EU Budget Deal: Progress, from a Psychological point of View?

The EU institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament) reached a deal on the Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) that plans EU budget spending for 2014-2020. The MFF is not absolutely final since it has to pass a Parliamentary vote in September, but the deal does mark the end of the parliamentary revolt against the deal cut by national leaders. Politically, it's been a very charged budget, with arguments for cuts in a time of austerity, the European Parliament flexing its muscles over the budget, and the resignation of the parliamentary rapporteur on the MFF after the Irish Presidency mistakenly announced a deal last week.


So what's in the deal?

The cuts agreed by the Council remain: for the first time, the EU Budget will face a real terms cut of €85 billion, reducing the budget over the next 7 years to €960 billion. The focus on cuts meant that the parts of the budget prized by national governments were protected at the expense of more discretionary spending. The deal softens this by:

- Permitting the front loading of up to €2,543 million in 2014-15 for youth employment, research and Erasmus and apprenticeships and pro-SME policies, to be split as:
            - €2,143 million for youth unemployment;
            - €200 million for Horizon 2020, the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation;
            - €150 million for Erasmus; and
            - €50 million for COSME, a programme for the competitiveness of SMEs;
- Allowing for voluntary contributions by Member States by up to €1 billion to the €2.5 billion pot for aid for the most deprived;
- Unspent money will in an annual budget will be retained by the EU for spending on other projects, rather than being returned to the Member States;

- There is a concession to the idea of the MFF being subject to review and revision, but it seems very vague.

Is this, in the words of EP President Martin Schulz, progress "from a psychological point of view"?

The deal has shown that the EP has made some progress in shifting the MFF back towards some spending that is not the preserve of a national carve-up. There are national vetoes behind agricultural spending, cohesion spending and rebates, but no single Member State has a defining interest in EU projects that tackle unemployment, research or competitiveness. Can you imagine a British Prime Minister saying that they've cut some of the rebate in order to protect spending on unemployment programmes? The EP has demonstrated some value in trying to balance the budget more in the direction of spending for programmes that all of Europe benefits from, but that don't deliver specific national receipts of money.

That said, the concessions aren't a major victory for the Parliament - particularly on the aid for the most deprived and on MFF review, where the concessions appear so vague and woolly as to be practically meaningless. However, it is notable that a right-leaning European Parliament has not held out for reducing or eliminating the cuts to the EU budget. Despite the unprecedented level of power over the budget, the Parliament hasn't been as pushy as it might have been. From my point of view on the left, the deal is a defeat: it doesn't really deliver that much in terms of research and employment projects, and it buys into the idea of austerity despite the EU Budget not being in deficit. Cutting from common programmes to symbolically satisfy austerity is daft, and it undercuts further the ability of common European spending to offset, at least to some extent, the economic damage caused by national austerity.

Still, the fact that a right-wing EP largely endorsed the budget direction set by the European People's Party-dominated Council is not surprising, though it's another sign that the Parliament does act along ideological and party lines, which is important for the upcoming elections next year. Party and policy do matter in the EP.


Party Positions

The EP still has to vote in the MFF in September if the Framework is to be passed, so the positions of the European political groups matter. What are they?

Supporters:

The European People's Party (EPP; centre-right) probably support the deal, though they do not have a specific press release at the time of writing. Since they are the largest group in the Parliament and dominate the Council and national governments, they will probably support the deal. EPP parliamentary leader Joseph Daul supports current Eurozone/EU economic policy, but also insists on flexibility and a review clause in the MFF. I think EPP support can be assumed.

The European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR; centre-right, but further right than the EPP), have welcomed the deal, and have complained that the European Parliament tried to obstruct it. Since they have got the cut in the budget they wanted, and the cut is a big win for David Cameron, they're not likely to vote against.

Qualified Supporters:

The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE; centrist, and economically centre-right) have welcomed the deal, but want to secure some of the details before giving support, such as on the legal basis of the MFF (to secure the Parliament's power), on money for the Digital Agenda and on the review clause.

The Socialists and Democrats group (S&D; centre-left) have welcomed the deal as an improvement for youth unemployment schemes and Erasmus, but will discuss their position next week.

Though only qualified support has been given, I imagine that now that the EP has finished its negotiations as a whole and that there have been some concessions, these groups will largely support the MFF.

Opposition:

The European Greens (Green) have condemned the deal as only consisting of cosmetic changes when the overall budget is still being cut.

United Left (GUE-NGL; left-wing) also condemned the cuts to the budget, and hit out against EP President Schulz for only seeking agreement with the two biggest political groups in the Parliament (EPP and S&D), keeping the rest of the groups in the dark.


While these aren't firm voting stances by the political groups, it looks like there will probably be a majority for the MFF, failing any last minute revivals of Parliament-wide opposition.

The Politics of Appointing Borg

The European Parliament has to decide whether or not to confirm Tonio Borg as the new Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy after John Dalli was controversially brought down by an OLAF investigation. Borg has met with opposition in the EP for his conservative views, particularly on divorce, abortion and cohabiting couples. The Greens, ALDE, United Left and Socialists and Democrats have concerns over Borg suitability and might reject him. Although Borg performed well in last week's hearing, saying that he will stick within the treaties and Charter of Fundamental Rights, these concerns remain, and the Parliament has released a check-list for consenting to his appointment:

"[Borg] should publicly commit to the following:

• The delivery of the legislative proposal on tobacco products by January 2013;
• The adoption of legislative proposals on animal cloning and novel food by mid-2013;
• The full respect of the March 2013 deadline for the ban of animal testing for cosmetics;
• Better enforcement of EU law on animal transport;
• Full respect of the EU Charter on Fundamental rights, in particular of Article 21, as well as of EU anti-discrimination legislation and case-law;
• Recognising the innate dignity of all citizens of the EU, regardless of their sexual orientations, actively working to address health inequalities and to acting against stigmatisation of people with HIV and AIDS;
• Actively supporting EU policies with regard to women’s rights."

There seems to be some confusion over the concerns these political groups have over Borg's appointment and  their connection to his prospective portfolio. While the battle over values echoes that of Rocco Buttiglione's rejection, the wider ideological battle is less obvious because the EP isn't electing the Commission en bloc, but is deciding on a replacement Commissioner, so the debate within the EP has been a bit more focused on the specific portfolio, so critics have been linking his conservatives views to the area of health, despite the EU's lack of power in this area. As Martin Holterman writes in his great article on how political Commissioner appointments could/should be:

"Judging, for example, from the headline of this opinion article on Public Service Europe, Mr. Borg’s critics seem to consider their objections to concern his “suitability” for the Health and Consumer Affairs portfolio in particular. They are not worried about the ideological balance of power in the College of Commissioners, and they are not even necessarily worried about ideology in general, but rather they seem to argue that his ideology will get in the way of his job performance in concrete ways. The author of this opinion article,Monika Kosiñska from the the European Public Health Alliance, for example, lists the candidate’s views on abortion, homosexuality and immigration as being particularly problematic. This is particularly curious because I’m not entirely sure how the Health and Consumer Affairs portfolio touches on these fields."

But while the views of the candidate and his or her specific competence are important, the general ideological  views of the candidate and the political make-up of the Commission does matter and is an important political issue. Commissioners vote on draft proposals before they are put to the Council and the Parliament, so the political viewpoints of each Commissioner matters for all areas of Commission policy, not just his or her own portfolio. Just this week Commissioner Reding introduced a watered-down version of her boardroom quotas law - watered down due to opposition that included fellow Commissioners who could vote to block the proposal.

This collective responsibility of the College of Commissioners means that its political make-up is a valid issue for the Parliament in deciding on new Commissioners. The fact that respect for women's rights is included on the list, and that the Commission is putting forward draft legislation in this area, shows that the ideology of the candidate is a relevant and live issue, and MEPs in the centre-ground and on the left should make it clear that the Commission should reflect the political make-up of the Parliament (or, better yet, the majority in Parliament). How will he influence policies in the areas of employment, social affairs, or justice and home affairs? For the political groups on the left, they should not vote for a candidate who holds such emphatically opposing political views unless something is won by way of coalition or concession.

The Commissarial Speech 2011

Barroso has just delivered his State of the (European) Union speech. Last year I pointed out that it was a work programme speech setting out the legislative programme for the year ahead - a bit like the speech from the throne in European constitutional monarchies. This year the speech actually reflected the State of the Union title a bit more, though it was still a Commissarial Speech.

The speech had two themes: the economic crisis and the EU's role in the world. On the economic crisis, Barroso proclaimed the Commission to be the economic government of Europe, and announced several measures on market regulation and on jobs and support for growth. Barroso reminded the Parliament of the Single Market Act announced last year, and urged that it be fast-tracked through the legislative process. He also pointed out that the services legislation had not yet been fully implemented by Member States, and claimed that implementation would spur growth in the economy.

The most notable announcements marked a shift leftwards - perhaps made possible by the leftwards shift of the EPP following the departure of the British Conservatives, and the economic and political pressures of the crisis. Growth is a goal. Barroso announced that the European Investment Bank needed to be reinforced so it could lend to the real economy (though no detail was given on how), and called on an "Erasmus for jobs" which would help with youth unemployment by making more internships and work experience available (however no plan has been put forward yet, apart from calling for industry, national governments and the EU to work together on such a scheme). Project bonds will be launched to finance green projects and transport projects, which will stimulate the economy, while Barroso noted that the Commission will bring forward Eurobond proposals. Some forms of Eurobond will require a treaty change, while others won't. The treaty-friendly Eurobond was coined the "Stability Bond".

The biggest announcement was his support for a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT). This was were Barroso showed the most rhetorical energy on the economy: it is a matter of fairness that the financial industry contributes when the ordinary taxpayer has pumped so much into the sector. Is it fair, Barroso asked, to make the farmer pay more in taxes when they have already contributed so much? However such a tax would require unanimity in the Council, and where it would face a lot of opposition. Given that tax sovereignty was such a big issue in Ireland during the Lisbon Referendums, it might even lead to a referednum, should it come to a Council vote.

This leftward shift is not all it might seem, however. Parts of this plan are hard for the Commission to deliver and may not actually happen (the FTT being the most obvious). But Barroso made passing reference to the need to reform the labour market and pension funds. As no actual plans, or even a direction, were given to these reforms, it will be interesting to see what proposals will surface.

Finally, Barroso made a few more general points on Europe and Europe's place in the world. The Commission would protect citizens' rights, including their free movement and Schengen rights. Nobody wants to see a G2 (of the US and China), but the EU needs to play its part in the world and take more responsibility. The COmmission's role in foreign policy - hard foreign policy, rather than development aid and trade - is quite limited, so Barroso could wax rhetorically here about Europe's potential role without making concrete proposals. He did, however make reference to the need for a European defence industry: though nothing was announced, maybe there will be some form of market reforms of further industry co-operation through the European Defence Agency.

Overall the speech was better than last year's - now we need to see how much progress will be made on these promises.


The Parliamentary Response:

Daul (EPP Leader) improved his performance this year. Though still a pro-Commission waffle (leading me to wonder whether Ashton was listening to improve her French or just tuning out), he said his group would support more public-private partnership in education, training and R&D, where more investment was needed, as well as a job erasmus.

Schulz (S&D Leader), who gave one of the better parliamentary speeches last year, floundered this year. Maybe it was because the key issue of the FTT was taken by Barroso, but there was no discussion or analysis of the proposals Barroso put forward, and no questions on the labour and pension reforms Barroso mentioned in passing. Instead of playing a good opposition, Schulz critiqued the use of "19th centuary Vienna Congress methods" of diplomacy which was being "bullied by the markets" - it may be true, but Schulz should be holding Barroso to account, and proposing alternatives, rather than devoting the whole speech to talking about the "other place". Politically, Schulz even failed to stake a claim on the FTT, despite the Party of European Socialists (that make up the vast majority of the S&D group in Parliament) campaigning on the issue.

Verhofstadt (ALDE), the Liberal group leader, has become the federalists' Farage, and focused entirely on a pro-intergration message. Like the S&D, the Liberal leader's central policy idea of the Eurobond was given a place in Barroso's speech, so maybe it left him without anything to say on the actual policies in the speech. The best line he delivered pointed out that it was all very well telling the Parliament about these plans, but "Now you have to say it in the other place" - the "other place" being the European Council.

Zahradil (ECR leader) is the only change in leader since the last speech (an indication of the political turbulance in the right wing group over the last year). While he agreed with Barroso's market measures, he attacked the proposed FTT, saying it would drive financial industries abroad. The rest of the speech attacked the federalism of the other groups, and the Euro, asking if some countries would leave the currency union and if other countries would reconsider their commitment to joining. Though he did not want the Euro to fail, he sharply criticised any of the proposals to change things in the Eurozone as increasing the EU's powers. This provides a handy political cover for playing up the anti-federalist credentials of the group, while not providing any alternatives on how to solve the Eurozone crisis.

Harms (Greens/EFA) hit out against the lack of action on sustainable development since 2007/8 when it was considered a priority, calling the proposals: "Small scale measures, taken too late". Bisky (United Left Leader) said he supported the Commission as far as it brings in good financial regulation, FTT and Eurogroup measures. He also spent a lot of time criticising the intergovernmental approach to solving the crisis. Farage (EFD) said that Barroso was doing more of the same of what was failing, and attacked him for being unelected. He said that people wanted trade, European co-operation, to work in other European capitals and Erasmus but without the EU. I've already written about the differences between free trade and the internal market: what Farage is proposing seems to be the end of the internal market - if so, he should come out and say it and campaign on it, instead of pretending that the same level of trade can be maintained without the EU structures. In his responce, Barroso retorted that Farage had failed to get elected to the UK Parliament, and that he should campaign for withdrawing from the EU there, since the European Parliament couldn't grant it.


Scoring Parliament

It was hardly the most inspiring parliamentary response. Little attention was paid to the actual policies (effectively limited to the ECR rejection of FTT and the Greens/EFA criticism that the project bonds plan and other measures weren't good enough), but there was a lot of time wasted on bashing the Council for being too intergovernmental. They had the Commission President in front of them! This was their opportunity to stake out their policy positions for the year - what they wanted to see happen, what they thought of the Commission's plans - but they failed to articulate an alternative. This might not be too serious for the EPP and ALDE (or even the ECR), which supported Barroso as Commission President, and are essentially the Commission's political base for delivering its economic and market policy. However the S&D, Greens and United Left should have been doing more do provide an alternative.

Verhofstadt and Farage have essentially become copies of each other for this set piece event on their respective sides. However Farage can rest easy knowing that he's done his political job by delivering a punchy speech, even if it doesn't do much in holding the Commission to account. Verhofstadt, on the other hand, advocates a position that needs strong and clear articulation, and which also demands a role of questioning the Commission and holding it to account (even as a pro-Commission party). He didn't measure up to this role.


(How did you score in Barroso Buzzword Bingo? You can read the Twittersphere comments on the speech here: #SOTEU).

The Commissarial Speech

Yesterday we had Barroso's first State of the Union speech (though it's not the first State of the Union speech we've had in the EU). The Euroblogosphere's reviews have been very critical (see coverage by the critical Grahnlaw, Eurogoblin; and the neutral-critical Rose, and Charlemagne, for example, though Eva en Europa (in Spanish) has written a good defence). So was it any good?


The State of the Union


The title of the speech caused the most problems; both in the image it conjured of the US State of the Union speech and the Euroblogosphere's (and perhaps also the MEP's) low expectations. When the speech ended, Schulz (S&D) and Kaminski (ECR) exclaimed: You did not mention the state of the union! Indeed, the structure, tone and content of the speech reveals a lot more about the state of the union and what kind of expectations we should have. Because this wasn't a State of the Union speech - it was a Commissarial Speech.

What do I mean by a "Commissarial Speech"? If the style was US-Presidential, then the substance and tone was European-constitutional-monarchial. It struck me as a kind of Queen's Speech; that Barroso is setting out the kind of policies his Commission will strive for, rather than an assessment of the state of the union by a strong executive. In this regard the Commission isn't even as powerful as a European parliamentary cabinet government: though it has formally the same legitimacy, it doesn't have the same, whipped, dependable parliamentary majority that most member states have.


A Step Towards a Parliamentary Europe:


This left its mark throughout the speech, with Barroso talking about a special relationship between the EP and the Commission, of own resources and economic governance. The budget plan of 7 years, recently defended by the Commission, was subject to a compromise to the EP's argument that it should be in line with its term: Barroso proposed a 10 year budget plan, with a halfway break to bring it in line with "both institution's terms". The implied emphasis on Parliament was again shown when Schulz derided the speech as being all things to all parties. Though Barroso is justly accused of giving in to the Franco-German alliance, this overlooks the fact that the Commission now needs a parliamentary base to function effectively in an independent fashion (defining "independent" as independent of the Council or a small group of member states). Barroso's appeals to the Parliament aren't just hollow - though it falls into the trap of aiming at a "pro-European majority", something that I've criticised before - if Barroso is to achieve what he has set out to do in this speech, he will need the strong and articulate support of the European Parliament.

After all, on Barroso's big day, the Twitter-sound-bite and idea that became most meme-like was from the EP President Buzek:

"This is the first time we have a debate on the State of the Union. It is a step on the road to a parliamentary Europe."

Parliamentary Reactions:


The speech itself actually wasn't that bad, if you dropped your preconceptions about the State of the Union imagery. As Honor Mahony pointed out, it was quite good as a work programme speech (particularly for a Barroso-speech). There will be a Single Market Act to close over 100 legal bottlenecks in the single market, EU Project Bonds to help finance European projects, obligitory mention of green-collar jobs, and proposals against organised crime and to strengthen external border policing. On human rights, abuses outside the EU were specifically mentioned, but unfortunately, the Roma situation was only implied. If Barroso wanted to make a real splash with his speech, then speaking out against the French deportation policy would have certainly got more people listening!

And the reactions of our EP party leaders? Daul (EPP) waffled agreement and included a veiled attack on Ashton when he criticised the EU's invisibility in the Middle Eastern Peace Process (in fact, his speech was so boring that I found myself watching the MEPs in seat numbers 33 & 34 behind in their not-so-secret attempts to read their newspapers). Verhofstadt (ALDE) talked about Trans-European networks and own resources. He also mentioned an 86% support for economic governance in Eurobarometer - blatent spin! Sadly Verhofstadt seems as focused on a "pro-European majority" instead of articulating a coherent party vision for the EU as Barroso. (Numbers 33 & 34 used this time to text someone).

Cohn-Bendit (Greens/EFA) talked about the battle between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism/the Community method, and criticised Barroso for the invisibility of the Commission throughout the crisis. He also oddly talked about the Greek defence budget, which spent €50 billion on weapons over 10 years, and said that it was a waste of money that could be stopped/reduced if Turkey became an EU member state (though noting this can't really add anything to the actual membership debate). Kaminski (ECR) agreed with pretty much all of what Barroso said (it seems to be a regular occurance for the EU's "first official opposition"!), but worried aloud about the effect of regulation on business. Given that Barroso spoke about simplifying regulation and a Single Market Act, this seemed strange to me, but then the ECR have a habit of opining on the cost of regulation at every opportunity to maintain their free market image, even if it's not really an issue.

Binsky (United Left) spoke about the opinion polls and thought that people wanted a more social Europe. Money on education and training was needed, and there should be a ban on bank speculation. Farage (EFD) attacked Barroso as unelected and unpopular compared to his US counterpart and spoke about the unloved EU institutions; he also countered claims of a desire for "more Europe". One of the more listenable and entertaining speeches, even if I disagree with him most of the time.

Schulz (S&D), though I don't like his shouting-speech style, actually gave the best party-leader speech, in my opinion, though this may be because he came after Daul (who cannot seem to give a good pro-government speech to save his life). He demanded a financial transaction tax, and said the PES (the party is distinct from the group) would try and force the Commission to consider it via the Citizen's Initative if it didn't introduce the policy. Pledging to support the Commission against the Council, in what seems to be a constructive-opposition style speech, he also heavily criticised Barroso's Commission for being invisible during the last few months, and for only being "technically active" [my words] through releasing a statement here or there, but not taking any really public action. All parties except the EPP and EFD (I think) spoke out on the Roma.

Schulz made it clear that Barroso would be judged on his progress on the promises in his speech. but this is a bit unfair. Barroso cannot hope to do most of this without strong parliamentary support. It is up to the Europarties to try and articulate their visions for the EU, to stand up and explain the policies and decisions that need to be taken, beyond the empty appeals for pro-European feeling. The European Parliament has won mouch power in the last few years, and it now the strongest supranational institution. Whether or not a parliamentary EU develops or Barroso's policies are adopted will depend largely on the European Parliament.

The question is not if Barroso can do it, but if the European Parliament can deliver.

Northern Ireland MEPs in the Wider European Parliament

My posts on the Northern Ireland MEPs' first year in the 7th European Parliament mostly focused on highlighting what their priorities/key policy areas are with a bit of analysis (mostly a loose comparison between their performance and the "models" of the Independent and Party MEPs). However, as Grahnlaw has highlighted, the 3 NI MEPs belong either to no Europarty or to one of the smaller ones, which affects their influence and the work they do:

"Besides influence in the political group and EP bodies, the drafting of committee reports (and opinions to other committees) would in my view constitute a crucial element when evaluating the influence of an MEP. There are huge differences in importance between reports, so here qualitative analysis is called for, and it is feasible due to the low number of significant reports and opinions drafted even by a well respected and connected MEP."

So I thought I should provide a bit of wider context about the European Parliament that our MEPs are working in and how that affects their roles.

Currently the EP is centre-right leaning (the centre-right won the Euro elections before as well):

European People's Party (Centre-Right Christan Democrats/conservatives) - 265 MEPs
Socialists and Democrats (the biggest centre-left party) - 184 MEPs
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (centrist) - 85 MEPs
European Greens (plus regionalists and the Pirate Party) - 55 MEPs
European Conservatives and Reformists (the Tory party's new EP grouping & party of James Nicholson) - 54 MEPs
European United Left - Nordic Green Left (far-left & Bairbre de Brún's party) - 35 MEPs
Europe of Freedom and Democracy (far right/nationalists) - 31 MEPs
Non-Aligned (Diane Dodds is in this group) - 27 MEPs

(Total: 736 MEPs - though this could be soon increased to bring it more into line with the Lisbon Treaty amendments of 751 MEPs)

None of the NI MEPs belong to the big 3: the EPP, S&D and the Liberals (ALDE), or even the 4th biggest, the Greens. James Nicholson belongs to the 5th biggest (or 3rd smallest) and Bairbre de Brún belongs to the 6th biggest (or 2nd smallest). The number and size of the parties gives an immediate impression of how hard it would be for an independent to get elected to a prominent Parliamentary position or to get an amendment passed, as the Europarties maneuver for influence (which is why I defined the Independent and Party MEPs as I did).

Belonging to the big parties has some advantage in that MEPs can try to influence the negotiating positions of the big players. And the European Parliament is increasingly important, so it does matter - for example, the EPP proposed Barroso for re-election as Commission President. Barroso was re-elected Commission President by the EP because the EPP won the election (though I don't think there were any EPP parties running for election in the NI or the rest of the UK when the Tories and UUP pulled out of the EPP). This was also partly due to the disarray of the S&D group, who couldn't agree on a candidate.

However, as the Commission is separate from the Parliament, the Parliament works more like a multi-party version of the US House of Representatives than the UK or Irish Parliaments as it's not controlled by the executive. So the parties generally make issue-to-issue coalitions. This means that the ECR isn't necessarily a key player in a pro-government coalition that can influence policy outcomes, so it can be outmaneuvered by the big 3. Indeed, that's what the VoteWatch.eu report on the EP's first 6 months has shown: there tends to be a centre-left winning bloc on civil rights (ALDE + S&D) and a centre-right one on the economy (EPP + ALDE). The ECR hasn't been a big part of winning centre-right coalitions, but has been left out of the loop a lot - indeed the EPP hasn't been on the winning side as often as its dominance would suggest. Perhaps this will change as the term continues if the EPP and ECR draw closer together.

As there's a hierarchy of parties, the bigger parties can get their MEPs on the important rapporteur-ing jobs, etc. Now I'm not suggesting that there's anything wrong with voting for the smaller parties or for independents - they play a role too, and you should vote for the party you want to strengthen in Parliament or the person you want to represent you - but we should be aware that the political battle-lines in Northern Ireland do not necessarily translate into the outcome we want in the European Parliament. If we don't discuss the question of Europarties at the Euro elections, then the election debate looses a lot of its potential value - and we have to ask if we're really making the most of our vote in that situation.

Lack of discussion of Europarties during the elections is widespread throughout the EU, but Northern Ireland is a rare example of a constituency that only returned MEPs that didn't belong to any of the main parties. I'd urge people to check up on their MEP (VoteWatch.eu is a very handy tool for this), and other bloggers and Eurobloggers to check up on and write about their MEPs.

The MEPs' profiles on the Parliament website give links to the speeches, etc., that each MEP has made. I read through these for the NI MEP series (speeches in the EP are generally set at about 1-1.5 minutes long), but for other MEPs in the bigger parties, the rapporteur drafts and Committee work could/should be bigger and provide better meat for investigation. Further into the term there should be more information for a better qualitative analysis.

Northern Ireland's MEPs: One Year On

The 7th European Parliament is a year into its first term since the June 2009 elections, so I’ve decided to take a look at the performance of the 3 Northern Ireland MEPs in the European Parliament over the last year. To do this I’ve looked over the questions and speeches of the MEPs from their plenary adventures on the European Parliament website, and the statistics of their voting patterns and parliamentary work from VoteWatch.eu. The articles on the 3 MEPs are summaries with analysis at the end, so this post will be an overview and contents page for the series.

The “reviews” of the MEPs are supposed to be neutral, and I try to summarise what the focus of each MEP’s work is and some of their general stances and look at the number of questions. All 3 MEPs had submitted under 10 written/oral questions to the Commission that were answered later (or are awaiting an answer). This is in line with MEPs in general: the vast majority seem to have asked 10 questions or less so far (with a few asking a lot more). Since they’re so close in the number of questions, I’ve looked at the “quality” of the questions (how specific they are) and, when assessing them in general, whether they are “party” or “independent” MEPs.

The model of “party” and “independent” MEP is generally:

- Party MEP: an MEP who is part of a Europarty group in the EP. Relevant to this role is how often they vote along with the party (since it shows how far voting for this MEP in elections is voting for that party and their policies/ideological leanings). Party MEPs would have more resources and are likely to be more specialised (focusing on a certain policy) and might depend on other MEPs in the group to deal with other policy areas. Party MEPs would be expected to be more likely to be spokespeople for their parties on issues and/or rapporteurs for the Parliament for a legislative proposal. (A rapporteur writes a report on the legislation and conducts negotiations between the parties to find an acceptable final package to put to the vote). In short: higher profiles and (assumed) greater influence but with less independence.

- Independent MEP: an MEP that doesn’t have the resources of the MEP as they sit outside the party groups. Assumed to be a more “generalist” MEP with time to focus on issues important to the constituency. So less rapporteuring, etc., and more time for asking questions and making speeches.

Nicholson (ECR/UCU-NF) and de Brún (GUE-NGL/Sinn Féin) are party MEPs and Dodds (No Group/DUP) is an independent MEP.

I’ve decided not to pass judgment on the low number of questions in this series – the general aim of the series is to give a loose assessment to show what the MEPs are doing (and give some criticism). This should show what policies they’re focusing on (because the EP does have power and it does do something!), and then you can decide how they’re doing and if you want to test them out for yourself with questions and constituency work. It should be noted that the info this is based on doesn't detail constituency work, so a lot of important contact with constituents isn't included. Nicholson and de Brún get a general “thumbs up” while I would question heavily the value and number of the questions Dodds has submitted.

Running through it is the theme of “independent” versus “party” MEP. I think that in a chamber of 700+ MEPs, having a party and connections is vital to get things done and influence legislation – not to mention providing some form of meaningful choice to the voter. That said, there are always arguments for and against.

James Nicholson (European Conservatives and Reformists/UCU-NF)
Bairbre de Brún (United Left [GUE-NGL]/Sinn Féin)
Diane Dodds (Non Aligned/DUP)

UPDATE: I've added another post to the series, this time looking at the wider context of the European Parliament, and why the bigger parties matter more.

P.S. VoteWatch.eu recently did a study on how the Europarties voted over the first 6 months of the Parliament. I’ve blogged about it here.

Bairbre de Brún MEP: One Year On

[Part of the series on the Northern Irish MEPs' first year in the 7th European Parliament]

Bairbre de Brún (GUE-HGL [United Left]) (Sinn Féin). Member of: the Environment Committee, Petitions Committee and the Delegation to the EU-Croatia Joint Parliamentary Committee. (Substitute on: the Regional Development Committee, Delegation for relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council, Delegation to the Euro-Mediterranian Parliamentary Assembly).

Statistics:
Attendance in plenary: 84.31%
Loyalty to Europarty: 89.88%
Loyalty to national majority: 53.02%
Speeches: 16 (In plenary, 14 [via VoteWatch, which wasn’t updated as recently])
Parliamentary Questions: 8
Motions for resolutions: 7
Written declarations: 0
Reports Amended: 8 (Mostly regarding reports on Climate Change, transport, biodiversity, and the treatment of animals (pets)).
Drafted Reports: 1 (Report on a proposed regulation on animal health requirements for non-commercial movement of pets).
Opinions: 0

De Brún’s speeches mostly cover climate change and animal welfare. On climate change she gave a speech in January advocating a binding international treaty on climate change, and urged for 40% cuts in CO2 emissions by 2020 and of 80-95% by 2050 for the EU, as well as funding for developing countries to combat climate change/clarity on the funding. These figures appear in several speeches and she has spoken for her political group on the matter a few times. Bairbre de Brún has also given speeches on the report on regulations for animal treatment (of pets while being moved) as rapporteur. The legislation concerns the transportation of pets and controls on rabies. In the end a few technical amendments were recommended.

[NOTE: A rapporteur prepares a report on a piece of legislation for the relevant committee and helps conduct negotiates between the political groups on it. The final report contains recommendations to accept, reject or amend the legislation].

When it comes to the Irish language, which is an important issue for de Brún’s national party, Sinn Féin, she gives her speeches in Irish. She has also made a speech on the legislation (now passed) on the access to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings criticising aspects of it where the native tongue might not be used/translated into [Text in Irish, but if you click on video and scroll down the speakers, you can find a translated video speech].

On Parliamentary questions, the 8 questions are on a range of topics. Though there’s no one topic, there is a theme of the environment for a few of the questions. Topics include: Lough Neagh Eels, Genetically Modified Organisms, Foreign Lecturers in Italian Universities (equal pay question), the movement of animals in Ireland, cross-border use of childcare vouchers and the failure of certain member states to implement EU law/questions on whether or not the law was being applied correctly in a certain case. Questions are asked regularly (i.e. roughly monthly rather than a bunch of questions at once), and tend to refer to specific situations and refer to a specific law.

The motions for resolutions are mostly procedural – motions to finish the debate on an issue, etc. The other resolutions are political declarations, and not legislation, on topics such as the Gaza flotilla incident and AIDs.

The reports that de Brún submitted amendments on mostly concern reports on climate change, transport, biodiversity, and the treatment of animals. This shows a specialised role that probably leads on from her membership of the Environment Committee.


Analysis:

Bairbre de Brún’s national party, Sinn Féin, is part of the GUE-NGL group (United Left-Nordic Green Left), so you could say that she plays the role of a party MEP. Groups get certain resources and being part of a political group increases your chances of forming alliances and getting high profile roles such as rapporteur, etc. So the role of the party MEP would be different to an independent MEP. On the whole, it looks like de Brún is asking specific, detailed questions, submitting amendments and motions that are around the same amount as most other MEPs (10 or less for each, though some few MEPs submit a lot more), and drafting/co-drafting a report. She seems very specialised in the environment policy area, and how good this is depends on your idea of the role of the MEP. Specialisation suggests that she is well positioned to influence environmental EU law, and has good party connections (whether or not the party has policies you agree with in this or other areas is another question). But perhaps this means that she doesn’t have as much time for questions/amendments in other policy areas (see the above linked video on the translation legislation, where she claimed not being on a Committee that dealt with that legislation meant that she’d less time to read it and come up with amendments). Other constituency work isn’t measured – we can’t say that these statistics and info show everything an MEP does/can do. Is she doing a good job in her area? Is she doing enough?

My personal opinion on the independent/party MEP aspect is that in a Parliament of 700+ MEPs, you need alliances on policies to get things done, and having them along ideological lines means that the voter can vote for a party that represents a broad line that they can support – pretty much like any other Parliament. Of course there are other advantages and disadvantages to each role. De Brún has voted with the United Left the vast majority of the time (shown by the high “group loyalty” percentage), so voting for Bairbre de Brún as an MEP is a vote to strengthen that party in the Eruopean Parliament, and their policies/ideology can be taken as a rough guide to her political behaviour as an MEP. In my opinion, Bairbre de Brún does a good job as a party MEP.


[For analysis on the other Northern Ireland MEPs and an overall analysis: link]

Votewatch's Report on the European Parliament's First 6 Months

Votewatch.eu have released a report on the status of the Euro-parties in the European Parliament (PDF; as reported in the EUobserver and flagged up by Writing for (y)EU).

Like in the last Parliament, Europarties in the 7th Parliament are increasingly cohesive along Europarty lines rather than national lines. The big increases in cohesiveness were on budget and civil liberties, and deceases in environment and agriculture. The general trend is towards increased cohesion along ideological, Europarty lines, meaning that it's more important for voters to know which Europarty their candidates will sit in when they're electing them.

"In the current European Parliament, MEPs vote primarily along transnational political lines rather than along national lines, as in EP6. Proof of this is the fact that cohesion rates of the four largest European political groups (EPP, S&D, ALDE, and G/EFA) are invariably higher than the cohesion scores of member states’ delegations of MEPs. The only policy area where this does not hold is on agriculture: here, the European political groups are significantly less cohesive than on other policy issues and some national parties (particularly the French and the Scandinavians) vote independently of their group colleagues."

The big surprise is that, despite the big gains in the 2009 elections and the collapse of the S&D vote, the centre-right EPP is less successful in terms of being on the winning sides of votes than in the last Parliament. Likewise, the S&D group is marginally more successful. How did this happen? The answer is that ALDE, the liberal group, is aligning itself more with the S&D group, particularly when it comes to the budget and civil liberties - important areas, given the increased power of the EP in the justice and home affairs and budget areas of policy. Perhaps the centre-left are the overall/marginal "winners" of the Lisbon-era powers of the European Parliament (at least in the first 6 months)? What is known is that the Liberals' kingmaker position is stronger than ever, since with fewer EPP-S&D coalitions, the position of ALDE in forming coalitions with either party usually decides an issue. So this Parliament is general centre-left on civil liberties and the budget, but centre-right on internal market and industry.

The ECR, though I never expected them to be very successful, have turned out to have had a disappointing first 6 months. Despite saying that they will vote with the EPP when they have common interests, it doesn't seem as if the party has been able to form many coalitions with the EPP (or should that be vice-versa?). It should be noted that the ECR has fallen behind the Greens on size since the start of Parliament. The ECR are one of the least successful parties, just ahead of the far-left United Left and the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (the latter trials as the least successful and cohesive group).

But the question is, will the resilience of the centre-left continue to be as successful over the next six months or over the rest of the Parliament's mandate? The ECR and EPP may grow closer together as time passes and the wounds of the Tory-EPP split are put behind them. With the Tories in a coalition government in the UK (a strange ECR-ALDE coalition in EP terms), and a voice in the Council, the ECR may draw closer to the EPP and general Council line, encouraging more centre-right coalitions. On the other hand, if the centre-left continue to build stronger links between them, perhaps come election time there could be more common campaigning (perhaps even coalition campaigns for the Commission presidency?)? (Of course, that's pure speculation - the Europarties have to decide on how common their own campaigns can be first...)