The Commission's proposed Data Protection Regulation (PDF) is a massive piece of legislation, and it touches many debates and issues: the right to be forgotten, the approach towards companies, what data protection really means to us as a society, the powers of the Commission, and the debates surrounding subsidiarity and having a comprehensive approach. I thought I'd note a few thoughts and impressions on the debate so far.
The Right to be Forgotten and what data protection means to us.
Data protection might be a right under EU Law (Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), but it has a mixed profile across the EU. In some countries - particularly Germany; see this week's Der Spiegel for example - it is a prominent issue, but in others there isn't so much awareness. I think that this changes when you start to talk about the privacy issues behind the technical term "data protection" - how companies (such as Google and Facebook) process and use information on you, and how governments do the same for everything from welfare to law enforcement. It's about privacy, but it's also about the freedom of the individual in society: whether it is government or business, the individual shouldn't have their freedom in society unfairly limited because of how organisations collect and use data concerning them.
The EU is more advanced in many ways than the US when it comes to data protection/privacy, but there's also a debate on whether the EU is going too far, and if the EU just wants to turn the clock back to a privacy golden age or freeze privacy standards as they were before the internet. I personally think it goes deeper than a fear of the internet age - the principles of data protection can be found back in 1981 in a Council of Europe convention - and it's about a genuine cultural attitude to privacy.
A key debate about privacy and the internet age is the right to be forgotten (Article 17 in the proposal). Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding has recently said (in this week's privacy platform meeting) that it was part of the old 1995 directive on data protection (the law this regulation would replace), and that it was more a failure of the 1995 Directive that it couldn't be implemented properly. It's true that you could ask to have your data erased under the 1995 Directive, but the Regulation would impose an obligation for data controllers to try to contact those they may have transferred the data to, not to continue to publish or process it, so the right to be forgotten would be an innovation on the current law. Controllers only have to make a reasonable attempt to inform those they may have passed the data on to that the data subject has requested that their data be deleted, so they won't have to police the internet.
Should there be a right to be forgotten? I support a balanced right to be forgotten that respects the freedom of expression. Reding says that the right to be forgotten will only apply to data people themselves hand over, and it won't affect journalists or bloggers - but the proposal seems vague on this point, and there should be a more explicit attempt to balance the freedom of expression with data protection.
The Powers of the Commission.
As the proposal stands, there would be a LOT of delegated powers for the Commission, permitting the Commission to draw up some rules and definitions so that some articles can be implemented properly. This makes it difficult to know what parts of the Regulation will mean in practice. For example, Article 17(9) would give the Commission the power to draw up specific rules for the right to be forgotten in certain sectors - so the scope of the right to be forgotten can't really be explained on the basis of the current provision. Perhaps this is the provision Reding means when she says journalists will be exempt. With at least 26 such delegated powers (I haven't done a thorough count), it seems a sloppy approach to law-making by the Commission.
Subsidiarity and the Comprehensive Approach.
The Regulation won't cover the processing of data in the area of freedom, security and justice (this will be done by a proposed directive), a split in the general data protection framework that has been criticised by the European Data Protection Supervisor (PDF), among others, but both the Regulation and Directive will ensure that data protection rules apply to all data processing, not just for data that will cross borders. This has provoked a debate on subsidiarity: should all processing be covered; should the public sector be covered? Rather than a Regulation - which would mean a single, directly applicable law for the private and public sectors (except for justice and policing) - some call for a directive, so that Member States have more freedom to implement the law.
It's interesting to see the debate on subsidiarity around this law - I haven't seen much political debate on subsidiarity yet - and it seems that the implementation and legislation for rights is a key question for subsidiarity (traditionally the constitutional courts of Member States are keen to defend their role as guardians of citizens' rights, which may entail the trumping of EU law by national law). Practically, it doesn't make sense to have 27 differing laws on data protection since the added value for the internal market and citizens' rights is to have the same high standard everywhere with clear uniform rules on those data protection rights can be exercised. And when you consider the impact of globalisation on data protection, having a single EU standard that can be defended and promoted globally makes sense in the long term when it comes to protecting our privacy laws. In addition, Article 16(2) TFEU gives the EU a more general legislative power/legal base on regulating data protection than simply in connection with the internal market, which is pretty unique when it comes to fundamental rights, so the institutions have a few cards in their favour to play for harmonisation.
There may be a consensus on the need for updated data protection laws, but there's still plenty of room for argument.
Showing posts with label EP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label EP. Show all posts
Friday, 30 March 2012
Tuesday, 13 December 2011
Nirj Deva and the European Parliament Presidency Campaign
The British European Conservative and Reformist candidate for the Presidency of the European Parliament, Nirj Deva, has gained support from far-right MEPs despite not seeking it:
Martin Schulz, the leader of the Socialists and Democrats group (the centre-left group), will probably win the contest as there is an agreement between the European People's Party group and the S&D that they will share the presidency during this parliament. The current president, Jerzy Buzek (EPP) will soon stand down, and Schulz will be officially backed by the EPP and the Liberal group. However, Schulz isn't the most popular MEP, and British Liberal MEP Diane Wallis is running as an independent against him.
With two challengers to the EPP-S&D carve up, it will be interesting to see who will do better. Wallis is officially acting without the support of her Liberal group, but she could attract those liberal and EPP MEPs - and perhaps even some S&D MEPs - who can't bring themselves to vote for Schulz. But how will it compare to Deva's support? Though the ECR group doesn't attract a lot of good will, and therefore is handicapped when it comes to building parliamentary coalitions, Deva is a well respected MEP who, according to EUObserver, has won "MEP of the year" in the area of development last month.
It's good to see the ECR contesting the election. The EP presidency is more political than the role of most parliamentary speakers/chairpersons as the EP President has to stick up for the Parliament in inter-institutional battles. So while I don't support the ECR, this is exactly the kind of election they should be contesting: institutional politics and questions of integration are a major reason for founding the ECR in the first place. Will Deva present himself as more than just a candidate hoping to force an election, and run on a more ideological campaign? It would be a lost opportunity if he doesn't, even if it makes it harder for him to build alliances.
"A nomination paper leaked to Hope Not Hate, a UK anti-fascist watchdog group, and seen by EUobserver shows the signatures of Griffin, Gollnisch and five other MEPs from the far-right of the chamber, one immediately after the other, suggesting the document was passed directly between these MEPs, all of which maintain close ties with each other.
The anti-federalist European Conservatives and Reformist grouping in the parliament, which backs Deva’s bid for the presidency, was quick to distance the candidate from his nationalist supporters.
“He has been nominated by the ECR and nobody else,” the group’s spokesman, James Holtum, told EUobserver."
Martin Schulz, the leader of the Socialists and Democrats group (the centre-left group), will probably win the contest as there is an agreement between the European People's Party group and the S&D that they will share the presidency during this parliament. The current president, Jerzy Buzek (EPP) will soon stand down, and Schulz will be officially backed by the EPP and the Liberal group. However, Schulz isn't the most popular MEP, and British Liberal MEP Diane Wallis is running as an independent against him.
With two challengers to the EPP-S&D carve up, it will be interesting to see who will do better. Wallis is officially acting without the support of her Liberal group, but she could attract those liberal and EPP MEPs - and perhaps even some S&D MEPs - who can't bring themselves to vote for Schulz. But how will it compare to Deva's support? Though the ECR group doesn't attract a lot of good will, and therefore is handicapped when it comes to building parliamentary coalitions, Deva is a well respected MEP who, according to EUObserver, has won "MEP of the year" in the area of development last month.
It's good to see the ECR contesting the election. The EP presidency is more political than the role of most parliamentary speakers/chairpersons as the EP President has to stick up for the Parliament in inter-institutional battles. So while I don't support the ECR, this is exactly the kind of election they should be contesting: institutional politics and questions of integration are a major reason for founding the ECR in the first place. Will Deva present himself as more than just a candidate hoping to force an election, and run on a more ideological campaign? It would be a lost opportunity if he doesn't, even if it makes it harder for him to build alliances.
Friday, 2 December 2011
Eurocrisis, Democratic Deficit and the Re:New Conference
Throughout the Re:New Conference references were made to that most European of monsters: Merkozy. Yesterday Sarkozy spoke, and today Merkel has spoken in the Bundestag about Europe and the Eurozone. While European integration - and a new treaty - was held up to be necessary, Merkel rejected Eurobonds as expensive and unconstitutional. At the same time, the European Parliament has passed a resolution, declaring that it should have equal powers with the Council over any new features of economic union (such as an EU Finance Minister) so that there is sufficient democratic oversight.
The same day Sarkozy, in Gaullist mode, firmly signalled that any further changes would be purely intergovernmental:
At first sight the battle between Merkozy and the EP might seem to be a foregone conclusion: the duo have sidelined the EU institutions so far in the Eurocrisis and Treaty change is itself intergovernmental, so how much power can influence can the Parliament, with falling turnout numbers, and the Commission, which has hardly been bursting with energy, bring to bear. However, intergovernmentalism favours secretive processes and large countries over transparency and smaller countries. I've written before about the faultlines dividing the European debate, and these will spur some Member States to fight for more supranationalism.
In the long run intergovernmentalism will be a mistake as is disempowers citizens and promotes a cynical them-and-us culture between the rest of us and the Paris-Berlin duopoly that is unhealthly for European politics and damaging to democracy. But it's also damaging in the short term - by going for intergovernmentalist solutions, the suspicion and anger with the Franco-German concentration of power will crystalise: should this summitry with France and Germany at the top - which has hardly worked wonders during this crisis - be not just for crises, but for life? Without QMV, Commission oversight and Parliamentary input, the majority of the Eurozone and Non-Eurozone states and citizens are threatened with the prospect of being marginalised within the EU structure. So far we've been working ad hoc, pretty much outside of the treaties. Now we're talking about committing ourselves to these governing structures by treaty.
That's not to say that the European Parliament is a great cure for this democratic deficit: though over last weekend I saw a PES that spoke like an opposition and proposed a different vision for the EU, as an opposition the PES, and other Europarties, remain too detached from citizens and even their national parties. It seems to me that supporters of a more democratic EU need to focus more energy on reforming the Europarties so that they can seriously propose new policies and debate them in public. This requires not just some autonomy on the part of the Europarties - you could argue they have autonomy at the moment since the national parties don't pay much attention to them for policy matters - but commitment from the national parties to help shape, debate and campaign on these policies.
With the PES in opposition almost everywhere in the EU, this should be easier for them to achieve. Could a basic common platform not provide a voice for the centre-left during the crisis both in Member States and at the EU level? The divisions between national parties and the protection of national party autonomy from European commitments are great and understandable, but it's hard to see how the centre-left - the opposition - can effectively put forward their own narrative and solutions if they cannot build a European coalition, even on a basic level, that can make their visions at a national level sound realistic. Given that pan-european crises of this scale are - thankfully - rare, I wouldn't expect much progress to happen in this area, which is why I hope a contest between Europarties for the Commission Presidency would push politics further along this path. But that's too long-term, and this crisis is progressing too rapidly.
I'm not a member of a political party, but if I believe in promoting democracy at a European level, then perhaps I should become one and add my voice, in whatever small way, to the need for a better European politics. Because we can't just hope that it will simply emerge to inspire a demand for it; rather those of us who want it should demand it, and demand it loudly. Despite my criticisms of the lack of policy at the PES Conference, I did see some vision there. If we want to have an inclusive EU rather than a concentrated summitry, then we'll have to strengthen our Europarties so they can represent us better.
The same day Sarkozy, in Gaullist mode, firmly signalled that any further changes would be purely intergovernmental:
""The reform of Europe is not a march towards supra-nationality," Sarkozy said. "Europe will reform itself by pragmatically drawing the lessons of the crisis. The crisis has pushed the heads of state and government to assume greater responsibilities because ultimately they have the democratic legitimacy to take decisions."
"The integration of Europe will go the inter-governmental way because Europe needs to make strategic political choices.""
At first sight the battle between Merkozy and the EP might seem to be a foregone conclusion: the duo have sidelined the EU institutions so far in the Eurocrisis and Treaty change is itself intergovernmental, so how much power can influence can the Parliament, with falling turnout numbers, and the Commission, which has hardly been bursting with energy, bring to bear. However, intergovernmentalism favours secretive processes and large countries over transparency and smaller countries. I've written before about the faultlines dividing the European debate, and these will spur some Member States to fight for more supranationalism.
In the long run intergovernmentalism will be a mistake as is disempowers citizens and promotes a cynical them-and-us culture between the rest of us and the Paris-Berlin duopoly that is unhealthly for European politics and damaging to democracy. But it's also damaging in the short term - by going for intergovernmentalist solutions, the suspicion and anger with the Franco-German concentration of power will crystalise: should this summitry with France and Germany at the top - which has hardly worked wonders during this crisis - be not just for crises, but for life? Without QMV, Commission oversight and Parliamentary input, the majority of the Eurozone and Non-Eurozone states and citizens are threatened with the prospect of being marginalised within the EU structure. So far we've been working ad hoc, pretty much outside of the treaties. Now we're talking about committing ourselves to these governing structures by treaty.
That's not to say that the European Parliament is a great cure for this democratic deficit: though over last weekend I saw a PES that spoke like an opposition and proposed a different vision for the EU, as an opposition the PES, and other Europarties, remain too detached from citizens and even their national parties. It seems to me that supporters of a more democratic EU need to focus more energy on reforming the Europarties so that they can seriously propose new policies and debate them in public. This requires not just some autonomy on the part of the Europarties - you could argue they have autonomy at the moment since the national parties don't pay much attention to them for policy matters - but commitment from the national parties to help shape, debate and campaign on these policies.
With the PES in opposition almost everywhere in the EU, this should be easier for them to achieve. Could a basic common platform not provide a voice for the centre-left during the crisis both in Member States and at the EU level? The divisions between national parties and the protection of national party autonomy from European commitments are great and understandable, but it's hard to see how the centre-left - the opposition - can effectively put forward their own narrative and solutions if they cannot build a European coalition, even on a basic level, that can make their visions at a national level sound realistic. Given that pan-european crises of this scale are - thankfully - rare, I wouldn't expect much progress to happen in this area, which is why I hope a contest between Europarties for the Commission Presidency would push politics further along this path. But that's too long-term, and this crisis is progressing too rapidly.
I'm not a member of a political party, but if I believe in promoting democracy at a European level, then perhaps I should become one and add my voice, in whatever small way, to the need for a better European politics. Because we can't just hope that it will simply emerge to inspire a demand for it; rather those of us who want it should demand it, and demand it loudly. Despite my criticisms of the lack of policy at the PES Conference, I did see some vision there. If we want to have an inclusive EU rather than a concentrated summitry, then we'll have to strengthen our Europarties so they can represent us better.
Wednesday, 21 September 2011
Our Commissioner, for a given value of "our"...
The Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget, Janusz Lewandowski, has been held up by the ruling Civic Platform Party in Poland as a means of getting the country a lot more money from the EU budget:
This has raised questions over the Commissioner's oath of independence, which Commissioners give when they are sworn into office to pledge that they will work in the general interest, and remain independent of national governments. EUObserver has reported that the Commission asserts that this was in line with the Commission's Code of Conduct:
Having a "national Commissioner" is a big issue. While there are far too many Commissioners, reatining one per Member State is a sticking point that is unlinkely to go away soon - the prospective loss of a Commissioner for 10 out of every 15 years was a major reason for the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in the first referendum, despite equal treatment of the proposed rotation of Commissioners between big and small Member States. Though the Commissioners may swear independence (you can find the oath as a PDF here), they are generally held to be a national voice in the College of Commissioners.
At the moment Commissioners are nominated by national governments,* accepted by the Commission President elect, and elected by the European Parliament (as part of the Commission as a whole), with the Commission being accountable to the EP between elections. The independence of the Commission, and the indivdual Commissioners could be strengthened by bringing an end to the national nominations. So while there could still be one Commissioner per Member State, the choice of who the Commissioner actually is would be for the Commission President and the Parliament to decide. However, this would require a treaty change.
*The Council adopts a list of Commissioners based on the suggestions of Member States which are effectively Member State nominations in practice. (Art. 17(7) TEU.
"Speaking in a wood-panelled room among fellow Civic Platform members, Lewandowski says: "We're talking about billions, even 300 billion zloty [€69 billion]. Thanks to this money we could reduce youth unemployment, even by half."
Fellow party member and foreign minister Radek Sikorski then pops up, adding: "That's what these elections are about. They are about money for Poland and who will get more of it. Why do we think we will do better? Because we have a strong team [gestures to Lewandowski] which can negotiate successfully.""
This has raised questions over the Commissioner's oath of independence, which Commissioners give when they are sworn into office to pledge that they will work in the general interest, and remain independent of national governments. EUObserver has reported that the Commission asserts that this was in line with the Commission's Code of Conduct:
"Commission spokeswoman Pia Ahrenkilde Hansen on Tuesday (20 September) said he did not cross the line because his remarks were of a "general" nature.
"The president [Barroso] is aware of the participation of the commissioner in this specific activity and it's our opinion that the commissioner, who intervened in a personal capacity, passed a very general message about the benefits of the general budget to Poland ... This activity, for which the commission punctually gave its agreement, is compatible with the code of conduct," she said."
Having a "national Commissioner" is a big issue. While there are far too many Commissioners, reatining one per Member State is a sticking point that is unlinkely to go away soon - the prospective loss of a Commissioner for 10 out of every 15 years was a major reason for the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in the first referendum, despite equal treatment of the proposed rotation of Commissioners between big and small Member States. Though the Commissioners may swear independence (you can find the oath as a PDF here), they are generally held to be a national voice in the College of Commissioners.
At the moment Commissioners are nominated by national governments,* accepted by the Commission President elect, and elected by the European Parliament (as part of the Commission as a whole), with the Commission being accountable to the EP between elections. The independence of the Commission, and the indivdual Commissioners could be strengthened by bringing an end to the national nominations. So while there could still be one Commissioner per Member State, the choice of who the Commissioner actually is would be for the Commission President and the Parliament to decide. However, this would require a treaty change.
*The Council adopts a list of Commissioners based on the suggestions of Member States which are effectively Member State nominations in practice. (Art. 17(7) TEU.
Monday, 4 July 2011
Lovers' Tiff?
On the Council of the European Union's website a document called "Relations with the European Parliament (July 2011)" only has an image of a shredded piece of paper next to it.
Hopefully given the positive vision of the Polish Presidency, Warsaw can relight the spark of passion and return Brussels to its natural state of a lovers' paradise. ;)
Hopefully given the positive vision of the Polish Presidency, Warsaw can relight the spark of passion and return Brussels to its natural state of a lovers' paradise. ;)
Friday, 31 December 2010
Europe in 2010
The 14th December symbolised Europe in 2010 for me. Berlusconi, despite all the scandals, won two confidence votes (in the lower house by just 3 votes!), and outside the protesters took to rioting. A few days later there would be a European Council summit where it was decided to dig in: there will be a Treaty amendment to make the Eurozone's bail-out facility permanent, but no increase in the facility's funds, nor any moves towards closer fiscal union through Eurobonds. Outside rages anger and uncertainty about the future, but inside there is little vision, and fear for the alternatives.
European solidarity now has a figure: €750 billion, and a few interest rate percentage points. At the heart of the matter lie questions of blame and responsibility as well as solidarity. Why should the German taxpayer - or Dutch, or Finnish - pay for the poor economic management of other Eurozone states? Or, from the other point of view, why should Greek and Irish taxpayers support a harsh austerity programme that bails out German, British and other private banks; why should these taxpayers pick up the tab for the reckless private sectors in other countries? Both are understandable viewpoints and have good arguments, but they reveal the extent of the "European integration" of the private sphere, and the need for a strong, coherent Eurozone response. I agree that countries like Ireland have mismanaged their economies and a great deal of the responsibility lies with them. But does it make sense to aim to penalise these countries' economies and demand penance, while at the same time advocating their rescue by the very same measures to ensure that their economies revive and cease to threaten the stability of the European economy?
The Eurozone needs a vision for how it will be run to benefit the whole, yet we hardly hear the arguments on Eurozone governance, and we don't debate the different viewpoints across borders. How can we be in a position - how can our leaders even be in the position - to make the rules for living together in the Eurozone when we are intent on having conversations with ourselves in fragmented groups, and trying to extract short-term advantage at each summit instead of trying to build a consensus on how to proceed together?
Though the economic crisis dominated 2010, there was much more to the year than that.
It was the first year of the Lisbon Treaty, which changed EU politics - you might even say it was the year the European Parliament. Whether it was the EU-US SWIFT Agreement on terrorist financing being shot down for a lack of safeguards, with US Vice President Biden imploring Parliament to accept it before a modified form was adopted, or the battle over the budget, the Parliament has been exerting its influence constantly. Victories weren't total, and I didn't always agree with the legislation passed, but the Parliament managed to make its mark on 2010. For me the greatest Parliamentary victory was over the formation of the European External Action Service, were it got a lot of its proposals accepted and heavily shaped the new institution despite only having the right of consultation under article 27(3) TEU - if anything symbolises the Parliament's new-found power, it should be this.
Politics of government and opposition strengthened in the Parliament this year, with the EPP generally supporting the Commission and Council with the help of the Liberals (where the right are in the majority), and a motley alliance of the PES, Greens and Liberals managing to upset the EPP's plurality on occasion. Though voting alliances remain fluid, the increasing coherence and importance of European parties with clearer policy platforms begs the question: why aren't we doing more to hold them to account and to use them to make a difference?
Barroso's second Commission was formally installed early in the year, and he tried to inject some vision into his second term in his hyped "State of the Union" speech. Generally the Commission was the least visible of the institutional triangle, though it did have a moment of glory when it temporarily grew a backbone to speak out over the Roma crisis in France.
Rights were very much an issue - civil liberties in SWIFT, citizenship and human rights for the Roma, human rights and elections in Belarus, and freedom of speech and the media in Hungary. If this is any indication, we will need to remain vigilant at home and across Europe for the next year and beyond.
Like Jon Worth, I'm not so optimistic for the future: there are too many narrow interests pulling in too many different directions. In September I heard a speech on the development of the EU. Europe, it was proclaimed, advanced through crises and managed to muddle through; we should not be worried or optimistic. I can't see that way of doing business working in the future. We need to make greater use of what is there to make the EU more inclusive and representative so that clearer arguments and vision can form and shape the Europe we live in. But it won't happen just through institutional reform and more information campaigns. It's a long road, but promoting debate between people and not just governments is essential if the EU is to become more democratic and joined-up. But this would require people to actively participate, rather than just being passive subjects.
European solidarity now has a figure: €750 billion, and a few interest rate percentage points. At the heart of the matter lie questions of blame and responsibility as well as solidarity. Why should the German taxpayer - or Dutch, or Finnish - pay for the poor economic management of other Eurozone states? Or, from the other point of view, why should Greek and Irish taxpayers support a harsh austerity programme that bails out German, British and other private banks; why should these taxpayers pick up the tab for the reckless private sectors in other countries? Both are understandable viewpoints and have good arguments, but they reveal the extent of the "European integration" of the private sphere, and the need for a strong, coherent Eurozone response. I agree that countries like Ireland have mismanaged their economies and a great deal of the responsibility lies with them. But does it make sense to aim to penalise these countries' economies and demand penance, while at the same time advocating their rescue by the very same measures to ensure that their economies revive and cease to threaten the stability of the European economy?
The Eurozone needs a vision for how it will be run to benefit the whole, yet we hardly hear the arguments on Eurozone governance, and we don't debate the different viewpoints across borders. How can we be in a position - how can our leaders even be in the position - to make the rules for living together in the Eurozone when we are intent on having conversations with ourselves in fragmented groups, and trying to extract short-term advantage at each summit instead of trying to build a consensus on how to proceed together?
Though the economic crisis dominated 2010, there was much more to the year than that.
It was the first year of the Lisbon Treaty, which changed EU politics - you might even say it was the year the European Parliament. Whether it was the EU-US SWIFT Agreement on terrorist financing being shot down for a lack of safeguards, with US Vice President Biden imploring Parliament to accept it before a modified form was adopted, or the battle over the budget, the Parliament has been exerting its influence constantly. Victories weren't total, and I didn't always agree with the legislation passed, but the Parliament managed to make its mark on 2010. For me the greatest Parliamentary victory was over the formation of the European External Action Service, were it got a lot of its proposals accepted and heavily shaped the new institution despite only having the right of consultation under article 27(3) TEU - if anything symbolises the Parliament's new-found power, it should be this.
Politics of government and opposition strengthened in the Parliament this year, with the EPP generally supporting the Commission and Council with the help of the Liberals (where the right are in the majority), and a motley alliance of the PES, Greens and Liberals managing to upset the EPP's plurality on occasion. Though voting alliances remain fluid, the increasing coherence and importance of European parties with clearer policy platforms begs the question: why aren't we doing more to hold them to account and to use them to make a difference?
Barroso's second Commission was formally installed early in the year, and he tried to inject some vision into his second term in his hyped "State of the Union" speech. Generally the Commission was the least visible of the institutional triangle, though it did have a moment of glory when it temporarily grew a backbone to speak out over the Roma crisis in France.
Rights were very much an issue - civil liberties in SWIFT, citizenship and human rights for the Roma, human rights and elections in Belarus, and freedom of speech and the media in Hungary. If this is any indication, we will need to remain vigilant at home and across Europe for the next year and beyond.
Like Jon Worth, I'm not so optimistic for the future: there are too many narrow interests pulling in too many different directions. In September I heard a speech on the development of the EU. Europe, it was proclaimed, advanced through crises and managed to muddle through; we should not be worried or optimistic. I can't see that way of doing business working in the future. We need to make greater use of what is there to make the EU more inclusive and representative so that clearer arguments and vision can form and shape the Europe we live in. But it won't happen just through institutional reform and more information campaigns. It's a long road, but promoting debate between people and not just governments is essential if the EU is to become more democratic and joined-up. But this would require people to actively participate, rather than just being passive subjects.
Wednesday, 29 September 2010
Onward, Community Soldiers
The Community method must be saved, cry the Community warriors. The European Council seems to be encroaching on Community territory: crisis after crisis has been dealt with by intergovernmental deal-making and policy taskforces set up by the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy. The Lisbon Treaty had increased the powers of the European Parliament to set it on par with the Council as a co-legislator in the vast majority of policy areas, yet the Community method - where the Commission proposes and the Council and Parliament legislate and decide - seems to be threatened enough to elicit pledges of support from the Liberal and Social Democratic leaders in the EP to Commission action that takes on intergovernmentalism. Though the Commission has struck back against France over the Roma - an important and welcome development - the Commission doesn't seem to have the same leading role as it had 20 years ago.
There is no Community any more, of course. The Lisbon Treaty did away with the old pillar structure of the EU, so now there's just the Union (though the residue of the internal divisions of the pillar structure still remain within the Union).
Grahnlaw has written about the Community method and the European Council under Van Rompuy. Stanley has welcomed Van Rompuy's style of leadership, with his attempts to try and involve heads of state and government in the EU more (proposing more frequent meetings, for example), so that they take more ownership of the EU and European policies.
On the surface, involving European leaders more in the European Union is a good idea, but the embrace of this method of integration seems to be an optimistic attempt of integration through socalisation of the European leadership. It's important that there's solidarity in Europe, but I cannot see being extended by monthly meetings by the European Council. Member States show solidarity out of community spirit, but also because belonging to the same Union has brought similar interests. Intergovernmentalism is a necessary part of the EU, but the European Council is a bandage for crises, and should be restricted in its role.
The increase in power of the European Council in comparison to the Commission also weakens the EP. If part of the role of the EP is to scrutinise the executive, by taking over the responsibilities of the Commission in setting policy, the European Council renders the EU less transparent and accountable. It is also bad for most Member States. Supranationalism - the Community method - is a good check on the big Member States. When diplomacy, intergovernmentalism and vetos (whether formal or informal) are strong features of the system, the big 3 can dominate, since it's easy to steamroller small objecting states, and when there's a Member State consensus, the EP may be faced with a fait accompli. In comparison, QMV, though voting is weighted according to population size, levels the playing field by making big states more open to conpromise because of the need for coalition building, and the Parliament, though it may encounter consensus in the Council under QMV, is not faced with a fait accompli from on high and may not be as inhibited in the legislative process.
The "Community method" is key to the (more) transparent, open and more democratic decision-making of the EU. It also has a longer-term quality to it as decisions do not have to take place within the pressured short-termist deal-making of a summit. As I have written before, the importance of the supranationalist elements of the EU is not just based on the enthusaism of federalists, but is a key part of the good will in, and the smooth running of, the intergovernmental side.
So I think that there's a need to defend the "Community method". There is a new group set up earlier this month by MEPs to do so: the Spinelli Group. It is a very federalist group, and I am torn over it. On one hand, it is important that the Community method is not circumvented by a domineering European Council. On the other hand, the group seems to be a new form of the "European Alliance" that Verhofstadt has called for before, and which I strongly reject. The Community method and the EP will be well served by strengthening the coherence and political will of the Europarties and developing a clear, visible politics for the citizen. Member State pacts cannot be successfully countered in the loong run by cosy consensuses in the Parliament. If the Spinelli Group focused on defending Parliament and strengthening the Europarties, then it would be more relevant and attractive than a federalist's club.
[As for Grahnlaw's question of how the Community method and the EU's way of operating should be termed now, perhaps the "Union method" could be used in the same manner as the "Community method". Perhaps opposed to the "Council method" or "Special method"? Although that's only my suggestion to the cosmetic part of the question...]
There is no Community any more, of course. The Lisbon Treaty did away with the old pillar structure of the EU, so now there's just the Union (though the residue of the internal divisions of the pillar structure still remain within the Union).
Grahnlaw has written about the Community method and the European Council under Van Rompuy. Stanley has welcomed Van Rompuy's style of leadership, with his attempts to try and involve heads of state and government in the EU more (proposing more frequent meetings, for example), so that they take more ownership of the EU and European policies.
On the surface, involving European leaders more in the European Union is a good idea, but the embrace of this method of integration seems to be an optimistic attempt of integration through socalisation of the European leadership. It's important that there's solidarity in Europe, but I cannot see being extended by monthly meetings by the European Council. Member States show solidarity out of community spirit, but also because belonging to the same Union has brought similar interests. Intergovernmentalism is a necessary part of the EU, but the European Council is a bandage for crises, and should be restricted in its role.
The increase in power of the European Council in comparison to the Commission also weakens the EP. If part of the role of the EP is to scrutinise the executive, by taking over the responsibilities of the Commission in setting policy, the European Council renders the EU less transparent and accountable. It is also bad for most Member States. Supranationalism - the Community method - is a good check on the big Member States. When diplomacy, intergovernmentalism and vetos (whether formal or informal) are strong features of the system, the big 3 can dominate, since it's easy to steamroller small objecting states, and when there's a Member State consensus, the EP may be faced with a fait accompli. In comparison, QMV, though voting is weighted according to population size, levels the playing field by making big states more open to conpromise because of the need for coalition building, and the Parliament, though it may encounter consensus in the Council under QMV, is not faced with a fait accompli from on high and may not be as inhibited in the legislative process.
The "Community method" is key to the (more) transparent, open and more democratic decision-making of the EU. It also has a longer-term quality to it as decisions do not have to take place within the pressured short-termist deal-making of a summit. As I have written before, the importance of the supranationalist elements of the EU is not just based on the enthusaism of federalists, but is a key part of the good will in, and the smooth running of, the intergovernmental side.
So I think that there's a need to defend the "Community method". There is a new group set up earlier this month by MEPs to do so: the Spinelli Group. It is a very federalist group, and I am torn over it. On one hand, it is important that the Community method is not circumvented by a domineering European Council. On the other hand, the group seems to be a new form of the "European Alliance" that Verhofstadt has called for before, and which I strongly reject. The Community method and the EP will be well served by strengthening the coherence and political will of the Europarties and developing a clear, visible politics for the citizen. Member State pacts cannot be successfully countered in the loong run by cosy consensuses in the Parliament. If the Spinelli Group focused on defending Parliament and strengthening the Europarties, then it would be more relevant and attractive than a federalist's club.
[As for Grahnlaw's question of how the Community method and the EU's way of operating should be termed now, perhaps the "Union method" could be used in the same manner as the "Community method". Perhaps opposed to the "Council method" or "Special method"? Although that's only my suggestion to the cosmetic part of the question...]
Monday, 6 September 2010
SOTEU: My Barroso Buzzword Bingo
Tomorrow at 9am Brussels time, Barroso will make the first European "State of the Union" speech. Expectations on the Euroblogosphere aren't high for the speech, and there seem to be fears that the same sentiment might infect the European Parliament as well. In order for it to be a success, Barroso has to show that he has a vision with substance: people are not going to pay attention just because the speech comes with a "State of the Union" label attached. His vision of his second Commission wasn't exactly inspiring when he was working on his re-election by Parliament, and the Commission hasn't been as visible as Paris or Berlin (or even Van Rompuy) over the crises-ridden last few months. It's hard to see a great performance.
However, Barroso doesn't need to fear damaging his re-election (or appointment) chances, and he needs to assert his and the Commission's position more, so he could be waiting to use this to relaunch his Commission Presidency. Well, maybe.
I would hope to hear a hard-hitting defence of the Roma and their rights, along with outlining plans on the environment, economic regulation and his position on social & structural funds in the up-coming budget battles. Plans to promote debate and citizen-participation in the EU would be good, given that it's one of the biggest weakspots of the EU.
But I'm more likely to be listening out for my "Buzzword Bingo" words. Bloggingportal.eu has come up with the idea of people creating their 10 buzzwords to watch out for during the speech (EU, member states and other institutions are excluded). So here's my list:
1. "solidarity".
2. "pessimisim".
3. "communication".
4. "leading role".
5. "our European values". (Though it'd be a big plus if he said "the moral authority of Europe"!).
6. "sustainable".
7. "resolve".
8. "resilient".
9. "partnership".
10. "citizens".
Annoyingly, I won't be able to watch it live, so expect my comments to be late!
However, Barroso doesn't need to fear damaging his re-election (or appointment) chances, and he needs to assert his and the Commission's position more, so he could be waiting to use this to relaunch his Commission Presidency. Well, maybe.
I would hope to hear a hard-hitting defence of the Roma and their rights, along with outlining plans on the environment, economic regulation and his position on social & structural funds in the up-coming budget battles. Plans to promote debate and citizen-participation in the EU would be good, given that it's one of the biggest weakspots of the EU.
But I'm more likely to be listening out for my "Buzzword Bingo" words. Bloggingportal.eu has come up with the idea of people creating their 10 buzzwords to watch out for during the speech (EU, member states and other institutions are excluded). So here's my list:
1. "solidarity".
2. "pessimisim".
3. "communication".
4. "leading role".
5. "our European values". (Though it'd be a big plus if he said "the moral authority of Europe"!).
6. "sustainable".
7. "resolve".
8. "resilient".
9. "partnership".
10. "citizens".
Annoyingly, I won't be able to watch it live, so expect my comments to be late!
Monday, 9 August 2010
PES Primaries and a Parliamentary EU
Jon Worth has picked up on a campaign of Desmond O'Toole's for the introduction of primaries in the Party of European Socialists (campaign blog here). With Jason O'Mahony recently writing for a presidential style system, there's been some very interesting talk about how to make the Commission more democratic and reverse the "democratic disconnect" with citizens.
I highly recommend reading Desmond's comments and blog, as well as this paper (PDF) by Dr. Anna Skrzypek on models of selecting a candidate (warning - it's 54 pages long).
These are great proposals, and I would strongly support a primary selection system that involves party members (though there should be some balance to prevent over-dominance by the bigger national parties). This involvement would encourage greater participation before the elections from members (promoting engagement from members who aren't usually interested in EU affairs. This would also help equip them better for the campaign); give a higher profile for the Europarty campaign and, if done well (which is always the qualifier), boost turnout; and force more serious policy competition at a European level, increasing the accountability and transparency of EU politics.
If done well, is a strong qualifier - especially when it comes to European politics. We are all used to uninspiring and unsatisfying decision-making and politics, and it's hard to see any initiative as a sure cure for the falling turnout numbers and lack of engagement. However, institutionalising the selection of a presidential candidate for the Commission would provide the platform for a real debate that can grow and develop over time (all campaigns are different, and of varying quality). There would be 2 key aspects of them: 1. it would force the PES to select a candidate for each election, therefore not leaving it up to national party executives (particularly as the members will [hopefully] have a feeling of ownership over the process/entitlement to vote), and there would be pressure for similar moves in other parties; 2. it would change the nature of the Europarties themselves by forcing regular, very public, debate on policy.
I think the second aspect is one that has been overlooked by supporters of a more explicitly presidential system. Arguments against the parliamentary system are: the EP doesn't really represent the citizens, the Europarties are too heterogeneous to provide real competitive politics, and that the main parties are in coalition a lot of the time. Supporters of a presidential system say it will give a clear choice compared to EP elections.
I think this overlooks the changes in EP politics recently. Simon Hix has written on the cohesiveness of the Europarties, and has concluded that they are more cohesive than their US counterparts. Hix and Votewatch have also looked at the voting patterns of the parties and found that there's a lot more left-right competition than some might expect (Votewatch found a left-wing winning coalition for civil rights, and a right-wing winning coalition on justice and home affairs). It's true that the EP sees a lot of coalition between the 3 main parties, but it is increasingly based on blocking one of the others out. This isn't the same as national parliaments, of course, which see more competition. However, elections with a presidential candidate (elected by the EP) encourage more cohesion, more joined-up policy thinking (or hopefully rewards such thinking), and promotes critical scrutiny of policy on a more European level. Because the Commission and the president(ial candidate) depends on the EP, and, more specifically, his/her coalition in it, this promotes a more pro- and anti- government set up of the EP and mitigates against grand coalitions (though it doesn't rule them out entirely).
The charge of grand coalitions making democracy unengaging in the EP and the EU as a whole is serious, but would a purely presidential system cure this? Not in my opinion. A presidential system would produce presidents who would have only their political capital to work with, and any support base in the EP could dry up quickly, as it isn't necessarily in their electoral interests to make the presidency a success. In other words, more grand coalitions, more national compromises (as the Commission would need the backing of the Council or EP to have a strong position). And how will people react to a President who has to balance grand coalition interests? I doubt it would be greeted with much enthusiasm on polling day.
So I think parliamentary politics are more in keeping with Europe's political traditions (generally). The EU is a wide based project, and a wide based parliamentary approach diffuses the nationality question of the candidates (to some extent), and re-focuses the debate on the ideological and policy positions of the Europarties in which more people can participate - and help shape. The EP would be changed by them - Europarties would could change as they might break up and reform along more ideologically coherent lines, or change long established policy to appeal to voters, as well as more distinct voting coalitions and coalition preferences in Parliament.
In the last European election, for all my blogging, I wasn't active in a campaigning or party role. If a (left-wing) Europarty ran primaries - in other words, offered more opportunities for engagement - then I would have got involved. But that might be looking at things backwards. Maybe I should get involved to try and open up those opportunities.
Would you?
I highly recommend reading Desmond's comments and blog, as well as this paper (PDF) by Dr. Anna Skrzypek on models of selecting a candidate (warning - it's 54 pages long).
These are great proposals, and I would strongly support a primary selection system that involves party members (though there should be some balance to prevent over-dominance by the bigger national parties). This involvement would encourage greater participation before the elections from members (promoting engagement from members who aren't usually interested in EU affairs. This would also help equip them better for the campaign); give a higher profile for the Europarty campaign and, if done well (which is always the qualifier), boost turnout; and force more serious policy competition at a European level, increasing the accountability and transparency of EU politics.
If done well, is a strong qualifier - especially when it comes to European politics. We are all used to uninspiring and unsatisfying decision-making and politics, and it's hard to see any initiative as a sure cure for the falling turnout numbers and lack of engagement. However, institutionalising the selection of a presidential candidate for the Commission would provide the platform for a real debate that can grow and develop over time (all campaigns are different, and of varying quality). There would be 2 key aspects of them: 1. it would force the PES to select a candidate for each election, therefore not leaving it up to national party executives (particularly as the members will [hopefully] have a feeling of ownership over the process/entitlement to vote), and there would be pressure for similar moves in other parties; 2. it would change the nature of the Europarties themselves by forcing regular, very public, debate on policy.
I think the second aspect is one that has been overlooked by supporters of a more explicitly presidential system. Arguments against the parliamentary system are: the EP doesn't really represent the citizens, the Europarties are too heterogeneous to provide real competitive politics, and that the main parties are in coalition a lot of the time. Supporters of a presidential system say it will give a clear choice compared to EP elections.
I think this overlooks the changes in EP politics recently. Simon Hix has written on the cohesiveness of the Europarties, and has concluded that they are more cohesive than their US counterparts. Hix and Votewatch have also looked at the voting patterns of the parties and found that there's a lot more left-right competition than some might expect (Votewatch found a left-wing winning coalition for civil rights, and a right-wing winning coalition on justice and home affairs). It's true that the EP sees a lot of coalition between the 3 main parties, but it is increasingly based on blocking one of the others out. This isn't the same as national parliaments, of course, which see more competition. However, elections with a presidential candidate (elected by the EP) encourage more cohesion, more joined-up policy thinking (or hopefully rewards such thinking), and promotes critical scrutiny of policy on a more European level. Because the Commission and the president(ial candidate) depends on the EP, and, more specifically, his/her coalition in it, this promotes a more pro- and anti- government set up of the EP and mitigates against grand coalitions (though it doesn't rule them out entirely).
The charge of grand coalitions making democracy unengaging in the EP and the EU as a whole is serious, but would a purely presidential system cure this? Not in my opinion. A presidential system would produce presidents who would have only their political capital to work with, and any support base in the EP could dry up quickly, as it isn't necessarily in their electoral interests to make the presidency a success. In other words, more grand coalitions, more national compromises (as the Commission would need the backing of the Council or EP to have a strong position). And how will people react to a President who has to balance grand coalition interests? I doubt it would be greeted with much enthusiasm on polling day.
So I think parliamentary politics are more in keeping with Europe's political traditions (generally). The EU is a wide based project, and a wide based parliamentary approach diffuses the nationality question of the candidates (to some extent), and re-focuses the debate on the ideological and policy positions of the Europarties in which more people can participate - and help shape. The EP would be changed by them - Europarties would could change as they might break up and reform along more ideologically coherent lines, or change long established policy to appeal to voters, as well as more distinct voting coalitions and coalition preferences in Parliament.
In the last European election, for all my blogging, I wasn't active in a campaigning or party role. If a (left-wing) Europarty ran primaries - in other words, offered more opportunities for engagement - then I would have got involved. But that might be looking at things backwards. Maybe I should get involved to try and open up those opportunities.
Would you?
Monday, 19 July 2010
Northern Ireland's MEPs: One Year On
The 7th European Parliament is a year into its first term since the June 2009 elections, so I’ve decided to take a look at the performance of the 3 Northern Ireland MEPs in the European Parliament over the last year. To do this I’ve looked over the questions and speeches of the MEPs from their plenary adventures on the European Parliament website, and the statistics of their voting patterns and parliamentary work from VoteWatch.eu. The articles on the 3 MEPs are summaries with analysis at the end, so this post will be an overview and contents page for the series.
The “reviews” of the MEPs are supposed to be neutral, and I try to summarise what the focus of each MEP’s work is and some of their general stances and look at the number of questions. All 3 MEPs had submitted under 10 written/oral questions to the Commission that were answered later (or are awaiting an answer). This is in line with MEPs in general: the vast majority seem to have asked 10 questions or less so far (with a few asking a lot more). Since they’re so close in the number of questions, I’ve looked at the “quality” of the questions (how specific they are) and, when assessing them in general, whether they are “party” or “independent” MEPs.
The model of “party” and “independent” MEP is generally:
- Party MEP: an MEP who is part of a Europarty group in the EP. Relevant to this role is how often they vote along with the party (since it shows how far voting for this MEP in elections is voting for that party and their policies/ideological leanings). Party MEPs would have more resources and are likely to be more specialised (focusing on a certain policy) and might depend on other MEPs in the group to deal with other policy areas. Party MEPs would be expected to be more likely to be spokespeople for their parties on issues and/or rapporteurs for the Parliament for a legislative proposal. (A rapporteur writes a report on the legislation and conducts negotiations between the parties to find an acceptable final package to put to the vote). In short: higher profiles and (assumed) greater influence but with less independence.
- Independent MEP: an MEP that doesn’t have the resources of the MEP as they sit outside the party groups. Assumed to be a more “generalist” MEP with time to focus on issues important to the constituency. So less rapporteuring, etc., and more time for asking questions and making speeches.
Nicholson (ECR/UCU-NF) and de Brún (GUE-NGL/Sinn Féin) are party MEPs and Dodds (No Group/DUP) is an independent MEP.
I’ve decided not to pass judgment on the low number of questions in this series – the general aim of the series is to give a loose assessment to show what the MEPs are doing (and give some criticism). This should show what policies they’re focusing on (because the EP does have power and it does do something!), and then you can decide how they’re doing and if you want to test them out for yourself with questions and constituency work. It should be noted that the info this is based on doesn't detail constituency work, so a lot of important contact with constituents isn't included. Nicholson and de Brún get a general “thumbs up” while I would question heavily the value and number of the questions Dodds has submitted.
Running through it is the theme of “independent” versus “party” MEP. I think that in a chamber of 700+ MEPs, having a party and connections is vital to get things done and influence legislation – not to mention providing some form of meaningful choice to the voter. That said, there are always arguments for and against.
James Nicholson (European Conservatives and Reformists/UCU-NF)
Bairbre de Brún (United Left [GUE-NGL]/Sinn Féin)
Diane Dodds (Non Aligned/DUP)
UPDATE: I've added another post to the series, this time looking at the wider context of the European Parliament, and why the bigger parties matter more.
P.S. VoteWatch.eu recently did a study on how the Europarties voted over the first 6 months of the Parliament. I’ve blogged about it here.
The “reviews” of the MEPs are supposed to be neutral, and I try to summarise what the focus of each MEP’s work is and some of their general stances and look at the number of questions. All 3 MEPs had submitted under 10 written/oral questions to the Commission that were answered later (or are awaiting an answer). This is in line with MEPs in general: the vast majority seem to have asked 10 questions or less so far (with a few asking a lot more). Since they’re so close in the number of questions, I’ve looked at the “quality” of the questions (how specific they are) and, when assessing them in general, whether they are “party” or “independent” MEPs.
The model of “party” and “independent” MEP is generally:
- Party MEP: an MEP who is part of a Europarty group in the EP. Relevant to this role is how often they vote along with the party (since it shows how far voting for this MEP in elections is voting for that party and their policies/ideological leanings). Party MEPs would have more resources and are likely to be more specialised (focusing on a certain policy) and might depend on other MEPs in the group to deal with other policy areas. Party MEPs would be expected to be more likely to be spokespeople for their parties on issues and/or rapporteurs for the Parliament for a legislative proposal. (A rapporteur writes a report on the legislation and conducts negotiations between the parties to find an acceptable final package to put to the vote). In short: higher profiles and (assumed) greater influence but with less independence.
- Independent MEP: an MEP that doesn’t have the resources of the MEP as they sit outside the party groups. Assumed to be a more “generalist” MEP with time to focus on issues important to the constituency. So less rapporteuring, etc., and more time for asking questions and making speeches.
Nicholson (ECR/UCU-NF) and de Brún (GUE-NGL/Sinn Féin) are party MEPs and Dodds (No Group/DUP) is an independent MEP.
I’ve decided not to pass judgment on the low number of questions in this series – the general aim of the series is to give a loose assessment to show what the MEPs are doing (and give some criticism). This should show what policies they’re focusing on (because the EP does have power and it does do something!), and then you can decide how they’re doing and if you want to test them out for yourself with questions and constituency work. It should be noted that the info this is based on doesn't detail constituency work, so a lot of important contact with constituents isn't included. Nicholson and de Brún get a general “thumbs up” while I would question heavily the value and number of the questions Dodds has submitted.
Running through it is the theme of “independent” versus “party” MEP. I think that in a chamber of 700+ MEPs, having a party and connections is vital to get things done and influence legislation – not to mention providing some form of meaningful choice to the voter. That said, there are always arguments for and against.
James Nicholson (European Conservatives and Reformists/UCU-NF)
Bairbre de Brún (United Left [GUE-NGL]/Sinn Féin)
Diane Dodds (Non Aligned/DUP)
UPDATE: I've added another post to the series, this time looking at the wider context of the European Parliament, and why the bigger parties matter more.
P.S. VoteWatch.eu recently did a study on how the Europarties voted over the first 6 months of the Parliament. I’ve blogged about it here.
Diane Dodds MEP: One Year On
[Part of the series on Northern Irish MEPs' first year in the 7th European Parliament]
Diane Dodds (NI) (DUP). Member of: the Agriculture Committee and the Delegation for Relations with Israel (Substitute on: the Fisheries Committee and the Delegation for Relations with Australia and New Zealand).
Statistics (VoteWatch Profile):
Attendance in plenary: 87.27%
Loyalty to Europarty: N/A
Loyalty to national majority: 46.15%
Speeches: 54 (In plenary, 49 [via VoteWatch, which wasn’t updated as recently])
Parliamentary Questions: 5
Motions for resolutions: 0
Written declarations: 0
Reports Amended: 5 (3 on the Future of the CAP after 2013 and 2 on the Draft Report on the Green Paper on the Reform of the CFP)
Drafted Reports: 0
Opinions: 0
Dodds’ speeches mostly refer to agriculture. According to these speeches, she supports a localist approach (speech on the amendment to regulations on agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union, and supporting local rather than EU geographical indicators when it comes to labelling ). She also raised the issue of the penalties against Northern Irish farmers due to allegations of fraudulent claims with Commission President Barroso during the Question Hour, and Barroso defended the procedure as objective, highlighting that the member state has space to present its case (though the matter is really one of the regional Northern Irish government). When it comes to the Common Fisheries Policy, she made a speech in favour of its regionalisation as set out in the Green Paper on CFP reform – however her ideal would be for the scrapping of the CFP and a return to member state control. From her speech on Icelandic accession to the Union, however, she seems to feel that Icelandic fishery policies on mackerel are unsustainable and that letting Iceland into the EU would damage UK fisheries; she opposes Icelandic entry on the basis of fisheries and the Icesave crisis.
Diane Dodds has also made speeches on the Israel/Palestine conflict and on terrorism in NI. She seems very supportive of security services, technology and intelligence: see here for her speech on body scanners at airports. She also voted for the EU-US SWIFT agreement (on the sharing of bank transfer info for terrorist investigations).
The 5 Parliamentary questions generally follow the same trend as the speeches. (4 of them were submitted on the 2nd July 2010, with the other one submitted back in December 2009, judging by the European Parliament website). Topics include: the EU-Libya cooperation agreement negotiations, the volatile diary market, the right to fish, and discrimination against producers and processors. Apart from the 2 questions asking for an update on how negotiations with Libya are going, the other questions concern work and discrimination of products; two of these ask for clarification on if/when discrimination is allowed (the producers and diary questions – though the questions are short and don’t provide a background or context so it’s unclear exactly what circumstances Dodds is asking questions about).
Only one question refers to a specific law (rather than just asking what the law is). This question asks whether restrictions on fishing conflict with the rights to find an occupation and engage in work in the Fundamental Charter of Rights.
In general the main focus of Dodds’ speeches are agriculture, fisheries and security/terrorism, which fits in with the rural character of Northern Ireland and the DUP’s general stance on security issues. If you want to check out her speeches and stances in more detail, you can find them here. You can check her voting record here.
Analysis:
Diane Dodds’ national party, the Democratic Unionist Party, isn’t aligned with any of the Europarty/political groupings in the European Parliament. Groups get certain resources and being part of a political group increases your chances of forming alliances and getting high profile roles such as rapporteur, etc. So in some ways the role of an independent MEP can’t be compared easily to that of a party MEP: party MEPs gain profile, political advantage and political leverage by influencing their party’s position and working to get more influential posts; while independents may be more constituency focused and focus on a wider range of issues based on their constituents’ interests. Party MEPs may be more specialised and become a party’s spokesperson in a policy area (and so depend on other party MEPs to defend their common interests in other policy areas and ask questions/table amendments there), while an independent might not have the time or resources to be experts on everything, but have the time (and freedom from the party line) to work on constituency concerns more directly.
In my opinion, the role of an independent MEP is to ask questions, make speeches, and table amendments on a wide range of issues that matter to the constituency – and can’t be blamed necessarily for the lack of report drafting, etc. Dodds has made a lot of speeches in the key areas of interest for the constituency, but there are few questions and amendments, considering that there is no Europarty work and my “model” of an independent MEP. Do the questions and amendments serve her constituents well? I doubt it. Questions are few and vague, and I doubt that they’ll get much more than a copy-and-paste reply of the general law in that area. Questions would need to be direct and specific to tease out a good reply; otherwise it seems as if she is just asking the Commission’s opinion to a question a constituent might have asked so she can pass the answer on. The statistics don’t show or measure other constituency work, however, so there could be other areas of local work that just aren’t highlighted by this.
How you judge Diane Dodds’ performance as an MEP may depend on how you view the role – as one of making speeches on matters important to the constituency, constituency work, asking questions or submitting amendments, and what combination you think is important. Apart from the question of ideology is also the question of party alignment: do you think an independent or a party-aligned MEP would be better? The European Parliament has gained new powers after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and is now equal to the Council (member states) in nearly all areas. Though the EP is no longer the talking shop it once was, Dodds seems to treat it as if nothing’s changed.
[For analysis on the other Northern Ireland MEPs and an overall analysis: link]
Diane Dodds (NI) (DUP). Member of: the Agriculture Committee and the Delegation for Relations with Israel (Substitute on: the Fisheries Committee and the Delegation for Relations with Australia and New Zealand).
Statistics (VoteWatch Profile):
Attendance in plenary: 87.27%
Loyalty to Europarty: N/A
Loyalty to national majority: 46.15%
Speeches: 54 (In plenary, 49 [via VoteWatch, which wasn’t updated as recently])
Parliamentary Questions: 5
Motions for resolutions: 0
Written declarations: 0
Reports Amended: 5 (3 on the Future of the CAP after 2013 and 2 on the Draft Report on the Green Paper on the Reform of the CFP)
Drafted Reports: 0
Opinions: 0
Dodds’ speeches mostly refer to agriculture. According to these speeches, she supports a localist approach (speech on the amendment to regulations on agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union, and supporting local rather than EU geographical indicators when it comes to labelling ). She also raised the issue of the penalties against Northern Irish farmers due to allegations of fraudulent claims with Commission President Barroso during the Question Hour, and Barroso defended the procedure as objective, highlighting that the member state has space to present its case (though the matter is really one of the regional Northern Irish government). When it comes to the Common Fisheries Policy, she made a speech in favour of its regionalisation as set out in the Green Paper on CFP reform – however her ideal would be for the scrapping of the CFP and a return to member state control. From her speech on Icelandic accession to the Union, however, she seems to feel that Icelandic fishery policies on mackerel are unsustainable and that letting Iceland into the EU would damage UK fisheries; she opposes Icelandic entry on the basis of fisheries and the Icesave crisis.
Diane Dodds has also made speeches on the Israel/Palestine conflict and on terrorism in NI. She seems very supportive of security services, technology and intelligence: see here for her speech on body scanners at airports. She also voted for the EU-US SWIFT agreement (on the sharing of bank transfer info for terrorist investigations).
The 5 Parliamentary questions generally follow the same trend as the speeches. (4 of them were submitted on the 2nd July 2010, with the other one submitted back in December 2009, judging by the European Parliament website). Topics include: the EU-Libya cooperation agreement negotiations, the volatile diary market, the right to fish, and discrimination against producers and processors. Apart from the 2 questions asking for an update on how negotiations with Libya are going, the other questions concern work and discrimination of products; two of these ask for clarification on if/when discrimination is allowed (the producers and diary questions – though the questions are short and don’t provide a background or context so it’s unclear exactly what circumstances Dodds is asking questions about).
Only one question refers to a specific law (rather than just asking what the law is). This question asks whether restrictions on fishing conflict with the rights to find an occupation and engage in work in the Fundamental Charter of Rights.
In general the main focus of Dodds’ speeches are agriculture, fisheries and security/terrorism, which fits in with the rural character of Northern Ireland and the DUP’s general stance on security issues. If you want to check out her speeches and stances in more detail, you can find them here. You can check her voting record here.
Analysis:
Diane Dodds’ national party, the Democratic Unionist Party, isn’t aligned with any of the Europarty/political groupings in the European Parliament. Groups get certain resources and being part of a political group increases your chances of forming alliances and getting high profile roles such as rapporteur, etc. So in some ways the role of an independent MEP can’t be compared easily to that of a party MEP: party MEPs gain profile, political advantage and political leverage by influencing their party’s position and working to get more influential posts; while independents may be more constituency focused and focus on a wider range of issues based on their constituents’ interests. Party MEPs may be more specialised and become a party’s spokesperson in a policy area (and so depend on other party MEPs to defend their common interests in other policy areas and ask questions/table amendments there), while an independent might not have the time or resources to be experts on everything, but have the time (and freedom from the party line) to work on constituency concerns more directly.
In my opinion, the role of an independent MEP is to ask questions, make speeches, and table amendments on a wide range of issues that matter to the constituency – and can’t be blamed necessarily for the lack of report drafting, etc. Dodds has made a lot of speeches in the key areas of interest for the constituency, but there are few questions and amendments, considering that there is no Europarty work and my “model” of an independent MEP. Do the questions and amendments serve her constituents well? I doubt it. Questions are few and vague, and I doubt that they’ll get much more than a copy-and-paste reply of the general law in that area. Questions would need to be direct and specific to tease out a good reply; otherwise it seems as if she is just asking the Commission’s opinion to a question a constituent might have asked so she can pass the answer on. The statistics don’t show or measure other constituency work, however, so there could be other areas of local work that just aren’t highlighted by this.
How you judge Diane Dodds’ performance as an MEP may depend on how you view the role – as one of making speeches on matters important to the constituency, constituency work, asking questions or submitting amendments, and what combination you think is important. Apart from the question of ideology is also the question of party alignment: do you think an independent or a party-aligned MEP would be better? The European Parliament has gained new powers after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and is now equal to the Council (member states) in nearly all areas. Though the EP is no longer the talking shop it once was, Dodds seems to treat it as if nothing’s changed.
[For analysis on the other Northern Ireland MEPs and an overall analysis: link]
James Nicholson MEP: One Year On
[Part of the series on the Northern Irish MEPs' first year in the 7th European Parliament]
James Nicholson (ECR) (UUP). Member of the Agriculture Committee, Vice-Chair of the Delegation to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. (Substitute for the Environment Committee, Regional Development Committee, and Delegation for relations for the Korean Peninsula).
Statistics:
Attendance in plenary: 98.28%
Loyalty to Europarty: 91.58%
Loyalty to national majority: 81.14%
Speeches: 29
Parliamentary Questions: 6
Motions for resolutions: 6
Written declarations: 0
Reports Amended: 10 (Mostly on the CAP and agriculture, but also on cancer, organ donation and transport, and food information for consumers).
Drafted Reports: 0
Opinions: 0
Nicholson’s speeches mainly focus on agriculture and food security, but he has also given speeches on cancer, organ transplants and donations, animal transport, the South Korean Trade Agreement, and on CFP reform. He’s spoken on behalf of the ECR group a surprising number of times: on the debate on agriculture in non-diary sectors, the EU-South Korean Trade Agreement, on Europol (deputising for the ECR rapporteur), the regulation on agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union, and the transportation of animals (he was in this case the “opposite number” Bairbre de Brún, the rapporteur for this piece of legislation – at least for this debate).
James Nicholson’s main focus is agriculture (where he, for instance, supports country of origin logos and opposes an EU logo), and, from these speeches, supports a limited role for Europol (stressing the sovereignty of member states), considers the 2002 CFP reform a failure, and is supportive of the legislation on animal transport and the report on organ donation and transport.
The 6 Parliamentary questions cover negotiations with Mercosur, property ownership in Spain, EEC pensions, tyre pressure safety regulations and the EU strategy against organised crime. Some of the questions are oral and some are written. Some of the written questions are fairly detailed, but all seem specific – asking about the details of EEC pension payouts, impact assessments of Mercosur trade and agricultural imports, etc.
The motions for resolution are mainly to wind up the debate on a topic or used to make a political statement, e.g. on North Korea or the diary crisis. The amendments to reports are mostly agricultural, and several are for the Future of the CAP After 2013 report. There are also amendments to the reports on organs, consumers and agricultural product quality.
Analysis:
James Nicholson’s national party, the Ulster Conservatives and Unionists – New Force, is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists, so his role is that of a party MEP. Groups get certain resources and being part of a political group increases your chances of forming alliances and getting high profile roles such as rapporteur, etc. So the role of the party MEP would be different to an independent MEP. Nicholson hasn’t acted as a rapporteur in the first year of this Parliament, though he has deputised for one in plenary and he has spoken on behalf of the ECR group on several issues. The questions seem to be specific and show the concern for free trade agreements and anti-red tape stance that you might expect from the right-to-centre-right, free trade, sovereigntist-leaning ECR, and the focus on agriculture in his speeches and his position on the Agriculture Committee echoes the rural interests of the constituency. The high attendance rate and high loyalty rate with the ECR group shows that he supports the ECR Europarty – an advantage in that you can vote for him or not based on the policies/ideology of the party and that the group is a voting bloc that can form alliances (whether or not it’s very successful at that is another question). According to his website: “Due to his experience and expertise in this field, Jim was appointed as coordinator for the ECR group for this policy area at the beginning of the new legislature.” Other constituency work isn’t measured on VoteWatch.eu or put on the European Parliament website.
The number of questions and report amendments seem to both be generally 10 or under for most MEPs (though there are a few that ask a lot more). Though the number is low, it’s roughly equivalent to the performance of the rest of the MEPs. I think that Nicholson is generally doing a good job as a party MEP.
[For analysis on the other Northern Ireland MEPs and an overall analysis: link]
James Nicholson (ECR) (UUP). Member of the Agriculture Committee, Vice-Chair of the Delegation to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. (Substitute for the Environment Committee, Regional Development Committee, and Delegation for relations for the Korean Peninsula).
Statistics:
Attendance in plenary: 98.28%
Loyalty to Europarty: 91.58%
Loyalty to national majority: 81.14%
Speeches: 29
Parliamentary Questions: 6
Motions for resolutions: 6
Written declarations: 0
Reports Amended: 10 (Mostly on the CAP and agriculture, but also on cancer, organ donation and transport, and food information for consumers).
Drafted Reports: 0
Opinions: 0
Nicholson’s speeches mainly focus on agriculture and food security, but he has also given speeches on cancer, organ transplants and donations, animal transport, the South Korean Trade Agreement, and on CFP reform. He’s spoken on behalf of the ECR group a surprising number of times: on the debate on agriculture in non-diary sectors, the EU-South Korean Trade Agreement, on Europol (deputising for the ECR rapporteur), the regulation on agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union, and the transportation of animals (he was in this case the “opposite number” Bairbre de Brún, the rapporteur for this piece of legislation – at least for this debate).
James Nicholson’s main focus is agriculture (where he, for instance, supports country of origin logos and opposes an EU logo), and, from these speeches, supports a limited role for Europol (stressing the sovereignty of member states), considers the 2002 CFP reform a failure, and is supportive of the legislation on animal transport and the report on organ donation and transport.
The 6 Parliamentary questions cover negotiations with Mercosur, property ownership in Spain, EEC pensions, tyre pressure safety regulations and the EU strategy against organised crime. Some of the questions are oral and some are written. Some of the written questions are fairly detailed, but all seem specific – asking about the details of EEC pension payouts, impact assessments of Mercosur trade and agricultural imports, etc.
The motions for resolution are mainly to wind up the debate on a topic or used to make a political statement, e.g. on North Korea or the diary crisis. The amendments to reports are mostly agricultural, and several are for the Future of the CAP After 2013 report. There are also amendments to the reports on organs, consumers and agricultural product quality.
Analysis:
James Nicholson’s national party, the Ulster Conservatives and Unionists – New Force, is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists, so his role is that of a party MEP. Groups get certain resources and being part of a political group increases your chances of forming alliances and getting high profile roles such as rapporteur, etc. So the role of the party MEP would be different to an independent MEP. Nicholson hasn’t acted as a rapporteur in the first year of this Parliament, though he has deputised for one in plenary and he has spoken on behalf of the ECR group on several issues. The questions seem to be specific and show the concern for free trade agreements and anti-red tape stance that you might expect from the right-to-centre-right, free trade, sovereigntist-leaning ECR, and the focus on agriculture in his speeches and his position on the Agriculture Committee echoes the rural interests of the constituency. The high attendance rate and high loyalty rate with the ECR group shows that he supports the ECR Europarty – an advantage in that you can vote for him or not based on the policies/ideology of the party and that the group is a voting bloc that can form alliances (whether or not it’s very successful at that is another question). According to his website: “Due to his experience and expertise in this field, Jim was appointed as coordinator for the ECR group for this policy area at the beginning of the new legislature.” Other constituency work isn’t measured on VoteWatch.eu or put on the European Parliament website.
The number of questions and report amendments seem to both be generally 10 or under for most MEPs (though there are a few that ask a lot more). Though the number is low, it’s roughly equivalent to the performance of the rest of the MEPs. I think that Nicholson is generally doing a good job as a party MEP.
[For analysis on the other Northern Ireland MEPs and an overall analysis: link]
Tuesday, 16 March 2010
Edward McMillian-Scott joins the LibDems
Edward McMillan-Scott, who ran for - and won - one of the Vice President posts of the European Parliament ahead of the ECR's preferred choice, Kaminski (now ECR leader in the EP), has now joined the Liberal Democrats (who are part of ALDE in the EP). McMillan-Scott had been expelled from the ECR after winning the VP post, and has now been expelled from the Tory party altogether. Instead of appealing the decision, the MEP has joined the LibDems and publicly bashed the Tory party as a "nasty party" - exactly the image party leader David Cameron has been trying to dispel:
Nick Clegg has appeared alongside McMillan-Scott to portray the LibDems as a credible and pragmatic European party in comparison to the Conservatives. Labour has also been bashing the Conservatives and using the party's European policy as a means of showing them up as a unpragmatic, nasty party.
So this could hurt the Tories, though it's unclear how far it would affect public opinion. McMillan-Scott could be portrayed by the party as a malcontent who disobeyed party orders and is lashing out now that he has to pay the price - but then again, this is hard to square with his success in the EP. How can a successful parliamentarian with enough support to win against the ECR's preferred candidate be a dangerous radical opposed to sensible party policy? His methods of political engagement seem to work better in the EP than current Tory policy, and MEPs such as Daniel Hannan are far more radical and potentially dangerous to the Tory's image than McMillan-Scott (particularly as Hannan played a poster-boy role in the US Republican's campaign against health care reform by portraying the NHS [a holy of holies in UK politics] as a national disaster). Explaining how radicals such as Hannan are protected while McMillan-Scott can be so easily ousted may be uncomfortable, even if he did disobey the ECR/Tory whip.
McMillan-Scott has written a column in the Observer hitting out against the Tories' euroscepticism.
""David Cameron shields his europhobes," he writes. "No murmur was made when last weekend Lord Tebbit in effect encouraged Conservatives to vote Ukip in the general election against the Speaker, John Bercow. The dog whistle is really at a lower pitch: that Ukip supporters know that there is a real home for them, back in the Conservative party.""
Nick Clegg has appeared alongside McMillan-Scott to portray the LibDems as a credible and pragmatic European party in comparison to the Conservatives. Labour has also been bashing the Conservatives and using the party's European policy as a means of showing them up as a unpragmatic, nasty party.
So this could hurt the Tories, though it's unclear how far it would affect public opinion. McMillan-Scott could be portrayed by the party as a malcontent who disobeyed party orders and is lashing out now that he has to pay the price - but then again, this is hard to square with his success in the EP. How can a successful parliamentarian with enough support to win against the ECR's preferred candidate be a dangerous radical opposed to sensible party policy? His methods of political engagement seem to work better in the EP than current Tory policy, and MEPs such as Daniel Hannan are far more radical and potentially dangerous to the Tory's image than McMillan-Scott (particularly as Hannan played a poster-boy role in the US Republican's campaign against health care reform by portraying the NHS [a holy of holies in UK politics] as a national disaster). Explaining how radicals such as Hannan are protected while McMillan-Scott can be so easily ousted may be uncomfortable, even if he did disobey the ECR/Tory whip.
McMillan-Scott has written a column in the Observer hitting out against the Tories' euroscepticism.
Thursday, 9 April 2009
EP & MTV
MTV has been enlisted in the publicity campaign to raise awareness of the European elections. The campaign aims to increase the participation of the younger generation, who are generally less likely to vote.
There's a website, if you want to take a look.
I'm not sure if this will have a massive impact on turnout: after all, people still need to get around to registering to vote, and manage to get to the voting stations - MTV will no doubt get a big turnout - it is MTV (the operative part being "TV"). But it's the best campaign strategy yet for the EP elections in terms of raising awareness.
I've complained about the tendency to depend on internet campaigns in targeting voters when used in isolation (how many uninterested Europeans will look up Europe on the internet?), but this could work well in increasing interest and awareness in the elections: it uses traditional media to stir up interest, offers ways to express opinions and get involved through the internet, and offers a way of physically getting involved and meeting others.
Open Europe is not impressed at this development, though I can't see it making any other argument other than the "guess who's paying for it!" one, which is always strikes me as simplistic and populist, but when it's used in isolation it's particularly unconvincing. Perhaps I'm old fashioned, but I like arguments when they advance an alternative vision, or at least provided a moderately detailed explanation of why something is flawed and won't work. It may describe itself as a think tank, yet I fail to see the analytical and critical thought behind its blog posts. (Or should a think tank be free of expectations of such intellectual effort in its blogging activities?)
My general opinions on engaging voters and debates can be found here and here.
So how much money can be justly spent in engaging voters simply to get them to vote, and in what manner should it be done?
Edit: Open Europe have given me a link to their report on information, which will take a while to read.
There's a website, if you want to take a look.
I'm not sure if this will have a massive impact on turnout: after all, people still need to get around to registering to vote, and manage to get to the voting stations - MTV will no doubt get a big turnout - it is MTV (the operative part being "TV"). But it's the best campaign strategy yet for the EP elections in terms of raising awareness.
I've complained about the tendency to depend on internet campaigns in targeting voters when used in isolation (how many uninterested Europeans will look up Europe on the internet?), but this could work well in increasing interest and awareness in the elections: it uses traditional media to stir up interest, offers ways to express opinions and get involved through the internet, and offers a way of physically getting involved and meeting others.
Open Europe is not impressed at this development, though I can't see it making any other argument other than the "guess who's paying for it!" one, which is always strikes me as simplistic and populist, but when it's used in isolation it's particularly unconvincing. Perhaps I'm old fashioned, but I like arguments when they advance an alternative vision, or at least provided a moderately detailed explanation of why something is flawed and won't work. It may describe itself as a think tank, yet I fail to see the analytical and critical thought behind its blog posts. (Or should a think tank be free of expectations of such intellectual effort in its blogging activities?)
My general opinions on engaging voters and debates can be found here and here.
So how much money can be justly spent in engaging voters simply to get them to vote, and in what manner should it be done?
Edit: Open Europe have given me a link to their report on information, which will take a while to read.
Wednesday, 1 April 2009
Africa may oversee European Elections
Reported in the EUobserver here. The African Parliament, and maybe even the African Union may monitor the fairness of elections to the European Parliament. In the article the main controversy seems to involve Zimbabwe and Russia, implying worries that if they send monitors, they may be politically biased.
However, as long as they're independent and fair, this would be a good development; both for Europe, in that it will scrutinise the fairness of the elections, and for the authority and legitimacy of election monitors. A mutual exchange of election monitors could weaken claims of bias and political motivation aimed at weakening the legitimacy of European election monitors when they deliver an unflattering verdict on a country's election.
However, as long as they're independent and fair, this would be a good development; both for Europe, in that it will scrutinise the fairness of the elections, and for the authority and legitimacy of election monitors. A mutual exchange of election monitors could weaken claims of bias and political motivation aimed at weakening the legitimacy of European election monitors when they deliver an unflattering verdict on a country's election.
Saturday, 28 March 2009
We want informed debate on Europe! (But Europe shouldn't take part)
The EU is distant; it doesn't engage; people feel uninformed about the issues and there is rarely any debate on substantive issues - the only debate seems to be infrequent, confused and hurried grandstanding on the constitutional issues.
People want more information. There should be more debate on what legislation is passed and decisions are made at an EU level.
Perhaps a campaign to try to engage people in the European elections would be a good idea? No, that would be propaganda.
Now this campaign is not at all likely to be effective - billboards cannot replace a vigorous political party debate and campaign, and these billboards aren't much good to start off with - but it does highlight a certain attitude which is sadly quite widespread in some approaches to debates on Europe, on both the pro-Europe and Eurosceptic sides. And it's mainly this: if a viewpoint on Europe comes from outside the member state, it is derided as foreign and therefore invalid and not worthy of consideration; official information campaigns are automatically labeled propaganda and are unhelpful to the debate.
Wait - so, on issues that effect more than one European country, other Europeans views are invalid; and in an area where people decry the lack of information, the official stance and official information is ignored? Perhaps I'm missing something, but how else do you improve the quality of debate and participation if you don't bring in more views and perspectives and never discuss the pros and cons of official policy? Is there another way?
I don't think so. As I've written before in more detail, all information has an ideological standpoint (something I've tried to put across in response to an Open Europe article), including official information and policy. But to dismiss its value out of hand for debates misses the point completely: after all, what would national political debates be like if nobody ever talked about what the government does or thinks on a particular issue? If policy statements or facts issued by the government are merely dismissed as propaganda and meddling in the debate, then it devalues the debate.
Basically, as long as politicians on both sides refuse to examine and debate and engage with official sources of information or other Europeans who are equally effected by common decisions, the public at large will be largely cut off from the political world and the decision-making process. And as long as the media doesn't hold the politicians to account, they will get away with it.
If anyone can show me how the debate can be enriched and the public engaged more without doing this; by continuing to exclude opinions and policies from the EU institutions, then let me know. But for now it seems to me that the unwillingness of politicians to fight on the basis of ideas and policies is what's really holding back and diminishing the quality of politics in today's Europe.
People want more information. There should be more debate on what legislation is passed and decisions are made at an EU level.
Perhaps a campaign to try to engage people in the European elections would be a good idea? No, that would be propaganda.
Now this campaign is not at all likely to be effective - billboards cannot replace a vigorous political party debate and campaign, and these billboards aren't much good to start off with - but it does highlight a certain attitude which is sadly quite widespread in some approaches to debates on Europe, on both the pro-Europe and Eurosceptic sides. And it's mainly this: if a viewpoint on Europe comes from outside the member state, it is derided as foreign and therefore invalid and not worthy of consideration; official information campaigns are automatically labeled propaganda and are unhelpful to the debate.
Wait - so, on issues that effect more than one European country, other Europeans views are invalid; and in an area where people decry the lack of information, the official stance and official information is ignored? Perhaps I'm missing something, but how else do you improve the quality of debate and participation if you don't bring in more views and perspectives and never discuss the pros and cons of official policy? Is there another way?
I don't think so. As I've written before in more detail, all information has an ideological standpoint (something I've tried to put across in response to an Open Europe article), including official information and policy. But to dismiss its value out of hand for debates misses the point completely: after all, what would national political debates be like if nobody ever talked about what the government does or thinks on a particular issue? If policy statements or facts issued by the government are merely dismissed as propaganda and meddling in the debate, then it devalues the debate.
Basically, as long as politicians on both sides refuse to examine and debate and engage with official sources of information or other Europeans who are equally effected by common decisions, the public at large will be largely cut off from the political world and the decision-making process. And as long as the media doesn't hold the politicians to account, they will get away with it.
If anyone can show me how the debate can be enriched and the public engaged more without doing this; by continuing to exclude opinions and policies from the EU institutions, then let me know. But for now it seems to me that the unwillingness of politicians to fight on the basis of ideas and policies is what's really holding back and diminishing the quality of politics in today's Europe.
Friday, 20 March 2009
Cowen Throws his weight behind the move to ELDR
While Brian Crowley, Fianna Fáil MEP and current co-leader of the UEN group, tried to reverse the decision of the FF party at their recent Ardfheis to join the Liberal grouping of ELDR in the EP, it seems that there's no backing out this time. Brian Cowen, FF president and Irish Taoiseach, has thrown his weight behind the decision - Cowen's position may have been weakened by the economic crisis, and his government's bumbling (and at times frankly incompetent) response to it, but I'd say that there's no chance of Crowley getting his way now.
Not only did Cowen hold private talks with ALDE head Graham Watson, but he appeared in a Liberal press conference alongside leading liberal-aligned politicians from the national political arena of other member states.
I wonder what the outcome for Crowley will be within the FF party at the end of all of this? He should be safe electorally since he's the biggest vote-winner for FF in European elections, but will he loose more than a co-presidency of a EP group?
Not only did Cowen hold private talks with ALDE head Graham Watson, but he appeared in a Liberal press conference alongside leading liberal-aligned politicians from the national political arena of other member states.
I wonder what the outcome for Crowley will be within the FF party at the end of all of this? He should be safe electorally since he's the biggest vote-winner for FF in European elections, but will he loose more than a co-presidency of a EP group?
Thursday, 19 March 2009
Image and the EU: Are they starting to think about it?
Everyone knows that the EU has an image problem, though it's not exactly clear what can be done about it (though I personally think it requires some structural and institutional changes). Communication problems about the EU are chronic not only at the EU level itself, but even at national level.
Still, in an election year it's harder for politicians and even EU bureaucrats to avoid the feeling that something must be done. The elections are, after all, an obvious opportunity to reach out to the public and to attempt to get them more involved in European politics. Though it was always going to be, of course, an uphill struggle.
So the EP has unveiled a plan for more spending and more promotion on the campaign trail, as well as plans for more co-ordination of electoral campaign strategies (based around a choice of 4 of 10 "themes") in order to give the elections a more European character. The lack of clarity over what the powers of the new EP will be (due to the problems of Lisbon Treaty ratification*) will make the task of sending out a clear message harder in some respects. I hope that the Lisbon issue won't be focused on too much - it would be far better in my opinion, if candidates and parties focused on providing a clear message of what plans they have to use the powers they currently have to work on the issues facing the electorate. Dredging up constitutional issues, which the EP has no control over, is not a good strategy, and it isn't likely to help MEPs connect with voters. Showing the voters how their votes can make a difference on practical issues would be more effective than focusing on more abstract constitutional questions.
And even Barroso may be showing some dim awareness of the need for good PR - on Wednesday he got into the Irish Times for having a pint of Guinness with Bob Geldof in Brussels on St. Patrick's Day. Though he spoilt the occasion by making a "St. Patrick's day wish" for an Irish yes to Lisbon. By all means promote Lisbon, but it would have been much better to celebrate the occasion for what it is, without turning it into such an obviously pro-Lisbon PR stunt.
I don't expect a big difference, but hopefully there will be more engagement with voters.
*I'm still of the opinion that it would be wrong to push having another referendum before the guarantees are decided on and worked out.
Still, in an election year it's harder for politicians and even EU bureaucrats to avoid the feeling that something must be done. The elections are, after all, an obvious opportunity to reach out to the public and to attempt to get them more involved in European politics. Though it was always going to be, of course, an uphill struggle.
So the EP has unveiled a plan for more spending and more promotion on the campaign trail, as well as plans for more co-ordination of electoral campaign strategies (based around a choice of 4 of 10 "themes") in order to give the elections a more European character. The lack of clarity over what the powers of the new EP will be (due to the problems of Lisbon Treaty ratification*) will make the task of sending out a clear message harder in some respects. I hope that the Lisbon issue won't be focused on too much - it would be far better in my opinion, if candidates and parties focused on providing a clear message of what plans they have to use the powers they currently have to work on the issues facing the electorate. Dredging up constitutional issues, which the EP has no control over, is not a good strategy, and it isn't likely to help MEPs connect with voters. Showing the voters how their votes can make a difference on practical issues would be more effective than focusing on more abstract constitutional questions.
And even Barroso may be showing some dim awareness of the need for good PR - on Wednesday he got into the Irish Times for having a pint of Guinness with Bob Geldof in Brussels on St. Patrick's Day. Though he spoilt the occasion by making a "St. Patrick's day wish" for an Irish yes to Lisbon. By all means promote Lisbon, but it would have been much better to celebrate the occasion for what it is, without turning it into such an obviously pro-Lisbon PR stunt.
I don't expect a big difference, but hopefully there will be more engagement with voters.
*I'm still of the opinion that it would be wrong to push having another referendum before the guarantees are decided on and worked out.
Sunday, 15 March 2009
Will the European Parliament block Barroso's Plan?
Barroso's plan for €5 million of unspent EU budget funds in energy projects, etc, could be voted down in the EP, Claude Turmes told EurActiv. It was never exactly a brilliant plan, although to be fair to Barroso, he's never claimed to be imaginative or competent enough to come up with one in the first place (See comments).
I don't know how viable or effective the idea of pumping it into the EIB is, but if it can be done, I do like the idea of using it to generate more money to help the member states.
Most of all, I'd like to see more initiative from the EP on this matter - as well as running candidates for Commission President in the elections.
Or am I misguided on the practicality of the Commission being more assertive and bold in its plans during the economic crisis? Is it now institutionally and politically impossible for the Commission to show leadership?
(In other news: the Commission and Irish officials will meet to decide how the Commission can help in the Lisbon debate. Is it hoping that nobody says anything stupid too much to hope for?)
I don't know how viable or effective the idea of pumping it into the EIB is, but if it can be done, I do like the idea of using it to generate more money to help the member states.
Most of all, I'd like to see more initiative from the EP on this matter - as well as running candidates for Commission President in the elections.
Or am I misguided on the practicality of the Commission being more assertive and bold in its plans during the economic crisis? Is it now institutionally and politically impossible for the Commission to show leadership?
(In other news: the Commission and Irish officials will meet to decide how the Commission can help in the Lisbon debate. Is it hoping that nobody says anything stupid too much to hope for?)
Saturday, 7 March 2009
EuroparlTV Presents: Secretary Clinton in the EP (Eventually)
Since Secretary Clinton had a question and answer session in the EP (sadly not with the MEPs), I thought that I'd watch it on EuroparlTV. (After all, it is there to show EP events).
You can watch it here, if you like, but it takes half an hour just to get to the main event, so have something to do in the meantime, unless you like watching a screen with "Awaiting Clinton/ H-G Poettering" on it, or audiences talking amongst themselves. (This is frankly unbelievable - have EuroparlTV never heard of editing?!).
It was interesting to watch, when I did eventually get to see it, with the Secretary of State making some very federalist noises ("reaching your full potential" as apposed to Dr. Rice's 'don't think you can equal us' rhetoric). Of course, it can be said that it's all just tailored to the audience, and it's not really of much value. In the end, how strong Europe is (and how we define a strong Europe) is up to us (if you'll allow me to restate the obvious).
One other thing: it'll be a proud day for the EP when it picks the Commission President, Mr. Poettering; you can't base a Parliament's good days on the sparse visits of high-ranking foreign dignitaries.
You can watch it here, if you like, but it takes half an hour just to get to the main event, so have something to do in the meantime, unless you like watching a screen with "Awaiting Clinton/ H-G Poettering" on it, or audiences talking amongst themselves. (This is frankly unbelievable - have EuroparlTV never heard of editing?!).
It was interesting to watch, when I did eventually get to see it, with the Secretary of State making some very federalist noises ("reaching your full potential" as apposed to Dr. Rice's 'don't think you can equal us' rhetoric). Of course, it can be said that it's all just tailored to the audience, and it's not really of much value. In the end, how strong Europe is (and how we define a strong Europe) is up to us (if you'll allow me to restate the obvious).
One other thing: it'll be a proud day for the EP when it picks the Commission President, Mr. Poettering; you can't base a Parliament's good days on the sparse visits of high-ranking foreign dignitaries.
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