The Role of the High Representative and the EU's CFSP

Dan Smith has written a very interesting and well thought-out post on the state of the External Action Service (EAS) and its potential as well as what aims it should have. The Institute of International and European Affairs had a guest lecture on the topic back at the start of March 2010 on the role of the HR and the President of the European Council. I've embedded the video below.

Ireland proposes greater EU military action under the UN

Ireland has circulated proposals for greater EU military involvement under the UN in peacekeeping missions. Greater EU involvement in peacekeeping missions would lead to a higher level of co-ordination and coherence in national planning, and make the process cheaper.

“It would increase the standing, influence and visibility of the union as a whole within the UN, particularly in relation to peace-keeping/peace-building operations, as EU member states would not alone be promoters and financiers of missions, but also major mission contributors,” it says.

This would fit in neatly with plans to increase the EU's visibility and role in the General Assembly of the UN, can would add substance to the EU's drive for an international role. In some ways it might be surprising that Ireland is eager to start a debate on military co-operation; after all, Ireland is fiercely attached to its neutrality (and there is strong domestic support for neutrality). It may be an attempt to frame the debate on military co-operation before the Polish presidency of the Council in 2011 (defence co-operation is high on the Polish agenda). Military co-operation with the UN combines the efficiency and cost-saving of military integration with the multilateral, UN-centred foreign policy worldview of the Irish State. If the EU does start participating more in UN missions, Ireland won't be as isolated in the EU when it comes to military matters, while being able to stay outside any more conventional alliances and integration and being able to sell the missions to the domestic audience as being in keeping with Irish foreign policy tradition.

I think that these proposals sound good (it'll be a long time before we'll see how far they'll go). The EU and its member states have supported the ideals of a mutlilateral world which is largely based on law, and with a stronger role for the UN. Being more active in peacekeeping would be a good way to add substance to that - putting our money where our mouth is. It would also add relevance to the EU role on the world stage. Though not as glamorous as the more traditional diplomacy we usually think of, it is an area that the EU can add value to, and would be complementary to its other roles in development, etc.

There's an opinion piece in The Irish Times that gives a taste of how important UN peace-keeping and the developing world are to the Irish idea of foreign policy.

Greater appitiate for European defence?

Lately there seems to be talk of greater co-operation on defence within the EU, perhaps due to the economic crisis putting pressure on national budgets, and the general unwillingness in Europe to spend money on defence. Greater co-operation on defence between member states could reduce costs and maintain effectiveness, if done properly.

Last week, there was news of a new defence review in the UK recommending closer ties with France in order to bolster its position. That France has been re-integrated back into NATO's command structures has probably helped the recommendation along. How far it will be acted upon is unclear; supporting defence links could help a conservative government repair damaged ties with European partners.

And on the weekend, the German foreign minister, Westerwelle, said that a European army accountable to parliament was the ultimate goal for defence policy in Europe. It's not likely to happen any time soon or to be pursued seriously for a long time, but it is interesting for Westerwelle to say this, as my impression of him was that he favoured a more assertive, separate, German foreign policy. Of course, such a vague future aspiration means that he doesn't actually have to do anything about it, but perhaps it shows a willingness to take on more defence co-operation?

France is likely to be pleased to see the British review recommend closer links, which could feed into stronger wider European links in terms of procurement, and if the opportunity arises to trumpet a new development in European defence, I'm sure Sarkozy will jump at it.

A short July Round-up

I was away for the weekend, so I've missed a few bits of news, so here's a short round-up:

1. Javier Solana has ruled himself out of the running for the High Representative of the CFSP post - or the replacement post if Lisbon is passed in the Irish Referendum. Solana has served as the CFSP chief for 10 years, as well as being the Secretary-General for the Council*; so he knew something about being in a "double-hatted" position, as the Lisbon HR's post would be (the HR would also be the vice president of the Commission). I wonder if this announcement is good news for Barroso or not. It means that there's one less Iberian to compete with if there's a multi-office package up for negotiation (Felipe González would probably be backed by Sarkozy who is reportedly dropping his support for Blair for the Presidency of the European Council). Barroso still has a chance that the EP could confirm him for the post before the Irish Lisbon vote.


*These posts aren't actually officially linked; he just happens to hold both of them at the same time.


2. The Bill for the 28th Amendment to the Irish Constitution has been published (see Stephen Spillane here and here and Irish Election - Irish Election has the full wording of the amendment).

So the second referendum campaign will start gearing up, and the campaign organisations Generation Yes and Ireland for Europe could become more active (Generation Yes has already been quite active). The Dáil will be closing for a long summer break soon, and I somehow doubt that TDs (Irish MPs) will spend it campaigning for the Lisbon Treaty - if they won't keep the Dáil open for longer during the worst economic crisis the state has had to face, then what are the chances of them doing some campaign work?

3. Barroso has been urging that the G8 accept the need for an 80% reduction in emissions by 2050. The Commission will attend the G8 in L'Aquila this week. The language of the article indicates that the Commission isn't asking that much of the G8 right now - "accepting the need" may turn out to be less significant than the European Council's "political backing" Barroso for a second term - but movements in policy this week could translate into more co-ordinated negotiations by the G8, and perhaps also the EU, come December's Copenhagen Climate Change conference. The significance of the G8 has in any case been downgraded politically by the rise of the G20, but the G8 may still reveal some of the changes in position in the diplomatic dance that will be ongoing between now and December.

At the moment, my expectations for the December Summit are quite low, given the economic crisis and the natural focus on getting the global economy going again. Some of the indications of the cost of fighting climate change are jaw-dropping, and it's hard to see how fiscally-pressed states will be able to stump up the cash. Sweden has a tough task ahead of it if it wants to boost the EU's green credentials. [The Swedish presidency has a page on EU environmental policy here].

Also worth looking out for is any sign of the press embarrassing Italy - which is Berlusconi's fear.


4. The US and Russia will probably agree on a new Treaty aimed at reducing their nuclear arsenal. It's good in terms of diplomacy and improving relations, but at the same time, it is probably one of the few areas in which they will find it easy to reach agreement. Georgia, NATO expansion, missle shields, etc. are much more sensitive diplomatic issues. Hopefully a deal on nuclear arms - and the inter-governmental commission that's mentioned - will throw up more opportunities for closer and better relations between the US (and EU) with Russia.

Tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Nationalist rhetoric is increasing in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), where the Assembly of the Serb-dominated state of Republika Srpska had issued some "Conclusions" which staked out claims for the state for power which are now held at the federal level. The High Representative (who is appointed by the international community, and also the EU's Special Representative to BiH) has vetoed the Conclusions as:

"Implementation of the conclusions would undermine the division of competencies between the State and the Entities, seek to give the RSNA veto rights in State level matters, undermine final and binding decisions of the BiH Constitutional Court, a Dayton institution, and determine that the HR’s powers are unconstitutional."

[You can read the veto's legal instrument here].

The country is a two-state federation of the Serb Republika Srpska and the Muslim and Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose federal government has slowly been strengthened by transferring some of the competences of the states ["Entities"] to the centre, while ensuring that power is shared between the "constituent peoples" fairly at federal level. The process of integration and state-building has been presided over by - and sometimes directed by - the Official High Representative (who is always also the EUSR for BiH) who is empowered by the Peace Implementation Council under the Dayton Agreement. Naturally, any move to weaken the central government and strengthen state power has nationalist implications for each side and threatens the break-up of the state.

Why does this matter for the EU? Well, BiH is practically an EU protectorate. The EUSR is the OHR as well, who can veto legislation and remove elected representatives from office. The EUSR also has a hand in advising the European Commission on BiH's progress and the implementation of Stability and Association agreements and advises the EU on progress in general (visa liberalisation is one of the carrots for BiH's progress). The EUSR is also the focal point for the political co-ordination of the EU's police mission there and EUFOR, as well as helping the HR for CSFP (Javier Solana, who was in BiH in May) on BiH matters. BiH has signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement and an Interim Agreement, with the eventual goal of EU membership. [The Council's Joint Action that installed the current EUSR, Dr. Valentin Inzko, gives a good picture of the EUSR's remit: link].

All of which means that the EU is heavily invested in the success of BiH as a state. But would the EU be prepared to act in BiH or be able to properly support it if tensions continued to grow to boiling point? The EU finds it hard to act in foreign policy at the best of times, and it will be caught up in a busy, and mainly inward-looking, agenda for the next 6 months: the Lisbon Treaty, a new Commission and Parliament, the Copenhagen Summit on climate change, the financial crisis, etc. Ultimately, of course, the US guarantees stability in BiH, despite European control of the peacekeeping forces and European control of significant political power - still, it would take an almost complete collapse to draw the US in, and the EU would generally be expected to keep the state functioning.

There's no real indication that there's anything beyond an increase in nationalist rhetoric, and Dr. Inzko hasn't mentioned any real instability in his report to the Political and Security Committee of the EU. But it may not take a crisis for EU politics to become entangled in BiH-ian politics: BiH has some ongoing border disputes with Croatia, and these could affect Croatia's accession (since the EU may be unwilling to admit Croatia if it will cause the same problems with BiH-ian accession as Slovenia is with Croat accession). It's likely that there won't be any big (EU-affecting) news coming out of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Swedish Presidency of the European Council, but it still might be worthwhile keeping an eye on BiH-ian politics given the economic crisis.

It's worth noting that for the next 6 months Carl Bildt, the Swedish Foreign Minister would be a capable pair of hands when it comes to BiH, since he is a former OHR/EUSR himself.

Does Europe have any Common Foreign Policy interests?

In my post on Neutrality and Europe, which was focused mainly on Ireland's policy of neutrality and its compatibility with EU membership, I hinted at what I thought was a basis of a possible section of common European foreign policy interests: the single market. On Grahnlaw's Blog (the post on Sweden's neutrality/non-alignment), in the discussion, Grahnlaw remarked on the tendency of European foreign policies to speak in more pacifist terms when discussing foreign policy, perhaps just to placate a more pacifist public. I think that Europe is probably home to some of the most pacifist populations and perhaps that translates into (truly) more cautious governments (I suppose that depends on both the country you're talking about, and who you're talking too), i.e. governments are actually affected deeply by the public consensus because they are part of that society, though the calculations would end up playing out a bit more differently when cold policy choices need to be made (and these can be between 2 evils).

These attitudes have both historical and contemporary reasons - and these are well known: WWII/history of destructive war, and the contemporary experience of successful multilateralism. However, I think that these attitudes and the policies that come with them are suited to the problems we face in our region (and perhaps even a mature reaction to these problems, though that would be very contentious to argue). While I've said that Europe has probably the most pacifist populations of any region of the world, I think that most people here fall into the multilateralist band - in other words strong diplomacy, and any use of force to be based on some form of the "just war" doctrine.

So what could be the common foreign policy problems that Europe faces? Sadly, this part isn't too radical, as much as I'd like to say something completely original here. It's mostly stability - stability of:

- Eastern Europe (defined here as countries east of the current member states)
- the non-EU former Yugoslav states
- North Africa
- the Middle East, especially Israel, Palestine and Iran
- energy security
- trade security (e.g. security of trade routes such as those passing by the Horn of Africa)

These would be issues for the member states with or without the EU, in a sense, because of geography. But the internal market means that we are a lot closer and our interests are less bound by coincidence: the free movements mean that we've a highly integrated economy which is adversely affected by stability on our frontiers. All member states are more equally exposed and exposed in more similar ways; northwestern member states are no longer quite so insulated. Failed states also mean more and less controlled immigration, more criminality, increased drug trade, etc. The impact of this on a free single market and our societies can be very damaging. The problemd with a lack of energy security can be seen by events over the last few winters in Ukraine and Russia. The Middle East Peace process is an issue for both these reasons and for moral reasons.

The solutions to these problems are mostly the ones which the European publics and the European states have been talking about for so long, albeit backed up with a more robust diplomacy and more willingness to take the initiative. A prime example is the Middle East Process, and indeed the Middle East in general. Due to our close proximity to the region, we suffer more than the US when things go wrong (though obviously we're not the ones that suffer the most) - it's hard to see why Europe isn't more assertive here; sure we have our differences, but we're all agreed on the goal. Even the US agrees with the European position. So why can't we be more robust in promoting the peace process? There needs to be tough love with both sides (a basic outline of some of my thoughts on what could be done here), and Europe has the resources to act effectively here. The US may handle Israel with kid gloves, but we don't have to, and we don't have to wait until the US catches up in foreign policy again.

The basic formulation of multilateralism, robust diplomacy and engagement tailored to each area is a winning formula, if done properly. Inherent in this is the recognition that foreign policy is, in a way, just like domestic policy: force of arms generally is a bad idea, and should only be used in extreme cases - and even in extreme cases, they only provide the breathing space needed for a proper political settlement. A good foreign policy is based on a drive for a legitimate international structure, based on balancing needs and interests encompassing economics, stability, participation and political recognition. In many ways a good foreign policy shapes and sustains a successful region in a way that mirrors that of domestic policy. Obviously there are some extreme cases which don't fall into this theoretical musing of mine: not all interests can be balanced or satisfied. However, I believe that such an approach is the best approach for the problems we currently commonly face.

While the US has been portrayed as a global policeman, I think that Europe is the one with the more policeman-like tendencies. The US is more like a superman, racing off to fix certain problems in special circumstances, while Europe works away in the manner of a policeman (though, still in a limited way and in a limit sphere): policing communities, building nations, acting as an administrator, a trader, etc, etc. The US has elements of this too in its policy, but these aspects are the core of how foreign policy is perceived here, if not consciously (or so it seems to me).

EU Foreign Policy

The EUobserver has a good article on the effectiveness of EU foreign policy in the context of the Gaza confilict.

If the French presidency showed how successful an EU presidency can be, then Sarkozy is now revealing how powerless the actual post is. In any form of governance, it's always bad to have to rely on "the strong man" (or woman) to do the job. It would be a big exaggeration to make a link with the culture of the "strong man" running the state in Russia, but strong institutions are the best way to make the system work, and the Presidency is far from being a strong institution.

It should be noted that the CFSP has only ever been run by Solana. I doubt he is seen as a "strong man" by the public (though perhaps he's a strong man institutionally within the CFSP), but could his long tenure end up having a negitive effect on the effectiveness of the CFSP when the time comes to find a successor?

At what point does having a strong leader or a long-serving experienced one become damaging to the role they are trying to fulfill?

While the more permanent presidency under Lisbon will have a lot of the underlying weaknesses of the post, it is still a definite improvement.