2014 dawns and the EU continues to widen and deepen. Latvia is now part of the Eurozone, bringing the total to 18. What has Latvia got itself into, you might ask, until you realise that it has pushed itself through a harsh austerity regime just to get into the club. Trepidation might be the right word for Latvia's entry into the Euro; that troubled zone where predecessors have encountered price rises. But with the trial by fire that was the last few years of austerity and Eurozone entry, the country is likely to prize its membership and look unkindly on the periphery's pleas for (debt) forgiveness.
Another event to be marked is Mayotte's move into the category of Outermost Region of the EU. 5 years after it voted to become a department of France, it's been added to the "outermost" category (and being of the coast of Madagascar it is fairly outermost from Europe's perspective), which is an enlargement of sorts. As an outermost region, Mayotte will be in the Customs Union and have the Euro as its currency. It remains outside of the Schengen zone, however. And of course, the restrictions on Romania and Bulgaria have expired today, giving their citizens the full rights of European citizens.
This is after a year where Croatia joined the Union and Ukraine saw huge protests for closer relations with the EU (though it's important to remember that the EU is not promising membership and may not be willing to offer more than the agreement that was on the table). But 2014 will be remembered (in EU circles) as a moment of truth in the European elections. It's a challenge to offer a proper choice when citizens go to the polls, and, as always, it partly depends on citizens demanding that choice. The European Year of Citizens may be rolling on, but we'll not get much in terms of primaries, and for the candidates to make themselves known there'll need to be some key policies to catch the public's attention.
A tough call - but a vital challenge. The 2014 elections will shape the EU for the next 5 years to come. It's not just that the European Parliament is a co-legislator now (the Member States in the Council need its agreement for most EU legislation), but the coherence and impact of the campaign will determine how the next Commission President will be elected and how European politics and the Eurocrisis will proceed. If there's a strong verdict delivered for a more social or less united Eurozone at the election that will influence the outcomes of the political wranglings for the next half a decade. Now we have a new year, can we make the most of it?
Showing posts with label France. Show all posts
Showing posts with label France. Show all posts
Wednesday, 1 January 2014
Monday, 4 February 2013
February to be a big month for same sex marriage in Western Europe
French deputies voted by 249-97 in favour of redefining marriage as applying to same sex as well as opposite sex couples. The change is not law yet, but the vote represents one of the bill's main hurdles, and it has been passed in a very passionate political atmosphere, with rallies on both sides.
France 24 reports that 63% are now in favour of marriage equality, with almost 50% supporting equal adoption rights as well.
Meanwhile in Britain there will be a debate on the Marriages (Same Sex Couples) Bill in the House of Commons this week. The Conservative minister charged with steering the bill through Parliament has stressed that it's the right thing to do at a time when it looks like the Conservative party will face a large rebellion on the issue. Social conservatives within the party are feeling that they are under attack from the Prime Minister and his allies in the name of detoxifying the "Nasty Party" in order to improve the party's image. As Cameron failed to win an outright majority with his rebranded party, it seems that social conservatives are more willing to speak out against some of Cameron's key social policies. There will be a free vote on the issue so that Tory MPs are free to vote with their conscience, but a major battle in the Commons over the issue may promote the image of the Conservative party as a party more interested in fighting itself over issues that aren't salient with the public.
Neveretheless the widespread support for same sex marriage in the House of Commons means that it is likely to be passed by a broad coalition of Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs.
In Ireland the Constitutional Convention has started its work and is scheduled to have a plenary session on same sex marriage in April (PDF). Though the Convention is mandated to look at only a few areas (and is unlikely to have much time to examine further issues on its own motion), and the Convention is not yet a major news story, attitudes in Ireland have changed considerably over same sex marriage. Civil partnerships were only brought in in 2010 (and in force from the start of 2011), but one poll in 2012 was already showing 73% of the population in favour of same sex marriage.
France 24 reports that 63% are now in favour of marriage equality, with almost 50% supporting equal adoption rights as well.
Meanwhile in Britain there will be a debate on the Marriages (Same Sex Couples) Bill in the House of Commons this week. The Conservative minister charged with steering the bill through Parliament has stressed that it's the right thing to do at a time when it looks like the Conservative party will face a large rebellion on the issue. Social conservatives within the party are feeling that they are under attack from the Prime Minister and his allies in the name of detoxifying the "Nasty Party" in order to improve the party's image. As Cameron failed to win an outright majority with his rebranded party, it seems that social conservatives are more willing to speak out against some of Cameron's key social policies. There will be a free vote on the issue so that Tory MPs are free to vote with their conscience, but a major battle in the Commons over the issue may promote the image of the Conservative party as a party more interested in fighting itself over issues that aren't salient with the public.
Neveretheless the widespread support for same sex marriage in the House of Commons means that it is likely to be passed by a broad coalition of Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs.
In Ireland the Constitutional Convention has started its work and is scheduled to have a plenary session on same sex marriage in April (PDF). Though the Convention is mandated to look at only a few areas (and is unlikely to have much time to examine further issues on its own motion), and the Convention is not yet a major news story, attitudes in Ireland have changed considerably over same sex marriage. Civil partnerships were only brought in in 2010 (and in force from the start of 2011), but one poll in 2012 was already showing 73% of the population in favour of same sex marriage.
Monday, 11 June 2012
Linguistic Complaints
BY CC umjanedoan.
As a lazy English-speaker, I can't complain when it comes to the EU and language: there's no doubt about it, I'm in the privillaged group when it comes to communication. So there's very little I can add to Martin Holterman's rebuttal of Quatremer's complaints on the decline of French in the EU, except to highlight that in European law, French is still the top dog.
A good example is the European Court of Justice,* where French is the first language. So much so, that the application forms for interns is only in French. Perhaps someone can correct me, but I'm not aware of an EU institution that only has an application form in English.
The truth is that French is a privileged language in the EU - sure, not as big as English, but it's streets ahead of the most widely-spoken native language in the EU (German), and light years ahead of any other language. So there isn't really any call for alarmism over the Commission's economic assessments being made in English. After all, wasn't the Lisbon Treaty first drafted in French...?**
*Ok, the Court of Justice of the European Union if you want to be technical.
** Leading to Grahnlaw comparing the French and English versions of the provisions on citizenship.
Tuesday, 8 May 2012
A referendum on political tactics
When the Fiscal Stability Treaty was agreed back in January (PDF), despite being short and to the point, it was hard to assess. First of all, the treaty is already 90% EU law, the European Parliament having passed the “six-pack” Barroso mentioned in his State of the Union speech – you can find the legislation here. The budgetary requirements have also caused a political storm in Belgium and been one of the causes (or the excuse for, on the part of the PVV) the collapse of the Dutch government.
However, though the treaty changes little in legal terms, it’s not something that could simply be voted against to force another renegotiation, as only 12 states need to ratify it before it comes into force. In addition, in the treaty for the European Stability Mechanism (PDF), it stipulates that only countries that have ratified the FST will have access to its funds for a bail-out. Despite the six-pack legislation not being subject to much debate in Ireland, the debate has so far centred around the big question of how Ireland secures its funding. The current bail-out arrangement lasts until 2013 when Ireland is supposed to return to the markets. Though there is widespread acceptance that the current austerity policy (essentially, the last 5 years) is not enough and that there should ideally be an investment and growth policy, the bail out loans cover the budget deficit for the Irish state, and without it Ireland would have to default, leading to harsher, more sudden cuts.
So far the No side has failed to come up with an alternative to the question: where would the money come from if we need a second bail out? It seems perverse, since the government line is that we won’t need one since Ireland is “on track”, but since the No side is based on the fact that the current bail-out programme won’t solve anything, it is not a question that can be ignored. One solution put forward by the No side is that Ireland could veto the ESM treaty – though this would be difficult since it can only be vetoed by states amounting to 10% of the subscriptions, of which Ireland makes up under 2%. All the political parties involved have trouble articulating a vision on Europe, and on making alliances to achieve their vision. This may partially be a result of the referendum process in Ireland and treaty structure of the EU as past referendums could block a treaty and force a renegotiation. This is not the case here, and though the quality of the debate is much higher than before (there have been no strange claims along the lines of abortion or conscription), the lack of an alternative vision is palpable. It means that the Irish government has an unimaginative and poor European policy, but in this case it helps the Yes side since the No campaign cannot rely on the “back to the drawing board” vote in the same way anymore.
But now there’s a Socialist in the Élysée talking about growth and leading the charge against austerity in Europe. The promise of Hollande to renegotiate the FST has already played a part in the campaign so far. For the No side this is the sign that a No vote would really count in the European debate on austerity. So far the messages from Hollande have been quite mixed, and there might not be a renegotiation of the FST per se:
Would a No vote help bury the austerity policy, or would it leave Ireland unnecessarily politically exposed while an extra treaty is put together – or new proposals are made within the EU legislative system? With only a month left before the vote there will be no alternative treaty before the vote, so it will be down to what tactics seem most credible. Ireland will listening closely to what the Élysée says in the next few weeks.
UPDATE: Van Rompuy has called a summit for the 23rd of May, so the outcome could impact on an Irish referendum - especially if any growth pact is tied to the Fiscal Stability Treaty.
However, though the treaty changes little in legal terms, it’s not something that could simply be voted against to force another renegotiation, as only 12 states need to ratify it before it comes into force. In addition, in the treaty for the European Stability Mechanism (PDF), it stipulates that only countries that have ratified the FST will have access to its funds for a bail-out. Despite the six-pack legislation not being subject to much debate in Ireland, the debate has so far centred around the big question of how Ireland secures its funding. The current bail-out arrangement lasts until 2013 when Ireland is supposed to return to the markets. Though there is widespread acceptance that the current austerity policy (essentially, the last 5 years) is not enough and that there should ideally be an investment and growth policy, the bail out loans cover the budget deficit for the Irish state, and without it Ireland would have to default, leading to harsher, more sudden cuts.
So far the No side has failed to come up with an alternative to the question: where would the money come from if we need a second bail out? It seems perverse, since the government line is that we won’t need one since Ireland is “on track”, but since the No side is based on the fact that the current bail-out programme won’t solve anything, it is not a question that can be ignored. One solution put forward by the No side is that Ireland could veto the ESM treaty – though this would be difficult since it can only be vetoed by states amounting to 10% of the subscriptions, of which Ireland makes up under 2%. All the political parties involved have trouble articulating a vision on Europe, and on making alliances to achieve their vision. This may partially be a result of the referendum process in Ireland and treaty structure of the EU as past referendums could block a treaty and force a renegotiation. This is not the case here, and though the quality of the debate is much higher than before (there have been no strange claims along the lines of abortion or conscription), the lack of an alternative vision is palpable. It means that the Irish government has an unimaginative and poor European policy, but in this case it helps the Yes side since the No campaign cannot rely on the “back to the drawing board” vote in the same way anymore.
But now there’s a Socialist in the Élysée talking about growth and leading the charge against austerity in Europe. The promise of Hollande to renegotiate the FST has already played a part in the campaign so far. For the No side this is the sign that a No vote would really count in the European debate on austerity. So far the messages from Hollande have been quite mixed, and there might not be a renegotiation of the FST per se:
“Hollande says he agrees with all existing provisions in the fiscal treaty, including tight limits on budget deficits and public debts.
[...]
Informal contacts have been taking place between Hollande’s camp and the authorities in Berlin, Frankfurt and Dublin, and despite Hollande’s public insistence on renegotiation, all signs suggest the ground is being prepared for a compromise.
Two of Hollande’s senior aides – policy director Michel Sapin and Europe adviser Catherine Trautmann – have indicated to The Irish Times that they may be open to a “growth pact” in the form of a protocol or a separate legal text, a fix that would leave the fiscal treaty as it stands.”
Would a No vote help bury the austerity policy, or would it leave Ireland unnecessarily politically exposed while an extra treaty is put together – or new proposals are made within the EU legislative system? With only a month left before the vote there will be no alternative treaty before the vote, so it will be down to what tactics seem most credible. Ireland will listening closely to what the Élysée says in the next few weeks.
UPDATE: Van Rompuy has called a summit for the 23rd of May, so the outcome could impact on an Irish referendum - especially if any growth pact is tied to the Fiscal Stability Treaty.
Monday, 7 May 2012
Hup Hollande Hup!
Sunday was a big election day for Europe. France elected its
first Socialist President in 17 years with Francois Hollande, and the Greek electorate looks like it has given the two main parties a huge kicking.
Hollande will add to the pressure for a change in direction
in the EU when it comes to austerity, and Hollande has already set himself up
to be the leader of counter-austerity Europe. Though he will undoubtedly clash
with Merkel, in the end they’re likely to muddle through unless Merkel sticks
to an absolutist vision of austerity Europe. With austerity failing in practical
terms – S&P used its report on Spain to critique the front-loaded austerity
programme and the EU’s general policy – and countries like Italy voicing the
need for a better approach to growth (while endorsing austerity in general),
the political winds look like they will shift the continent leftwards to a
degree (Europe is still dominated by the centre-right EPP political family).
Within Germany there is more debate on Eurobonds, etc, than
I think outside commentators give credit for, though there is still a lack of
debate. The opposition Social Democrats and Greens are more enthusiastic on
Eurobonds and deeper fiscal integration, but the rise of the Pirate Party makes
the German political scene more unpredictable. Germany has been caught up in a
lot of comment on the rise of Die Piraten: what exactly are they about? Do they
have the kind of leadership structure or policy programme that makes them a
credible force? If they remain so unstructured – and wedded to “fluid democracy”
(crudely put, where policy is crafted online by activists and then represented
in parliament by Pirate representatives) – could they ever be capable of
coalition with the other parties?
Sunday brought an election in the Northern German Land of
Schleswig-Holstein, where the Pirate Party gained 8.3%, and there was little
between the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), even if the centre-left coalition is ahead - the rival Christian Democrats-Liberal bloc trial the Social Democratic-Green
bloc 39% to 43.4%. It now looks like the Social Democrats will lead a
coalition with the Greens and the Danish minority party SSW (which is not subject
to the same 5% threshold as the other parties), that may have a majority of
just 1. The Liberal FDP is unlikely to do as well at the federal level as in
Schleswig-Holstein (honestly, after the bad year they’ve had, being kicked out
of one state parliament after another, their 8.2% vote in S-H is a huge
victory), but it just demonstrates how the sudden rise of the Pirates could
splinter the political field further.
Muddling along will likely continue in Europe, except now
the hope is that we’ll start to see a direction with more solidarity develop.
The biggest shock to the system will be the Greek elections, where it could be
very difficult indeed to form the next government. With the far-right getting
into parliament and the collapse in the vote for the two main parties,
political instability is going to dog Greece and the rest of Europe for a long
time to come. France and Germany can’t afford to squabble for too long: Greece
will be bursting back on to the agenda before we know it.
And the referendum in Ireland? I don’t know how much
Hollande’s election will make a difference until – or if – he makes it clear if
he is seeking another treaty to supplement the Fiscal Stability Treaty or a
renegotiation. From what he’s said it looks like he wants an extra treaty – it’ll
be easier to get this, as it will be easier for Merkel to agree to this without
losing face – and Ireland might be in a difficult position if it rejects the
treaty to push a joint cause with Hollande... and then have to re-run the
referendum in order to get the second treaty too (though it should then be
clear that enough’s changed to have a re-run at least). The vote’s not until
the end of May, so there’s still some time to read the signals from the Élysée.
Friday, 27 April 2012
Merkel's Intervention
Merkel's intervention in the French elections yesterday - effectively attacking Hollande by stating that there will be no renegotiation of the Fiscal Stability Treaty - strikes me as bizarre. If she's hoping that this will discredit Hollande and lead to voters voting Sarkozy, I can't see how it will work (will those who voted for the far-right be more willing to vote for the candidate closest to German policy, or the candidate who is almost setting himself up as the leader of an anti-German leadership alliance?).
It's also starting to seem a bit desperate. Hollande's position isn't really so radical: no renegotiation of the treaty itself, but some new measures before it will be adopted. Since 90% the treaty is already EU law, Merkel's discipline provisions are in reality safe from Hollande. Even the Eurobonds Hollande is proposing aren't connected to mutualising debt, but for investment in infrastructure, etc. Calls for the remit of the ECB to also have encouraging growth and employment as part of its task will find a lot of sympathy in other states too. Is Merkel really going to set her face against all of this?
The Eurozone crisis is worsening day by day and the same austerity approach isn't working for anyone (even in Ireland there is talk that a second bailout might be needed - indeed, the Yes side in favour of the Fiscal Stability Treaty relies on this need for access to bailout funds to gain support for the treaty). While economic reforms are necessary, this extreme austerity is an insane way of going about it. The German government wants its fellow Eurozone states in a strange limbo of danger, where there is enough stability that the reforms can be implemented, but sufficient economic danger to ensure governments will enact these reforms.
While the German government may think it's the only way bailout states won't flush money down the drain, the political logic doesn't - and cannot - add up. The lack of a solution simply worsens the situation and spreads the crisis to yet more Eurozone states, while draining away the political support for the Euro in general, leaving people cynical that any of this mystic summitry the European Council engages in is a waste of time. All pain, no gain.
For Merkel to refuse even Hollande's modest proposals would be disastrous. The political winds are starting to blow against austerity, and Germany's great adapter will have a very tumultuous EU on her hands if she decides she won't give an inch.
It's also starting to seem a bit desperate. Hollande's position isn't really so radical: no renegotiation of the treaty itself, but some new measures before it will be adopted. Since 90% the treaty is already EU law, Merkel's discipline provisions are in reality safe from Hollande. Even the Eurobonds Hollande is proposing aren't connected to mutualising debt, but for investment in infrastructure, etc. Calls for the remit of the ECB to also have encouraging growth and employment as part of its task will find a lot of sympathy in other states too. Is Merkel really going to set her face against all of this?
The Eurozone crisis is worsening day by day and the same austerity approach isn't working for anyone (even in Ireland there is talk that a second bailout might be needed - indeed, the Yes side in favour of the Fiscal Stability Treaty relies on this need for access to bailout funds to gain support for the treaty). While economic reforms are necessary, this extreme austerity is an insane way of going about it. The German government wants its fellow Eurozone states in a strange limbo of danger, where there is enough stability that the reforms can be implemented, but sufficient economic danger to ensure governments will enact these reforms.
While the German government may think it's the only way bailout states won't flush money down the drain, the political logic doesn't - and cannot - add up. The lack of a solution simply worsens the situation and spreads the crisis to yet more Eurozone states, while draining away the political support for the Euro in general, leaving people cynical that any of this mystic summitry the European Council engages in is a waste of time. All pain, no gain.
For Merkel to refuse even Hollande's modest proposals would be disastrous. The political winds are starting to blow against austerity, and Germany's great adapter will have a very tumultuous EU on her hands if she decides she won't give an inch.
Thursday, 12 January 2012
Shifts on the New Fiscal Compact
The EU Observer has reported some changes in the drafts on the new fiscal compact:
The "golden rule" on deficits will no longer have to be inserted into constitutions, so the final deal could simply require an act of parliament to ensure governments don't spend over a certain limit. This would get around the need for referendums in several Member States, but it could open up political problems in the future if budgets passed by parliaments are being challenged by other EU countries in the courts - a potentially politically toxic situation.
France's position on the Commission's powers is revealing and worrying for the credibility of the pact. Given that it's simply a Stability and Growth Pact Plus, further entrenching the current rules, the institutional and political credibility of the mechanisms actually working was the key problem. Of course, if any contracting country can take another to court, then it's more likely to happen than under the current system which requires a vote in Council. Still, France wants the Commission to be kept away from this position of power because diplomacy could still influence the outcome - and this would be much more advantageous to larger Member States who could throw their weight around more. The potential for differences in treatment echo the complaints from the smaller Member States that France and Germany were among the first to break the Stability and Growth Pact in the last decade. Also, the value of integrating the deal into the current treaties for the European Parliament is questionable if the Commission's role is minimal, since there would be little for the EP to act on.
Finally, setting the minimum number of Member States at 12 for the treaty to come into effect will, if it's in the final draft, have a big effect in the parliamentary votes and referendum campaigns as it ensures that even some Eurozone states could reject it (and stay outside it), and the deal wouldn't be completely stopped. The fear of exclusion (and the effect of this on the economies of the excluded Eurozone States) will make opposing the deal more problematic, and it will be a major feature of the Yes campaigns.
UPDATE: Honor Mahony has written a good blog on the problems these shifts reveal for the future of the negotiations.
"The role of the EU commission in taking debt sinners to court for not properly transposing the golden rule into national law, an idea introduced in the second draft at the demand of the European Parliament, has also been watered down to the commission "issuing a report" at the demand of another country adhering to the pact.
The power of taking countries to court is instead to reside with countries - a u-turn going back to the first draft - after French worries the commission risks becoming too powerful.
[...]
Another watering down of earlier drafts rules out introducing new sanctions for countries that break rules on overall public debt, opting instead to limit such penalties to ballooning budget deficits.
[...]
The 'working group' which is pumping out the texts - a mixed bag of member states' officials led by a Luxemburger - kept another EU parliament demand, to enshrine the intergovernmental pact in EU Treaty law in the next five years.
But it also changed the threshold of countries needed to ratify the pact for it to come into force from 15 to 12. In the first draft, the threshold was even lower, at nine countries."
The "golden rule" on deficits will no longer have to be inserted into constitutions, so the final deal could simply require an act of parliament to ensure governments don't spend over a certain limit. This would get around the need for referendums in several Member States, but it could open up political problems in the future if budgets passed by parliaments are being challenged by other EU countries in the courts - a potentially politically toxic situation.
France's position on the Commission's powers is revealing and worrying for the credibility of the pact. Given that it's simply a Stability and Growth Pact Plus, further entrenching the current rules, the institutional and political credibility of the mechanisms actually working was the key problem. Of course, if any contracting country can take another to court, then it's more likely to happen than under the current system which requires a vote in Council. Still, France wants the Commission to be kept away from this position of power because diplomacy could still influence the outcome - and this would be much more advantageous to larger Member States who could throw their weight around more. The potential for differences in treatment echo the complaints from the smaller Member States that France and Germany were among the first to break the Stability and Growth Pact in the last decade. Also, the value of integrating the deal into the current treaties for the European Parliament is questionable if the Commission's role is minimal, since there would be little for the EP to act on.
Finally, setting the minimum number of Member States at 12 for the treaty to come into effect will, if it's in the final draft, have a big effect in the parliamentary votes and referendum campaigns as it ensures that even some Eurozone states could reject it (and stay outside it), and the deal wouldn't be completely stopped. The fear of exclusion (and the effect of this on the economies of the excluded Eurozone States) will make opposing the deal more problematic, and it will be a major feature of the Yes campaigns.
UPDATE: Honor Mahony has written a good blog on the problems these shifts reveal for the future of the negotiations.
Friday, 6 January 2012
Send in the Junior Ministers
Given the talk about the UK and the infamous veto and what it means for British diplomacy, it might be worth puzzling over the French use of its Junior Ministers.
French EU Affairs minister Jean Leonetti made a strong prediction for the Financial Transaction Tax being passed this year as France and Germany had decided it:
This obviously will rub the other Member States up the wrong way, but it's not the first time France's junior ministers have mouthed off, and last month saw a big spat between the UK and France over the UK's credit rating. It's an astonishing way to do politics, and you have to wonder at the tactics behind it (or the political control and coherence in the heart of government). Britain might have shot itself in the foot last month, but France would be a fool if it thinks this behaviour won't impact on its diplomatic success.
French EU Affairs minister Jean Leonetti made a strong prediction for the Financial Transaction Tax being passed this year as France and Germany had decided it:
"He added: "France and Germany have already agreed on it. And I believe the new Italian government, with which we have been in contact, is not opposed. Twenty six out of 27, in fact all the EU countries except Great Britain have no objections to the idea, and except Sweden, which had a bad experiment in this area.""
This obviously will rub the other Member States up the wrong way, but it's not the first time France's junior ministers have mouthed off, and last month saw a big spat between the UK and France over the UK's credit rating. It's an astonishing way to do politics, and you have to wonder at the tactics behind it (or the political control and coherence in the heart of government). Britain might have shot itself in the foot last month, but France would be a fool if it thinks this behaviour won't impact on its diplomatic success.
Friday, 16 December 2011
The Troubles of the New Fiscal Compact
Yesterday I wrote about the left and the new fiscal compact, and I've noted that the centre-left PES seems to be hoping that the French and German elections will help replace our current Merkozy with a PES version. EUObserver has reported that a majority of the French public (52%) are opposed to the (as yet undrafted) EU deal on fiscal union, largely following left-right lines. The Socialist challenger for the presidency, Francois Hollande:
While not all of the troubles fall along clearly drawn left-right battlelines, I think it's fair to say that it would be a mistake to read in a support for the UK negotiating position, as the issues seem to be based around the content of fiscal union rather than either the question of having a fiscal union or voting arrangements for regulating the financial services. Apart from the right-left divide is the concern of the non-Eurozone countries, like Hungary, that it would lead to tax harmonisation even outside the Eurozone. I don't know if this is being discussed (it wasn't mentioned in the deal produced last week), but it seems unlikely that there will be tax harmonisation even for the Eurozone, given so many Eurozone members are against it.
But the main issues will be those Hollande has highlighted: how much solidarity there should be in fiscal union. Merkel is kidding herself (or talking up the value of the deal for her domestic audiance) if she thinks that the deal on the table means political union - the greatest challenge to the deal will come from the push against the maintanence of the German sacred cows of retaining the ECB's current role and the ruling out of Eurobonds. However, it is doubtful that these ambitious goals could be won as well as removing the "golden budget rule" (who knows, maybe any financial relief fund would be sold as a counter-balance to national austerity brought about by the golden rule). The question is whether this pressure (and that of the markets) will force the negotiations to move further and further away from the starting points agreed on this month...
"...announced that he would renegotiate the document.
"If I am elected president, I will renegotiate the agreement to put what it lacks today," he told RTL.
He said that he would “add what is missing”, mentioning he would push to include intervention from the European Central Bank, the creation of eurobonds and a financial relief fund.
“Finally, there must also be growth,” he added. “Without growth, we will not reach any of our objectives of deficit reduction.”
The Frenchman attacked the core concept of the new agreement, a ‘golden rule’, or balanced budget amendment that should be inscribed into constitutions, in effect preventing future governments from exercising expansionary fiscal policies.
Asked about the golden rule, the candidate said he would not vote for it “under this logic”."
While not all of the troubles fall along clearly drawn left-right battlelines, I think it's fair to say that it would be a mistake to read in a support for the UK negotiating position, as the issues seem to be based around the content of fiscal union rather than either the question of having a fiscal union or voting arrangements for regulating the financial services. Apart from the right-left divide is the concern of the non-Eurozone countries, like Hungary, that it would lead to tax harmonisation even outside the Eurozone. I don't know if this is being discussed (it wasn't mentioned in the deal produced last week), but it seems unlikely that there will be tax harmonisation even for the Eurozone, given so many Eurozone members are against it.
But the main issues will be those Hollande has highlighted: how much solidarity there should be in fiscal union. Merkel is kidding herself (or talking up the value of the deal for her domestic audiance) if she thinks that the deal on the table means political union - the greatest challenge to the deal will come from the push against the maintanence of the German sacred cows of retaining the ECB's current role and the ruling out of Eurobonds. However, it is doubtful that these ambitious goals could be won as well as removing the "golden budget rule" (who knows, maybe any financial relief fund would be sold as a counter-balance to national austerity brought about by the golden rule). The question is whether this pressure (and that of the markets) will force the negotiations to move further and further away from the starting points agreed on this month...
Friday, 2 December 2011
Eurocrisis, Democratic Deficit and the Re:New Conference
Throughout the Re:New Conference references were made to that most European of monsters: Merkozy. Yesterday Sarkozy spoke, and today Merkel has spoken in the Bundestag about Europe and the Eurozone. While European integration - and a new treaty - was held up to be necessary, Merkel rejected Eurobonds as expensive and unconstitutional. At the same time, the European Parliament has passed a resolution, declaring that it should have equal powers with the Council over any new features of economic union (such as an EU Finance Minister) so that there is sufficient democratic oversight.
The same day Sarkozy, in Gaullist mode, firmly signalled that any further changes would be purely intergovernmental:
At first sight the battle between Merkozy and the EP might seem to be a foregone conclusion: the duo have sidelined the EU institutions so far in the Eurocrisis and Treaty change is itself intergovernmental, so how much power can influence can the Parliament, with falling turnout numbers, and the Commission, which has hardly been bursting with energy, bring to bear. However, intergovernmentalism favours secretive processes and large countries over transparency and smaller countries. I've written before about the faultlines dividing the European debate, and these will spur some Member States to fight for more supranationalism.
In the long run intergovernmentalism will be a mistake as is disempowers citizens and promotes a cynical them-and-us culture between the rest of us and the Paris-Berlin duopoly that is unhealthly for European politics and damaging to democracy. But it's also damaging in the short term - by going for intergovernmentalist solutions, the suspicion and anger with the Franco-German concentration of power will crystalise: should this summitry with France and Germany at the top - which has hardly worked wonders during this crisis - be not just for crises, but for life? Without QMV, Commission oversight and Parliamentary input, the majority of the Eurozone and Non-Eurozone states and citizens are threatened with the prospect of being marginalised within the EU structure. So far we've been working ad hoc, pretty much outside of the treaties. Now we're talking about committing ourselves to these governing structures by treaty.
That's not to say that the European Parliament is a great cure for this democratic deficit: though over last weekend I saw a PES that spoke like an opposition and proposed a different vision for the EU, as an opposition the PES, and other Europarties, remain too detached from citizens and even their national parties. It seems to me that supporters of a more democratic EU need to focus more energy on reforming the Europarties so that they can seriously propose new policies and debate them in public. This requires not just some autonomy on the part of the Europarties - you could argue they have autonomy at the moment since the national parties don't pay much attention to them for policy matters - but commitment from the national parties to help shape, debate and campaign on these policies.
With the PES in opposition almost everywhere in the EU, this should be easier for them to achieve. Could a basic common platform not provide a voice for the centre-left during the crisis both in Member States and at the EU level? The divisions between national parties and the protection of national party autonomy from European commitments are great and understandable, but it's hard to see how the centre-left - the opposition - can effectively put forward their own narrative and solutions if they cannot build a European coalition, even on a basic level, that can make their visions at a national level sound realistic. Given that pan-european crises of this scale are - thankfully - rare, I wouldn't expect much progress to happen in this area, which is why I hope a contest between Europarties for the Commission Presidency would push politics further along this path. But that's too long-term, and this crisis is progressing too rapidly.
I'm not a member of a political party, but if I believe in promoting democracy at a European level, then perhaps I should become one and add my voice, in whatever small way, to the need for a better European politics. Because we can't just hope that it will simply emerge to inspire a demand for it; rather those of us who want it should demand it, and demand it loudly. Despite my criticisms of the lack of policy at the PES Conference, I did see some vision there. If we want to have an inclusive EU rather than a concentrated summitry, then we'll have to strengthen our Europarties so they can represent us better.
The same day Sarkozy, in Gaullist mode, firmly signalled that any further changes would be purely intergovernmental:
""The reform of Europe is not a march towards supra-nationality," Sarkozy said. "Europe will reform itself by pragmatically drawing the lessons of the crisis. The crisis has pushed the heads of state and government to assume greater responsibilities because ultimately they have the democratic legitimacy to take decisions."
"The integration of Europe will go the inter-governmental way because Europe needs to make strategic political choices.""
At first sight the battle between Merkozy and the EP might seem to be a foregone conclusion: the duo have sidelined the EU institutions so far in the Eurocrisis and Treaty change is itself intergovernmental, so how much power can influence can the Parliament, with falling turnout numbers, and the Commission, which has hardly been bursting with energy, bring to bear. However, intergovernmentalism favours secretive processes and large countries over transparency and smaller countries. I've written before about the faultlines dividing the European debate, and these will spur some Member States to fight for more supranationalism.
In the long run intergovernmentalism will be a mistake as is disempowers citizens and promotes a cynical them-and-us culture between the rest of us and the Paris-Berlin duopoly that is unhealthly for European politics and damaging to democracy. But it's also damaging in the short term - by going for intergovernmentalist solutions, the suspicion and anger with the Franco-German concentration of power will crystalise: should this summitry with France and Germany at the top - which has hardly worked wonders during this crisis - be not just for crises, but for life? Without QMV, Commission oversight and Parliamentary input, the majority of the Eurozone and Non-Eurozone states and citizens are threatened with the prospect of being marginalised within the EU structure. So far we've been working ad hoc, pretty much outside of the treaties. Now we're talking about committing ourselves to these governing structures by treaty.
That's not to say that the European Parliament is a great cure for this democratic deficit: though over last weekend I saw a PES that spoke like an opposition and proposed a different vision for the EU, as an opposition the PES, and other Europarties, remain too detached from citizens and even their national parties. It seems to me that supporters of a more democratic EU need to focus more energy on reforming the Europarties so that they can seriously propose new policies and debate them in public. This requires not just some autonomy on the part of the Europarties - you could argue they have autonomy at the moment since the national parties don't pay much attention to them for policy matters - but commitment from the national parties to help shape, debate and campaign on these policies.
With the PES in opposition almost everywhere in the EU, this should be easier for them to achieve. Could a basic common platform not provide a voice for the centre-left during the crisis both in Member States and at the EU level? The divisions between national parties and the protection of national party autonomy from European commitments are great and understandable, but it's hard to see how the centre-left - the opposition - can effectively put forward their own narrative and solutions if they cannot build a European coalition, even on a basic level, that can make their visions at a national level sound realistic. Given that pan-european crises of this scale are - thankfully - rare, I wouldn't expect much progress to happen in this area, which is why I hope a contest between Europarties for the Commission Presidency would push politics further along this path. But that's too long-term, and this crisis is progressing too rapidly.
I'm not a member of a political party, but if I believe in promoting democracy at a European level, then perhaps I should become one and add my voice, in whatever small way, to the need for a better European politics. Because we can't just hope that it will simply emerge to inspire a demand for it; rather those of us who want it should demand it, and demand it loudly. Despite my criticisms of the lack of policy at the PES Conference, I did see some vision there. If we want to have an inclusive EU rather than a concentrated summitry, then we'll have to strengthen our Europarties so they can represent us better.
Thursday, 6 January 2011
Schengen Wars
After France and Germany sent a letter to the EU opposing the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen zone (a decision each Schengen member state has a veto on), Romania has hit back with suggestions that it will delay Croatian accession (or that the CVM [Co-operation and Verification Mechanism] that applies to it and Bulgaria should be applied to Croatia as well), and that it might delay ratifying the Protocol allowing the 18 Lisbon MEPs from taking their seats in the European Parliament. France and Germany are blocking the expansion of the Schengen zone to include Romania and Bulgaria because of their failure to make good progress in combating corruption and organised crime. However, technically both Bulgaria and Romania have met the criteria for acceding to the Schengen zone, and the two sets of criteria are supposed to be separate.
Romania's fight-back has been couched in the language of the rights of small states against the power of the Franco-German core. Ironically, a few days before EUobserver reported the Franco-German letter, I heard this policy being held up as an example of successful small state diplomacy - the Netherlands was extremely reluctant to let Romania and Bulgaria join, and wanted to put pressure on them to speed up justice reform. (Justice, immigration and law and order are policy areas the Dutch government is very keen on). Though the Netherlands has a veto in this area, using the "nuclear option" isn't a great diplomatic technique, and it's much better to get wider support for their position, so the Dutch lobbied the other states (particularly France) on the issue. (Yet another example of the veto not being a practical tool in European politics, I think).
In any case there's the question of whether or not it's right to move the goalposts like this. Wikileaks, as the EUobserver reported, has shown the considerable frustration in the EU over the the failure of the 2007 accession states to effectively fight corruption. The EU has been lax and hasty in its enlargement, and there's little incentive for states to reform after they've joined. It is hard to see how corruption and organised crime can be divorced from the burden Romania and Bulgaria would have to assume in becoming the EU/Schengen zone's border. Would border controls be or remain effective?
It may be unfair to tie these issues together after the fact, and the EU should have perhaps linked them more closely earlier, but these issues aren't optional for Romania, Bulgaria or the EU, and we have to find some way of ensuring that they will be tackled. There is a big question over big states versus small states rights, but this is not the most glorious way of fighting the small states' fight - because in the end this is about Romania and Bulgaria living up to the commitments of membership, which will benefit them and and EU.
UPDATE: Romania has given up on this strategy. Also worth reading is Kosmopolito's critque of Romania's brand of EU politics.
Romania's fight-back has been couched in the language of the rights of small states against the power of the Franco-German core. Ironically, a few days before EUobserver reported the Franco-German letter, I heard this policy being held up as an example of successful small state diplomacy - the Netherlands was extremely reluctant to let Romania and Bulgaria join, and wanted to put pressure on them to speed up justice reform. (Justice, immigration and law and order are policy areas the Dutch government is very keen on). Though the Netherlands has a veto in this area, using the "nuclear option" isn't a great diplomatic technique, and it's much better to get wider support for their position, so the Dutch lobbied the other states (particularly France) on the issue. (Yet another example of the veto not being a practical tool in European politics, I think).
In any case there's the question of whether or not it's right to move the goalposts like this. Wikileaks, as the EUobserver reported, has shown the considerable frustration in the EU over the the failure of the 2007 accession states to effectively fight corruption. The EU has been lax and hasty in its enlargement, and there's little incentive for states to reform after they've joined. It is hard to see how corruption and organised crime can be divorced from the burden Romania and Bulgaria would have to assume in becoming the EU/Schengen zone's border. Would border controls be or remain effective?
It may be unfair to tie these issues together after the fact, and the EU should have perhaps linked them more closely earlier, but these issues aren't optional for Romania, Bulgaria or the EU, and we have to find some way of ensuring that they will be tackled. There is a big question over big states versus small states rights, but this is not the most glorious way of fighting the small states' fight - because in the end this is about Romania and Bulgaria living up to the commitments of membership, which will benefit them and and EU.
UPDATE: Romania has given up on this strategy. Also worth reading is Kosmopolito's critque of Romania's brand of EU politics.
Wednesday, 15 September 2010
The Commission bravely missed a good opportunity to stay quiet
"This is not how you speak to a major power like France," said France's junior EU minister, echoing Chirac's comments on the support of some eastern European member states for the Iraq War: "It is not really responsible behavior. It is not well brought-up behavior. They missed a good opportunity to keep quiet."
It was a response to yesterday's strong position taken by Commissioner Reding on the treatment - the mass deportations - of the Roma in France:
France will be taken to court by the Commission for breaching EU law, which does not permit mass explusions based on ethnicity, which seems to be have been explicit French policy according to a French memo on the policy. Though the explusions were taking place too quickly for a case-by-case approach (which would have been permitted), French officials had been reassuring the Commission that they would deport people on a case-by-case basis. This deception by French officials empowered to discuss the matter in Brussels has upset Reding too.
I'm glad the Commission is finally taking a strong, outspoken stance on the issue. Reding had made an earlier statement, but this goes much further and has rightly attracted more attention, and is a welcome counter to attempts to make the explusions respectable by Europeanising the issue.
France's response highlights the government's view on Europe: as a place where a privillaged few major powers are treated differently to the smaller member states. This is a destructive attitude for the EU, since it erodes the confidence of small states and of citizens in the Commission when this vision is played out. When Paris feels that it can issue a lettres de cachet and not be effected by the rule of law, it naturally strikes at the heart of a system backed up only by the rule of law. It is easy for the Commission to become trapped between the big states and to play down its voice when they verge on breaking the law, so it's great to see the Commission bravely miss an opportunity to remain quiet.
You can watch Reding's statement here.
It was a response to yesterday's strong position taken by Commissioner Reding on the treatment - the mass deportations - of the Roma in France:
"My patience is wearing thin. Enough is enough," Ms Reding said, while pounding her fist on the pulpit.
France will be taken to court by the Commission for breaching EU law, which does not permit mass explusions based on ethnicity, which seems to be have been explicit French policy according to a French memo on the policy. Though the explusions were taking place too quickly for a case-by-case approach (which would have been permitted), French officials had been reassuring the Commission that they would deport people on a case-by-case basis. This deception by French officials empowered to discuss the matter in Brussels has upset Reding too.
I'm glad the Commission is finally taking a strong, outspoken stance on the issue. Reding had made an earlier statement, but this goes much further and has rightly attracted more attention, and is a welcome counter to attempts to make the explusions respectable by Europeanising the issue.
France's response highlights the government's view on Europe: as a place where a privillaged few major powers are treated differently to the smaller member states. This is a destructive attitude for the EU, since it erodes the confidence of small states and of citizens in the Commission when this vision is played out. When Paris feels that it can issue a lettres de cachet and not be effected by the rule of law, it naturally strikes at the heart of a system backed up only by the rule of law. It is easy for the Commission to become trapped between the big states and to play down its voice when they verge on breaking the law, so it's great to see the Commission bravely miss an opportunity to remain quiet.
You can watch Reding's statement here.
Thursday, 26 August 2010
The Moral Authority of Europe
Despite the rhetoric of the EU as the "EUSSR", a neo-liberal project or as some sort of Papist plot, Europe holds an - at times, surprising - amount of moral authority, even in the more Eurosceptic member states. This is probably because of the practice of using "Europe" as a continental yardstick (e.g. highest cancer death rate in Europe; lowest teenage pregnancy in Europe), and because of the legal certainty the EU and ECHR can lend to policies (if the European Court of Human Rights rules on something, it carries a lot of legal and moral authority, even if legal academics continue to argue and debate the reasoning).
Which is why I wrote an open letter to President Barroso, Commissioner Reding and European Council President Van Rompuy on the Roma issue, urging them to speak out (NOTE: the refusal of the Commission website to relay my email to Barroso, and the chore of moving house have meant that I only managed to send a paper version to Barroso earlier this week). While the EU has issued statements that they will monitor the legal status and treatment of the Roma, there is an important role for the Europarties and EU institutions to speak out for equality and rights (though they obviously need to be held to account on this score as well). So it was good to see Commissioner Reding finally making the wider argument for tolerance (hat tip @dicknieuwenhuis and @Anna_EU_webteam).
However, the argument against mass explusions and for equal treatment needs to be made continuously, and, in the future, the response should be faster. France's calls for a exclusive immigration summit and calls that the EU decide a "coordinated response" on how to "deal" with the Roma's deportation show that national politicians and leaders who support discrimination against the Roma as a group know that the nation-state is a badly tarnished vehicle for carrying out their prejudices. These summits and immigration meetings are attempts to legitimise Roma explusions as "the norm" and "legally acceptable".
So we need to keep making the case for tolerance and equal treatment at the European level. If we don't, one day we'll find discrimination being legitimised in Europe's name.
Which is why I wrote an open letter to President Barroso, Commissioner Reding and European Council President Van Rompuy on the Roma issue, urging them to speak out (NOTE: the refusal of the Commission website to relay my email to Barroso, and the chore of moving house have meant that I only managed to send a paper version to Barroso earlier this week). While the EU has issued statements that they will monitor the legal status and treatment of the Roma, there is an important role for the Europarties and EU institutions to speak out for equality and rights (though they obviously need to be held to account on this score as well). So it was good to see Commissioner Reding finally making the wider argument for tolerance (hat tip @dicknieuwenhuis and @Anna_EU_webteam).
However, the argument against mass explusions and for equal treatment needs to be made continuously, and, in the future, the response should be faster. France's calls for a exclusive immigration summit and calls that the EU decide a "coordinated response" on how to "deal" with the Roma's deportation show that national politicians and leaders who support discrimination against the Roma as a group know that the nation-state is a badly tarnished vehicle for carrying out their prejudices. These summits and immigration meetings are attempts to legitimise Roma explusions as "the norm" and "legally acceptable".
So we need to keep making the case for tolerance and equal treatment at the European level. If we don't, one day we'll find discrimination being legitimised in Europe's name.
Monday, 26 July 2010
Nuns on the Run
Nuns have been in the news this week a surprising amount (though maybe I'm underestimating the news-worthiness of nuns, I don't know). It's been reported by the Guardian that there are nuns on the run in France, where two octogenarian nuns have gone into hiding after their religious order had decided to end their teaching roles and move them to a retirement home 400km away.
I wonder where they might have gotten the idea from...
Also in the news is a group of nuns in Avignon who have been signed a recording deal with Universal music for a new Gregorian chant album. These nuns live in a closed-off cloister, so they'll have to do a lot of the recording and picture-taking for promotional material as outsiders aren't allowed into their communities in order to prevent their spiritual work from being disturbed.
It just goes to show that reality TV shows aren't the only route to fame and an adventurous lifestyle. I wonder how long before we see a book release of "If I were a Spy" by Sister X...
"A third nun, who had also planned to disobey an order for the first time in her life, is recovering in hospital after breaking her hip, Le Parisien reported on Sunday. [...] The two nuns are refusing to leave their home since 1964, and are hiding in an apartment lent to them by a Christian charity, the owner of the flat told the newspaper."
I wonder where they might have gotten the idea from...
Also in the news is a group of nuns in Avignon who have been signed a recording deal with Universal music for a new Gregorian chant album. These nuns live in a closed-off cloister, so they'll have to do a lot of the recording and picture-taking for promotional material as outsiders aren't allowed into their communities in order to prevent their spiritual work from being disturbed.
"The deal follows the worldwide success of the Cistercian Monks of Stift Heiligenkreuz whose 2008 Universal Music album, Chant: Music For Paradise, sold more than 1m copies. The monks have used the money made from their unexpected success to fund charitable works."
It just goes to show that reality TV shows aren't the only route to fame and an adventurous lifestyle. I wonder how long before we see a book release of "If I were a Spy" by Sister X...
Thursday, 15 July 2010
French Deputies ban marriage in attempt to eliminate domestic violence
Yesterday the National Assembly in France voted by an overwhelming majority to ban the institution of marriage, as it was found that domestic violence took place within this form of relationship. The large majority was due to the abstention of the Parti Socaliste, which decided to refrain from voting against despite being very critical of the proposed law, claiming that it was going overboard to ban marriage outright, particularly as domestic violence can occur within cohabiting relationships. The PS had originally suggested that instead of banning romantic relationships, a ban on the participants living in the same house should instead be instituted.
Well, ok, that didn't happen. And I in no way want to make fun of domestic violence - it's a serious problem that ruins lives. But like the fears over the oppression of women due to the burqa - bans of which are working their way through Belgium and France - it's a complex problem to approach, and outright bans of the institutions or traditions that can sometimes hide or be a symptom of the oppression won't help.
If the French National Assembly were really interested in preventing religious oppression of women, then they would fund initiatives and build relationships with local communities to provide services and support for women to turn to (and build up the trust with the individual/community to make it more likely that such service would be used). Of course, that would be a costly and complex, long term approach. What the ban of the burqa is essentially doing is replacing the oppressive husband telling his wife what to wear, with a state telling all women what they're not allowed to wear.
Now, unlike the banning of minarets in Switzerland, these bans aren't explicitly aimed against the burqa or a specific group: the ban is against covering the face. So in a sense it's a more equal ban, since it affects all people, though it may be felt more by some groups. But it does suppress the freedom of the individual to wear certain clothes (and could infringe the right to religious expression or to a private life) - these rights are qualified and can be curtailed by the state if the measures are proportionate to a necessary goal. It might be necessary to ban the burqa, masks, etc., when there's security needs or a need for identification, such as being questioned/identified by police, or for passport photos/control, etc. However, for such situations a partial ban or being required by law to remove the covering in that situation is all that's strictly necessary to the situation. Banning the wearing of masks or burqas while going for a walk in the park isn't really connected to any security needs...
UPDATE: Other Eurobloggers have written about this topic too - see A Bit More Complicated... and MountEUlympus. (We've also been debating the topic on MountEUlympus' blog).
Monday, 8 February 2010
Greater appitiate for European defence?
Lately there seems to be talk of greater co-operation on defence within the EU, perhaps due to the economic crisis putting pressure on national budgets, and the general unwillingness in Europe to spend money on defence. Greater co-operation on defence between member states could reduce costs and maintain effectiveness, if done properly.
Last week, there was news of a new defence review in the UK recommending closer ties with France in order to bolster its position. That France has been re-integrated back into NATO's command structures has probably helped the recommendation along. How far it will be acted upon is unclear; supporting defence links could help a conservative government repair damaged ties with European partners.
And on the weekend, the German foreign minister, Westerwelle, said that a European army accountable to parliament was the ultimate goal for defence policy in Europe. It's not likely to happen any time soon or to be pursued seriously for a long time, but it is interesting for Westerwelle to say this, as my impression of him was that he favoured a more assertive, separate, German foreign policy. Of course, such a vague future aspiration means that he doesn't actually have to do anything about it, but perhaps it shows a willingness to take on more defence co-operation?
France is likely to be pleased to see the British review recommend closer links, which could feed into stronger wider European links in terms of procurement, and if the opportunity arises to trumpet a new development in European defence, I'm sure Sarkozy will jump at it.
Last week, there was news of a new defence review in the UK recommending closer ties with France in order to bolster its position. That France has been re-integrated back into NATO's command structures has probably helped the recommendation along. How far it will be acted upon is unclear; supporting defence links could help a conservative government repair damaged ties with European partners.
And on the weekend, the German foreign minister, Westerwelle, said that a European army accountable to parliament was the ultimate goal for defence policy in Europe. It's not likely to happen any time soon or to be pursued seriously for a long time, but it is interesting for Westerwelle to say this, as my impression of him was that he favoured a more assertive, separate, German foreign policy. Of course, such a vague future aspiration means that he doesn't actually have to do anything about it, but perhaps it shows a willingness to take on more defence co-operation?
France is likely to be pleased to see the British review recommend closer links, which could feed into stronger wider European links in terms of procurement, and if the opportunity arises to trumpet a new development in European defence, I'm sure Sarkozy will jump at it.
Sunday, 7 June 2009
European Elections 2009: Polling Day 4
There are a lot of member states voting today, and I'm afraid it turns out that I won't be able to cover all the countries as I'd originally hoped (enlargement will make it even harder in the future...). Below are a few countries I had begun on, plus a few stats I've seen floating around the web (well, Twitter mostly).
At this point there's not much point in covering the rest of the countries since the results will be in in a few hours, and I'll only have sporadic control of the computer. I'll try to comment on results. Sorry for the (many) member states that I've left out.
Contents:
- France
- Slovenia
- Hungry
- Germany
- Austria
France:
Polls opened for the Outre-mer or overseas territories yesterday, and polls open for metropolitian France today. Still not much more to add since the bust-up between Daniel Cohn-Bendit and MoDem leader Francois Bayrou. It looks like the UMP/EPP will do well here with a good poll lead (about 27%) over the socialists (PS/PES) at about 21-2%. MoDem/ELDR are at 11-2%, and Cohn-Bendit's Europe Ecologie (European Greens) is at about 9%.
France 24 has reported that at midday it looks like the turnout may have increased slightly.
Slovenia:
I can't claim much knowledge here, but the current government is lead by the Social Democrats, with Zares, the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, and a pensioner's party. Slovenia has 7 seats in the European Parliament. [The below isn't that well informed].
the Social Democrats (PES) are the biggest party in national parliament and are in danger of losing a seat.
The main opposition party, the Slovenien Democratic Party (EPP-ED), is likely to remain on 2 seats.
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (ELDR), which was part of the government until 2008, currently has 2 MEPs. They have been in general decline however (judging from national parliament results) and are likely to lose a seat in this election.
New Slovenia - Christian People's Party are EPP-ED-aligned, and are not represented in the Slovene parliament (it went from 9 seats to 0 in the last 2 elections). Despite that, opinion polls (that I've seen) indicate that it has a fairly good chance of winning a seat.
Zares/ELDR from the opinion polls look to have an outside chance of winning a seat. The pensioner's party, Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia, also has an outside chance of winning a seat.
Hungry:
Hungry has 22 seats in the EP. Hungry has been badly hit by the economic crisis and has been bailed out be the IMF. There are concerns that far-right parties could do well here. See the Predict 09 predictions here.
Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Union/EPP) is the main opposition party and is set to do extremely well in the elections, with around 60% in opinion polls. They've 12 MEPs at the moment on a 47.4% share of the vote in 2004. Fellow EPP party, Hungarian Democratic Forum, has a chance of retaining its sole seat.
The Hungarian Social Democrats (PES), currently in a minority government and with 9 MEPs, are likely to come a distant second on around 20%. They had around 34% of the vote last time around.
The Alliance of Free Democrats (ELDR) could lose a seat (currently on 2). The far-right Jobbik could is predicted to win their first seat in these elections.
Germany:
ARD prediction of CDU/EPP 31%, CSU/EPP 7.5%, SPD/PES 21%, FDP/ELDR 11%, Greens/European Greens 11.5%, Die Linke/GUE-NGL 7.5%. Via 27etmoi.
Turnout in Germany will be a big influence on the EP's legitimacy and on turnout overall.
Austria:
Figures floating around Twitter:
Social Democrats/PES 24%
Christian Democrats/EPP 30,6%
Martin 18,1%
GREENS 9,1%
Freedom Party 12,7%
BZÖ 4,5%
At this point there's not much point in covering the rest of the countries since the results will be in in a few hours, and I'll only have sporadic control of the computer. I'll try to comment on results. Sorry for the (many) member states that I've left out.
Contents:
- France
- Slovenia
- Hungry
- Germany
- Austria
France:
Polls opened for the Outre-mer or overseas territories yesterday, and polls open for metropolitian France today. Still not much more to add since the bust-up between Daniel Cohn-Bendit and MoDem leader Francois Bayrou. It looks like the UMP/EPP will do well here with a good poll lead (about 27%) over the socialists (PS/PES) at about 21-2%. MoDem/ELDR are at 11-2%, and Cohn-Bendit's Europe Ecologie (European Greens) is at about 9%.
France 24 has reported that at midday it looks like the turnout may have increased slightly.
Slovenia:
I can't claim much knowledge here, but the current government is lead by the Social Democrats, with Zares, the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, and a pensioner's party. Slovenia has 7 seats in the European Parliament. [The below isn't that well informed].
the Social Democrats (PES) are the biggest party in national parliament and are in danger of losing a seat.
The main opposition party, the Slovenien Democratic Party (EPP-ED), is likely to remain on 2 seats.
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (ELDR), which was part of the government until 2008, currently has 2 MEPs. They have been in general decline however (judging from national parliament results) and are likely to lose a seat in this election.
New Slovenia - Christian People's Party are EPP-ED-aligned, and are not represented in the Slovene parliament (it went from 9 seats to 0 in the last 2 elections). Despite that, opinion polls (that I've seen) indicate that it has a fairly good chance of winning a seat.
Zares/ELDR from the opinion polls look to have an outside chance of winning a seat. The pensioner's party, Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia, also has an outside chance of winning a seat.
Hungry:
Hungry has 22 seats in the EP. Hungry has been badly hit by the economic crisis and has been bailed out be the IMF. There are concerns that far-right parties could do well here. See the Predict 09 predictions here.
Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Union/EPP) is the main opposition party and is set to do extremely well in the elections, with around 60% in opinion polls. They've 12 MEPs at the moment on a 47.4% share of the vote in 2004. Fellow EPP party, Hungarian Democratic Forum, has a chance of retaining its sole seat.
The Hungarian Social Democrats (PES), currently in a minority government and with 9 MEPs, are likely to come a distant second on around 20%. They had around 34% of the vote last time around.
The Alliance of Free Democrats (ELDR) could lose a seat (currently on 2). The far-right Jobbik could is predicted to win their first seat in these elections.
Germany:
ARD prediction of CDU/EPP 31%, CSU/EPP 7.5%, SPD/PES 21%, FDP/ELDR 11%, Greens/European Greens 11.5%, Die Linke/GUE-NGL 7.5%. Via 27etmoi.
Turnout in Germany will be a big influence on the EP's legitimacy and on turnout overall.
Austria:
Figures floating around Twitter:
Social Democrats/PES 24%
Christian Democrats/EPP 30,6%
Martin 18,1%
GREENS 9,1%
Freedom Party 12,7%
BZÖ 4,5%
Saturday, 6 June 2009
European Elections 2009: Polling Day 3
The European elections have started in Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia and Outre-mer parts of the French Republic.
Czech Republic:
Polling continues for the second and final day today in the Czech Republic, with President Klaus only voting this morning - he famously derided the EP elections as "unnecessary". Turnout is expected to be low, and many of the 30 parties running for a share of the Czech Republic's 22 seats won't win enough votes to send any MEPs to Brussels/Strasbourg. Former President Havel has backed the Green party, but it's unclear how much of a boost they'll get: Green parties generally haven't attracted much support in the new member states.
Lubos Palata has complained that there's no real choice for pro-European voters.
More detailed info on the Czech Republic here.
Italy:
In Italy, immigration and Berlusconi's private life are talking points, but it's unlikely that divisive immigration rhetoric or continuing questions over Berlusconi's private life is going to dent his People of Freedom party's chances. With the left in disarray (as in France), and Berlusconi's ratings amazingly high for a leader in power during the economic crisis, the EPP can expect a big win here.
Cyprus:
Poor turnout for the final election rally of the ALDE-aligned European Party is not encouraging for their prospects, despite the leader claiming that the party wanted it nice and quiet. The ADLE-aligned Democratic party is almost certain of a seat.
The Communist, GUE-NGL aligned AKEL party (who controls the country's presidency), is one of the main parties fighting the elections - in 2004 they returned 2 MEPs. While the Democratic Rally (DISY), EPP-aligned, also returned 2 MEPs in 2004. Both parties are certain of returning 2 MEPs each again in the 6 seat country constituency.
The final seat is up for grabs. Low turnout and an overview of the elections in Cyprus here.
Latvia:
I'm afraid I don't know much about the elections in Latvia at all, though their economic is one of the worst hit in the economic crisis, so issues such as joining the euro early or devaluation of the Lat are likely to be high up.
The EPP-aligned New Era party is currently leading a 4-party governing coalition (only came in March 2009) but they've faced a loss of popularity over recent years. The People's Party headed the old government, but is still in the governing coalition (it's also EPP aligned), so I'm not sure how far the governing parties can escape punishment at the ballot box.
The Latvian Social Democratic Worker's Party is the PES-aligned party in Latvia, but it doesn't have a history of doing well in elections and is currently not in Parliament.
For Human Rights in United Latvia returned a MEP to the Greens-EFA in 2004 (I think it was the only Green-aligned MEP to be returned from the new eastern European Member States in 2004). It is currently represented in parliament, so it should have more of a chance of retaining its seat than the LSDWP has of gaining one.
Malta:
Immigration is a big issue, as in Italy, and for similar reasons (though minus the Roma issue). Malta returns 5 MEPs to the European Parliament. Predict 09 has forecast no change in the party share of MEPs, with 3 MEPs for the Labour Party (PES), and 2 for the Nationalist Party (EPP). The Nationalist Party is currently in government.
Turnout (as of 2pm) is around 34%.
Slovakia:
The country with the lowest turnout in the last European elections (17%).
The governing PES-aligned Direction - Social Democracy was suspended from the PES in 2006 for forming a government with the right-wing Slovak National Party, which was PES considers as a party that stirs up racial hatred.
The Party of the Hungarian Coalition and the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democratic Party are the main EPP aligned parties in Slovakia and are in opposition.
There's recently been a controversy over the Hungarian minority, with the party leader of the Hungarian right-wing Fidesz party, Orban, stressing the importance of electing Hungarian MEPs to defend the interests of Hungarians across the border in a comment in a meeting with the Hungarian Coalition. There was a meeting of the Slovak parliament on the last campaigning day to discuss the event - and it may have been used in an attempt to boost turnout and for party advantage.
Predict 09 predicts that Direction - Social Democracy will gain two seats, while the EPP aligned parties will lose seats.
France:
Not much to add since my last update - the clash between Daniel Cohn-Bendit and MoDem leader Francois Bayrou seems to be the big story of the campaign.
Czech Republic:
Polling continues for the second and final day today in the Czech Republic, with President Klaus only voting this morning - he famously derided the EP elections as "unnecessary". Turnout is expected to be low, and many of the 30 parties running for a share of the Czech Republic's 22 seats won't win enough votes to send any MEPs to Brussels/Strasbourg. Former President Havel has backed the Green party, but it's unclear how much of a boost they'll get: Green parties generally haven't attracted much support in the new member states.
Lubos Palata has complained that there's no real choice for pro-European voters.
More detailed info on the Czech Republic here.
Italy:
In Italy, immigration and Berlusconi's private life are talking points, but it's unlikely that divisive immigration rhetoric or continuing questions over Berlusconi's private life is going to dent his People of Freedom party's chances. With the left in disarray (as in France), and Berlusconi's ratings amazingly high for a leader in power during the economic crisis, the EPP can expect a big win here.
Cyprus:
Poor turnout for the final election rally of the ALDE-aligned European Party is not encouraging for their prospects, despite the leader claiming that the party wanted it nice and quiet. The ADLE-aligned Democratic party is almost certain of a seat.
The Communist, GUE-NGL aligned AKEL party (who controls the country's presidency), is one of the main parties fighting the elections - in 2004 they returned 2 MEPs. While the Democratic Rally (DISY), EPP-aligned, also returned 2 MEPs in 2004. Both parties are certain of returning 2 MEPs each again in the 6 seat country constituency.
The final seat is up for grabs. Low turnout and an overview of the elections in Cyprus here.
Latvia:
I'm afraid I don't know much about the elections in Latvia at all, though their economic is one of the worst hit in the economic crisis, so issues such as joining the euro early or devaluation of the Lat are likely to be high up.
The EPP-aligned New Era party is currently leading a 4-party governing coalition (only came in March 2009) but they've faced a loss of popularity over recent years. The People's Party headed the old government, but is still in the governing coalition (it's also EPP aligned), so I'm not sure how far the governing parties can escape punishment at the ballot box.
The Latvian Social Democratic Worker's Party is the PES-aligned party in Latvia, but it doesn't have a history of doing well in elections and is currently not in Parliament.
For Human Rights in United Latvia returned a MEP to the Greens-EFA in 2004 (I think it was the only Green-aligned MEP to be returned from the new eastern European Member States in 2004). It is currently represented in parliament, so it should have more of a chance of retaining its seat than the LSDWP has of gaining one.
Malta:
Immigration is a big issue, as in Italy, and for similar reasons (though minus the Roma issue). Malta returns 5 MEPs to the European Parliament. Predict 09 has forecast no change in the party share of MEPs, with 3 MEPs for the Labour Party (PES), and 2 for the Nationalist Party (EPP). The Nationalist Party is currently in government.
Turnout (as of 2pm) is around 34%.
Slovakia:
The country with the lowest turnout in the last European elections (17%).
The governing PES-aligned Direction - Social Democracy was suspended from the PES in 2006 for forming a government with the right-wing Slovak National Party, which was PES considers as a party that stirs up racial hatred.
The Party of the Hungarian Coalition and the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democratic Party are the main EPP aligned parties in Slovakia and are in opposition.
There's recently been a controversy over the Hungarian minority, with the party leader of the Hungarian right-wing Fidesz party, Orban, stressing the importance of electing Hungarian MEPs to defend the interests of Hungarians across the border in a comment in a meeting with the Hungarian Coalition. There was a meeting of the Slovak parliament on the last campaigning day to discuss the event - and it may have been used in an attempt to boost turnout and for party advantage.
Predict 09 predicts that Direction - Social Democracy will gain two seats, while the EPP aligned parties will lose seats.
France:
Not much to add since my last update - the clash between Daniel Cohn-Bendit and MoDem leader Francois Bayrou seems to be the big story of the campaign.
European Elections 2009: Update (2)
Some more news and updates on the elections and stories that could affect the elections:
In Italy, which will start its 2 day long poll today, Berlusconi has been caught up in yet another scandal in the media, with pictures of naked women in his villa (and a naked man who may or may not be Topolanek, the leader of the Czech ODS party). The pictures were published by El Pais and are banned from appearing in the press in Italy due to being a breach of privacy. I doubt the pictures, or rumours of pictures, will have much effect on Berlusconi's EPP-aligned right-wing party in the elections - none of the other scandals have (including divorce proceedings).
In France, there's been a big clash between Danny the Red and the leader of ELDR aligned MoDem, Francois Bayrou, on French television. Daniel Cohen-Bendit viciously slammed Bayrou as a leader and presidential candidate, while Bayrou countered by raising old allegations of pedophilia against the former '68 student leader. I wonder how much of an impact this will have on the Greens and MoDem in France - Sarkozy's UMP are expected to comfortably win a good number of votes, with the Socialists behind due to their disarray. A new communist group is doing well in the polls, perhaps to the socialists' expense, but it means that MoDem and the Greens could be fighting for third to fifth place. Perhaps this outburst will damage the chances of either reaching third.
MoDem has also declared themselves against Barroso's bid for a second term.
The Commission is once again annoyed with the Netherlands for producing preliminary results before the rest of the member states have voted. There have been some indications that the Commission could actually do something about it and perhaps even refer it to the ECJ. However, the lack of a truely pan-European campaign means that the Dutch results are unlikely to have much of an impact on the rest of the voting.
Analysis over the preliminary result is already taking place - especially on what the surge in support for the right wing PVV actually means.
RTÉ predicts that there will be a healthy turnout in Ireland - around 60%, and perhaps higher than the last local and European elections due to the economic crisis (then also 60%). On Northern Ireland, RTÉ reports that there was a 42.8% turnout (a drop of around 9% from the last European election), and speculates that de Brún will top the poll with a big lead, making Sinn Féin the "biggest party in any election" - not that it matters in this election. The DUP could have been hit hard (they've not exactly run a good campaign, with a candidate who was frankly embarrassing at times). I suspect that the extent of the vote-splitting with have a lot to do with how Diane Dodds has gone down with DUP voters.
In Italy, which will start its 2 day long poll today, Berlusconi has been caught up in yet another scandal in the media, with pictures of naked women in his villa (and a naked man who may or may not be Topolanek, the leader of the Czech ODS party). The pictures were published by El Pais and are banned from appearing in the press in Italy due to being a breach of privacy. I doubt the pictures, or rumours of pictures, will have much effect on Berlusconi's EPP-aligned right-wing party in the elections - none of the other scandals have (including divorce proceedings).
In France, there's been a big clash between Danny the Red and the leader of ELDR aligned MoDem, Francois Bayrou, on French television. Daniel Cohen-Bendit viciously slammed Bayrou as a leader and presidential candidate, while Bayrou countered by raising old allegations of pedophilia against the former '68 student leader. I wonder how much of an impact this will have on the Greens and MoDem in France - Sarkozy's UMP are expected to comfortably win a good number of votes, with the Socialists behind due to their disarray. A new communist group is doing well in the polls, perhaps to the socialists' expense, but it means that MoDem and the Greens could be fighting for third to fifth place. Perhaps this outburst will damage the chances of either reaching third.
MoDem has also declared themselves against Barroso's bid for a second term.
The Commission is once again annoyed with the Netherlands for producing preliminary results before the rest of the member states have voted. There have been some indications that the Commission could actually do something about it and perhaps even refer it to the ECJ. However, the lack of a truely pan-European campaign means that the Dutch results are unlikely to have much of an impact on the rest of the voting.
Analysis over the preliminary result is already taking place - especially on what the surge in support for the right wing PVV actually means.
RTÉ predicts that there will be a healthy turnout in Ireland - around 60%, and perhaps higher than the last local and European elections due to the economic crisis (then also 60%). On Northern Ireland, RTÉ reports that there was a 42.8% turnout (a drop of around 9% from the last European election), and speculates that de Brún will top the poll with a big lead, making Sinn Féin the "biggest party in any election" - not that it matters in this election. The DUP could have been hit hard (they've not exactly run a good campaign, with a candidate who was frankly embarrassing at times). I suspect that the extent of the vote-splitting with have a lot to do with how Diane Dodds has gone down with DUP voters.
Tuesday, 12 May 2009
Update on the European Elections (and media coverage)
France 24 has set up its own page on the European elections, where you can see the current president of the EP, Hans-Gert Poettering, facing questions from young people on issues and how Europe can/should deal with them.
Personally, I found Poettering's answers very disappointing: he waffled on and didn't answer some of the first questions put to him. On one question he didn't make it clear where the responsibility for decision-making lies - blathering on about the need to work together rather than properly addressing the issue. Since his role was to explain what the EP could do for citizens and to encourage young people to vote, I have to give him a fail on this occasion - he gave no real sense of what the EP was for and what it could do for citizens.
Another story is Sarkozy and Merkel's common campaigning for the EPP - and Merkel's thinly veiled criticism of the UK Conservative's championing of enlargement while not facing up to the need for reform by embracing the Lisbon Treaty. Though it seems not to have made much of an impact over in the UK (the BBC haven't reported it anyway), it will probably be used by the Liberal Democrats and Labour to bash the Tories' weakeness/highlight their isolation in Europe.
The LibDems have just launched their election campaign. I wasn't impressed with their Public Election Broadcast (PEB) on the BBC: no mention of Europe, just a promotional video for the still new-ish leader Nick Clegg. Quite disappointing, since Clegg used to be an MEP. However, at the launch Clegg stressed the need for the EU and gave specific examples of how it was a positive force for Britain.
The Irish Independent and the Irish Times have increased their coverage of the European elections, with sections of their papers devoted to the campaign leading up to the June 5th polls.
Personally, I found Poettering's answers very disappointing: he waffled on and didn't answer some of the first questions put to him. On one question he didn't make it clear where the responsibility for decision-making lies - blathering on about the need to work together rather than properly addressing the issue. Since his role was to explain what the EP could do for citizens and to encourage young people to vote, I have to give him a fail on this occasion - he gave no real sense of what the EP was for and what it could do for citizens.
Another story is Sarkozy and Merkel's common campaigning for the EPP - and Merkel's thinly veiled criticism of the UK Conservative's championing of enlargement while not facing up to the need for reform by embracing the Lisbon Treaty. Though it seems not to have made much of an impact over in the UK (the BBC haven't reported it anyway), it will probably be used by the Liberal Democrats and Labour to bash the Tories' weakeness/highlight their isolation in Europe.
The LibDems have just launched their election campaign. I wasn't impressed with their Public Election Broadcast (PEB) on the BBC: no mention of Europe, just a promotional video for the still new-ish leader Nick Clegg. Quite disappointing, since Clegg used to be an MEP. However, at the launch Clegg stressed the need for the EU and gave specific examples of how it was a positive force for Britain.
The Irish Independent and the Irish Times have increased their coverage of the European elections, with sections of their papers devoted to the campaign leading up to the June 5th polls.
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