Does Europe have any Common Foreign Policy interests?

In my post on Neutrality and Europe, which was focused mainly on Ireland's policy of neutrality and its compatibility with EU membership, I hinted at what I thought was a basis of a possible section of common European foreign policy interests: the single market. On Grahnlaw's Blog (the post on Sweden's neutrality/non-alignment), in the discussion, Grahnlaw remarked on the tendency of European foreign policies to speak in more pacifist terms when discussing foreign policy, perhaps just to placate a more pacifist public. I think that Europe is probably home to some of the most pacifist populations and perhaps that translates into (truly) more cautious governments (I suppose that depends on both the country you're talking about, and who you're talking too), i.e. governments are actually affected deeply by the public consensus because they are part of that society, though the calculations would end up playing out a bit more differently when cold policy choices need to be made (and these can be between 2 evils).

These attitudes have both historical and contemporary reasons - and these are well known: WWII/history of destructive war, and the contemporary experience of successful multilateralism. However, I think that these attitudes and the policies that come with them are suited to the problems we face in our region (and perhaps even a mature reaction to these problems, though that would be very contentious to argue). While I've said that Europe has probably the most pacifist populations of any region of the world, I think that most people here fall into the multilateralist band - in other words strong diplomacy, and any use of force to be based on some form of the "just war" doctrine.

So what could be the common foreign policy problems that Europe faces? Sadly, this part isn't too radical, as much as I'd like to say something completely original here. It's mostly stability - stability of:

- Eastern Europe (defined here as countries east of the current member states)
- the non-EU former Yugoslav states
- North Africa
- the Middle East, especially Israel, Palestine and Iran
- energy security
- trade security (e.g. security of trade routes such as those passing by the Horn of Africa)

These would be issues for the member states with or without the EU, in a sense, because of geography. But the internal market means that we are a lot closer and our interests are less bound by coincidence: the free movements mean that we've a highly integrated economy which is adversely affected by stability on our frontiers. All member states are more equally exposed and exposed in more similar ways; northwestern member states are no longer quite so insulated. Failed states also mean more and less controlled immigration, more criminality, increased drug trade, etc. The impact of this on a free single market and our societies can be very damaging. The problemd with a lack of energy security can be seen by events over the last few winters in Ukraine and Russia. The Middle East Peace process is an issue for both these reasons and for moral reasons.

The solutions to these problems are mostly the ones which the European publics and the European states have been talking about for so long, albeit backed up with a more robust diplomacy and more willingness to take the initiative. A prime example is the Middle East Process, and indeed the Middle East in general. Due to our close proximity to the region, we suffer more than the US when things go wrong (though obviously we're not the ones that suffer the most) - it's hard to see why Europe isn't more assertive here; sure we have our differences, but we're all agreed on the goal. Even the US agrees with the European position. So why can't we be more robust in promoting the peace process? There needs to be tough love with both sides (a basic outline of some of my thoughts on what could be done here), and Europe has the resources to act effectively here. The US may handle Israel with kid gloves, but we don't have to, and we don't have to wait until the US catches up in foreign policy again.

The basic formulation of multilateralism, robust diplomacy and engagement tailored to each area is a winning formula, if done properly. Inherent in this is the recognition that foreign policy is, in a way, just like domestic policy: force of arms generally is a bad idea, and should only be used in extreme cases - and even in extreme cases, they only provide the breathing space needed for a proper political settlement. A good foreign policy is based on a drive for a legitimate international structure, based on balancing needs and interests encompassing economics, stability, participation and political recognition. In many ways a good foreign policy shapes and sustains a successful region in a way that mirrors that of domestic policy. Obviously there are some extreme cases which don't fall into this theoretical musing of mine: not all interests can be balanced or satisfied. However, I believe that such an approach is the best approach for the problems we currently commonly face.

While the US has been portrayed as a global policeman, I think that Europe is the one with the more policeman-like tendencies. The US is more like a superman, racing off to fix certain problems in special circumstances, while Europe works away in the manner of a policeman (though, still in a limited way and in a limit sphere): policing communities, building nations, acting as an administrator, a trader, etc, etc. The US has elements of this too in its policy, but these aspects are the core of how foreign policy is perceived here, if not consciously (or so it seems to me).

Neutrality and Europe

Ireland, Sweden and Austria are all both neutral and EU member states: but can you really be both, and what is the value of policies of neutrality and alternative foreign policies? (My main focus will be on Ireland, since I'm more familiar with its policy goals).

Neutrality is a very value-driven foreign policy, and there are several reasons why states become neutral; most of these are tied up in history and identity as well as in the national interest. In Ireland a policy of neutrality underlines the independence of the state, running on the 1940s logic that the ability to stay clear of great power wars was a mark of sovereignty. In Austria, neutrality was necessary to ensure the country's freedom and sovereignty in the middle of Cold War Europe.

Both these policies were the best policies for their time: Ireland, having just been through a war of independence, a civil war, and a trade war, was in no position to enter a world war - especially if it meant opening Ireland to the British military when the conflict of the last 20 years had been about getting them out in the first place. Internal stability and external independence depended on neutrality (and on Ireland being lucky in the course of the war). For Austria, preventing the division of the country between east and west in the same manner as Germany depended on constitutional guarantees that the Second Austrian Republic would be a neutral state.

But, for Ireland at least, neutrality wasn't meant to be permanent; it was just wartime policy. Post-War Ireland tried to ally itself with America, but America turned Ireland down: it was either the NATO alliance or no alliance. Since joining NATO would mean recognising British sovereignty over Northern Ireland, the republic decided not to join.

So what does the EU mean for neutrality, and what does the EU mean for the calculation of national interests when it comes to neutrality?

Under the NATO umbrella, the EU has created a zone of peace, so Europe is not split between 2 antagonistic blocs. This doesn't mean that there's no value in being neutral, but it does change the calculation: the policy goals of neutral states can be more effectively achieved through cooperation with fellow European states without the risks that come with associating with an alliance bloc in tense international circumstance. For Ireland, the main foreign policy goals, apart from a general policy of trying to prevent conflict through the UN and other international organisations, is non-proliferation, disarmament of inhumane weapons (e.g. cluster mines), and conflict resolution through international peacekeeping mission. (Leaving aside the goal of eventual reunification).

The EU, and the interconnectedness with other European states, can be an important factor in all of these aims, and in getting them more widely recognised and more effective action taken on a regional and global level.

The internal market also means that member states share, directly, the same interests in several fields. The free movement of people means that immigration is a shared issue, even for non-Schengen states. Connected to this is the stability and prosperity of the countries neighbouring the EU. Immediately there is a need for a common approach to development aid, trading policy (which is common in any case in the EU), as well as the need for a more political foreign policy voice in the region: whenever trouble breaks out, we are affected; US policy in the region therefore also has an affect on us. The best way of ensuring an effective policy is to have a common policy. Ireland has been involved in helping promote stability in the region along with other European states, particularly in the EUFor in Chad. Energy issues and environmental issue are also areas which require a high degree of coordination.

These goals do not require the sort of militarisation of the EU in the way a lot of neutrality supporters in Ireland fear. See some good defences of the foreign policy role of the EU here and the EDA here.

In this context, the question of whether a neutral or non-aligned or even an allied stance would be the best for pursuing both national and common interests should be asked. Some neutral supporters have (successfully) tried to frame the argument by portraying the choice as one between neutrality (of which Ireland's is in any case doubtful - it even has its own wikipedia page and an almost separate definition from classical neutrality) and a militaristic super-state (possibly practicing conscription). Ignoring the fact that many European states are phasing or have phased out conscription, why should the debate in Ireland, and possibly in the other neutral European states this is similar, be limited to these 2 choices?

In my opinion, the existence of the internal market and membership of the EU has changed the political context for neutral European states. This doesn't automatically mean that military integration should be adopted, but a range of options should be discussed. Still, integration to some degree of foreign policy can provide some clear advantages. Of course, it will never be a simple calculation of interest; the politics of identity will mean that any discussion of foreign policy in neutral states will be fraught with emotional arguments.

Note: Fine Gael is the only Irish party that has a policy of cooperation in a European defence policy.