Belarus leaving the Russian Sphere of Influence?

Russia has feared that the Eastern Partnership will make the EU the dominant power in its post-Soviet sphere of influence. One of the key states in Russia's sphere of influence, especially since the Orange Revolution (which isn't looking too stable itself at the moment), is Belarus. Belarus is generally seen as being firmly within the Russian sphere of influence, with even ideas of Russo-Belarussian Union floating about at different points. I doubt that Belarus will somehow turn into a pro-EU state, but I think that Belarus will use the EaP as a way of asserting its independence through playing the EU and Russia off each other.

What may be a bigger factor in Russian insecurity over the EaP may not be the set-up of the EaP itself, which is economically-orientated, but the weakness of Russia to maintain its sphere of influence. Less than a year ago it was harder to see the shrinkage of Russian influence with the war in the Caucasus, which asserted Russian military dominance in the region. However, it was interesting to see that Belarus didn't recognise the breakaway republics in line with Russian foreign policy.

Now it seems that Belarus is moving further from the Russian sphere due to a list of grievences with Russia:

"Mr Lukashenko has been frustrated by the Kremlin’s reticence over plans to form a “union state” linking Russia and Belarus and by energy disputes, but he was infuriated by Moscow’s refusal this week to provide finance to his country due to fears it is badly run and could collapse."

Russia's reluctance to cultivate its influence in its backyard - probably due to the pressure the economic crisis has put it under - could lead to Belarus becoming less able to play the EU and Russia off each other in the short term, as the Russian card looses some of its value. Hard power may be impressive, but its utility can often be very constrained, and Russian hard power isn't always that impressive.

That said, it remains to be seen if the EU can really fill the vaccum through the EaP, or if the political will and resources are there to play the influence game. Especially at a time when showing solidarity with the big bang EU members can be problematic, never mind helping out a country widely considered to be "the last dictatorship in Europe". It could turn out to be a temporary spat and Belarussan relations with Moscow could warm up again.

Economic aid or Sphere of Influence?

At the European summit on Thursday and Friday, several measures were decided on to help both non-euro EU members and non-EU members. EUobserver has reported on the measures here. The support for non-euro members will be doubled to €50 billion, and a further €75 billion will be pumped into the IMF (which, though it will help non-European countries, is going to help both EU and non-EU European states). The much fought-over €5 billion, which was the initiative of the Commission, will help the older, richer member states more, but then it is peanuts in any case.

And the Eastern Partnership will be alocated €600 million. I know, still peanuts - in fact, hardly any peanuts at all. One of the most interesting aspects of the Eastern Partnership (perhaps so called to annoy those who like abbreviations?) is the level of Commission involvement there will be in the project: the number of meetings with the representatives with the eastern countries, negotiating and setting common policy, etc. Could this be a strengthening of the Commission's hand in guiding foreign affairs at the expense of the CFSP? Of course, this could be viewed as linked with the Commission's external relations department's traditional role of economic relations, and so it is to an extent, but the sheer amount and frequency of the involvement will surely mean that the head of the CFSP will be eclipsed by the head of the Commission's foreign relations.

Though it depends on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty - which would merge the 2 posts, so it may be a bit much to emphasise this. The Council will also host foreign ministerial meetings every 2 years. However, the other departments of the Commission would also be heavily involved too. Perhaps this could lead to the Commission as a whole becoming more aware and sensitive to the needs of Ukraine, etc., and vice versa? It could mean that a lot of the substance of member states' relations with the Eastern Partnership countries will be handled by the Commission - would it help change (older) member states opinions and policies in the region?

Russia views it as a dangerous development - claiming that the Eastern Partnership represents an attempt by the EU at carving out a sphere of influence. It seems that any tightening of relations on Russia's western border amount to carving out a sphere of influence - basically: "EU and NATO: get out and stay out." At the same time, however, we should recognise that we sometimes get caught up in the same sort of thinking. Worries about Russo-German closeness is one example. In any case, a deepening of relations in the Eastern Partnership won't involve a security dimension, so how can you read these worries of Russia's without reading the implication that these countries should be in Russia's sphere of influence?

On the Belarus question, I think that the EU shouldn't be too lenient on Belarus. Russia is wrong to suggest that the Eastern Partnership has a coercive stance; Belarus can choose to join or not, but I think that the EU needs to be more demanding in its conditions for Partnership membership. A common stance on Georgia is good, but Belarus in my opinion is too oppressive to be considered for membership.