Hup Hollande Hup!

Sunday was a big election day for Europe. France elected its first Socialist President in 17 years with Francois Hollande, and the Greek electorate looks like it has given the two main parties a huge kicking.

Hollande will add to the pressure for a change in direction in the EU when it comes to austerity, and Hollande has already set himself up to be the leader of counter-austerity Europe. Though he will undoubtedly clash with Merkel, in the end they’re likely to muddle through unless Merkel sticks to an absolutist vision of austerity Europe. With austerity failing in practical terms – S&P used its report on Spain to critique the front-loaded austerity programme and the EU’s general policy – and countries like Italy voicing the need for a better approach to growth (while endorsing austerity in general), the political winds look like they will shift the continent leftwards to a degree (Europe is still dominated by the centre-right EPP political family).

Within Germany there is more debate on Eurobonds, etc, than I think outside commentators give credit for, though there is still a lack of debate. The opposition Social Democrats and Greens are more enthusiastic on Eurobonds and deeper fiscal integration, but the rise of the Pirate Party makes the German political scene more unpredictable. Germany has been caught up in a lot of comment on the rise of Die Piraten: what exactly are they about? Do they have the kind of leadership structure or policy programme that makes them a credible force? If they remain so unstructured – and wedded to “fluid democracy” (crudely put, where policy is crafted online by activists and then represented in parliament by Pirate representatives) – could they ever be capable of coalition with the other parties?

Sunday brought an election in the Northern German Land of Schleswig-Holstein, where the Pirate Party gained 8.3%, and there was little between the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), even if the centre-left coalition is ahead - the rival Christian Democrats-Liberal bloc trial the Social Democratic-Green bloc 39% to 43.4%. It now looks like the Social Democrats will lead a coalition with the Greens and the Danish minority party SSW (which is not subject to the same 5% threshold as the other parties), that may have a majority of just 1. The Liberal FDP is unlikely to do as well at the federal level as in Schleswig-Holstein (honestly, after the bad year they’ve had, being kicked out of one state parliament after another, their 8.2% vote in S-H is a huge victory), but it just demonstrates how the sudden rise of the Pirates could splinter the political field further.

Muddling along will likely continue in Europe, except now the hope is that we’ll start to see a direction with more solidarity develop. The biggest shock to the system will be the Greek elections, where it could be very difficult indeed to form the next government. With the far-right getting into parliament and the collapse in the vote for the two main parties, political instability is going to dog Greece and the rest of Europe for a long time to come. France and Germany can’t afford to squabble for too long: Greece will be bursting back on to the agenda before we know it.

And the referendum in Ireland? I don’t know how much Hollande’s election will make a difference until – or if – he makes it clear if he is seeking another treaty to supplement the Fiscal Stability Treaty or a renegotiation. From what he’s said it looks like he wants an extra treaty – it’ll be easier to get this, as it will be easier for Merkel to agree to this without losing face – and Ireland might be in a difficult position if it rejects the treaty to push a joint cause with Hollande... and then have to re-run the referendum in order to get the second treaty too (though it should then be clear that enough’s changed to have a re-run at least). The vote’s not until the end of May, so there’s still some time to read the signals from the Élysée.

The Troubles of the New Fiscal Compact

Yesterday I wrote about the left and the new fiscal compact, and I've noted that the centre-left PES seems to be hoping that the French and German elections will help replace our current Merkozy with a PES version. EUObserver has reported that a majority of the French public (52%) are opposed to the (as yet undrafted) EU deal on fiscal union, largely following left-right lines. The Socialist challenger for the presidency, Francois Hollande:

"...announced that he would renegotiate the document.

"If I am elected president, I will renegotiate the agreement to put what it lacks today," he told RTL.

He said that he would “add what is missing”, mentioning he would push to include intervention from the European Central Bank, the creation of eurobonds and a financial relief fund.

“Finally, there must also be growth,” he added. “Without growth, we will not reach any of our objectives of deficit reduction.”

The Frenchman attacked the core concept of the new agreement, a ‘golden rule’, or balanced budget amendment that should be inscribed into constitutions, in effect preventing future governments from exercising expansionary fiscal policies.

Asked about the golden rule, the candidate said he would not vote for it “under this logic”."

While not all of the troubles fall along clearly drawn left-right battlelines, I think it's fair to say that it would be a mistake to read in a support for the UK negotiating position, as the issues seem to be based around the content of fiscal union rather than either the question of having a fiscal union or voting arrangements for regulating the financial services. Apart from the right-left divide is the concern of the non-Eurozone countries, like Hungary, that it would lead to tax harmonisation even outside the Eurozone. I don't know if this is being discussed (it wasn't mentioned in the deal produced last week), but it seems unlikely that there will be tax harmonisation even for the Eurozone, given so many Eurozone members are against it.

But the main issues will be those Hollande has highlighted: how much solidarity there should be in fiscal union. Merkel is kidding herself (or talking up the value of the deal for her domestic audiance) if she thinks that the deal on the table means political union - the greatest challenge to the deal will come from the push against the maintanence of the German sacred cows of retaining the ECB's current role and the ruling out of Eurobonds. However, it is doubtful that these ambitious goals could be won as well as removing the "golden budget rule" (who knows, maybe any financial relief fund would be sold as a counter-balance to national austerity brought about by the golden rule). The question is whether this pressure (and that of the markets) will force the negotiations to move further and further away from the starting points agreed on this month...

The Left and the New Fiscal Compact

The new fiscal compact is all about discipline. Eurozone states will need to keep their debt and deficits under control and this will be supervised by the Commission. The compact has come in for a lot of criticism already for two reasons - it's too austerity focused (making keynesianism policies difficult if not impossible), and it doesn't address the immediate crisis. This has lead to calls for the left to take the fight to the EU and queries over the democratic desirability of the deal. But what can the left do?

The urgency of fiscal union and the necessity of discipline

To some extent discipline is necessary. If there's going to be a currency union with fiscal solidarity (Eurobonds, the ECB playing the role of the lender of last resort, etc.), then Member states need to be relatively sure that they're not signing an open-ended agreement to support the spending plans of other Eurozone countries without any say or safeguards from the moral hazards that might arise.

The problem is that this new fiscal compact offers no real solidarity: it's essentially a Stability and Growth Pact Plus. The economic hopes behind the deal were pinned on the reaction of the ECB, and whether it would act more as a lender of last resort (it would have been better if this was part of the deal, rather than a hoped-for side effect). The deal expresses an intention for future fiscal solidarity, but it doesn't define what the possibilities are or set a time frame for them. That said, there's 3 months to negotiate the actual treaty so the crisis and negotiations could take twists and turns that force the Eurozone to look more closely at fiscal solidarity. Still, for all the urgency for greater solidarity to make the Eurozone more politically and economically credible, some level of discipline is necessary to underline the necessary trust for the system to work. Any alternative articulated by the left needs to take account of this.

The options for fiscal union seem to be: do nothing (which doesn't seem an option, but is the default if the deal falls apart), fiscal discipline, or fiscal discipline plus some form of solidarity (from a changed ECB role to Eurobonds and a common growth strategy). The argument runs that the bail-out countries need investment and growth plans and that the new discipline entrenches the failed austerity. But where would the money come from to invest in the bail-out countries and in the countries on the edge of bailed-out-dom? The markets won't accept the level of borrowing necessary, so there would need to be more solidarity and support across the Eurozone to encourage growth. (Not to mention rhe need for democratic controls through national and the European parliaments). There needs to be a coordinated response, and therefore any alternative has to be backed up by a political coalition that could win support to advance its solution across the Eurozone. Success in simply opposing the new fiscal compact would merely keep us in the same position we're in now: there needs to be a viable alternative.

Does the Left measure up to this?

Simply put: no, not really. The Party of European Socialists (the centre-left bloc of parties) has criticised the lack of Eurobonds and changes for the ECB:

"PES interim-President, Sergei Stanishev, argued that the important elements missing from the summit decisions are granting the European bailout fund a banking licence, introducing eurobonds, introducing a financial transactions tax, and a "real plan" for investment and growth.

[...]

The European Central Bank (ECB) has also been given the possibility to provide ‘technical support’ for the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and buy bonds only on secondary markets. The European Stability Mechanism is set to start in July 2012.

In summary, this draft plan is a clear and historical signal of what a Conservative majority in Europe means for ordinary people. In the past, the European Union succeeded because any advance on the single market or on monetary union was always balanced by improvements in social Europe. This is not the case this time. The absence of a growth strategy and solidarity is striking.

There is a huge risk that the absence of proposals on Eurobonds, on an EFSF banking license, and on a coherent Investment strategy, could lead to an absence of public support."

Despite making the right noises, there doesn't seem to be a full vision for what needs to be done and what shape it will take. Though the Europarties tend to be quite coherent in the European Parliament, they have a dismal track record at forming the basis of promoting new political arguments or shaping a political coalition around established arguments.

Within the Eurozone countries discussion will turn to the benefits of the deal versus the loss of sovereignty. If the choice isn't to be between the compact and what we have now, the opposition will have to organise around a credible alternative. But then there's never been a political demand within the national parties for a stronger common platform - and even with the best will in the world it would be hard to construct one ad hoc at the moment. But perhaps the PES could act as a link between centre-left parties to transmit ideas and to help some sort of consensus emerge slowly as the crisis progresses (and it's got a long way to go yet). It will be a miracle if the left can build a common theme and European alliances they can point to form a basis to their opposition, but it's necessary to form a constructive opposition.

Anyone willing to place their bets?

The European Citizen: One of the most influential left-of-centre Euroblogs?

It turns out that The European Citizen has been nominated for a poll of the most influential left-of-centre Euroblogs in a Social Europe Journal poll. If you like the blog, and think I've been suitably left-of-centre enough, you can for me and 2 others (or even, theoretically, 3 blogs which aren't The European Citizen) here. The vote is open to 5pm tomorrow.

The (reader nominated) shortlist is 18 nominations long - I'm not entirely sure if that's due to the small size of the left-of-centre Euroblogosphere or the lack of nominations. I'm also not sure if I'm that "influential" (I've never even received a reply to the closest I've come to direct engagement with the EU instituions - though I wasn't really angling for a direct reply - and I doubt any shadowy Bilderbergers or Buchgemeinschaft der schwaebische Hausfrauen members read my blog). Nonetheless it's nice to be nominated.



UPDATE: Here are the results. I came in joint 9th place with the European Tribune. Thanks to those who voted for me!

European Theology Season opens early on Euroblogs

Is it yet another sign of climate change? Usually Eurobloggers hang on for another week or so before they start musing on identity crises and the meaning of European integration, but today 4 bloggers started to ponder the purpose and direction of European integration: Charlemagne, Jason O Mahony, Eurogoblin, and Grahnlaw.

Grahnlaw ended his post with this line (and perhaps I'm just imagining the weariness):

"There is no end in sight for blogging on the high politics of EU fundamentals."

Integration Doctrine?

No doubt some people do see European integration in somewhat doctrinal terms, but it's not something I've seen a lot of Eurobloggers do (indeed, it's noteworthy that Open Europe recently seemed to advocate greater discussion on the "Integrate or not to Integrate" question rather than focusing on policy*). Charlemagne is right to say that doctrinal thinking on integration - to see opponents as nationalists and integration as a higher goal - is wrong. But it's important to note that there are many shades of integrationalism and that being for integration is no indication of being against subsidiarity and healthy local government. For example, I don't think even the most ardent federalist would support a single European social security system (the clue's in the name "federalist" - federalists believe in political power at several levels).


Anglo-Saxon Europeans

Eurogoblin has called himself an "Anglo-Saxon European": greater democracy at a European level is good, but the Council is and should remain the most powerful institution, and member states should remain the primary form of political organisation. In a lot of ways, I agree: member states do a lot of things better than the EU, and the subsidiarity principle needs to be strengthened and given greater practical effect. However, I don't think that the Council should remain ever-mighty forever: it needs reform to be made more transparent, open and responsive to national parliaments. It is the focus on the national and intergovernmental character of the Council that gives it political licence to work in the secrecy of diplomacy and intergovernmentalism.

"Rather than creating a centralised federal super-state, my support for the EU stems from my belief that the barriers between states should be melted away. I want a genuine European single market – with goods, services, capital, labour and knowledge swimming backwards and forwards across borders. Europe is working to reduce the arbitrary power of the state over the individual, and to let citizens travel, settle or conduct business wherever they want. The EU is a tool of decentralisation – encouraging devolution of powers to regions and local administrations and helping to settle (peacefully) nationalist conflicts."

Again, here I'd like to point out that federalism emphasises power being dispersed to different levels (though I think Eurogoblin was relying on "centralised federal super-state" as a turn of phrase - it is, after all, a cliché of European politics). It's hard to see, however, how the EU could be a tool for decentralisation without interfering in the make-up of member states, which would surely entail a massive centralisation of power in the first place. Unless it was only meant to be an example of federalism to be repeated within member states.

I actually think that integration is a flawed process and not a panacea - and, perhaps ironically, this leads me to the conclusion that a more politicised EU would be better. This would entail greater political prominence of the institutions and greater political competition within them (and also greater public participation). Especially if the dismantling of barriers is to make sense. Which leads me to the next point.


A political Union or a Union that's political?

People have argued against a more political EU because they say that the EU cannot get the support to decide on redistributionist policies, so therefore the EU should restrict itself to the internal market. Now the internal market will never be complete, in the same way that national markets aren't complete: economic and business innovation mean that regulations will always be evolving. Nevertheless the internal market has made remarkable progress and it pretty integrated. Further integration and barrier-breaking would necessarily entail a degree of redistribution: of chances and opportunities in the market, etc. As the conflict over the services directive show, further market integration is not a non-political question. Should we integrate further in the free movement of services and people, there will need to be choices on what level of European protections need to be set.

The EU is a lot more "redistributionist" in its decision-making than is realised. What about CAP and the Structural Funds? Are decisions of more or less regulation not increasingly about market protection, worker protection, etc., and do these decisions not affect the incomes and lives of people? The Euro, as we have seen, redistributes risk - not only in the sense that ratings agencies treated Greece the same as Germany, but the whole European economy is integrated: after all, Greek debt is owned by French and German banks.

Integration has brought economic development and growth, as well as greater freedom for citizens across the continent. But simply liberalising everything doesn't help everyone equally: there are losers in this process. Let's flip the question of greater democracy in the EU on its head: instead of "can a democratic EU retain the support of the people?" let's ask, "can an EU focused on a closed-off Council make these decisions and retain public support - or would a more democratic EU be better placed to make these decisions?"

I believe in further integration and democracy because I believe that not everyone benefits, even though integration and the internal market are necessary for our economy(ies). An integrated market provides the best guarantee for prosperity, but we need the scope for greater political involvement to decide how we run it, and to decide how we can make it work better for those who have lost out. This requires greater political integration; more pan-European elections that offer a choice in competing policies. This also necessarily means that the EU level will become more prominent versus the national egos in the Council, but the member states will remain in control of most of the areas that affect citizens lives. Put simply, we need greater integration and participation in the areas we are already "integrated" in, and more political control, because integration isn't perfect, and we all need to be involved in making sure it works for us.



*I disagree completely. The more the Euroblogosphere examines the policy questions, the more mature it is and the greater impact it can have, rather than just being an online club for discussions on integration theories. Discussing integration is good and necessary, but we shouldn't withdraw into a theoretical bubble.

UPDATE: Grahnlaw has written another article on the subject.

Europe doesn't need a Pro-European Alliance in the EP

Guy Verhofstadt has spoken of the need for a "strong pro-European alliance" in the European Parliament for this term. He said:

"The three largest groups in the European Parliament announced today their commitment to pro-European values and their intention to seek a political consensus at the heart of the European Union in order to respond in a coherent and united way to the multiple challenges that Europe's citizens are now facing in terms of employment and financial security."

Now the only thing you can say about pro-Europeanism when it comes to "employment and financial security", it that there should be some degree of EU involvement in these policy areas. The problem is that "pro-Europeanism" either amounts to the constitutional status quo, or a vague degree of increased integration. "Pro-Europeanism" in itself doesn't provide any ideological clue to what kind of policies a coalition will enact - what, for instance, is Europeanism's stance on the level of workers rights that's appropriate to an economy in recession? Verhofstadt has confused a unified cross-party pro-European alliance for some sort of Coalition from the Napoleonic Wars that, if it held together long enough, would put an end to the spectre of Euroscepticism. But it can't work like that.

Grand Coalitions aren't necessarily a bad thing; grand coalitions can make good governments, and they provide political stability in a country. But they need a common programme for government. In the EP, the executive is separate from the legislature so there's no need for a fixed or agreed programme of government to provide stability. So this alliance is not strictly necessary on a long-term basis. Also, since the EP's say over constitutional matters is extremely limited, basing a coalition on what is essentially a non-issue - apart from non-binding reports and the occasional vote on treaties or enlargements - isn't exactly a strong foundation. The rhetoric of Pro-European unity will paper over the divisions on the practical issues that the EP has to deal with in its day-to-day life. It hardly helps the EP's image to have such an alliance - wouldn't it be better to project it as a mature arena for political debate that scrutinises legislation and the Commission well?

If Verhofstadt wants to win more hearts and minds to "pro-Europeanism", he needs to draw in the public to the Brussels Bubble and spark interest and participation in EP politics. An outwardly cosy coalition in control of Parliament won't do this. Political competition encourages participation and interest, so it shouldn't be suppressed. The alliance - which I suspect will be more rhetorical than real, except for important votes, such as the Commission President vote - will give credibility to the ECR's strange claim to be the "first real opposition". For several reasons, the ECR is just not that significant, and will probably collapse at some point. Open political competition will make party politics in the EP matter more and if this perception increases among the public, then it would be more of a threat to the ECR than attempts to marginalise them. After all, the ECR are already having difficulties maintaining coherence, and it's only their first day!

It's also bad politics for ALDE. Ruling out coalitions on an issue-by-issue basis ties the hands of the EPP, since the only other option it has is a coalition with PASD or PASD and ALDE. This weakens ALDE's position as the EPP and PASD can do deals without ALDE's input. While it strengthens the hand of the PASD when it comes to coalition politics, in terms of electoral politics it will mean that they are not playing the oppositional role well or positioning themselves properly for the next elections.

Finally, this line of politics already goes against what ALDE and the PASD want - Barroso has used this line of reasoning before to try and brush away calls for presenting a programme for the next 5 years and to downplay the significance of the lack of a contest for his post. He said:

"I am in favour of a political Europe, but I am against partisan political confrontation in Europe. If we are a supra-national reality, we need to be supra-partisan politicians. ...I am against political parties’ artificial dramatisation... We must talk about Europe positively, because what most encourages eurosceptics in times of crisis is the pessimism of pro-Europeans."

Surely the worst thing "pro-Europeanism" could do is adopt the politics of Barroso?

On Phone Chargers

The EU has managed to get the top 10 mobile phone companies to agree to adopt a single phone charger that will be compatible across their brands. The companies include:

"...Apple, LG, Motorola, Nokia, Samsung, and Sony Ericsson – [and they] represent 90 percent of Europe's mobile phone market."

The story has been covered by Stephen Spillane and Gulf Stream Blues.

There will be no legislation to enforce this; the move is an agreement between the companies and it won't be enforceable in law. However, the agreement only came about when the EU applied pressure by threatening to introduce legislation in this area - which would probably pass in the Council and the European Parliament, just like the roaming charge cap.

The benefits of such a move will be mostly environmental, since there will be less electrical waste of old, incompatible chargers being thrown away, but there will also be benefits to the consumer in terms of convenience.

Dave Keating at Gulf Stream Blues touched on what could be one of the most interesting aspects of this story as it (might) develop:

"Since most of these companies also design phones in the US and the rest of the world, I would assume that this standardization will eventually spread to the rest of the world. After all, why would they make phones with different electrical input jacks specifically for Europe?"

If the single charger is adopted by these companies outside of the EU, it will demonstrate the economic power that comes with the single market. As the economy globalises, it's likely that market access will become more essential in the calculations of the economic and political consequences of regulation. The bigger the market, the more insulated that market is from the negative economic effect of regulation: so it's easier for big markets such as the EU to set higher standards than small (and sometimes even medium) states as the relative economic power of big companies is reduced when they want to ensure they have market access.

Not that the EU should go mad regulating, and I'm not denying that EU regulation can have negative effects on the economy - it all depends on the regulation, and views on particular examples of regulation will vary depending on political priorities. But the single market enables states to re-assert (some of) their political power and relevance at a time when economic power is growing and limiting the political options of states.

Another thing to note is that the Tories in the EP have welcomed this new move:

"British Conservative MEP Malcolm Harbour, member of the consumer affairs committee in the European Parliament, also welcomed the agreement.

"The days of drawers full of useless old mobile phone chargers will soon be over. Common sense has prevailed," Mr Harbour stated.

"We will no longer have to worry about forgetting our chargers and having to ask around to find one that is compatible. This agreement will also encourage more chargers to be recycled, preventing electronic waste," he added."

Perhaps an attractive aspect of this deal for the Conservatives is that it was reached without any actual legislation (though it's still strange to hear the Tories hailing a European move as a victory for "common sense"), but it shows that there is recognition in the Conservative party that the single market is worth something as a working reality, and not just a free-market ideal to pay lip-service to - and what's more, there's a recognition that common rules/policies mean something.

Now it could easily be countered that the Tories could hardly mean anything else when they say they support the single market as you can't have a single market without common rules. Still, the recent political message of the Conservatives gives a different impression. If the Tories are serious about this new group, and are serious about the single market, they will have to show in their rhetoric that some decisions need to be made in Brussels. They also need - and this is a big step that they might never take - to accept that it follows that there should be some form of political contest in the EU, since the question of economic governance is a left-right issue. They will have to accept the value of politics while (if they remain committed to the ECR) rejecting political union itself.

A coherent political vision from the ECR will probably never occur to anyone within the group, let alone see the light of day, yet that is what they'll need if they don't want to be outflanked by withdrawlists and if they wish to avoid being cornered into policies that will weaken the single market itself. In other words, their political group at the very least needs to get political. Politics isn't bad, you know.

Irish voting already started on Friday, and some political ponderings

Some Irish voters have already voted in the European and local elections. Normally some of the islands vote before the mainland, but this time the voting was officially started by patients in the Central Mental Hospital in Dundrum. It seems that there's been a 60% turnout there, though naturally there will probably be a much lower turnout by the general public on June 5th.

The European elections may have the effect of - or be proof of - shifting the national politics into a more traditional European direction. It may also be the point where national politics became more integrationist (in a society sense), with EU immigration starting to have an impact on the political parties.

First of all, Irish politics may finally be moving towards a left-right contest, as the conservative Fianna Fáil party is stuck on 20% popularity - and this is the political party that has dominated Irish politics since the 1930s. The European elections have become a contest between Fine Gael and Labour in a sense, though the media doesn't make it out to be quite so adversarial as it would if it was a government-opposition set up.

However, if the shift is taking place, it will be a long road. The STV system of voting means that candidates are important, and despite FF's vast unpopularity, one of its candidates, Brian Crowley in the Ireland South constituency, will probably be the candidate to attract the most votes in the country (he's at 30%, well over the 25% quota to get elected). For a number of reasons, Ireland is likely to return pretty much the same MEPs as in the last election.

Still, it's FG vs Labour in Ireland East, with Labour on course to win a seat at the expense of FG who had unexpectedly won two seats in the 3 seat constituency in 2004. If Labour becomes the second party in the next general election, they will need to fight the temptation to go into government with FG (the temptation will be very strong since the leadership is aging) and force them into a coalition with civil war enemies FF. (Interestingly, however, there have been reports that up to one third of the Irish electorate could be floating voters, which is more than previously thought).

[See Frank Schnittger's Th!nk About It article on the European elections in Ireland here].

In terms of the political balance of the EP, these elections are unlikely to change much given the stability of the MEP delegation. The PES may gain 1 or even 2 seats (though an extra second seat is becoming less likely as Kathy Sinnot (InDem group) experiences a surge in the last two weeks. Still, a second seat is not beyond the realms of possibility. The EPP will lose one seat. Though FF could lose a seat in Dublin, if it does it can't really be considered an ELDR loss, as the FF MEPs won't join them until the next EP assembles, so ELDR will gain at least 3 seats in Ireland.

In Northern Ireland, there's an outside possibility that SDLP candidate, Alban Maginness, could win the third seat if the unionist vote is split. So the PES could be in for a 1-3 seat increase from the island as a whole, but it would be a big upset for this to happen. I've written a basic overview of the election in NI here.

Another factor which could emerge from this election is the participation of non-Irish EU citizens. I briefly pondered about this a good while back, and it has been good to see that Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael have polish versions of their websites (I didn't include a link for FF because it doesn't seem to be working at the moment). Of course, there are immigrants from other big bang member states, especially from the Baltic states, as well as immigrants from Africa (mostly Nigeria), so hopefully there is a drive for inclusion there too.

This Irish Times has an article on immigrants and political party partcipation (link here). Will more partcipation and the experience of availing of the free movement of workers lead to a good turnout? Or will the registration system and lack of information put people off?

I really liked the article's fantastic English-Polish Irish political phrasebook:

"We are where we are - Jestesmy, gdzie jestesmy.

I have a deep passion for pot- hole-related issues - Mam glebokie zainteresowanie dla problemów zwiazanych z dziurami w drogach.

Poles before politics - Polacy przed polityka.

This is a damning indictment/ appalling vista - To jest potepiajace oskarzenie/ przerazajaca perspektywa.

We cannot let this country go backwards, going forward - Nie mozemy pozwolic, aby ten kraj sie cofnal, idac naprzód.

The money was just resting in my account - Pieniadze tylko spoczywaly na moim koncie. [My favourite]

I’m glad you asked me that question, but if I could just return to an earlier point - Ciesze sie ze Pan mnie o to zapytal, ale czy móglbym powrócic do wczesniejszego punktu."