Flotilla Diplomacy

Following the Israeli raid on the flotilla of activists carrying aid to the blockaded Gaza strip there has been a massive international backlash, but will the EU be able to forge a common policy? In some ways, it's a more opportune time, given the uniform "swing" of opinion against Israel, and the creation of the High Representative and European Council President roles creates some need to show that the institutional reforms will pay off - and shouldn't the EU be able to act in its own backyard?

It will never be easy to have a common policy on the Middle East Peace Process that goes beyond the outline structure of a two-state solution, but it's important that Europe gets involved to facilitate it, and this demands agreeing on the detail. Sarkozy has suggested European or international forces policing boats shipping in aid to prevent arms being shipped in. It's a good start, since it would hopefully go some way to easing the situation for Palestinians and allowing Israel to slowly back out of the politics of blockade - though it's important that we don't slip into a situation where we end up legitimising and helping the blockade. I'm tempted to suggest a Bosina-like solution or interim measure for Gaza (and maybe the West Bank too) - i.e. international protectorate that would build a functioning state, and hopefully police and prevent attacks from the territory while denying Israel the opportunity to attack or blockade it. But then, the Bosnia case hasn't been a proven success yet...

The EU also needs to demand and international element to the inquiry on last week's raid. Israel might be smarting after the last international report (the Goldsmith Inquiry on the settlements, which was very scathing of Israel's role), but the fact is that it took place in international waters, and there is a glaring question of international law that cannot be denied. PR-wise, Israel's attempts to spin the issue in a more favourable light haven't worked, and, though it may not agree, admitting error and having an inquiry with international involvement would be the best option for it. The EU should demand the international element because it is required of the situation and the EU's values - particularly the need to uphold international law.

Some states will favour a tough stance, like Ireland, which backed the last flotilla boat (the crew and passengers were returned to Ireland today), though other states, may not want to go as far as pledging action: how far would Germany feel it could go? Ireland has asked Ashton to put Israel on the agenda for the next Council meeting. Will Ashton be able to channel the differing views into some sort of coherent policy? It'll be an uphill struggle - reading the EUobserver article, it looks like Ashton is out of the loop to a large degree (it doesn't seem to have been a good week for her - there seem to be a few foreign policy ideas being pushed at the EU level without her being consulted).

The idea of another boat carrying MEPs seems to be floating about - perhaps we'll end up sending boatfuls of politicians until Israel gives up and ends the blockade? Diplomacy via flotilla.

No Upgrade for Israel

On Tuesday, the Israeli Foreign Minister was in Luxembourg for an EU meeting; the question of strengthening relations between the EU and Israeli has been thrown into doubt lately due to the Gaza conflict in December/January and the election of a right-wing, more hardline, Israeli government.

Now the Israeli government has accepted in principle the two state solution (probably due to Obama's insistence on it, but the desire to upgrade relations with the EU would also have been a factor). It remains to be seen whether or not the Israeli government can remain united behind the PM's peace plans, and he may have to rely on the main opposition's qualified support in the future to keep on track. In Luxembourg, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Liberman, who is even more hardline than PM Netanyahu, has been pushing the line that this development is a positive step on the path to peace. Did Israeli get the upgrade in relations? No.

Why? Because the support given to the two state solution comes with conditions attached; though the proposed negotiations are to be "without preconditions" (a phrase that seems to be spreading since Obama made it fashionable), Netanyahu's vision of a Palestinian state is one without any part of Jerusalem, and without an army of its own. So while Netanyahu's speech has been praised as a "step forward" by the EU's head of the CFSP, Javier Solana, and the External Relations Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, have very much stressed that it is only a first step.

The Swedish Foreign Minister has even commmented that it's debatable whether or not Netanyahu's vision of the Palestinian state can really be classified as a state.

In many respects, he's right. The Palestinian state demand is a demand for equality, and it would be hard to present the implementation of the Netanyahu vision as a state equal in status to the Israeli state if it is forbidden to have an army. It also wouldn't help Israel's position much in the long term - the whole point of the peace process is to produce an outcome where both sides are moderately satisfied and so the support for violence is vastly reduced. A demilitarized Palestinian state, however, would be more likely to look to other Arab nations to guarantee its security, and it would be more likely to be a revisionist state - constantly seeking to reverse the conditions imposed on it. This could lead to an unstable international situation (though it could be more stable than the one at the moment) where Israel is constantly tempted to intervene to uphold the settlement, and other Arab states, if Palestine-aligned, could be drawn in.

Th EU is right to keep up pressure on Israel to commit fully to the two state solution.

Of course, the speech could have just been an opening bid to increase the bargaining chips of Israeli, or a attempt by Netanyahu to slowly move his party/coalition and cabinet towards the concessions Israeli will have to make if there's to be a viable two state solution. I think that would be a very optimistic view, however.

Munich International Security Conference: Second Day

Joe Biden addressed the conference today (reported here in German; Tagesschau clip here; BBC report here). There wasn't much - or indeed anything - new about US policy that can be divined from his speech; it was mostly a restatement of Obama's previous announcements: more multilateralism, shift from Iraq to Afghanistan, closure of Guantanamo and the decision of whether or not to give the go-ahead to the anti-missile system in Eastern Europe to be based on the technological feasibility of the system.

More interesting is Angela Merkel's announced willingness to consider "tough sanctions" against Iran if Iran doesn't make any progress in negotiations (here, again in German). This could be a significant hardening of German attitudes to Iran, with which Germany has numerous business interests. However, we'll have to see how Germany defines a lack of progress and tough sanctions.

Jaap de Hoop, NATO General Secretary has again called for closer transatlantic ties, with an America more open to listening to the European states and European states more willing to help in Afghanistan. He also called for a more trusting relationship between NATO and Russia.


BBC news has also uncovered some very important Russian news.

What role should the EU play in the Israel-Palastine Peace Process?

Despite my very gloomy view of the value of international input into the Middle East conflict when it turns hot, I think that the EU has the ability to play an important part in the peace process. In the end, change must come from the Israelis and Palestinians themselves, but the EU can and should play a role in creating conditions which would encourage this.

There is a very interesting article in EurActiv on this topic.

The EU finds it very hard to coordinate foreign policy in this area, as can be seen from the argument over whether or not to call for an investigation into possible war crimes committed in Gaza and into the bombing of UN buildings by Israel.

As formulating common policy from crisis-to-crisis is almost impossible, the EU should play to its strengths. The EU's power and influence is mostly economic and institutional: the size of the single market gives it economic power concerning access and entry, and institutional make up of the EU gives it the attractive political lure of membership, etc.

So a more successful, and possibly more easily sustainable, EU policy on the peace process may be to make a massive commitment to the region based on the common end goal of the two-state solution. An "objective" institutionalised mechanism for engagement would offer a more coherent and effective policy towards the region. It would be objective not ideologically - it would be clearly committed to the two-state solution - but "objective" in that it would involve a progressive ladder of incentives and sanctions to which the member states would be committed, and which would reduce the scope and effects of differing political viewpoints based on recent flare-ups in the conflict.

So the EU could commit to a system of rewards and punishments for progress on peace, based on negotiations leading to a two-state solution and on economic links and security between the two states. For Israel, incentives would include better relations with the EU and more access to the single market, and sanctions would be the lessening of such links and access. For Palestinians, development aid and state building would form the basis of the incentive/sanction scale. If eventual membership is a possibility, it needs to be placed in the context of a successful peace that is proven to be sustainable.

The Quartet could also participate in a more institutionalised peace process, but the EU should not leave it completely to others to determine its approach to the conflict.