Monday, 6 April 2009
America, the 28th Member State?
Verdict? Europe was being to stubborn and unreasonable - and there seemed to be an almost complete ignorance of what the EU actually is.
The question was [paraphrasing from memory] "now that Obama has pushed for Turkey to be admitted, or at least called for Turkey to be admitted, into the European Union, will that increase Turkey's chances of joining?". There was no reference made to the French or German reactions to Obama's - well, I'd like to call it a gaffe, but has there been any recognition to this outside of Europe?
Turkish membership was discussed purely as a way of "reaching out" to the Islamic world. I'm a big supporter of Turkish entry, but I wouldn't support it if it was just a gesture of "reaching out". It was never said, but the discussion and the questions gave me the sense that Europe was being obstructionist; Turkey was co-operating; would Europe risk endangering the success of Obama's reaching out?; can't Europe see how good it would be to reach out to Turkey and the Islamic world?
First of all, why is EU membership being spoken of as a US foreign policy tool? It seems so obvious that to point it out is almost idiotic, but it seems that it has to be done - the US is not an EU member. Though it would make more difference if I told them...
Second, membership is not a token gesture awarded to countries to make them feel better (in fact, how could an empty gesture make much difference in international diplomacy?): EU membership means a high degree of economic integration, along with elements of political and cultural integration (Turkey would probably make the "big 3" a "big 4"). Membership is a huge step, and it should only be granted when the candidate country is able and willing to take on the obligations as well as the rights - it's not something dreamt up to be used purely for some touchy-feely exercise of "reaching out".
And I'm surprised at this. I don't hold American journalism in particularly high esteem (why watch CNN when you can watch the news?), but America has been the source of a lot of literature on the EU/Europe, both academic and popular, and the American public generally reads more books on China, Europe, geopolitics, etc. than European publics. And you would think that a financial news programme would be aware of the workings of the EU, and how political decisions can impact on economic ones.
They did have a French political analyst, who just kept insisting that it was a "sensitive issue" in Europe, without explaining the significance of membership. Still, a casual knowledge of the EU would help if you're going to report on it. Must do better.
The Turkish Question, and Which Europe?
The US has certainly given its blessing to the Union, though this has upset those who see parental blessing as outmoded and interfering.
Apart from the issues concerning Turkey itself (of which there are many [see further down]), the EU's "Turkish Question" is mostly about the EU itself, and how it sees itself (though everything seems to boil down to that in Europe nowadays). So here are 2 incomplete models (they overlap a lot, and they're also unsatisfactory in themselves anyway): Europe the geographical and Europe the cultural.
1. Europe the geographical:
Despite the fact that Europe is not really a continent in the geographic sense (it is a continent largely through a historical-cultural consciousness/tradition), there are geographically themed arguments for the limitation of Europe.
The EU should be limited to the European continent (and a limited version of that), since most of its benefits only make sense in that context: peace between European nations, strong and strengthening trade links with neighbours, plus cultural factors are heavily influenced by geography: history and common values can only spread so far and bind so many. By expanding the EU beyond Europe's "natural frontiers" (an idea heavily layered in political and cultural thought in itself), these common ties weaken - not just between older members and the newer, far-flung members, but between all members.
The common ties linked so heavily with geography cannot be so easily exported, especially since the EU model of integration leaves national identity and cultures largely intact: without a higher degree of assimilation, which would in itself detract from the European model, how could such an ever widening membership retain a common identity? Addition of new member states beyond a certain frontier is also of dubious value in pure materialistic terms: the greatest beneficiaries of integration are the core geographical countries: goods and services flow thickest between the original 6 and their neighbours due to geographical factors (though all countries benefit greatly from the single market). The further the member state is from the "core", the less the materialistic benefit to the older members. The opening of markets is a great benefit, but would geographical factors mitigate against the realisation of this potential, and render it a paper gain, whereas the costs remain real.
2. Europe the cultural:
This includes some of the ideas in the "geographical" model: a shared history and geography form the basis of common cultural ties. However, it moves beyond that to hold up some of the rationales underlying the EU (as opposed to the current form of the EU itself) as containing universalist ideals which are ripe for export to other countries, and that there can be a process of societal and value change which may result in a country sharing the same "top-level" of values: the welfare state, similar views on the relationship between the state and the individual, on the relationship between individuals and between states and peoples. This "top-level" of values and cultural modes of thinking would leave most local and national traditions and identities intact, but it would set them in a context suitable for membership of the EU without weakening the common values of the Union.
The cultural model places less store in the limiting factors of geography, and this applies to the material sphere: before the "big bang" expansion of 2004, there was no group of member states that could provide a counter-weight to the core. As the eastern European states grow more wealthy, they could form a "core" of their own - or more likely, give rise to a series of interlinking cores across the continent. Such a set-up would be more stable than the geographical model suggests, and all member states would benefit from a strong single market economy both economically, and politically in trade talks, etc. The "costs" to older member states would decline as the newer member states become more wealthy and develop equally strong trading links, and the benefits of their membership for the other members would remain and grow. The increasing power of technology as a communication tool and a trading tool also unlocks the potential of sustaining strong trade and economic links, as well as cultural links, across greater distances.
While the cultural model underplays the restrictions of geography, the restrictions of time are more acutely felt: values take longer to transmit than the acquis of the EU.
These are both terrible models - I'm leaving a lot out, and throwing in a lot of my own speculation, as well as implying a level of coherence and awareness about the models that doesn't translate into real life. But I've tried it to shed some light on what I think are a few of the arguments that underlie enlargement.
My own feelings for the moment lie somewhere in the middle, as a mix of both. Both are to some extent arguable with the models of ASEAN, Union for South American Nations, and the Africian Union. These organisations show that the universalist aspects of the EU model can be exportable - but perhaps that the limits imposed by geography, as well as political factors, mean that this will result in regional variants rather than EU expansion. (Granted, this is a crude comparison).
And Turkey...
So where does Turkey fit in in all of this? It has some territory in what is classically considered Europe, and it has many of the same values that are considered shared European values. There are also big differences on both counts: the "European territory" is small, and Turkey faces legal reform challenges, especially on Human Rights.
Of course, there are also a lot of political reasons too: letting in a big, comparitively poor country raises issues of the balance of political power within the EU institutions and the strain on the EU budget, quite apart from any politically sensitive cultural differences. My personal preference is that Turkey should become a fully-fledged EU member - apart from all of the practical arguments, I feel that we have already made a committment to Turkey's eventual membership by opening negotiations, and it would be wrong to turn our backs on Turkey now - if anything else, it will reduce the EU's leverage in the region.
As for the big question of "Kleineuropa oder Grosseuropa?", I'm a Grosseuropa-ist at the moment, though I would put off accepting any more candidates for membership until the EU is institutionally ready for them.
Saturday, 17 January 2009
Turkey's PM to arrive in Brussels on Sunday
Turkey's PM, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, hopes to kick-start the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU during a three days of meetings in Brussels starting Sunday. (Well, accelerate – the negotiations are still ongoing, but at snail’s pace).
Other initiatives designed to get Turkey back on the yellow brick road to Europe include finally appointing a full time EU negotiator. Turkey has also made some progress in the area of minority rights, such as launching the new Kurdish-language channel, TRT 6, which is hopefully an indication that further progress will be made.
While there are many issues for Turkey to resolve before it can accede to the Union, most notably regarding human rights and Cyprus, the most frustrating thing for Turks must be that, as much as they may reform, their EU destiny is largely out of their hands. The threat of a French referendum on Turkish entry, which would most likely result in a "No", is one example of this.
The term used to explain this is "enlargement fatigue" on the part of the EU; the idea that the EU can only take on so much. While a lot of this is quite true - the institutions need reform to handle deals between 27+ member states and peoples - it is only part of a wider "change fatigue".
The EU has gone through a protracted period of reform - there have been 5 Treaties (including the Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon) and 3 enlargements since 1992. The pace of change has been disappointing to some and terrifying to others, and the EU is probably unique among international organisations for the rate of reform it has seen. However the perception of change may be much greater than actual change, and the perception that the EU is a project out of the control of the electorate means that however much change is needed, it doesn't always sit well with the electorate.
This is partially to blame on the member states, who have not been far-sighted in their reforms of the EU. Too much dithering over how democratic and effective they should make the EU (or how little reform they could get away with to not upset each other and protect their positions within the system) has resulted in an inflated number of treaties without the necessary public engagement to ensure public consent to further change, never mind encouraging public interaction with the European project.
The consequent feeling of a loss of control has led to an unwillingness to accept further change. In some states, this has focused on Turkey for historical and cultural reasons (and in some cases, outright anti-Islamic reasons). For France and Germany, the size of Turkey - it will be the first country of the 1st rank in population terms to join since Britain in 1973, if it manages to join - means that whatever fears they have over loss of control have and added potency.
However, to refuse Turkey, a western-orientated country for decades with cultural and historical links to Europe, entry into the EU club would damage the EU's celebrated "soft power" not just in the Islamic world but elsewhere. Most of the EU's soft power comes from its openness and its willingness to enlarge. If Turkey reforms itself successfully, it must be welcomed into the EU.
Refusing entry to Turkey won't help restore people’s, or states’, feelings of control over the European project, only a proper debate and meaningful engagement with the electorate can.