals! I wouldn’t have thought that brains to be the most maligned characteristic in Leinster House...

If you have any tips on election blogs or posts, you can contact myself or Stephen on Twitter via @EuropeanCitizen and @Spiller2.

Irish Election Blog Round-Up #10

Or at least I think it's #10 - it's hard to keep track!

Another day, another debate, but the first debate between the big 3 – as Gaelige – will broadcast later, so we’ll have to wait for the next rash of post-debate analysis. Meanwhile, there are plenty of competing viewpoints in the blogosphere, particularly between those who believe we have the political clout for renegotiation, and those who a rapidly concluding that the parties won’t be in any position to renegotiate.

Social questions are getting more of an airing online than in the debates so far. Maman Poulet takes a look at how the parties’ manifestos deal with LGBT issues and Jason O’Mahony asks the question: what will Fine Gael’s social values be in a single-party government?

With Labour not doing as well as they expected in the polls, Eoin O’Malley tries to answer the conundrum: What’s gone wrong for Labour? Fianna Fáil may have dropped historically low in the polls, but that doesn’t mean that they aren’t attracting a new electoral base...

Finally, more talk about tax, with Fine Gael proposing a tax on “content” instead of a TV licence.

If you have any tips on election blogs or posts, you can contact myself or Stephen on Twitter via @EuropeanCitizen and @Spiller2.

Irish Election Blog Round-Up #8

As we come to the end of another week of election campaigning, there seems to be a divide between the blogosphere and the media on the quality of the election. While many in the mainstream media seem to find the campaign interesting – at least when it came to the debate earlier this week – the blogosphere’s not so impressed. Over at Irish Question they ask if Ireland is a “political zombie” because of the lack of ideology.

Meanwhile Stephen Spillane has a few notes on canvassing, and Jason Mahony asks about Labour: if not now, when?

Maman Poulet takes a look at the manifesto promises so far on disability, and News Whip challenges us on political reform, asking: is the car broken, or the driver just drunk?

Finally, as the election seems to be focused on who we will send to Europe to negotiate on our behalf, it’s worth noting that we’ve chosen “Jedward” to send to the next Eurovision. What that says about the prospects of electing a competent government, I’ll leave for you to decide...

If you have any tips on election blogs or posts, you can contact myself or Stephen on Twitter via @EuropeanCitizen and @Spiller2.

Irish Election Blog Round-Up #6

Yet another day on the election campaign trail in the Blogosphere, and no doubt you have been saturated with debate analysis. The big election show on Tuesday is a common trend in the blogs, but there are a few other stories cropping up as well.

Slugger O'Toole has noticed that Sinn Féin have mixed up the nationality of the road signs on their election literature.

Irish Election is questioning Brian Lenihan's decision to delay drawing on the Stability Mechanism until the new government enters office: is it allowed under the deal? Also, for those who are interested in polling statistics, Irish Election spells out just how bad the polls are for Fianna Fáil, while the Cedar Lounge Revolution is stunned by the stability of the polls.

Meanwhile, in Brussels, the vague Franco-German plan doesn't seem to have rallied many to it. How will the debate on the Eurozone change as this election progresses?

And Pass Level Politics gives some insight into the art of canvassing.

If you have any tips on election blogs or posts, you can contact myself or Stephen on Twitter via @EuropeanCitizen and @Spiller2.

Irish Election Blog Round-Up #3

It's only the first week of the election, but already some are drawing a few lessons. Enda Kenny may want to prove himself capable of being a fast learner, as the Blogosphere has been quite critical of him over the last few hours. Kenny has stated that he doesn't want to appear on a TV3 debate run by Vincent Browne due to a joke he made during the Fine Gael leadership challenge last year. Called an act of cowardice by some, and simply ridiculed by others, unfortunately his comments on Gemma Hussey's questioning of his leadership on RTÉ haven't gone down well either.

Fianna Fáil's first video of the campaign is doing the rounds, and it features Micheál Martin playing some hurling - is this the Irish version of Tony Blair playing tennis?

It is impossible to escape the issue of the banks in this election, and NewsWhip brings us some more news on AIB bank bonuses.

There will be few constituencies as interesting as Dun Laoghaire in this campaign, so over at The Cedar Lounge Revolution they've been musing about what way the vote is likely to go.

It may be one of the most serious elections that has faced the state, but there's plenty of election humour around. Here's some courtesy of Lucy's Drowning and the Oireachtas Retort.

If you have any tips on election blogs or posts, you can contact myself or Stephen on Twitter via @EuropeanCitizen and @Spiller2.