Because it just wouldn't be New Year's without...

...A gas crisis.

EUobserver has reported that there are warning signs of yet another gas crisis on the horizon, with Ukraine looking for high transit fees. Though the article reads as if everyone involved is trying to give off reassuring signals, budgetary pressures on both Russia and Ukraine (though perhaps particularly Ukraine) may work against a quiet solution.

It's stressed that there are enough reserves to see out any cut-offs in supply:

"The EU's executive body has re-assured, however, that there is "no current threat to supplies to households or to businesses" as emergency oil stocks in the 27-nation bloc stand at comfortable level of 122 days of consumption.

Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic also report having sufficient reserves - 118, 94 and 101 days, respectively - figures well above the mandatory 90 days."

If there is another gas crisis, then the EU's response will be very interesting. By now, the EU's approach should be more coherent, given the regularity of the gas crises, but even beyond that the role of Baroness Ashton, the new High Representative, will be worth watching. Would she prove effective at advocating a common position and articulating it? Would pressure be brought to bear more on Ukraine or on Russia, and how? Would pressure be applied (can it be applied) through the Eastern Partnership?

Since the HR's work will be mostly done behind the scenes, and with so many factors outside her control, it may be a difficult to fairly access her approach, however...

South Ossetian Elections

Elections have just taken place in the breakaway republic of South Ossetia (which broke away from Georgia de facto a while ago but has recently been recognized by Russia, in payback for the Georgian war and the West (or most of the West's) recognition of Kosovo as an independent state). Rebel leader Eduard Kokoity is in a strong position now, with most of the parties in parliament either supportive or uncritical of the leader.

The EU has condemned the elections as illegitimate, as has the Georgian government naturally enough. But should the EU not take a more constructive role in the region? Backing Georgia may be more in our interests, but the problem won't be solved - whether by independence or reintegration - if the EU either doesn't engage or encourage a multilateral peace process. Isolated republics, dependent on great power patronage, will not work well for their citizens, and the current political alignment only encourages grandstanding by both sides from inside the political bunkers of their alliances. I'm not saying that the South Ossetian regime is good or bad - I suspect the later considering the apparent lack of a proper opposition - but the situation is worsened by the international political atmosphere, and it will be the same for the other breakaway republic.

The kind of approach needed to encourage détente would have to be skillful and effective - sadly an approach unlikely to be forthcoming from the EU in its current "lowest common demoninator" state.

Belarus leaving the Russian Sphere of Influence?

Russia has feared that the Eastern Partnership will make the EU the dominant power in its post-Soviet sphere of influence. One of the key states in Russia's sphere of influence, especially since the Orange Revolution (which isn't looking too stable itself at the moment), is Belarus. Belarus is generally seen as being firmly within the Russian sphere of influence, with even ideas of Russo-Belarussian Union floating about at different points. I doubt that Belarus will somehow turn into a pro-EU state, but I think that Belarus will use the EaP as a way of asserting its independence through playing the EU and Russia off each other.

What may be a bigger factor in Russian insecurity over the EaP may not be the set-up of the EaP itself, which is economically-orientated, but the weakness of Russia to maintain its sphere of influence. Less than a year ago it was harder to see the shrinkage of Russian influence with the war in the Caucasus, which asserted Russian military dominance in the region. However, it was interesting to see that Belarus didn't recognise the breakaway republics in line with Russian foreign policy.

Now it seems that Belarus is moving further from the Russian sphere due to a list of grievences with Russia:

"Mr Lukashenko has been frustrated by the Kremlin’s reticence over plans to form a “union state” linking Russia and Belarus and by energy disputes, but he was infuriated by Moscow’s refusal this week to provide finance to his country due to fears it is badly run and could collapse."

Russia's reluctance to cultivate its influence in its backyard - probably due to the pressure the economic crisis has put it under - could lead to Belarus becoming less able to play the EU and Russia off each other in the short term, as the Russian card looses some of its value. Hard power may be impressive, but its utility can often be very constrained, and Russian hard power isn't always that impressive.

That said, it remains to be seen if the EU can really fill the vaccum through the EaP, or if the political will and resources are there to play the influence game. Especially at a time when showing solidarity with the big bang EU members can be problematic, never mind helping out a country widely considered to be "the last dictatorship in Europe". It could turn out to be a temporary spat and Belarussan relations with Moscow could warm up again.

Could this be the beginning of a great Partnership...?

The summit launching the Eastern Partnership was held in Prague today, though you might miss the good feeling that was presumably supposed to burst forth from the summit, with some leaders not attending, some leaders (ok, just Georgia) being annoyed with Russia, and Russia being annoyed with the whole thing.

Of course, everyone has said that the EaP isn't a sphere of influence at all (apart from Georgia, which proclaims it as having an integrational direction), and that Russia shouldn't get so worked up about it. Though the effect is ruined somewhat by a former EU official saying:

"This is only happening because Russia has annoyed everyone."

The EaP is a sphere of influence, but I don't think that there's any malign intent behind the project - I'd say it's a mix of needing to politically finding a way of stalling the push for enlargement, trying to ensure political and economic stability along the EU's eastern frontier, and building a buffer zone when it comes to Russian influence. It's debatable whether or not the EU would have pursued the project if Russia was perceived to be a more reliable partner in EU eyes, though Polish ties with Ukraine and the EU's (and EU member states') tendency to view the whole thing as purely economic affair along with intra-EU politics on the need to balance the Union for the Med. in the south with an eastern project... well, perhaps the EU would have done it anyway without really thinking that much about Russia.

EU-Russian relations are mainly pursued through the Common Spaces. Is it time to change the relationship with Russia?

Meanwhile, Bruno Waterfield over at the EUobserver has blogged that the EaP has nothing to offer Ukraine and that the agreement doesn't have enough on the table to tempt Ukraine westwards. Beyond this he raises questions of ethics. I've mused on the ethics of the Partnership before, though in a foreign policy sort of way - Bruno raises the question (at least, this is my reading) of the EaP denying Ukraine's European identity; of not living up to pan-European ideals by going far enough to offer Ukrainians more rights and opportunities. Particularly in the area of visas.

His assessment is that the EaP could destabilize Ukraine further.

A case of creating an expectation-capability gap?

Restrictions on travel certainly weaken the EU's soft power in the region, but I don't think that the EaP is a destabilising force. Restrictions on the movement of Ukrainians into its EU members have existed since the big bang enlargement of 2004 - the EU's presence and economic power means that it was always going to have an impact, the question was only what form it would take and if there was going to be a structured political will behind it (or any sort of will at all). The idea of a "Common European Home", which the EU has effectively claimed the mantle of, is a powerful political call, though it may seem very weak to us from inside. The management of the EU's influence is vital here, since the biggest foreign policy tool is essentially to turn the foreign policy question into a domestic one.

Bruno is right that the lack of a visa agenda will be a blow to the EU's influence in the region, though the size of the blow is debatable. In my opinion though, we're just still at our default position - a missed opportunity - rather than having heedlessly rushed into an empty arrangement that made things worse. The EaP is a start in regularising relations between the EU and its "Eastern March", and could open a lot of doors diplomatically for wider co-operation. Like any foreign policy, it will depend much more on the political will and the effectiveness of co-ordination over time perhaps even more than the structures that the EU will work within.

It will be extremely interesting to see if the high level of Commission involvement will lead to greater co-ordination and effectiveness, or if a lack of member state support behind the Commission will hamper the whole process. And that's beside the question of whether or not whoever has the most influence will do the job well anyway.

Plus the Russian factor...

Economic aid or Sphere of Influence?

At the European summit on Thursday and Friday, several measures were decided on to help both non-euro EU members and non-EU members. EUobserver has reported on the measures here. The support for non-euro members will be doubled to €50 billion, and a further €75 billion will be pumped into the IMF (which, though it will help non-European countries, is going to help both EU and non-EU European states). The much fought-over €5 billion, which was the initiative of the Commission, will help the older, richer member states more, but then it is peanuts in any case.

And the Eastern Partnership will be alocated €600 million. I know, still peanuts - in fact, hardly any peanuts at all. One of the most interesting aspects of the Eastern Partnership (perhaps so called to annoy those who like abbreviations?) is the level of Commission involvement there will be in the project: the number of meetings with the representatives with the eastern countries, negotiating and setting common policy, etc. Could this be a strengthening of the Commission's hand in guiding foreign affairs at the expense of the CFSP? Of course, this could be viewed as linked with the Commission's external relations department's traditional role of economic relations, and so it is to an extent, but the sheer amount and frequency of the involvement will surely mean that the head of the CFSP will be eclipsed by the head of the Commission's foreign relations.

Though it depends on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty - which would merge the 2 posts, so it may be a bit much to emphasise this. The Council will also host foreign ministerial meetings every 2 years. However, the other departments of the Commission would also be heavily involved too. Perhaps this could lead to the Commission as a whole becoming more aware and sensitive to the needs of Ukraine, etc., and vice versa? It could mean that a lot of the substance of member states' relations with the Eastern Partnership countries will be handled by the Commission - would it help change (older) member states opinions and policies in the region?

Russia views it as a dangerous development - claiming that the Eastern Partnership represents an attempt by the EU at carving out a sphere of influence. It seems that any tightening of relations on Russia's western border amount to carving out a sphere of influence - basically: "EU and NATO: get out and stay out." At the same time, however, we should recognise that we sometimes get caught up in the same sort of thinking. Worries about Russo-German closeness is one example. In any case, a deepening of relations in the Eastern Partnership won't involve a security dimension, so how can you read these worries of Russia's without reading the implication that these countries should be in Russia's sphere of influence?

On the Belarus question, I think that the EU shouldn't be too lenient on Belarus. Russia is wrong to suggest that the Eastern Partnership has a coercive stance; Belarus can choose to join or not, but I think that the EU needs to be more demanding in its conditions for Partnership membership. A common stance on Georgia is good, but Belarus in my opinion is too oppressive to be considered for membership.

Is the Lisbon Treaty a hostage to US-Russian relations?

I would like to think not, but a report from EurActiv sadly suggests that EU politics are not subject to the decisions of European countries. And where are the effects of this diplomatic positioning being felt? Prague.

I've long since lost the impression that there was an effective government in the Czech Republic - does it get many laws passed, or is it just treaties that it has problems with?

Will the Captain go down before the ship?

The Kremlin is contemplating cuts in the military, which the military isn't too happy about, as you can imagine. With Putin already weakened can he afford to risk discontent in the ranks? (Though Putin is a tough leader, and valid perceptions of "weakened" and be difficult to ascertain in Russia).

If the Kremlin weakens in terms of unity as power struggles develop, will this mean a weakening of Russian geopolitical ambitions, or a renewed attempt to increase Russian geopolitical standing in the world?

A Song for Europe*

Politics will always bubble over into culture, and now it could feature in the Georgian Eurovision entry this year. Though I suppose it depends on where you stand on Eurovision being culture.

"We Don't Wanna Put In / The negative move, / It's killin' the groove," using a phrase that sounds like "We don't want Putin."

It's not exactly great political satire, but should the EBU ask the group to change the lyrics? The Eurovision is supposed to be a fun kind of continental get-together (naturally to get drunk), so political digs at other countries isn't really in keeping with the spirit of the contest. But should that mean intervention by the EBU?




*A gold star for correctly identifying the reference.

Munich International Security Conference: Second Day

Joe Biden addressed the conference today (reported here in German; Tagesschau clip here; BBC report here). There wasn't much - or indeed anything - new about US policy that can be divined from his speech; it was mostly a restatement of Obama's previous announcements: more multilateralism, shift from Iraq to Afghanistan, closure of Guantanamo and the decision of whether or not to give the go-ahead to the anti-missile system in Eastern Europe to be based on the technological feasibility of the system.

More interesting is Angela Merkel's announced willingness to consider "tough sanctions" against Iran if Iran doesn't make any progress in negotiations (here, again in German). This could be a significant hardening of German attitudes to Iran, with which Germany has numerous business interests. However, we'll have to see how Germany defines a lack of progress and tough sanctions.

Jaap de Hoop, NATO General Secretary has again called for closer transatlantic ties, with an America more open to listening to the European states and European states more willing to help in Afghanistan. He also called for a more trusting relationship between NATO and Russia.


BBC news has also uncovered some very important Russian news.

Steinmeier calls for more disarmament at the start of Munich Security Conference

Walter Steinmeier, German Foreign Minister and SPD Chancellor candidate, has opened the international security conference in Munich calling for more disarmament of both conventional and nuclear weapons. (German; and a short English version).

He described the political situation in Russia and the US (with Obama and a Russian President not so attached to Cold War ideas) as "Das Fenster der Geschichte ist für eine Weile geöffnet" - a window of history has opened [for disarmament and security]. US Vice-President Joe Biden will address the conference later today, with a speech that's expected to set out the new Administration's foreign policy course. Hopefully it will include plans to open new arms control talks to put together a treaty to replace the expiring START 1 treaty.

Russia is in an interesting position at the moment. It's worsening economic condition makes any aggressive foreign policy (or one that might be perceived as aggressive) more risky. Putin, like Obama, has to fix the economy. Putin is still very popular in Russia, but the growing economy was the basis of his popularity, and a lot of his government's legitimacy, and now he is more open to criticism, if only indirectly - The Irish Times has an interesting article noting how it has become acceptable to criticise the government (as a whole) after Medvedev began to criticise the government for its response to the crisis.

Putin is still very much in control, but perhaps the power could slowly shift over time to Medvedev. The US and Europe may prefer to deal with the more liberal President rather than the Prime Minister, but this situation may make it even harder for outsiders to know who they should be talking to in order to "talk with Russia".

Arms control talks would be a good start to relations with Russia, and will probably be popular with the Russian government too. Hopefully any temptation (however remote) to sabre-rattle to distract people's attention from the economic crisis will be cancelled out in Moscow by the need not to frighten off business and investment.

Would accepting Nord Stream be a blow to European interests?

Angela Merkel is pushing for the EU to back the Russo-German Nord Stream pipeline, which should supply gas to Germany, bypassing Eastern transit countries.

But with energy security an increasing concern - with the Czech Presidency even describing the South Stream project (a Russian pipeline to go through the Balkans) as a "threat" to the EU's plans for an alternative non-Russian controlled pipeline through Turkey ("Nabucco"). These new pipelines will reduce the political insecurity of gas supply which has dogged European countries over the last few years, but they will mean that EU countries will remain dependent to a large degree on Russia for its gas.

It would be easy to overstate the threat involved here. Russia is not forcing anyone to buy its gas, and these pipelines will not prevent the EU from developing green energy sources and finding other suppliers. However, the political courage to take any of these energy security measures it largely (if not solely) one of necessity. At a time when Obama is making the right noises about investing in green technology and promoting a green economy (of course, it's too early to tell how this will work out), the EU has weakened its committment in December. Could Al Gore be right when he said that only the US can lead on climate change?

The weaknesses of our politicians in making tough decisions in this area is a lot harder to overstate.

EU Gas Flow Monitors

Russia has agreed to let the EU monitor the flow of gas through the Ukraine, though negotiations over how the monitors will function are still on-going.

The inability of Ukraine to pay its bills and suggestions that Ukraine has been taking gas bound for the EU has provoked this move. Sarkozy has also questioned Ukraine's dependability as a partner.

While this in no way solves the core problem of Ukraine's gas bills, it does mark a step in the EU trying to ensure that the member states will get the gas they pay for, and that Russia has no excuse to turn off the tap to those who pay their bills. Of course, this is also in Russia's interests, as it makes the question of Russia's dependability as a gas supplier less pressing - which is important at a time when Russia needs all the business it can get.