Last week President Obama was re-elected in the US under the electoral college system. It's been described as "arcane" on this side of the Atlantic, which got me thinking about the possibility of a directly elected Commission President in the EU.
I've discussed in more detail here why I think a parliamentary system would be better for the EU than a directly elected President (or indirectly in the US case). But if we introduced a "directly" elected president in the EU, could we do it without weighting the votes to protect the smaller Member States? I don't think so: a simple majority vote would render campaigning in the small(er) Member States less useful and there would be fewer incentives for candidates to overcome language barriers.
And if we would need an electoral college, why not just have a parliamentary system, with the European Parliament acting as that electoral college?
Showing posts with label US. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US. Show all posts
Monday, 12 November 2012
Tuesday, 25 September 2012
Reports of US breaching EU PNR Agreement
The transfer of Passenger Name Record Data - the information you hand over to airlines when you book a flight - from EU airlines to the US government has been a controversial issue in Brussels, with the transfers taking place for a decade on one basis or another without a satisfactory agreement in place to regulate it.
Earlier this year the European Parliament ratified an agreement with the US to regulate - and make legal in the EU - the transfer of this personal data to the US government for anti-terrorism and crime fighting purposes. I was against this agreement because it is spectacularly disproportionate and infringed privacy rights: data can be held for far too long (over a decade) for practically any purpose whatsoever. Sadly Sophie In't Veld's report advising rejection of the agreement was voted down in Committee and the Parliament ratified the agreement in plenary.
However it seems that the US hasn't been satisfied with even this gift of a treaty, with reports that the US government has been collecting data on people on flights that do not take off or land in the US, in contravention of the agreement. The S&D Group in the European Parliament has called on the Justice Commissioner Malmstrom to account for this before the LIBE Committee in Parliament:
It would not be the first time the Parliament has been disappointed by poor results from bad treaties.
Earlier this year the European Parliament ratified an agreement with the US to regulate - and make legal in the EU - the transfer of this personal data to the US government for anti-terrorism and crime fighting purposes. I was against this agreement because it is spectacularly disproportionate and infringed privacy rights: data can be held for far too long (over a decade) for practically any purpose whatsoever. Sadly Sophie In't Veld's report advising rejection of the agreement was voted down in Committee and the Parliament ratified the agreement in plenary.
However it seems that the US hasn't been satisfied with even this gift of a treaty, with reports that the US government has been collecting data on people on flights that do not take off or land in the US, in contravention of the agreement. The S&D Group in the European Parliament has called on the Justice Commissioner Malmstrom to account for this before the LIBE Committee in Parliament:
"S&D spokesperson on civil liberties, justice and home affairs, Claude Moraes MEP, said:
"The media reports show that the US may be requesting data which falls outside the scope of the EU-US PNR agreement. We signed up to the agreement on strict conditions and we need clear answers if EU citizens' data is being collected contrary to spirit of the agreement."If our citizens' data is being collected for flights simply going through US airspace, then this could be against EU data protection laws. We are taking this matter very seriously and that is why the S&Ds have requested that Commissioner Malmström comes to the civil liberties committee to give MEPs a full picture of the situation regarding US collection of EU citizens' PNR data.""
It would not be the first time the Parliament has been disappointed by poor results from bad treaties.
Tuesday, 17 July 2012
“I feel that we’ve been had!” – Report on the SWIFT Agreement
BY CC greenefa.
In 2010 the EU ratified an agreement with the US called the SWIFT Agreement (or more technically: the “Terrorist Financial Tracking Programme” – PDF), after the first agreement was vetoed by the Parliament, and despite privacy concerns remaining for the second agreement. The SWIFT Agreement permits the transfer of financial transaction information to the US government for the purpose of counter-terrorism. The problem is that you can’t ask for someone’s transaction information, but data is transferred in bulk to the US, where they search through the information to see if they can find out anything relevant to counter-terrorism. As a check, the second agreement stipulates that Europol must check that requests for transfers are in compliance with the agreement. Given that Europol could gain from any leads from the information, it’s not exactly the impartial check of a judicial body.
The LIBE Committee debated the Second Report on the role of Europol by the Joint Supervisory Body on 21/6/2012 (you can watch it here). The first report (PDF) found some serious failings, including:
- Due to the abstract nature of transfer requests, proper verification of whether the requests are in line with the conditions of the Agreement is impossible.
- Information provided orally to Europol affects their decision making, but cannot be reviewed by the JSB. Whether the deficiency in information in the requests is remedied by oral information is impossible to verify.
- Significant involvement of oral information renders proper internal and external audit impossible.
Recommendations:
- Inform the JSB on the results of the review in policies and procedures for Europol’s role. - Ensure the ability of the Europol Data Protection Officer to carry out his role.
- Ensure hard-deletion of Article 4 data (data to the US where Europol has to verify their requests), which where inputted into some of Europol’s information processing systems before the upgrading of the security level.
- Contact the US Treasury Department and ensure that adequate information is provided with requests.
- Ensure verifications by Europol are made based on written requests, along with any supplemental documents, in order to allow for proper internal and external audit.
The Second Report notes that all US data requests to date have been approved and that some of the reasons are too generic. Many of the request applications included “copy and paste” texts and the information provided was out-of-date and already in the public domain, and oral information is still being provided to Europol in order for it to make decisions. Also, there is no geographic limitation to these requests (data concerning the whole world is requested), and the requests submitted on a monthly basis for a month in duration (so effectively data transfer is ongoing all year round with little limitation).
The JSB concluded that 2 of its recommendations from its previous report have been implemented, while progress is ongoing for the other 3. The EU and US have signed an agreement for a second person to be posted from the EU to the US Treasury Department to oversee the operation of the agreement. The Overseer currently in place has been involved in intensive on-the-job training, and has been in US Treasury briefings. Clearly continuous information is being provided on generic and incomplete information with little restriction, so it’s hard to see how the current system provides adequate safeguards.
The full report however is not publically available or even available to the MEPs on the LIBE Committee – when the Committee requested access to the report, the JSB said it had no objections, and that there was nothing sensitive in the report that would prevent it from being disclosed. However, Europol stated that disclosure would threaten operational interests, so the report has not been disclosed. You can find the JSB’s public statement here: PDF.
Sophie in’t Veld and Jan Albrecht weren’t impressed (Veld: “I feel that we’ve been had!”). Veld highlighted that the EP was assured that there would be no data mining, but that the current procedure – of continuous and almost unlimited access – is much worse and goes further than what Parliament had expected. Veld objected to the secrecy of the report, saying that the Committee cannot fulfil its role of scrutinising Europol and the Agreement properly on the basis of a “3 page summary”. Albrecht said that the demands of MEPs have not been met after 2 years of the agreement, adding that if we have a functional fundamental rights jurisdiction, we could get this taken down in court.
While the role of the Europol Data Protection Officer seems to have been strengthened, it hardly seems like there are any safeguards on the flow of financial transaction data to the US. Without a sunset clause on the agreement, the European Parliament is in a fairly weak position to act against the treaty or to demand amendments. We seen the trend of PNR treaties on passenger information lead to a bad proposal for EU PNR, and soon the Commission will propose a TFTS for the EU. We need to make sure that we don’t throw away our civil liberties for little or no security gain simply because law enforcement authorities want our information and data.
Friday, 27 April 2012
US PNR Deal passes
After the European Parliament consented to the US PNR Agreement by 409 to 226 votes (strangely the EUObserver thinks this is "half-hearted" support; I call it a pretty solid majority), the Council has also passed the Agreement.
The treaty will probably come into force on 1st June 2012 (PDF).
The Parliament is also currently debating the EU's own PNR system, which monitors passengers on flights into and out of the EU (though it may be extended to cover flights within the EU if the proposal is amended) by collecting the flight information of all passengers. The LIBE Committee's draft report has been published (PDF), and there are over 400 proposed amendments to the proposed Directive (PDF 1 and 2).
The treaty will probably come into force on 1st June 2012 (PDF).
The Parliament is also currently debating the EU's own PNR system, which monitors passengers on flights into and out of the EU (though it may be extended to cover flights within the EU if the proposal is amended) by collecting the flight information of all passengers. The LIBE Committee's draft report has been published (PDF), and there are over 400 proposed amendments to the proposed Directive (PDF 1 and 2).
Thursday, 19 April 2012
EU-US PNR vote today
The European Parliament is going to vote in plenary today on the EU-US PNR Agreement (you can watch the debate here - it's on now), which will permit the transfer of passenger data (including credit card, luggage and meal choice details) from airlines to US authorities when flying to the US. Rapporteur Sophie in 't Veld's report recommended that the agreement be rejected due to a lack of guarantees that US authorities won't use the data for purposes other than the fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime, and because EU citizens will not have sufficient access to legal redress under the agreement.
However the LIBE Committee rejected this report and the EP is likely to accept the agreement, though the BBC reports that it may be by a thin majority. It seems that worries over the US bypassing the EU and making bilateral agreements with national governments and a sense that the EP has already made at least some display of strength over forcing a renegotiation have fed into the desire to vote for the agreement.
However the LIBE Committee rejected this report and the EP is likely to accept the agreement, though the BBC reports that it may be by a thin majority. It seems that worries over the US bypassing the EU and making bilateral agreements with national governments and a sense that the EP has already made at least some display of strength over forcing a renegotiation have fed into the desire to vote for the agreement.
Wednesday, 28 March 2012
Report on EU-US PNR Treaty rejected in Committee
Sophie in ‘t Veld’s (ALDE) report to the LIBE (Civil liberities, justice and home affairs) Committee was rejected yesterday. The report to reject the EU-US treaty failed in a vote of 23 votes for, 31 against, and 1 abstention.
The PNR treaty will confirm the transfer of passenger data on flights to the US to the Department of Homeland Security. In ‘t Veld had urged rejection of the treaty for several reasons, but chief among them was the loopholes which permitted the data to be used for unspecified purposes outside the treaty’s aim of fighting terrorism and serious transborder crime.
It’s likely that the EP will assent to the treaty in plenary now, avoiding a clash with the US similar to over the SWIFT I treaty.
The PNR treaty will confirm the transfer of passenger data on flights to the US to the Department of Homeland Security. In ‘t Veld had urged rejection of the treaty for several reasons, but chief among them was the loopholes which permitted the data to be used for unspecified purposes outside the treaty’s aim of fighting terrorism and serious transborder crime.
It’s likely that the EP will assent to the treaty in plenary now, avoiding a clash with the US similar to over the SWIFT I treaty.
Monday, 27 February 2012
In 't Veld to propose EP rejection of EU-US PNR Agreement
Sophie in 't Veld (ALDE), rapporteur on the EU-US Passenger Name Record Agreement (Text) will present her report to the committee on civil liberties, justice and home affairs today. The PNR agreement will permit the transfer of Passenger Name Record data for passengers on flights from the EU to the US to fight terrorism and serious crime. PNR data is all the data from the machine-readable part of the passport (name, etc.) plus the times of departure and arrival, place of departure and arrival, check in time/status, payment details, luggage details, and other general information.
If the Parliament does vote for rejection, it will be a big blow to the US and those in the EU who have been trying to set the rules for this data transfer. In fact, the PNR saga has been going on for about a decade now, since the US adopted its PNR regime in the wake of the September 11 attacks, setting penalties for airlines that refused to transfer the PNR data they collect (airlines collect PNR data for commercial purposes). This left EU airlines in the position where they would be punished by the US if they didn't hand over the data, and by EU data protection laws if they did. An agreement in 2004 fell foul of an ECJ judgment over the legal base used, and an agreement in 2007 was never assented to by the EP (as required under the Lisbon Treaty after December 2009), so it only applied provisionally. The European Parliament called for new agreements with the US (and Canada and Australia) to bring them more into line with data protection rights (the Committee voted to assent to the new Australian agreement in October).
There have been several concerns raised over the agreement, mainly on data protection grounds. In her report, in 't Veld highlights that the necessity and proportionality of PNR systems haven't been satisfactorily established - in fact, with the EU's own proposed PNR Directive, this is also the case (PDF) - when information gathering could be done on a smaller scale (e.g. via an API system that just covers passport and flight departure/arrival data); that the agreement does not limit the use of data to fighting terrorism and serious crime; that data does not have to be destroyed, but can be held indefinitely: despite its use being restricted over time, it could still be accessed and used. It is also pointed out that the agreement does not provide a sufficient protection against the use of sensitive data by the US Department of Homeland Security (data indicating race, religion, sexual orientation, etc); that there aren't sufficient guarantees that data will be equally well protected if it's transferred to another country from the US; and that the agreement might not provide EU citizens with adequate means of judicial address.
She says (PDF):
I hope the Committee votes for this report - the case for PNR regimes is quite shaky, with high levels of data collection from people who aren't suspected of any crime, for no proven gains in effectiveness over less invasive and data protection-compliant alternatives. Rejecting the PNR Agreement would be the second time this parliament that the EP has blocked an US-EU Agreement - the first being over SWIFT I (which prompted heavy lobbying by the US). Blocking this agreement would not only put an end to invasive data gathering, but also raise the profile of the EP and of the importance of data protection rights in the US's security dealings with the EU.
The report will be presented to the Committee at 15:00 CET. The Committee will vote on the report on March 20th, and the plenary will vote on the agreement in April.
If the Parliament does vote for rejection, it will be a big blow to the US and those in the EU who have been trying to set the rules for this data transfer. In fact, the PNR saga has been going on for about a decade now, since the US adopted its PNR regime in the wake of the September 11 attacks, setting penalties for airlines that refused to transfer the PNR data they collect (airlines collect PNR data for commercial purposes). This left EU airlines in the position where they would be punished by the US if they didn't hand over the data, and by EU data protection laws if they did. An agreement in 2004 fell foul of an ECJ judgment over the legal base used, and an agreement in 2007 was never assented to by the EP (as required under the Lisbon Treaty after December 2009), so it only applied provisionally. The European Parliament called for new agreements with the US (and Canada and Australia) to bring them more into line with data protection rights (the Committee voted to assent to the new Australian agreement in October).
There have been several concerns raised over the agreement, mainly on data protection grounds. In her report, in 't Veld highlights that the necessity and proportionality of PNR systems haven't been satisfactorily established - in fact, with the EU's own proposed PNR Directive, this is also the case (PDF) - when information gathering could be done on a smaller scale (e.g. via an API system that just covers passport and flight departure/arrival data); that the agreement does not limit the use of data to fighting terrorism and serious crime; that data does not have to be destroyed, but can be held indefinitely: despite its use being restricted over time, it could still be accessed and used. It is also pointed out that the agreement does not provide a sufficient protection against the use of sensitive data by the US Department of Homeland Security (data indicating race, religion, sexual orientation, etc); that there aren't sufficient guarantees that data will be equally well protected if it's transferred to another country from the US; and that the agreement might not provide EU citizens with adequate means of judicial address.
She says (PDF):
"The call for a coherent approach and a single set of principles to govern international agreements on the transfer of PNR data was an approach embraced by the Commission and the Council. However, the Agreement with the US differs fundamentally from this approach as well as from the Agreement with Australia, concluded on 13 December 2011. This Agreement was considered to be sufficiently consistent with the criteria set out by Parliament, while the Agreement with the US departs from the approach that had been agreed by the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council in 2010. Additionally, compared to the first EU US PNR Agreement of 2004, this 2011 Agreement even represents a deterioration on many points. Having in mind that the European Parliament sought annulment of the 2004 Agreement before the Court of Justice, your Rapporteur will recommend the European Parliament to decline to consent to the conclusion of the Agreement."
I hope the Committee votes for this report - the case for PNR regimes is quite shaky, with high levels of data collection from people who aren't suspected of any crime, for no proven gains in effectiveness over less invasive and data protection-compliant alternatives. Rejecting the PNR Agreement would be the second time this parliament that the EP has blocked an US-EU Agreement - the first being over SWIFT I (which prompted heavy lobbying by the US). Blocking this agreement would not only put an end to invasive data gathering, but also raise the profile of the EP and of the importance of data protection rights in the US's security dealings with the EU.
The report will be presented to the Committee at 15:00 CET. The Committee will vote on the report on March 20th, and the plenary will vote on the agreement in April.
Thursday, 9 September 2010
US organisation funds groups in Europe to destabilise governments
Well, not really, but an article in the Guardian about the Washington-based Freedom Works, which is advising the Taxpayers' Alliance on Tea Party-style tactics has a great line:
I couldn't resist.
So will Tea Partying catch on in Europe? I doubt it: Europeans are wedded to our welfare states, as we are often reminded, and tend to hang on to the simple equation "taxes go in, public services come out". And public services are still popular. In fact, I think that public services in Europe help add a lot to national and local identity - it is quite a surreal situation when the Tories, who seem to like the idea of privatising the Royal Mail, float the idea of the "Big Society", Cameron suggests that communities run their own post office.
I'll run that by you again. Cameron, who has talked about "Broken Britain", sees the post office as a creature of the community, but I doubt the Royal Mail will get much Conservative sympathy. Sometimes I wonder how people underestimate the value of public institutions in community and national identity. They are a show of solidarity between different parts of the country, mean that people have similar experiences and have a joint commitment to institutions that form a part of a community's past, present and future. Naturally it can be argued that the Royal Mail just isn't that relevant or central to life anymore, but when there are more faith schools, and free schools or academies, it's hard to see how integration or cohesion can work effectively. But enough of that aside.
Tea Party-ers ("Partiers" doesn't look quite right) will likely remain thin on the ground. The mood of austerity is in the air, and governments are cutting services to help pay off debt. Arguing for more cuts to services in this atmosphere just to cut taxes would signal that the state was in full retreat, and effectively abondoning people to the recession after asking taxpayers to pay for the mess the banks made. Saying that the government would be seen as "abondoning people" might seem a very strange thing to say, and is unlikely to make much sense to people who just want the government out of their lives. But I don't think it's too much of an exaggeration - even if it's a very crude generalisation - to say that European history has a long and rich theme of trying to integrate and cope with different sections of society, to become more inclusive. This has been true of the US, of course, with civil rights, and also with a lot of societies. But I think that government in Europe is seen as a way of including people in society, if used properly, and as a part of the community (even if the idea is badly battered).
After all, in an era of popular sovereignty, does it make sense to talk of the state as an alien force simply to be resisted?
Even the Tea Party Movement isn't myopic over the usefulness of the state; they want to use it like any other political movement - to achieve their ends. The only policy I'm aware of, is their support for ID cards for immigrants in Arizona. As Gulf Stream Blues convincingly argues, this is more government - in that, logically, more people will need to carry ID papers for it to work. The Tea Party Movement might not have a strict agenda, which might make it hard to combat, but I doubt that it will be truly popular on this side of the Atlantic. It may still end up being an influential part of the debate though, like the Taxpayers' Alliance who are a rent-a-quote for outrage on public taxation and spending.
So that's my two eurocents, and I hope that I'll never find myself writing about Tea Parties again. We've our own home-grown right-wingers to worry about.
Edit: I wrote Freedom House instead of Freedom Works, which was what the article was actually about; it's been changed now.
"The Taxpayers' Alliance, an influential campaign group that calls for tax cuts and low government spending, is being advised by Freedom Works, a powerful Washington organisation credited with helping to destabilise the Obama administration through its mobilisation of 800,000 grassroots activists."
I couldn't resist.
So will Tea Partying catch on in Europe? I doubt it: Europeans are wedded to our welfare states, as we are often reminded, and tend to hang on to the simple equation "taxes go in, public services come out". And public services are still popular. In fact, I think that public services in Europe help add a lot to national and local identity - it is quite a surreal situation when the Tories, who seem to like the idea of privatising the Royal Mail, float the idea of the "Big Society", Cameron suggests that communities run their own post office.
I'll run that by you again. Cameron, who has talked about "Broken Britain", sees the post office as a creature of the community, but I doubt the Royal Mail will get much Conservative sympathy. Sometimes I wonder how people underestimate the value of public institutions in community and national identity. They are a show of solidarity between different parts of the country, mean that people have similar experiences and have a joint commitment to institutions that form a part of a community's past, present and future. Naturally it can be argued that the Royal Mail just isn't that relevant or central to life anymore, but when there are more faith schools, and free schools or academies, it's hard to see how integration or cohesion can work effectively. But enough of that aside.
Tea Party-ers ("Partiers" doesn't look quite right) will likely remain thin on the ground. The mood of austerity is in the air, and governments are cutting services to help pay off debt. Arguing for more cuts to services in this atmosphere just to cut taxes would signal that the state was in full retreat, and effectively abondoning people to the recession after asking taxpayers to pay for the mess the banks made. Saying that the government would be seen as "abondoning people" might seem a very strange thing to say, and is unlikely to make much sense to people who just want the government out of their lives. But I don't think it's too much of an exaggeration - even if it's a very crude generalisation - to say that European history has a long and rich theme of trying to integrate and cope with different sections of society, to become more inclusive. This has been true of the US, of course, with civil rights, and also with a lot of societies. But I think that government in Europe is seen as a way of including people in society, if used properly, and as a part of the community (even if the idea is badly battered).
After all, in an era of popular sovereignty, does it make sense to talk of the state as an alien force simply to be resisted?
Even the Tea Party Movement isn't myopic over the usefulness of the state; they want to use it like any other political movement - to achieve their ends. The only policy I'm aware of, is their support for ID cards for immigrants in Arizona. As Gulf Stream Blues convincingly argues, this is more government - in that, logically, more people will need to carry ID papers for it to work. The Tea Party Movement might not have a strict agenda, which might make it hard to combat, but I doubt that it will be truly popular on this side of the Atlantic. It may still end up being an influential part of the debate though, like the Taxpayers' Alliance who are a rent-a-quote for outrage on public taxation and spending.
So that's my two eurocents, and I hope that I'll never find myself writing about Tea Parties again. We've our own home-grown right-wingers to worry about.
Edit: I wrote Freedom House instead of Freedom Works, which was what the article was actually about; it's been changed now.
Tuesday, 29 June 2010
SWIFT II: European Data Protection Supervisor's Report to Council
The European Data Protection Supervisor yesterday sent a report (PDF) on the SWIFT II agreement (or TFTP agreement) to the Council. Given the criticism of the agreement from Parliament (though there is recent news of some agreed compromise), the EDPS report is interesting.
For example, at paragraph 5, the EDPS notes that the proposal does not see Article 16 TFEU (on data protection) as a legal basis, though the agreement and proposal note the data protection concerns. The report tersely notes: "...the EDPS reiterates that this agreement not only relates to the exchange of personal data, but also to the protection of these data. Article 16 TFEU is therefore not less relevant as legal basis than Articles 82 and 87 TFEU relating to law enforcement cooperation that have been chosen as legal bases."
The scope for future agreements on data protection and for a general agreement between the US and EU on data protection is discussed as well, particularly in paragraph 8. The EDPS recommends that the current proposal (agreement) be amended so that if there's a general agreement on data protection, it will apply - or at least get an agreement that it would apply to TFTP circumstances.
The EDPS takes a look at the question of privacy rights and the security question through explicitly rights-based language (Para 15):
The report goes on to flag up the same concerns that the agreement's critics in Parliament have highlighted: the retention of data for up to 5 years regardless of whether it's been extracted or if there's a "proved link with a specific investigation or prosecution.", and bulk transfers are the big concerns. In fact, paragraph 20 urges for a transitional approach to bulk data if it is to be used at all:
Also worth higlighting is the whithering criticism for handing the judicial oversight role to Europol:
The report also criticises some aspects of the personal rights under the agreement when it comes to the correction/deletion of information. (As it's already turning into a long post, I'll let you read it [paragraphs 28-33], but it raises questions over the ability of people to exercise these rights). The EDPS also urges the inclusion of a sunset clause in the agreement to help encourage sustained work towards improving data protection under its provisions.
Overall the report echoes the concerns of the critical EP voices, while welcoming the changes make since SWIFT I. How much of an impact will it have in the Council? It's hard to tell how wedded the Member States are to the agreement, though it's interesting to note that the report mentions that the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) considers the retention of data over 6 months to be excessive, so it is possible that some Member States could share worries over the diminution of privacy rights of their citizens. What will be the extent of any agreed amendments be? Hopefully these clear calls will have a positive impact.
For example, at paragraph 5, the EDPS notes that the proposal does not see Article 16 TFEU (on data protection) as a legal basis, though the agreement and proposal note the data protection concerns. The report tersely notes: "...the EDPS reiterates that this agreement not only relates to the exchange of personal data, but also to the protection of these data. Article 16 TFEU is therefore not less relevant as legal basis than Articles 82 and 87 TFEU relating to law enforcement cooperation that have been chosen as legal bases."
The scope for future agreements on data protection and for a general agreement between the US and EU on data protection is discussed as well, particularly in paragraph 8. The EDPS recommends that the current proposal (agreement) be amended so that if there's a general agreement on data protection, it will apply - or at least get an agreement that it would apply to TFTP circumstances.
The EDPS takes a look at the question of privacy rights and the security question through explicitly rights-based language (Para 15):
"15. Against this background, the Commission proposal highlights the usefulness of the TFTP Programme, as put forward by the US Treasury and by the eminent person's reports. However, the condition laid down by Article 8 ECHR in order to justify interference with private life is "necessity" rather than "usefulness"."
The report goes on to flag up the same concerns that the agreement's critics in Parliament have highlighted: the retention of data for up to 5 years regardless of whether it's been extracted or if there's a "proved link with a specific investigation or prosecution.", and bulk transfers are the big concerns. In fact, paragraph 20 urges for a transitional approach to bulk data if it is to be used at all:
"...EDPS believes that solutions should be found to ensure that bulk transfers are replaced with mechanisms allowing financial transaction data to be filtered in the EU, and ensuring that only relevant and necessary data are sent to US Authorities. If these solutions could not be found immediately, then the Agreement should in any event strictly define a short transitional period after which bulk transfers are no longer allowed."
Also worth higlighting is the whithering criticism for handing the judicial oversight role to Europol:
"25. Moreover, Europol has specific interests in the exchange of personal data, on the basis of the proposed agreement. Article 10 of the proposal gives Europol the power to request for relevant information obtained through the TFTP, if it has a reason to believe that a person or an entity has a nexus to terrorism. It is hard to reconcile this power of Europol, which may be important for the fulfilment of Europol's task and which requires good relations with the US Treasury, with the task of Europol to ensure independent oversight.
26. Furthermore, the EDPS wonders to which extent the current legal framework entrusts Europol - especially without changing its legal basis pursuant to the ordinary procedure established by the Lisbon Treaty - with the tasks and powers to make an administrative request coming from a third country "binding" (Article 4.5) on a private company, which will thus become "authorized and required" to provide data to that third country. In this context it is useful to note that it is under the present state of EU law not evident whether a decision of Europol vis-à-vis a private company would be subject to judicial control by the European Court of Justice."
The report also criticises some aspects of the personal rights under the agreement when it comes to the correction/deletion of information. (As it's already turning into a long post, I'll let you read it [paragraphs 28-33], but it raises questions over the ability of people to exercise these rights). The EDPS also urges the inclusion of a sunset clause in the agreement to help encourage sustained work towards improving data protection under its provisions.
Overall the report echoes the concerns of the critical EP voices, while welcoming the changes make since SWIFT I. How much of an impact will it have in the Council? It's hard to tell how wedded the Member States are to the agreement, though it's interesting to note that the report mentions that the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) considers the retention of data over 6 months to be excessive, so it is possible that some Member States could share worries over the diminution of privacy rights of their citizens. What will be the extent of any agreed amendments be? Hopefully these clear calls will have a positive impact.
Wednesday, 16 June 2010
SWIFT II Sent to Council and Parliament
The new SWIFT agreement (or the "Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme") has been reached between the Commission and the US, and the agreement has been sent to the Council and Parliament for assent. Green MEP Jan Albrecht has written about the new agreement and uploaded a PDF of it here. Statewatch also released a PDF of the agreement here.
So does the new agreement address the concerns of the Parliament? Privacy is the central issue, and the long preamble to the deal takes care to highlight the tradition of privacy rights and protection in each jurisdiction (though MEPs tend not to see US privacy laws in the most flattering of lights), but a few new changes have been introduced to try and reassure Parliament.
Elements of the deal include: some oversight by Europol; that the data, if relevant to tackling terrorism by European authorities, will be forwarded to them; data providers can seek redress; citizens can request the erasure, correction or blocking of their information; the deal can be paused or cancelled upon notification after the first 6 months (though the cancellation would take place 6 months after notification); after the deal expires, it is automatically renewed each year for a year unless cancelled; there are provisions for passing on the data to third parties in some cases.
The safeguards are unlikely to fill the EP will a lot of confidence. Europol is an agency to aid work against organised crime, etc. in the EU - and therefore more likely to have a "police" outlook rather than a more impartial judge's outlook on how legal the transfer of data is. Having Eurojust look at the transfer of data to ensure that it complies would be better, as it would have more legal expertise, but a specialised legal review board would be better, in my opinion. In any case, despite the constant references in the deal that applications for data will be on specific data, the net will be quite wide in reality, since Swift only deals with bulk packages of data, and cannot separate them out.
If the data being transferred is bulk data, then it devalues the oversight - some private data will be transferred anyway, so there will already be a high tolerance for its transfer. There would presumably have to be quite a big breach of the agreement for Europol to stop a transfer (though my understanding is that they check that the application is correct, rather than going through the data itself - I doubt they have the resources to do that). The US have undertaken to delete data irrelevant to the deal's purpose, but effective safeguards are what the EP's after.
It's hard to see how effective the citizen's right to erasure, etc. would be. It would be rare that people would discover that data concerning them has been transferred, so how often can these rights be expected to be exercised? Effective safeguards before transfer are vital under these circumstances. Ideally there would be an application to a judicial panel for specific information, which would then be passed on if it complied with the deal.
Jan also brings up the question of how long the data would be retained for in his post. 5 years is too much, though if it was an exceptional period for an exceptional investigation and subject to rigorous safeguards and scrutiny, then such retention may be justifiable. Clearly such conditions aren't satisfied here.
Will it pass in Parliament? I hope not, and there are plenty of reasons here for the EP to reject it. However, there may be pressure to accept it to prevent the US from making bilateral deals and circumventing the EP altogether (though the US would have to consider how that could sour relations with the EP on matters that it cannot circumvent them).
On L'Europe en Blogs, there's an interview with the Commissioner for Home Affairs (whose department this falls under) here.
So does the new agreement address the concerns of the Parliament? Privacy is the central issue, and the long preamble to the deal takes care to highlight the tradition of privacy rights and protection in each jurisdiction (though MEPs tend not to see US privacy laws in the most flattering of lights), but a few new changes have been introduced to try and reassure Parliament.
Elements of the deal include: some oversight by Europol; that the data, if relevant to tackling terrorism by European authorities, will be forwarded to them; data providers can seek redress; citizens can request the erasure, correction or blocking of their information; the deal can be paused or cancelled upon notification after the first 6 months (though the cancellation would take place 6 months after notification); after the deal expires, it is automatically renewed each year for a year unless cancelled; there are provisions for passing on the data to third parties in some cases.
The safeguards are unlikely to fill the EP will a lot of confidence. Europol is an agency to aid work against organised crime, etc. in the EU - and therefore more likely to have a "police" outlook rather than a more impartial judge's outlook on how legal the transfer of data is. Having Eurojust look at the transfer of data to ensure that it complies would be better, as it would have more legal expertise, but a specialised legal review board would be better, in my opinion. In any case, despite the constant references in the deal that applications for data will be on specific data, the net will be quite wide in reality, since Swift only deals with bulk packages of data, and cannot separate them out.
If the data being transferred is bulk data, then it devalues the oversight - some private data will be transferred anyway, so there will already be a high tolerance for its transfer. There would presumably have to be quite a big breach of the agreement for Europol to stop a transfer (though my understanding is that they check that the application is correct, rather than going through the data itself - I doubt they have the resources to do that). The US have undertaken to delete data irrelevant to the deal's purpose, but effective safeguards are what the EP's after.
It's hard to see how effective the citizen's right to erasure, etc. would be. It would be rare that people would discover that data concerning them has been transferred, so how often can these rights be expected to be exercised? Effective safeguards before transfer are vital under these circumstances. Ideally there would be an application to a judicial panel for specific information, which would then be passed on if it complied with the deal.
Jan also brings up the question of how long the data would be retained for in his post. 5 years is too much, though if it was an exceptional period for an exceptional investigation and subject to rigorous safeguards and scrutiny, then such retention may be justifiable. Clearly such conditions aren't satisfied here.
Will it pass in Parliament? I hope not, and there are plenty of reasons here for the EP to reject it. However, there may be pressure to accept it to prevent the US from making bilateral deals and circumventing the EP altogether (though the US would have to consider how that could sour relations with the EP on matters that it cannot circumvent them).
On L'Europe en Blogs, there's an interview with the Commissioner for Home Affairs (whose department this falls under) here.
Thursday, 6 May 2010
Biden courts Parliament with Security's "Terrible Beauty"
US Vice-President Joe Biden gave a 30 minute speech to the European Parliament in Brussels today. The first half of the speech was taken up with flattery for the EP, invoking powerful imagery of the EP and Congress jointly representing 800 million people (the EP 500 million of those). A comment that got particular attention on Twitter was that Brussels had as equal right as Washington to the title of "capital of the free world".
I was a bit confused with a reference he made to Yeats early in his speech when talking about how the EP and the EU have changed and remarking on President Regan's visit to the EP in 1985. Biden suddenly quoted Yeats' poem "Easter, 1916", which is about the Easter Rising - "All is changed, changed utterly: a terrible beauty is born." I'm not sure if it was a slip in concentration on my part, or strange delivery on Biden's, but it sounded like he was comparing Irish revolutionary violence to the EU's formation and change.
Halfway through his speech, it became clear that he was referring to the security challenges in today's world. And at this point the speech became a diplomatic courting of the EP to get its support for US security interests. The lobbying for SWIFT was particularly blatant, with Biden explaining the long history of privacy protection in the US and his deep respect for the value, before turning to security as an "equally inalienable" value. Message: we need this information for protection.
Though obviously angling for the EP's backing on the EU-US deal, if changes are made to SWIFT to include safeguards, it could be helpful in winning over support. Biden talked about understanding, listening and responding to the concerns of Parliament over civil liberties - let's see if it's followed up with action.
Biden also raised concerns over nuclear proliferation (i.e. North Korea and Iran), and regional destabilisation. He said that the US supports security co-operation between NATO and the EU.
Overall, it seemed to be a speech that got sucked up into the "terrible beauty" of security issues, and it didn't touch much on economic issues, apart from a self-congratulatory mention that the US and EU had prevented a global economic depression. Though the EP is severely limited when it comes to security, it shows how the Parliament has gained in importance and power over the last few years, and how the US is keen on developing links with it so that there won't be the shock defeat of a matter dear to Washington's heart. The European Parliament's opinion matters, and it will have to be negotiated with and listened to.
I was a bit confused with a reference he made to Yeats early in his speech when talking about how the EP and the EU have changed and remarking on President Regan's visit to the EP in 1985. Biden suddenly quoted Yeats' poem "Easter, 1916", which is about the Easter Rising - "All is changed, changed utterly: a terrible beauty is born." I'm not sure if it was a slip in concentration on my part, or strange delivery on Biden's, but it sounded like he was comparing Irish revolutionary violence to the EU's formation and change.
Halfway through his speech, it became clear that he was referring to the security challenges in today's world. And at this point the speech became a diplomatic courting of the EP to get its support for US security interests. The lobbying for SWIFT was particularly blatant, with Biden explaining the long history of privacy protection in the US and his deep respect for the value, before turning to security as an "equally inalienable" value. Message: we need this information for protection.
Though obviously angling for the EP's backing on the EU-US deal, if changes are made to SWIFT to include safeguards, it could be helpful in winning over support. Biden talked about understanding, listening and responding to the concerns of Parliament over civil liberties - let's see if it's followed up with action.
Biden also raised concerns over nuclear proliferation (i.e. North Korea and Iran), and regional destabilisation. He said that the US supports security co-operation between NATO and the EU.
Overall, it seemed to be a speech that got sucked up into the "terrible beauty" of security issues, and it didn't touch much on economic issues, apart from a self-congratulatory mention that the US and EU had prevented a global economic depression. Though the EP is severely limited when it comes to security, it shows how the Parliament has gained in importance and power over the last few years, and how the US is keen on developing links with it so that there won't be the shock defeat of a matter dear to Washington's heart. The European Parliament's opinion matters, and it will have to be negotiated with and listened to.
Tuesday, 2 February 2010
Obama doesn't love us anymore...
Obama won't be attending the upcoming EU-US summit in Madrid. Do you feel abandoned? Alone? Unloved?
Despite the talk this will generate, there's not really that much to say. Obama is a smart man, and if there's a point to attending, he will attend. We might wring our hands over the loss in status and perceived snubs, but at the end of the day if the EU doesn't prove itself to be a valid global actor, then it won't attract a global guest list to its summits. That the summit is in Madrid doesn't really matter (as Julien Frisch highlights), but it does indicate why Obama won't bother coming: the central institutions are loosing out to the member states.
The Economist has a very good article on the need for Ashton to assert herself against a Spanish rotating presidency meddling in EU foreign policy. If Ashton can't even slap down member states for floating policy ideas as policy fact, then what does that say for the credibility of the Lisbon institutions? Would you dial a number if the person at the end of the line is too afraid to speak?
In short, there's no point wringing our hands over this latest loss in prestige. We need to get to grips with where we want to go with our foreign policy (and on who will do what both in foreign policy and domestically), and how we're going to get there. Then others will be willing to talk to us about it.
Despite the talk this will generate, there's not really that much to say. Obama is a smart man, and if there's a point to attending, he will attend. We might wring our hands over the loss in status and perceived snubs, but at the end of the day if the EU doesn't prove itself to be a valid global actor, then it won't attract a global guest list to its summits. That the summit is in Madrid doesn't really matter (as Julien Frisch highlights), but it does indicate why Obama won't bother coming: the central institutions are loosing out to the member states.
The Economist has a very good article on the need for Ashton to assert herself against a Spanish rotating presidency meddling in EU foreign policy. If Ashton can't even slap down member states for floating policy ideas as policy fact, then what does that say for the credibility of the Lisbon institutions? Would you dial a number if the person at the end of the line is too afraid to speak?
In short, there's no point wringing our hands over this latest loss in prestige. We need to get to grips with where we want to go with our foreign policy (and on who will do what both in foreign policy and domestically), and how we're going to get there. Then others will be willing to talk to us about it.
Friday, 29 January 2010
Will European bonds translate into Eurobonds?
There are, we are told, no plans to bail out Greece, which has come under a lot of pressure and scrutiny for its government debt. However there seems to be a general feeling that if it came to it, Greece would be bailed out: see the Irish Times and A Fistful of Euros. A few months ago, when the pressure was more focused on Ireland, I had the impression that, in the end, Merkel would relent and accept the need to bail out Ireland to prevent the Euro from being damaged. In terms of the Euro, any state is probably too big to fail, and so there probably needs to be some mechanism for supporting Eurozone states.
If Greece is bailed out by the EU, then there’ll be a strong precedent and expectation to do it again – and it could be called to do so again, as AFoE seems to suggest when you consider its articles on Spain. Of course, it may not come to a bail out, but already the EU is setting precedents through checking the Greek government’s figures and offering advice on the economy. Granted, the EU isn’t yet setting fiscal policy or writing Athens cheques, but it does show a growing need for greater formal economic co-ordination – and a certain willingness to do something about it.
There have been calls for more co-ordination in tax (which would be resisted by Ireland, among many member states).
Also, the Eurobond issue has been raised again, as it was when Ireland was the focus, and with the S&D group coming out in favour of its creation. It would make borrowing cheaper for countries like Ireland and Greece, but more expensive for countries in a better position, which in political terms looms large as Germany. Germany rejected the idea back when Ireland was the issue, and Berlin remains an obstacle to the idea. But if idea proves resilient and keeps coming back – as it probably will during what will likely be a long recession, and particularly if Greece does need to be bailed out – it could happen. Is it a necessary element of a stronger Eurozone?
The S&D group is also advocating the EU adoption of Obama-like plans for the banking sector. Given the UK’s unease with the prospect of financial regulation at a European level in the guise of a simple oversight system, and the dominance of the right generally, it isn’t really a serious prospect. Except... It is interesting that in the UK the Conservatives have, strangely, enthusiastically adopted Obama’s ideas and David Cameron has called on the Prime Minister to clearly come out publicly in favour as well. I doubt they adopt the same position in the EP.
Could Gordon Brown turn around and say, “Why, yes, of course we support such a plan – and we’re part of an EU-spanning political party that advocates it too. Given the international value of banking, and the single market, it would make sense to have common rules on the matter – and we’re the only party in the UK that has the political clout in Europe to make it happen.”? Well... no. Besides Britain’s euroscepticism and the government’s continued awe of the City, it would be too risky to support it at a European level because the S&D are in opposition, so there’s no guarantee that it would pass in the EP, never mind in the Council and Commission; the Commission, which would need to introduce any draft legislation on the matter, may not back the idea; it could end up playing as a victory for the French and a result of their “winning” an economic portfolio, even if it was originally Obama’s idea, etc.
Pity: the thought of Labour turning its European-dimension to its advantage on an issue (to show coherence and effectiveness on several levels compared with the Tories) is a nice thought, but still a fantasy.
Will European bonds translate into more co-ordinated action and a more structured way of working together in the future? Necessity might demand it, but there may not be the supply of political will.
If Greece is bailed out by the EU, then there’ll be a strong precedent and expectation to do it again – and it could be called to do so again, as AFoE seems to suggest when you consider its articles on Spain. Of course, it may not come to a bail out, but already the EU is setting precedents through checking the Greek government’s figures and offering advice on the economy. Granted, the EU isn’t yet setting fiscal policy or writing Athens cheques, but it does show a growing need for greater formal economic co-ordination – and a certain willingness to do something about it.
There have been calls for more co-ordination in tax (which would be resisted by Ireland, among many member states).
Also, the Eurobond issue has been raised again, as it was when Ireland was the focus, and with the S&D group coming out in favour of its creation. It would make borrowing cheaper for countries like Ireland and Greece, but more expensive for countries in a better position, which in political terms looms large as Germany. Germany rejected the idea back when Ireland was the issue, and Berlin remains an obstacle to the idea. But if idea proves resilient and keeps coming back – as it probably will during what will likely be a long recession, and particularly if Greece does need to be bailed out – it could happen. Is it a necessary element of a stronger Eurozone?
The S&D group is also advocating the EU adoption of Obama-like plans for the banking sector. Given the UK’s unease with the prospect of financial regulation at a European level in the guise of a simple oversight system, and the dominance of the right generally, it isn’t really a serious prospect. Except... It is interesting that in the UK the Conservatives have, strangely, enthusiastically adopted Obama’s ideas and David Cameron has called on the Prime Minister to clearly come out publicly in favour as well. I doubt they adopt the same position in the EP.
Could Gordon Brown turn around and say, “Why, yes, of course we support such a plan – and we’re part of an EU-spanning political party that advocates it too. Given the international value of banking, and the single market, it would make sense to have common rules on the matter – and we’re the only party in the UK that has the political clout in Europe to make it happen.”? Well... no. Besides Britain’s euroscepticism and the government’s continued awe of the City, it would be too risky to support it at a European level because the S&D are in opposition, so there’s no guarantee that it would pass in the EP, never mind in the Council and Commission; the Commission, which would need to introduce any draft legislation on the matter, may not back the idea; it could end up playing as a victory for the French and a result of their “winning” an economic portfolio, even if it was originally Obama’s idea, etc.
Pity: the thought of Labour turning its European-dimension to its advantage on an issue (to show coherence and effectiveness on several levels compared with the Tories) is a nice thought, but still a fantasy.
Will European bonds translate into more co-ordinated action and a more structured way of working together in the future? Necessity might demand it, but there may not be the supply of political will.
Sunday, 24 January 2010
What MEPs want.
Ashton may not have gone to Haiti, but the High Representative has met with Secretary of State Clinton (Link. Via David Garrahy).
This is foreign policy as the MEPs want to see it: glamorous, high profile, with the US praising the EU and talking up its role in the world. And Clinton did praise - the Lisbon Treaty was described as a historic event in world history. A wide range of topics was also discussed, such as Afghanistan and Iran, though the EU has little say in these areas. Nevertheless, no doubt the sight of Ashton and Clinton talking tough on Iran was a dream come true for MEPs, and it might leave them satisfied with theatrics abroad for the time being.
The question remaining from this and Ashton's meeting is what role will Ashton play with regard to Iran? Will she try to be proactive in shaping a common policy, or is Iran just an easy target for tough speeches these days?
This is foreign policy as the MEPs want to see it: glamorous, high profile, with the US praising the EU and talking up its role in the world. And Clinton did praise - the Lisbon Treaty was described as a historic event in world history. A wide range of topics was also discussed, such as Afghanistan and Iran, though the EU has little say in these areas. Nevertheless, no doubt the sight of Ashton and Clinton talking tough on Iran was a dream come true for MEPs, and it might leave them satisfied with theatrics abroad for the time being.
The question remaining from this and Ashton's meeting is what role will Ashton play with regard to Iran? Will she try to be proactive in shaping a common policy, or is Iran just an easy target for tough speeches these days?
Saturday, 2 January 2010
"What Is Living and What Is Dead in Social Democracy?"
"What Is Living and What Is Dead in Social Democracy?" is a speech by Tony Judt I came across via Concurring Opinions. While it's addressed to America, and is concerned with the lack of political space to properly discuss ideas outside the conservative box, it's also a great review of social democracy over the last century. As a short overview it's great at putting social democracy in context, and Judt delivers a good defense of its validity, even if it may not be as visionary or inspiring an ideological direction as some may hope for.
Examining the future of social democracy in Europe is fashionable (see Social Europe's blog, particularly the Ken Livingston video) after the defeat suffered by the centre-left in the European elections at a time when the economic project of the right had stalled globally. I'd encourage you to read the lecture, as it's very good at setting social democracy in a historical context, and it does help when thinking of the direction social democratic parties should take in the future.
Judt rightly observes that Europe is a place where social democracy has "won": there's been a consensus here for a long time over the rights and responsibilities of citizens and the state, and a political will to maintain a stable social order based on lower levels of income inequality. Though this has been eroded over the last two decades or so, such attitudes still remain and can be seen when the "European model" is invoked. This should be both comforting and discomforting to the left: it means that the basic set of assumptions they promise about society is largely accepted, but it also means it's harder to formulate what they stand for that's different and new. This challenge is made tougher by the left's adaptation and acceptance of the right's economic views, which has left the left far less able to adapt politically to the changes brought about by the recession than the right, as can be seen from the European elections.
At the same time, what does the left stand for on the European stage? What does it propose that's different from the right? Environment, financial regulation... it's not enough to say that the left will govern better and with the vague promise to be more socially minded - the left must develop politics that go beyond the economy, and offer a better an more comprehensive vision of fairness and justice. If it can confidently promote a more socially just vision, and seem less beholden to the same political mindset of the right without been utopianistic, then the left can set about rebuilding itself as a coherent and positive movement. Of course, this is all easier said than done.
Examining the future of social democracy in Europe is fashionable (see Social Europe's blog, particularly the Ken Livingston video) after the defeat suffered by the centre-left in the European elections at a time when the economic project of the right had stalled globally. I'd encourage you to read the lecture, as it's very good at setting social democracy in a historical context, and it does help when thinking of the direction social democratic parties should take in the future.
Judt rightly observes that Europe is a place where social democracy has "won": there's been a consensus here for a long time over the rights and responsibilities of citizens and the state, and a political will to maintain a stable social order based on lower levels of income inequality. Though this has been eroded over the last two decades or so, such attitudes still remain and can be seen when the "European model" is invoked. This should be both comforting and discomforting to the left: it means that the basic set of assumptions they promise about society is largely accepted, but it also means it's harder to formulate what they stand for that's different and new. This challenge is made tougher by the left's adaptation and acceptance of the right's economic views, which has left the left far less able to adapt politically to the changes brought about by the recession than the right, as can be seen from the European elections.
"So long as the primary objective of social democrats was to convince voters that they were a respectable radical choice within the liberal polity, this defensive stance made sense. But today such rhetoric is incoherent. It is not by chance that a Christian Democrat like Angela Merkel can win an election in Germany against her Social Democratic opponents—even at the height of a financial crisis—with a set of policies that in all its important essentials resembles their own program.
Social democracy, in one form or another, is the prose of contemporary European politics. There are very few European politicians, and certainly fewer still in positions of influence, who would dissent from core social democratic assumptions about the duties of the state, however much they might differ as to their scope. Consequently, social democrats in today's Europe have nothing distinctive to offer: in France, for example, even their unreflective disposition to favor state ownership hardly distinguishes them from the Colbertian instincts of the Gaullist right. Social democracy needs to rethink its purposes.
The problem lies not in social democratic policies, but in the language in which they are couched. Since the authoritarian challenge from the left has lapsed, the emphasis upon "democracy" is largely redundant. We are all democrats today. But "social" still means something—arguably more now than some decades back when a role for the public sector was uncontentiously conceded by all sides. What, then, is distinctive about the "social" in the social democratic approach to politics?"
At the same time, what does the left stand for on the European stage? What does it propose that's different from the right? Environment, financial regulation... it's not enough to say that the left will govern better and with the vague promise to be more socially minded - the left must develop politics that go beyond the economy, and offer a better an more comprehensive vision of fairness and justice. If it can confidently promote a more socially just vision, and seem less beholden to the same political mindset of the right without been utopianistic, then the left can set about rebuilding itself as a coherent and positive movement. Of course, this is all easier said than done.
Monday, 6 April 2009
America, the 28th Member State?
I had restrained myself when Obama gave his support to Turkish membership of the EU. Sure, it's diplomatically impolite, but I tried not to take much notice. However, while flicking around news channels, I saw a discussion on CNBC (which is about finance, so I've never watched it before) about Turkish-American relations and Turkish entry to the EU.
Verdict? Europe was being to stubborn and unreasonable - and there seemed to be an almost complete ignorance of what the EU actually is.
The question was [paraphrasing from memory] "now that Obama has pushed for Turkey to be admitted, or at least called for Turkey to be admitted, into the European Union, will that increase Turkey's chances of joining?". There was no reference made to the French or German reactions to Obama's - well, I'd like to call it a gaffe, but has there been any recognition to this outside of Europe?
Turkish membership was discussed purely as a way of "reaching out" to the Islamic world. I'm a big supporter of Turkish entry, but I wouldn't support it if it was just a gesture of "reaching out". It was never said, but the discussion and the questions gave me the sense that Europe was being obstructionist; Turkey was co-operating; would Europe risk endangering the success of Obama's reaching out?; can't Europe see how good it would be to reach out to Turkey and the Islamic world?
First of all, why is EU membership being spoken of as a US foreign policy tool? It seems so obvious that to point it out is almost idiotic, but it seems that it has to be done - the US is not an EU member. Though it would make more difference if I told them...
Second, membership is not a token gesture awarded to countries to make them feel better (in fact, how could an empty gesture make much difference in international diplomacy?): EU membership means a high degree of economic integration, along with elements of political and cultural integration (Turkey would probably make the "big 3" a "big 4"). Membership is a huge step, and it should only be granted when the candidate country is able and willing to take on the obligations as well as the rights - it's not something dreamt up to be used purely for some touchy-feely exercise of "reaching out".
And I'm surprised at this. I don't hold American journalism in particularly high esteem (why watch CNN when you can watch the news?), but America has been the source of a lot of literature on the EU/Europe, both academic and popular, and the American public generally reads more books on China, Europe, geopolitics, etc. than European publics. And you would think that a financial news programme would be aware of the workings of the EU, and how political decisions can impact on economic ones.
They did have a French political analyst, who just kept insisting that it was a "sensitive issue" in Europe, without explaining the significance of membership. Still, a casual knowledge of the EU would help if you're going to report on it. Must do better.
Verdict? Europe was being to stubborn and unreasonable - and there seemed to be an almost complete ignorance of what the EU actually is.
The question was [paraphrasing from memory] "now that Obama has pushed for Turkey to be admitted, or at least called for Turkey to be admitted, into the European Union, will that increase Turkey's chances of joining?". There was no reference made to the French or German reactions to Obama's - well, I'd like to call it a gaffe, but has there been any recognition to this outside of Europe?
Turkish membership was discussed purely as a way of "reaching out" to the Islamic world. I'm a big supporter of Turkish entry, but I wouldn't support it if it was just a gesture of "reaching out". It was never said, but the discussion and the questions gave me the sense that Europe was being obstructionist; Turkey was co-operating; would Europe risk endangering the success of Obama's reaching out?; can't Europe see how good it would be to reach out to Turkey and the Islamic world?
First of all, why is EU membership being spoken of as a US foreign policy tool? It seems so obvious that to point it out is almost idiotic, but it seems that it has to be done - the US is not an EU member. Though it would make more difference if I told them...
Second, membership is not a token gesture awarded to countries to make them feel better (in fact, how could an empty gesture make much difference in international diplomacy?): EU membership means a high degree of economic integration, along with elements of political and cultural integration (Turkey would probably make the "big 3" a "big 4"). Membership is a huge step, and it should only be granted when the candidate country is able and willing to take on the obligations as well as the rights - it's not something dreamt up to be used purely for some touchy-feely exercise of "reaching out".
And I'm surprised at this. I don't hold American journalism in particularly high esteem (why watch CNN when you can watch the news?), but America has been the source of a lot of literature on the EU/Europe, both academic and popular, and the American public generally reads more books on China, Europe, geopolitics, etc. than European publics. And you would think that a financial news programme would be aware of the workings of the EU, and how political decisions can impact on economic ones.
They did have a French political analyst, who just kept insisting that it was a "sensitive issue" in Europe, without explaining the significance of membership. Still, a casual knowledge of the EU would help if you're going to report on it. Must do better.
The Turkish Question, and Which Europe?
The EU and Turkey. Will they? Won't they? Could they just move in together for a few months and see how it goes?
The US has certainly given its blessing to the Union, though this has upset those who see parental blessing as outmoded and interfering.
Apart from the issues concerning Turkey itself (of which there are many [see further down]), the EU's "Turkish Question" is mostly about the EU itself, and how it sees itself (though everything seems to boil down to that in Europe nowadays). So here are 2 incomplete models (they overlap a lot, and they're also unsatisfactory in themselves anyway): Europe the geographical and Europe the cultural.
1. Europe the geographical:
Despite the fact that Europe is not really a continent in the geographic sense (it is a continent largely through a historical-cultural consciousness/tradition), there are geographically themed arguments for the limitation of Europe.
The EU should be limited to the European continent (and a limited version of that), since most of its benefits only make sense in that context: peace between European nations, strong and strengthening trade links with neighbours, plus cultural factors are heavily influenced by geography: history and common values can only spread so far and bind so many. By expanding the EU beyond Europe's "natural frontiers" (an idea heavily layered in political and cultural thought in itself), these common ties weaken - not just between older members and the newer, far-flung members, but between all members.
The common ties linked so heavily with geography cannot be so easily exported, especially since the EU model of integration leaves national identity and cultures largely intact: without a higher degree of assimilation, which would in itself detract from the European model, how could such an ever widening membership retain a common identity? Addition of new member states beyond a certain frontier is also of dubious value in pure materialistic terms: the greatest beneficiaries of integration are the core geographical countries: goods and services flow thickest between the original 6 and their neighbours due to geographical factors (though all countries benefit greatly from the single market). The further the member state is from the "core", the less the materialistic benefit to the older members. The opening of markets is a great benefit, but would geographical factors mitigate against the realisation of this potential, and render it a paper gain, whereas the costs remain real.
2. Europe the cultural:
This includes some of the ideas in the "geographical" model: a shared history and geography form the basis of common cultural ties. However, it moves beyond that to hold up some of the rationales underlying the EU (as opposed to the current form of the EU itself) as containing universalist ideals which are ripe for export to other countries, and that there can be a process of societal and value change which may result in a country sharing the same "top-level" of values: the welfare state, similar views on the relationship between the state and the individual, on the relationship between individuals and between states and peoples. This "top-level" of values and cultural modes of thinking would leave most local and national traditions and identities intact, but it would set them in a context suitable for membership of the EU without weakening the common values of the Union.
The cultural model places less store in the limiting factors of geography, and this applies to the material sphere: before the "big bang" expansion of 2004, there was no group of member states that could provide a counter-weight to the core. As the eastern European states grow more wealthy, they could form a "core" of their own - or more likely, give rise to a series of interlinking cores across the continent. Such a set-up would be more stable than the geographical model suggests, and all member states would benefit from a strong single market economy both economically, and politically in trade talks, etc. The "costs" to older member states would decline as the newer member states become more wealthy and develop equally strong trading links, and the benefits of their membership for the other members would remain and grow. The increasing power of technology as a communication tool and a trading tool also unlocks the potential of sustaining strong trade and economic links, as well as cultural links, across greater distances.
While the cultural model underplays the restrictions of geography, the restrictions of time are more acutely felt: values take longer to transmit than the acquis of the EU.
These are both terrible models - I'm leaving a lot out, and throwing in a lot of my own speculation, as well as implying a level of coherence and awareness about the models that doesn't translate into real life. But I've tried it to shed some light on what I think are a few of the arguments that underlie enlargement.
My own feelings for the moment lie somewhere in the middle, as a mix of both. Both are to some extent arguable with the models of ASEAN, Union for South American Nations, and the Africian Union. These organisations show that the universalist aspects of the EU model can be exportable - but perhaps that the limits imposed by geography, as well as political factors, mean that this will result in regional variants rather than EU expansion. (Granted, this is a crude comparison).
And Turkey...
So where does Turkey fit in in all of this? It has some territory in what is classically considered Europe, and it has many of the same values that are considered shared European values. There are also big differences on both counts: the "European territory" is small, and Turkey faces legal reform challenges, especially on Human Rights.
Of course, there are also a lot of political reasons too: letting in a big, comparitively poor country raises issues of the balance of political power within the EU institutions and the strain on the EU budget, quite apart from any politically sensitive cultural differences. My personal preference is that Turkey should become a fully-fledged EU member - apart from all of the practical arguments, I feel that we have already made a committment to Turkey's eventual membership by opening negotiations, and it would be wrong to turn our backs on Turkey now - if anything else, it will reduce the EU's leverage in the region.
As for the big question of "Kleineuropa oder Grosseuropa?", I'm a Grosseuropa-ist at the moment, though I would put off accepting any more candidates for membership until the EU is institutionally ready for them.
The US has certainly given its blessing to the Union, though this has upset those who see parental blessing as outmoded and interfering.
Apart from the issues concerning Turkey itself (of which there are many [see further down]), the EU's "Turkish Question" is mostly about the EU itself, and how it sees itself (though everything seems to boil down to that in Europe nowadays). So here are 2 incomplete models (they overlap a lot, and they're also unsatisfactory in themselves anyway): Europe the geographical and Europe the cultural.
1. Europe the geographical:
Despite the fact that Europe is not really a continent in the geographic sense (it is a continent largely through a historical-cultural consciousness/tradition), there are geographically themed arguments for the limitation of Europe.
The EU should be limited to the European continent (and a limited version of that), since most of its benefits only make sense in that context: peace between European nations, strong and strengthening trade links with neighbours, plus cultural factors are heavily influenced by geography: history and common values can only spread so far and bind so many. By expanding the EU beyond Europe's "natural frontiers" (an idea heavily layered in political and cultural thought in itself), these common ties weaken - not just between older members and the newer, far-flung members, but between all members.
The common ties linked so heavily with geography cannot be so easily exported, especially since the EU model of integration leaves national identity and cultures largely intact: without a higher degree of assimilation, which would in itself detract from the European model, how could such an ever widening membership retain a common identity? Addition of new member states beyond a certain frontier is also of dubious value in pure materialistic terms: the greatest beneficiaries of integration are the core geographical countries: goods and services flow thickest between the original 6 and their neighbours due to geographical factors (though all countries benefit greatly from the single market). The further the member state is from the "core", the less the materialistic benefit to the older members. The opening of markets is a great benefit, but would geographical factors mitigate against the realisation of this potential, and render it a paper gain, whereas the costs remain real.
2. Europe the cultural:
This includes some of the ideas in the "geographical" model: a shared history and geography form the basis of common cultural ties. However, it moves beyond that to hold up some of the rationales underlying the EU (as opposed to the current form of the EU itself) as containing universalist ideals which are ripe for export to other countries, and that there can be a process of societal and value change which may result in a country sharing the same "top-level" of values: the welfare state, similar views on the relationship between the state and the individual, on the relationship between individuals and between states and peoples. This "top-level" of values and cultural modes of thinking would leave most local and national traditions and identities intact, but it would set them in a context suitable for membership of the EU without weakening the common values of the Union.
The cultural model places less store in the limiting factors of geography, and this applies to the material sphere: before the "big bang" expansion of 2004, there was no group of member states that could provide a counter-weight to the core. As the eastern European states grow more wealthy, they could form a "core" of their own - or more likely, give rise to a series of interlinking cores across the continent. Such a set-up would be more stable than the geographical model suggests, and all member states would benefit from a strong single market economy both economically, and politically in trade talks, etc. The "costs" to older member states would decline as the newer member states become more wealthy and develop equally strong trading links, and the benefits of their membership for the other members would remain and grow. The increasing power of technology as a communication tool and a trading tool also unlocks the potential of sustaining strong trade and economic links, as well as cultural links, across greater distances.
While the cultural model underplays the restrictions of geography, the restrictions of time are more acutely felt: values take longer to transmit than the acquis of the EU.
These are both terrible models - I'm leaving a lot out, and throwing in a lot of my own speculation, as well as implying a level of coherence and awareness about the models that doesn't translate into real life. But I've tried it to shed some light on what I think are a few of the arguments that underlie enlargement.
My own feelings for the moment lie somewhere in the middle, as a mix of both. Both are to some extent arguable with the models of ASEAN, Union for South American Nations, and the Africian Union. These organisations show that the universalist aspects of the EU model can be exportable - but perhaps that the limits imposed by geography, as well as political factors, mean that this will result in regional variants rather than EU expansion. (Granted, this is a crude comparison).
And Turkey...
So where does Turkey fit in in all of this? It has some territory in what is classically considered Europe, and it has many of the same values that are considered shared European values. There are also big differences on both counts: the "European territory" is small, and Turkey faces legal reform challenges, especially on Human Rights.
Of course, there are also a lot of political reasons too: letting in a big, comparitively poor country raises issues of the balance of political power within the EU institutions and the strain on the EU budget, quite apart from any politically sensitive cultural differences. My personal preference is that Turkey should become a fully-fledged EU member - apart from all of the practical arguments, I feel that we have already made a committment to Turkey's eventual membership by opening negotiations, and it would be wrong to turn our backs on Turkey now - if anything else, it will reduce the EU's leverage in the region.
As for the big question of "Kleineuropa oder Grosseuropa?", I'm a Grosseuropa-ist at the moment, though I would put off accepting any more candidates for membership until the EU is institutionally ready for them.
Friday, 20 March 2009
Is the Lisbon Treaty a hostage to US-Russian relations?
I would like to think not, but a report from EurActiv sadly suggests that EU politics are not subject to the decisions of European countries. And where are the effects of this diplomatic positioning being felt? Prague.
I've long since lost the impression that there was an effective government in the Czech Republic - does it get many laws passed, or is it just treaties that it has problems with?
I've long since lost the impression that there was an effective government in the Czech Republic - does it get many laws passed, or is it just treaties that it has problems with?
Thursday, 12 March 2009
Does Europe have any Common Foreign Policy interests?
In my post on Neutrality and Europe, which was focused mainly on Ireland's policy of neutrality and its compatibility with EU membership, I hinted at what I thought was a basis of a possible section of common European foreign policy interests: the single market. On Grahnlaw's Blog (the post on Sweden's neutrality/non-alignment), in the discussion, Grahnlaw remarked on the tendency of European foreign policies to speak in more pacifist terms when discussing foreign policy, perhaps just to placate a more pacifist public. I think that Europe is probably home to some of the most pacifist populations and perhaps that translates into (truly) more cautious governments (I suppose that depends on both the country you're talking about, and who you're talking too), i.e. governments are actually affected deeply by the public consensus because they are part of that society, though the calculations would end up playing out a bit more differently when cold policy choices need to be made (and these can be between 2 evils).
These attitudes have both historical and contemporary reasons - and these are well known: WWII/history of destructive war, and the contemporary experience of successful multilateralism. However, I think that these attitudes and the policies that come with them are suited to the problems we face in our region (and perhaps even a mature reaction to these problems, though that would be very contentious to argue). While I've said that Europe has probably the most pacifist populations of any region of the world, I think that most people here fall into the multilateralist band - in other words strong diplomacy, and any use of force to be based on some form of the "just war" doctrine.
So what could be the common foreign policy problems that Europe faces? Sadly, this part isn't too radical, as much as I'd like to say something completely original here. It's mostly stability - stability of:
- Eastern Europe (defined here as countries east of the current member states)
- the non-EU former Yugoslav states
- North Africa
- the Middle East, especially Israel, Palestine and Iran
- energy security
- trade security (e.g. security of trade routes such as those passing by the Horn of Africa)
These would be issues for the member states with or without the EU, in a sense, because of geography. But the internal market means that we are a lot closer and our interests are less bound by coincidence: the free movements mean that we've a highly integrated economy which is adversely affected by stability on our frontiers. All member states are more equally exposed and exposed in more similar ways; northwestern member states are no longer quite so insulated. Failed states also mean more and less controlled immigration, more criminality, increased drug trade, etc. The impact of this on a free single market and our societies can be very damaging. The problemd with a lack of energy security can be seen by events over the last few winters in Ukraine and Russia. The Middle East Peace process is an issue for both these reasons and for moral reasons.
The solutions to these problems are mostly the ones which the European publics and the European states have been talking about for so long, albeit backed up with a more robust diplomacy and more willingness to take the initiative. A prime example is the Middle East Process, and indeed the Middle East in general. Due to our close proximity to the region, we suffer more than the US when things go wrong (though obviously we're not the ones that suffer the most) - it's hard to see why Europe isn't more assertive here; sure we have our differences, but we're all agreed on the goal. Even the US agrees with the European position. So why can't we be more robust in promoting the peace process? There needs to be tough love with both sides (a basic outline of some of my thoughts on what could be done here), and Europe has the resources to act effectively here. The US may handle Israel with kid gloves, but we don't have to, and we don't have to wait until the US catches up in foreign policy again.
The basic formulation of multilateralism, robust diplomacy and engagement tailored to each area is a winning formula, if done properly. Inherent in this is the recognition that foreign policy is, in a way, just like domestic policy: force of arms generally is a bad idea, and should only be used in extreme cases - and even in extreme cases, they only provide the breathing space needed for a proper political settlement. A good foreign policy is based on a drive for a legitimate international structure, based on balancing needs and interests encompassing economics, stability, participation and political recognition. In many ways a good foreign policy shapes and sustains a successful region in a way that mirrors that of domestic policy. Obviously there are some extreme cases which don't fall into this theoretical musing of mine: not all interests can be balanced or satisfied. However, I believe that such an approach is the best approach for the problems we currently commonly face.
While the US has been portrayed as a global policeman, I think that Europe is the one with the more policeman-like tendencies. The US is more like a superman, racing off to fix certain problems in special circumstances, while Europe works away in the manner of a policeman (though, still in a limited way and in a limit sphere): policing communities, building nations, acting as an administrator, a trader, etc, etc. The US has elements of this too in its policy, but these aspects are the core of how foreign policy is perceived here, if not consciously (or so it seems to me).
These attitudes have both historical and contemporary reasons - and these are well known: WWII/history of destructive war, and the contemporary experience of successful multilateralism. However, I think that these attitudes and the policies that come with them are suited to the problems we face in our region (and perhaps even a mature reaction to these problems, though that would be very contentious to argue). While I've said that Europe has probably the most pacifist populations of any region of the world, I think that most people here fall into the multilateralist band - in other words strong diplomacy, and any use of force to be based on some form of the "just war" doctrine.
So what could be the common foreign policy problems that Europe faces? Sadly, this part isn't too radical, as much as I'd like to say something completely original here. It's mostly stability - stability of:
- Eastern Europe (defined here as countries east of the current member states)
- the non-EU former Yugoslav states
- North Africa
- the Middle East, especially Israel, Palestine and Iran
- energy security
- trade security (e.g. security of trade routes such as those passing by the Horn of Africa)
These would be issues for the member states with or without the EU, in a sense, because of geography. But the internal market means that we are a lot closer and our interests are less bound by coincidence: the free movements mean that we've a highly integrated economy which is adversely affected by stability on our frontiers. All member states are more equally exposed and exposed in more similar ways; northwestern member states are no longer quite so insulated. Failed states also mean more and less controlled immigration, more criminality, increased drug trade, etc. The impact of this on a free single market and our societies can be very damaging. The problemd with a lack of energy security can be seen by events over the last few winters in Ukraine and Russia. The Middle East Peace process is an issue for both these reasons and for moral reasons.
The solutions to these problems are mostly the ones which the European publics and the European states have been talking about for so long, albeit backed up with a more robust diplomacy and more willingness to take the initiative. A prime example is the Middle East Process, and indeed the Middle East in general. Due to our close proximity to the region, we suffer more than the US when things go wrong (though obviously we're not the ones that suffer the most) - it's hard to see why Europe isn't more assertive here; sure we have our differences, but we're all agreed on the goal. Even the US agrees with the European position. So why can't we be more robust in promoting the peace process? There needs to be tough love with both sides (a basic outline of some of my thoughts on what could be done here), and Europe has the resources to act effectively here. The US may handle Israel with kid gloves, but we don't have to, and we don't have to wait until the US catches up in foreign policy again.
The basic formulation of multilateralism, robust diplomacy and engagement tailored to each area is a winning formula, if done properly. Inherent in this is the recognition that foreign policy is, in a way, just like domestic policy: force of arms generally is a bad idea, and should only be used in extreme cases - and even in extreme cases, they only provide the breathing space needed for a proper political settlement. A good foreign policy is based on a drive for a legitimate international structure, based on balancing needs and interests encompassing economics, stability, participation and political recognition. In many ways a good foreign policy shapes and sustains a successful region in a way that mirrors that of domestic policy. Obviously there are some extreme cases which don't fall into this theoretical musing of mine: not all interests can be balanced or satisfied. However, I believe that such an approach is the best approach for the problems we currently commonly face.
While the US has been portrayed as a global policeman, I think that Europe is the one with the more policeman-like tendencies. The US is more like a superman, racing off to fix certain problems in special circumstances, while Europe works away in the manner of a policeman (though, still in a limited way and in a limit sphere): policing communities, building nations, acting as an administrator, a trader, etc, etc. The US has elements of this too in its policy, but these aspects are the core of how foreign policy is perceived here, if not consciously (or so it seems to me).
Saturday, 7 March 2009
EuroparlTV Presents: Secretary Clinton in the EP (Eventually)
Since Secretary Clinton had a question and answer session in the EP (sadly not with the MEPs), I thought that I'd watch it on EuroparlTV. (After all, it is there to show EP events).
You can watch it here, if you like, but it takes half an hour just to get to the main event, so have something to do in the meantime, unless you like watching a screen with "Awaiting Clinton/ H-G Poettering" on it, or audiences talking amongst themselves. (This is frankly unbelievable - have EuroparlTV never heard of editing?!).
It was interesting to watch, when I did eventually get to see it, with the Secretary of State making some very federalist noises ("reaching your full potential" as apposed to Dr. Rice's 'don't think you can equal us' rhetoric). Of course, it can be said that it's all just tailored to the audience, and it's not really of much value. In the end, how strong Europe is (and how we define a strong Europe) is up to us (if you'll allow me to restate the obvious).
One other thing: it'll be a proud day for the EP when it picks the Commission President, Mr. Poettering; you can't base a Parliament's good days on the sparse visits of high-ranking foreign dignitaries.
You can watch it here, if you like, but it takes half an hour just to get to the main event, so have something to do in the meantime, unless you like watching a screen with "Awaiting Clinton/ H-G Poettering" on it, or audiences talking amongst themselves. (This is frankly unbelievable - have EuroparlTV never heard of editing?!).
It was interesting to watch, when I did eventually get to see it, with the Secretary of State making some very federalist noises ("reaching your full potential" as apposed to Dr. Rice's 'don't think you can equal us' rhetoric). Of course, it can be said that it's all just tailored to the audience, and it's not really of much value. In the end, how strong Europe is (and how we define a strong Europe) is up to us (if you'll allow me to restate the obvious).
One other thing: it'll be a proud day for the EP when it picks the Commission President, Mr. Poettering; you can't base a Parliament's good days on the sparse visits of high-ranking foreign dignitaries.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)