Ethics and the Eastern Partnership

The European Union promotes itself as a force for peace, and a organisation of shared values. So how do we, and how much should we, let values guide the foreign policy aspects of the EU?

The Eastern Partnership is interesting in several aspects:

1. It is made up of countries who could join the EU in the future - unlike the Union for the Mediterranean, so the member countries have more of a stake in its operation. Even if EU membership is long delayed or even ruled out, the member countries can probably count on a degree of economic integration and benefit.

2. The Commission could potentially be the top institutional actor on the EU side in this case, rather than the Council, which normally deals with the grander aspects of EU foreign policy. Why? Because a lot of the policy meeting in the Partnership will be with Commissioners from the relevant policy area, whereas meetings with the Council will be much rarer.

3. Russia. The Eastern Partnership is an economic sphere of influence, and Russia fears that it stands to loose a lot of influence in the region. That Belarus did not recognise the breakaway republics in the Caucasus when Russia did suggests that Russia may already be loosing influence, as Minsk tries to balance the EU on one side and Russia on the other.

There will be an Eastern Partnership summit, and the invitations have been sent. And some of the invitees are controversial, especially Belarus, which has been described as the last dictatorship in Europe.

Given the stated values of the EU of democracy and human rights, should Belarus be invited? It's my understanding that Belarus will be involved at a lesser level than the other states, but this still gives Belarus a major boost in relations with Europe - without any real attempt at reform.

However, I am persuaded of the value of engagement - it doesn't mean that we should be soft on Belarus, but a forum where the EU can engage with Belarus can create an environment more favourable to reform. Belarus is a close ally of Russia, and it could easily slip back into being isolated from Europe. It also means that even if we do engage, any process of reform with Belarus will be painfully slow: that Belarus is balancing Russia and Europe shows that it's looking for a political constellation that gives it the most leeway to do what it likes, not that it is starting to see any value in European values. Yet this opening means that, through the Eastern Partnership, some reforms could be achieved.

The EU is all about slow institutional change: it's what it does best. The benefits of Europe can only be shared with the Eastern Partnership states through joint reform and opening up on both sides. This road isn't inevitable, and Belarus could stop at any point along it (as could any of the others), yet some reform is better than no reform, and some influence is better than raging impotently outside.

That is, if the EU plays it's cards right. (And is this more likely if the Commission has the key role? Consistency is an important factor in foreign policy; especially if one actor is playing both sides and looking to exploit any opening it can find...).

Economic aid or Sphere of Influence?

At the European summit on Thursday and Friday, several measures were decided on to help both non-euro EU members and non-EU members. EUobserver has reported on the measures here. The support for non-euro members will be doubled to €50 billion, and a further €75 billion will be pumped into the IMF (which, though it will help non-European countries, is going to help both EU and non-EU European states). The much fought-over €5 billion, which was the initiative of the Commission, will help the older, richer member states more, but then it is peanuts in any case.

And the Eastern Partnership will be alocated €600 million. I know, still peanuts - in fact, hardly any peanuts at all. One of the most interesting aspects of the Eastern Partnership (perhaps so called to annoy those who like abbreviations?) is the level of Commission involvement there will be in the project: the number of meetings with the representatives with the eastern countries, negotiating and setting common policy, etc. Could this be a strengthening of the Commission's hand in guiding foreign affairs at the expense of the CFSP? Of course, this could be viewed as linked with the Commission's external relations department's traditional role of economic relations, and so it is to an extent, but the sheer amount and frequency of the involvement will surely mean that the head of the CFSP will be eclipsed by the head of the Commission's foreign relations.

Though it depends on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty - which would merge the 2 posts, so it may be a bit much to emphasise this. The Council will also host foreign ministerial meetings every 2 years. However, the other departments of the Commission would also be heavily involved too. Perhaps this could lead to the Commission as a whole becoming more aware and sensitive to the needs of Ukraine, etc., and vice versa? It could mean that a lot of the substance of member states' relations with the Eastern Partnership countries will be handled by the Commission - would it help change (older) member states opinions and policies in the region?

Russia views it as a dangerous development - claiming that the Eastern Partnership represents an attempt by the EU at carving out a sphere of influence. It seems that any tightening of relations on Russia's western border amount to carving out a sphere of influence - basically: "EU and NATO: get out and stay out." At the same time, however, we should recognise that we sometimes get caught up in the same sort of thinking. Worries about Russo-German closeness is one example. In any case, a deepening of relations in the Eastern Partnership won't involve a security dimension, so how can you read these worries of Russia's without reading the implication that these countries should be in Russia's sphere of influence?

On the Belarus question, I think that the EU shouldn't be too lenient on Belarus. Russia is wrong to suggest that the Eastern Partnership has a coercive stance; Belarus can choose to join or not, but I think that the EU needs to be more demanding in its conditions for Partnership membership. A common stance on Georgia is good, but Belarus in my opinion is too oppressive to be considered for membership.

Eastern Europe? What Eastern Europe?

Eastern Europe is a contested term: apart from the geographical questions of "where is central Europe" and "where is eastern Europe?" (which is related in turn to the even more contested question of where Europe's final frontier lies). Some eastern Europeans and bloggers are annoyed with the label of "eastern European", partly due to negative connotations of low levels of economic development. So it should be great news that the argument that each country should be seen more as an individual has won the day in Brussels. Though ironically, this argument was prepared by a pre-summit summit of eastern European countries.*

These new member states will be treated on a case by case basis. So I wonder, will this whole situation strengthen or weaken the cohesiveness, such as it is, of "eastern Europe" as a bloc within the EU? Their summit helped them get some of what they wanted, but what they wanted involved them being treated differently. Will the operation of any plans in practise cause rifts between these states? And will this effect the political alignments of other member states?

In the end I just hope that this won't be used as a way to limit aid to the new member states.




* I think that the EU is so big now in terms of member states that it's inevitable that there will be generalised regional images. This isn't limited to eastern Europe: "Mediterranean countries" and "Nordic countries" are also labels. The international presence of the big 3 prevents a very strong, single western European label; "eastern Europe" or "CEE" countries do have a shared recent history and has joined the EU at (pretty much) the same time. Western Europe has a shared recent history too, and western Europe exists as a label, but the bickering of the big 3 tends to paper over it. I would definitely agree that there needs to be a higher quality of reporting from the eastern EU member states, though.

Germany: willing to step in?

It seems that Germany is finally beginning to realise the need for it to take a lead in the EU (and I suppose we'll worry later if this unduly increases Germany's influence in the bloc further). The eurozone bond idea is out, as far as Germany is concerned (and so as far as the eurozone is concerned too). The Nordic countries are apparently sceptical about the idea (while agreeing that the euro is a Good Thing), but I'd say that Germany has pretty much killed it off for now. A eurozone bond would have helped the more crisis stricken eurozone countries, but if western banks are so tied up in Eastern Europe, then it might not do much good overall anyway.

And in any case, it would make things more expensive for Germany.

Of course, German money will be handed out only on German terms. For Ireland the conditions could be a bit of a slap in the face: protection of the Irish corporation tax (which is quite low in order to attract investment) was one of the planks of the No campaign back in June, despite the retention of the veto in such areas. In the end economic realities could force us to raise our corporation tax to get our hands on German money.

Of course, the German government is there to serve the German people so it can hardly be blamed for acting to ensure its own interests where its own money could be splashed about. Shoring up the European economy is naturally itself in the interests of Germany, but moves to act on this can hardly be politically comfortable, to say the least, and if this is acted on, then Germany should be congratulated for its solidarity with other member states when Germany itself is facing a tough time too.

Perhaps there should be some sort of country or industry insurance in the EU (or the eurozone)? I know nothing about economics, so I'm just tossing out random ideas, but with Europe's economies so interdependent, a common fund for supporting member state governments or Europe-wide industries could be an alternative to just relying solely on Germany. If every country contributed regularly to this fund, which could be administered by the Commission to ensure that it wasn't applied in such a way that it could harm the workings of the internal market, then the burden would be lifted from Germany (to a degree), and the political danger inherent in relying on one member to prop up the whole group would be mitigated. Member states would have to commit to certain rules to make sure that the fund wasn't abused (though it's hard to see how it could be enforced when the whole point of it is to help in times of crisis).

The EIB, etc. are stepping into a support role for countries at the moment, but they were not designed to help combat the effects of a crisis of this scale in the member states. Something stronger is needed.

Moves to help ensure the better regulation of Europe-wide (and global) flows of money are good, but all economic areas grow and develop quickly and the regulation regime we produce today may be outmoded in 20 years time, or even dismantled in the future just as the regulation resulting from the Great Depression was scrapped in the name of free market orthodoxy (plus the fact that every generation sees themselves as smarter than the last one). So prevention, while better than the cure, cannot always be relied on. We need to have some medicine in place as a back up, should we need it.