Belarus leaving the Russian Sphere of Influence?

Russia has feared that the Eastern Partnership will make the EU the dominant power in its post-Soviet sphere of influence. One of the key states in Russia's sphere of influence, especially since the Orange Revolution (which isn't looking too stable itself at the moment), is Belarus. Belarus is generally seen as being firmly within the Russian sphere of influence, with even ideas of Russo-Belarussian Union floating about at different points. I doubt that Belarus will somehow turn into a pro-EU state, but I think that Belarus will use the EaP as a way of asserting its independence through playing the EU and Russia off each other.

What may be a bigger factor in Russian insecurity over the EaP may not be the set-up of the EaP itself, which is economically-orientated, but the weakness of Russia to maintain its sphere of influence. Less than a year ago it was harder to see the shrinkage of Russian influence with the war in the Caucasus, which asserted Russian military dominance in the region. However, it was interesting to see that Belarus didn't recognise the breakaway republics in line with Russian foreign policy.

Now it seems that Belarus is moving further from the Russian sphere due to a list of grievences with Russia:

"Mr Lukashenko has been frustrated by the Kremlin’s reticence over plans to form a “union state” linking Russia and Belarus and by energy disputes, but he was infuriated by Moscow’s refusal this week to provide finance to his country due to fears it is badly run and could collapse."

Russia's reluctance to cultivate its influence in its backyard - probably due to the pressure the economic crisis has put it under - could lead to Belarus becoming less able to play the EU and Russia off each other in the short term, as the Russian card looses some of its value. Hard power may be impressive, but its utility can often be very constrained, and Russian hard power isn't always that impressive.

That said, it remains to be seen if the EU can really fill the vaccum through the EaP, or if the political will and resources are there to play the influence game. Especially at a time when showing solidarity with the big bang EU members can be problematic, never mind helping out a country widely considered to be "the last dictatorship in Europe". It could turn out to be a temporary spat and Belarussan relations with Moscow could warm up again.

Could this be the beginning of a great Partnership...?

The summit launching the Eastern Partnership was held in Prague today, though you might miss the good feeling that was presumably supposed to burst forth from the summit, with some leaders not attending, some leaders (ok, just Georgia) being annoyed with Russia, and Russia being annoyed with the whole thing.

Of course, everyone has said that the EaP isn't a sphere of influence at all (apart from Georgia, which proclaims it as having an integrational direction), and that Russia shouldn't get so worked up about it. Though the effect is ruined somewhat by a former EU official saying:

"This is only happening because Russia has annoyed everyone."

The EaP is a sphere of influence, but I don't think that there's any malign intent behind the project - I'd say it's a mix of needing to politically finding a way of stalling the push for enlargement, trying to ensure political and economic stability along the EU's eastern frontier, and building a buffer zone when it comes to Russian influence. It's debatable whether or not the EU would have pursued the project if Russia was perceived to be a more reliable partner in EU eyes, though Polish ties with Ukraine and the EU's (and EU member states') tendency to view the whole thing as purely economic affair along with intra-EU politics on the need to balance the Union for the Med. in the south with an eastern project... well, perhaps the EU would have done it anyway without really thinking that much about Russia.

EU-Russian relations are mainly pursued through the Common Spaces. Is it time to change the relationship with Russia?

Meanwhile, Bruno Waterfield over at the EUobserver has blogged that the EaP has nothing to offer Ukraine and that the agreement doesn't have enough on the table to tempt Ukraine westwards. Beyond this he raises questions of ethics. I've mused on the ethics of the Partnership before, though in a foreign policy sort of way - Bruno raises the question (at least, this is my reading) of the EaP denying Ukraine's European identity; of not living up to pan-European ideals by going far enough to offer Ukrainians more rights and opportunities. Particularly in the area of visas.

His assessment is that the EaP could destabilize Ukraine further.

A case of creating an expectation-capability gap?

Restrictions on travel certainly weaken the EU's soft power in the region, but I don't think that the EaP is a destabilising force. Restrictions on the movement of Ukrainians into its EU members have existed since the big bang enlargement of 2004 - the EU's presence and economic power means that it was always going to have an impact, the question was only what form it would take and if there was going to be a structured political will behind it (or any sort of will at all). The idea of a "Common European Home", which the EU has effectively claimed the mantle of, is a powerful political call, though it may seem very weak to us from inside. The management of the EU's influence is vital here, since the biggest foreign policy tool is essentially to turn the foreign policy question into a domestic one.

Bruno is right that the lack of a visa agenda will be a blow to the EU's influence in the region, though the size of the blow is debatable. In my opinion though, we're just still at our default position - a missed opportunity - rather than having heedlessly rushed into an empty arrangement that made things worse. The EaP is a start in regularising relations between the EU and its "Eastern March", and could open a lot of doors diplomatically for wider co-operation. Like any foreign policy, it will depend much more on the political will and the effectiveness of co-ordination over time perhaps even more than the structures that the EU will work within.

It will be extremely interesting to see if the high level of Commission involvement will lead to greater co-ordination and effectiveness, or if a lack of member state support behind the Commission will hamper the whole process. And that's beside the question of whether or not whoever has the most influence will do the job well anyway.

Plus the Russian factor...

Ethics and the Eastern Partnership

The European Union promotes itself as a force for peace, and a organisation of shared values. So how do we, and how much should we, let values guide the foreign policy aspects of the EU?

The Eastern Partnership is interesting in several aspects:

1. It is made up of countries who could join the EU in the future - unlike the Union for the Mediterranean, so the member countries have more of a stake in its operation. Even if EU membership is long delayed or even ruled out, the member countries can probably count on a degree of economic integration and benefit.

2. The Commission could potentially be the top institutional actor on the EU side in this case, rather than the Council, which normally deals with the grander aspects of EU foreign policy. Why? Because a lot of the policy meeting in the Partnership will be with Commissioners from the relevant policy area, whereas meetings with the Council will be much rarer.

3. Russia. The Eastern Partnership is an economic sphere of influence, and Russia fears that it stands to loose a lot of influence in the region. That Belarus did not recognise the breakaway republics in the Caucasus when Russia did suggests that Russia may already be loosing influence, as Minsk tries to balance the EU on one side and Russia on the other.

There will be an Eastern Partnership summit, and the invitations have been sent. And some of the invitees are controversial, especially Belarus, which has been described as the last dictatorship in Europe.

Given the stated values of the EU of democracy and human rights, should Belarus be invited? It's my understanding that Belarus will be involved at a lesser level than the other states, but this still gives Belarus a major boost in relations with Europe - without any real attempt at reform.

However, I am persuaded of the value of engagement - it doesn't mean that we should be soft on Belarus, but a forum where the EU can engage with Belarus can create an environment more favourable to reform. Belarus is a close ally of Russia, and it could easily slip back into being isolated from Europe. It also means that even if we do engage, any process of reform with Belarus will be painfully slow: that Belarus is balancing Russia and Europe shows that it's looking for a political constellation that gives it the most leeway to do what it likes, not that it is starting to see any value in European values. Yet this opening means that, through the Eastern Partnership, some reforms could be achieved.

The EU is all about slow institutional change: it's what it does best. The benefits of Europe can only be shared with the Eastern Partnership states through joint reform and opening up on both sides. This road isn't inevitable, and Belarus could stop at any point along it (as could any of the others), yet some reform is better than no reform, and some influence is better than raging impotently outside.

That is, if the EU plays it's cards right. (And is this more likely if the Commission has the key role? Consistency is an important factor in foreign policy; especially if one actor is playing both sides and looking to exploit any opening it can find...).