1st December 2009, and the Lisbon Treaty is in force (well, it has amended the two treaties that make up the constitution of the EU, anyway). It's biggest innovations were the extension of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council and the increase of Parliamentary power - the two are pretty much in step. The European Parliament wasn't powerless before, but now it is virtually an equal to the Council, except in areas of unanimity, such as foreign affairs.
So now there's nowhere for Parliament to hide - it has to prove that it's deserving of these powers; that it's willing to go further in holding the to account, in staking out it's own position more clearly from the Commission and Council, and it must go further in transparency - both from itself, and from the Council and Commission. The Commission President's Question Time needs to become more focused as well: now MEPs have more power, they should prove themselves able to get a good handle on the different issues and ask the awkward questions - this doesn't mean ranting on about political points (I'm looking at you, Martin Schulz), but digging around and making sure you put Barroso and other Commissioners on the spot to open up the Commission to real scrutiny.
The hearing of the Commissioners in the run up to the vote in January must be rigorous, revealing, and truly testing for the Commissioners-designate. In particular, Baroness Ashton's positions on Iran, Russia, the Middle East peace process, energy policy, the Eastern Partnership, etc. must be made clear. Likewise, Oettinger needs to be pushed on how he wants to see the EU's energy policy develop; it's an important portfolio, and one that the Commission has proven quick to move on in Barroso I, with important energy market reforms and the implications of climate change politics - is Oettinger up to the job? The Parliament needs to be willing to reject the Commission if it doesn't correspond to its political views; it shouldn't just rely on there being someone who can be easily recognised as objectionable even through a lazy media glance - a list of good policy reasons should be enough. There doesn't need to be a rejection of the Commission just to ritually assert the Parliament's position, but they should make sure the opportunity to shape it doesn't pass them by.
Finally, and as a greater task, all the parties in the Parliament should work to make their mark outside the Brussels Bubble in the public's minds. Better Parliamentary debates help, and will hopefully entice the media to report on them more, but the parties need to make their presence felt more in the mainstream media and at grassroots level. The Citizen's Initiative could be an excellent way of doing this if done right: a campaign for a certain policy for the media to report on, co-operation across borders with common campaigns, engaging people in European politics ("We need your support! This is what we're trying to do for you in Parliament and the EU!") and it builds up at least some recognition of the Euro-parties (or at least the position of the national parties on European issues, which will be helpful in any case come election time).
The Citizen's Initiative requires 1 million signatures across borders, and the Euro-Parties are supposed to help express cross-border political debate. The link and the logic should be obvious, and the party to latch on to it and to runs campaigns well - and follow them up in Parliament effectively - would be laying good groundwork for the 2014 elections.
Now that Lisbon's in force, we deserve a better working Parliament - more transparency, scrutiny and engagement. There are no more excuses for not trying.
Showing posts with label Lisbon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lisbon. Show all posts
Tuesday, 1 December 2009
Tuesday, 10 November 2009
Chasing Brussels #6
Episode 6 of everyone's favourite EU politics podcast (I think that's specific enough to be true)is out now.
This week we discuss the lengths to which the EU went to get Klaus' signature on the dotted line. What does this tell us about the EU's political culture? Can the opt out from a Charter of Rights be justified?
The panel for episode 6:
Joe Litobarski (Host)
Linda Broughton
Myself
This week we discuss the lengths to which the EU went to get Klaus' signature on the dotted line. What does this tell us about the EU's political culture? Can the opt out from a Charter of Rights be justified?
The panel for episode 6:
Joe Litobarski (Host)
Linda Broughton
Myself
Tuesday, 3 November 2009
Lisbon Treaty Ratified: only months of speculation left!
In the course of one day, the Lisbon Treaty has had the challenges against it rejected by the Czech Constitutional Court, and Klaus has finally signed it into law. The Treaty has now been fully ratified in all 27 member states, and the way is clear for it to be brought into force on 1st December.
So ends almost a decade of wrangling, negotiation and debate (of varying degrees of coherence). But fear not, the endless speculation about how the constitutional structure of the EU will evolve isn't over yet - though the prospect of a referendum on the Treaty is off the table for the Conservatives, when they announce their policy tomorrow (some political improv from Cameron, perhaps?), it will almost certainly feature a commitment to tinker further with the EU constitutional system.
The question is: how practical will the Tories be when it comes to their (re)negotiation over competence? When reflecting on the Tories' record on Europe, the capacity for pragmatic engagement isn't particularly confidence-inspiring, especially given the recent news of how much influence hardline Eurosceptics (in particular "Better Off Out" supporter Daniel Hannan) will have on the political thought and direction of the ill-conceived European Conservatives and Reformists Group.
But it's not just that the Conservatives seem stuck in an ideological black hole on Europe; Tory policy making seems to have lost all sense of pragmatism when it comes to constitutional thought - and even all sense of clear thought of how principles should be carried out. This was made clear for me when Cameron spoke on constitutional reform within the UK, which was full of weak sops to parliamentarianism mixed with attacks on judical power and on the concept of entrenched human rights.
Practically speaking, there's not much the Tories can realistically ask for; it will need a lot of political goodwill to get any concessions through, since it will require treaty change, which will be subject to unanimity. Would the UK need to offer something to gain opt outs? The obvious concession would be the Rebate (which is nigh-on indefensible), but it's hard to square this with Eurosceptic thought that the UK is (1) already paying too much, and (2) the appearence that as the UK withdraws from aspects of the EU, it's harder to explain (particularly to an Eurosceptic audience) how paying more is justified. In any case, the concessions the 26 can offer is extremely limited by the nature of the Union (after all, despite the opt-out from the Charter, if legislation is drafted and passed in a way that respects the Charter, the opt-out's practical effect may be limited).
In fact, the rhetoric and practical issues involved mean that it's hard to see how the changes can be either very trival (such as the Economist's passport example) or quite fundamental (to the point of leaving the EU).
And if that doesn't keep you from going into post-Lisbon withdrawal pangs, there'll no doubt be lots of opportunity to analyse how the Lisbon reforms are playing out in practise.
Phew - see? Doesn't sound so bad now, does it?
So ends almost a decade of wrangling, negotiation and debate (of varying degrees of coherence). But fear not, the endless speculation about how the constitutional structure of the EU will evolve isn't over yet - though the prospect of a referendum on the Treaty is off the table for the Conservatives, when they announce their policy tomorrow (some political improv from Cameron, perhaps?), it will almost certainly feature a commitment to tinker further with the EU constitutional system.
The question is: how practical will the Tories be when it comes to their (re)negotiation over competence? When reflecting on the Tories' record on Europe, the capacity for pragmatic engagement isn't particularly confidence-inspiring, especially given the recent news of how much influence hardline Eurosceptics (in particular "Better Off Out" supporter Daniel Hannan) will have on the political thought and direction of the ill-conceived European Conservatives and Reformists Group.
But it's not just that the Conservatives seem stuck in an ideological black hole on Europe; Tory policy making seems to have lost all sense of pragmatism when it comes to constitutional thought - and even all sense of clear thought of how principles should be carried out. This was made clear for me when Cameron spoke on constitutional reform within the UK, which was full of weak sops to parliamentarianism mixed with attacks on judical power and on the concept of entrenched human rights.
Practically speaking, there's not much the Tories can realistically ask for; it will need a lot of political goodwill to get any concessions through, since it will require treaty change, which will be subject to unanimity. Would the UK need to offer something to gain opt outs? The obvious concession would be the Rebate (which is nigh-on indefensible), but it's hard to square this with Eurosceptic thought that the UK is (1) already paying too much, and (2) the appearence that as the UK withdraws from aspects of the EU, it's harder to explain (particularly to an Eurosceptic audience) how paying more is justified. In any case, the concessions the 26 can offer is extremely limited by the nature of the Union (after all, despite the opt-out from the Charter, if legislation is drafted and passed in a way that respects the Charter, the opt-out's practical effect may be limited).
In fact, the rhetoric and practical issues involved mean that it's hard to see how the changes can be either very trival (such as the Economist's passport example) or quite fundamental (to the point of leaving the EU).
And if that doesn't keep you from going into post-Lisbon withdrawal pangs, there'll no doubt be lots of opportunity to analyse how the Lisbon reforms are playing out in practise.
Phew - see? Doesn't sound so bad now, does it?
Sunday, 4 October 2009
Does time heal all policy wounds?
David Cameron's European policy seems purely aimed at placating the anti-EU wing of the Conservative party, perhaps the sole aspect of the unappealing Old Tory party that has been openly embraced by Cameron, who has tried to modernise the party and shift it towards the centre. This has given the policy an ad hoc quality, and has allowed it to be driven largely by shadow foreign minister William Hague and Tory MEP Daniel Hannan. I say ad hoc because, though the Tories' European policy can easily be identified as Euroskeptic, it's harder to see the actual goal of the policy. And surely to have a successful policy, you need to know where you want to go?
The policy - insofar as it exists as a conscious policy - is also ad hoc because the principles behind it that are on display, aren't really backed up with action after the symbolic move has been taken. Though the Tories have tried to present the ECR Group in the European Parliament as the "first real opposition" and the separation from the EPP as the opportunity to give people a chance to vote for a sceptic, non-withdrawalist grouping, scant attention has been paid to the ECR apart from its scandals (of which it has quite a few for such a young party). In fact, the Group doesn't even have it's own website - this was brilliantly exposed by Jon Worth's cybersquatting. But then, the aim was never to advance a political ideology, but to bin Europe as an issue in the Tory party altogether. The move to the ECR will therefore result in a loss of influence in the European Parliament, while not advancing any clear political vision. It has also started to damage relations with former EPP sister parties like the CDU - as the BBC reports:
Though pragmatism will mean that the UK won't be completely isolated in the Council under a Tory government, the Tories will have to work and lobby harder to construct issue-by-issue alliances.
The promise of a referendum over the Lisbon Treaty brings the Tory dilemma over European policy to a head (though it naturally won't be resolved given the dangers the issue poses to party unity). Since the UK Parliament has already ratified the Treaty, it would be an incredible reversal of UK foreign policy to push for its retrospective rejection in a referendum - especially if the Treaty has come into force. Tearing up (or attempting to tear up) a painstakingly negotiated compromise is also unlikely to help with mending fences after the EPP split. Perhaps most importantly for Cameron's likely government: it would also open a can of worms for the Tory government - with no clear party vision on what it wants out of Europe, and with the fragile unity the party has on Europe, can a Tory government seriously renegotiate a relationship with the EU that's: (a) acceptable to the whole Conservative party; (b) acceptable to the other member states; and (c) legally and practically possible? And that's without taking into account the vast economic problems the Cameron government would have to face, as well as the questionable populism with which the Conservatives are approaching constitutional reform in general.
So what's Tory policy towards the EU if the Treaty is in force if/when they come to power? Either there's a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty or on EU membership, or there's an attempt at renegotiating back competences, which would require a clear idea of what exactly the Conservatives want, and what they think the EU is for. It would have been better for Cameron if Ireland had voted No and taken the flak for binning the Treaty, so that the Tories could advance their aims, such as they are, without a loss in diplomatic, political capital and party unity. But now Cameron has to make a choice.
At the heart of the Tory dilemma is that it wants to see reform the EU, without exactly knowing what it wants from the EU. Presumably withdrawalism, though vocal in the form of Cash and Hannan, remains a minority opinion in the party since the ECR is more geared towards retaining and advancing the single market aspects of the EU while supporting deregulation and reversing integration. Yet the die-hard anti-EU wing of the party has managed to exert considerable influence on European policy, because the withdrawalists are the only wing of the party that have a clear vision of the UK's relationship with the EU and also enough momentum in the form of the policy concessions they've won from the party leadership to drive their agenda.
Cameron effectively lost control of European policy from day 1 when he promised that the Conservatives would leave the EPP, since he can't push for a more moderate form of scepticism. This creates real problems for him, because the belligerent style of current Tory policy makes progress on even moderate aspects of Tory European policy almost impossible to achieve. The European question won't go away - time won't solve this one. Splitting from the EPP means that Cameron can't hide from the European question by just muddling along as before. Cameron has signalled a change in Tory policy toward Europe, even if substantive change wasn't intended, and with little control over the expectations his party creates, Cameron is likely to be dogged by the issue if he can't deliver.
The policy - insofar as it exists as a conscious policy - is also ad hoc because the principles behind it that are on display, aren't really backed up with action after the symbolic move has been taken. Though the Tories have tried to present the ECR Group in the European Parliament as the "first real opposition" and the separation from the EPP as the opportunity to give people a chance to vote for a sceptic, non-withdrawalist grouping, scant attention has been paid to the ECR apart from its scandals (of which it has quite a few for such a young party). In fact, the Group doesn't even have it's own website - this was brilliantly exposed by Jon Worth's cybersquatting. But then, the aim was never to advance a political ideology, but to bin Europe as an issue in the Tory party altogether. The move to the ECR will therefore result in a loss of influence in the European Parliament, while not advancing any clear political vision. It has also started to damage relations with former EPP sister parties like the CDU - as the BBC reports:
"Joint policy groups have been scrapped and an annual meeting has been cancelled. [...] Mr Altmaier [from the CDU] acknowledged that the working groups had concluded their work, but added that when the time came to form new ones the CDU would be looking to their partners in the EPP. [...] He added that, for the same reason, no Tory MPs had been invited to come to Germany as observers during the recent election campaign, as they usually would have been."
Though pragmatism will mean that the UK won't be completely isolated in the Council under a Tory government, the Tories will have to work and lobby harder to construct issue-by-issue alliances.
The promise of a referendum over the Lisbon Treaty brings the Tory dilemma over European policy to a head (though it naturally won't be resolved given the dangers the issue poses to party unity). Since the UK Parliament has already ratified the Treaty, it would be an incredible reversal of UK foreign policy to push for its retrospective rejection in a referendum - especially if the Treaty has come into force. Tearing up (or attempting to tear up) a painstakingly negotiated compromise is also unlikely to help with mending fences after the EPP split. Perhaps most importantly for Cameron's likely government: it would also open a can of worms for the Tory government - with no clear party vision on what it wants out of Europe, and with the fragile unity the party has on Europe, can a Tory government seriously renegotiate a relationship with the EU that's: (a) acceptable to the whole Conservative party; (b) acceptable to the other member states; and (c) legally and practically possible? And that's without taking into account the vast economic problems the Cameron government would have to face, as well as the questionable populism with which the Conservatives are approaching constitutional reform in general.
So what's Tory policy towards the EU if the Treaty is in force if/when they come to power? Either there's a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty or on EU membership, or there's an attempt at renegotiating back competences, which would require a clear idea of what exactly the Conservatives want, and what they think the EU is for. It would have been better for Cameron if Ireland had voted No and taken the flak for binning the Treaty, so that the Tories could advance their aims, such as they are, without a loss in diplomatic, political capital and party unity. But now Cameron has to make a choice.
At the heart of the Tory dilemma is that it wants to see reform the EU, without exactly knowing what it wants from the EU. Presumably withdrawalism, though vocal in the form of Cash and Hannan, remains a minority opinion in the party since the ECR is more geared towards retaining and advancing the single market aspects of the EU while supporting deregulation and reversing integration. Yet the die-hard anti-EU wing of the party has managed to exert considerable influence on European policy, because the withdrawalists are the only wing of the party that have a clear vision of the UK's relationship with the EU and also enough momentum in the form of the policy concessions they've won from the party leadership to drive their agenda.
Cameron effectively lost control of European policy from day 1 when he promised that the Conservatives would leave the EPP, since he can't push for a more moderate form of scepticism. This creates real problems for him, because the belligerent style of current Tory policy makes progress on even moderate aspects of Tory European policy almost impossible to achieve. The European question won't go away - time won't solve this one. Splitting from the EPP means that Cameron can't hide from the European question by just muddling along as before. Cameron has signalled a change in Tory policy toward Europe, even if substantive change wasn't intended, and with little control over the expectations his party creates, Cameron is likely to be dogged by the issue if he can't deliver.
Saturday, 3 October 2009
Lisbon passed with 67.1% voting Yes
It's official: the Irish people have voted Yes to the Lisbon Treaty, with a big swing from the first result (53% No) to 67.1% Yes. With the Polish President promising to add his signature to the Parliamentary ratification of the Treaty, the only real obsticle left for full ratification is President Klaus of the Czech Republic.
Nosemonkey has already examined the question of the referendum's legitimacy.
Will he hold out long enough for a Tory government to be elected in the UK? It probably depends on the fate of another challenge some Czech senators are making against the Treaty in the Constitutional court. If the challenge is thrown out, it will become nigh impossible politically for Klaus to hold out - after all, he is only an indirectly elected figure-head head of state.
Kosmopolito has asked whether this marks the end of the road for big EU treaties and if smaller, single-issue treaties are the way forward. I think that single issue treaties would be a great move: presenting a clear-cut issue would go a long way to ensuring that future debates can stick on topic. However, the image of a complicated tangle of competences and treaty law isn't appealing - I would prefer a unanimious system rather than an opt-in, opt-out ad hoc one.
Grahnlaw has already called for greater transparency under the Lisbon setup, and has set out quite clearly what he would like to see happen. I'd love to see it myself, but I can't say I think it will quite happen....
Finally, happy Unity Day to Germany! Froehe Tag der Deutschen Einheit!
Nosemonkey has already examined the question of the referendum's legitimacy.
Will he hold out long enough for a Tory government to be elected in the UK? It probably depends on the fate of another challenge some Czech senators are making against the Treaty in the Constitutional court. If the challenge is thrown out, it will become nigh impossible politically for Klaus to hold out - after all, he is only an indirectly elected figure-head head of state.
Kosmopolito has asked whether this marks the end of the road for big EU treaties and if smaller, single-issue treaties are the way forward. I think that single issue treaties would be a great move: presenting a clear-cut issue would go a long way to ensuring that future debates can stick on topic. However, the image of a complicated tangle of competences and treaty law isn't appealing - I would prefer a unanimious system rather than an opt-in, opt-out ad hoc one.
Grahnlaw has already called for greater transparency under the Lisbon setup, and has set out quite clearly what he would like to see happen. I'd love to see it myself, but I can't say I think it will quite happen....
Finally, happy Unity Day to Germany! Froehe Tag der Deutschen Einheit!
Friday, 2 October 2009
Referendum Day
So today's the big day, and Ireland is going to the polls to vote on the Lisbon Treaty in a referendum. I'm hoping for a Yes, and I'd encourage Irish voters to vote for a Yes for 4 main, simple reasons:
1. It will strengthen the European Parliament. The Treaty gives the EP a greater say over EU legislation and the EU budget, which gives our vote in the European elections more weight.
2. It will involve national parliaments more in the EU legislative process. It give national parliaments a greater opportunity to scrutinize EU draft legislation and allows a "yellow card" system so they can register disapproval or subsidarity concerns.
3. It forces the Council to vote in the open - increasing transparency and accountability.
4. It gives the Charter of Fundamental Rights the force of law, enshrining human rights and workers' rights so that EU law has to comply with these standards.
In other words, I hope for a Yes result because the Lisbon Treaty, while imperfect, enables the EU to work better, and strengthens democracy, transparency and human rights in the EU.
The result will be revealed on Saturday, since counting doesn't start until then. There is a live blog on Irish Election.
1. It will strengthen the European Parliament. The Treaty gives the EP a greater say over EU legislation and the EU budget, which gives our vote in the European elections more weight.
2. It will involve national parliaments more in the EU legislative process. It give national parliaments a greater opportunity to scrutinize EU draft legislation and allows a "yellow card" system so they can register disapproval or subsidarity concerns.
3. It forces the Council to vote in the open - increasing transparency and accountability.
4. It gives the Charter of Fundamental Rights the force of law, enshrining human rights and workers' rights so that EU law has to comply with these standards.
In other words, I hope for a Yes result because the Lisbon Treaty, while imperfect, enables the EU to work better, and strengthens democracy, transparency and human rights in the EU.
The result will be revealed on Saturday, since counting doesn't start until then. There is a live blog on Irish Election.
Monday, 14 September 2009
Ganley's Back
A few days ago, @stevenconlon found some indications in the Wall Street Journal that Declan Ganley would return to the referendum debate on Lisbon despite saying that he would not campaign if he wasn't elected to the European Parliament in June (and since he wasn't elected...).
And yesterday he announced his return to the campaign:
"The truth does not require a mandate"* - a fun line that simultaneously tries to reverse the relevance of his electoral defeat, while also claiming legitimacy from an abstract value. Ganley mandated by truth to campaign for a No? Well, it's good to know that someone has access to universal truths (well, treaty-related ones anyway).
Hopefully he won't be too adverse to the Referendum Commission answering questions.
*Sadly unlikely to work in everyday life situations.
"His name is Declan Ganley. He was one of the driving forces behind the No campaign the last time around, and he's back to do it again. Your correspondent recently sat down with him to find out what he's fighting for in trying to see to it that Ireland once again votes No to Lisbon"
And yesterday he announced his return to the campaign:
"“It’s anybody’s right and privilege to change their mind,” he said yesterday. The Yes side were asking the Irish people to change their mind on Lisbon. “I didn’t want to re-engage in this debate. It wasn’t something that I relished.”
But he continued: “This isn’t about me, I’m not important in this. This is about Ireland’s place in the European Union . . . it’s about my country, a country that I love and it’s about standing up for the truth when people are telling huge lies, and the truth does not require a mandate.”
He said that “listening to this cacophony of half-truths and misleading campaigning – it’s just become unbearable”. He said the European Commission had “crossed a line that should never have been crossed and started to interfere in a constitutional debate in a member state”."
"The truth does not require a mandate"* - a fun line that simultaneously tries to reverse the relevance of his electoral defeat, while also claiming legitimacy from an abstract value. Ganley mandated by truth to campaign for a No? Well, it's good to know that someone has access to universal truths (well, treaty-related ones anyway).
Hopefully he won't be too adverse to the Referendum Commission answering questions.
*Sadly unlikely to work in everyday life situations.
Friday, 11 September 2009
Bloggers For Europe
A new website has started up this week focusing on the Lisbon Referendum: Bloggers For Europe. It's a pro-Lisbon blogging group, that will be blogging about the referendum campaign and Lisbon news. You can visit it here.
I've been invited to be part of the group, and I've just posted my first article on the Charter of Fundamental Rights - here.
I've been invited to be part of the group, and I've just posted my first article on the Charter of Fundamental Rights - here.
Sunday, 6 September 2009
The 26+1 Formula
In an interview with the Irish Times, the Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt floated the idea of a 26+1 solution to the legal problem of the Commission's size if Lisbon was voted down in the Irish referendum on October 2nd. Though he warned against a No vote, Reinfeldt said that the Swedish presidency was thinking of a back-up plan in the case that the Treaty is rejected:
However, he also said that the time could come when the Commission needs to be reduced:
It's an issue that I've argued we can't duck forever, but it's clear that for the foreseeable future there will be attempts to keep the Commission as big as possible. That's not to say that this is a definite Plan B - Reinfeldt has only described it as an "option", and there's no written political commitment from the entire Council, in comparison with the Lisbon Treaty guarantees. Since the No side rejects the validity or trustworthiness of these guarantees, it's hard to see how they could (honestly) capitalise on this statement as a "guarantee" for the No side. There are still some states in favour of slimming down the Commission (particularly Germany), and the original Lisbon system of a member state having a Commissioner for 10 out of every 15 years could be revived in some form in the case of a No vote.
Still, a No vote represents political uncertainty when it comes to European constitutional reform. Even though amendments to the Treaties must be unanimously passed, the fact remains that the member states are still sovereign states who can decide to carry on in a different direction if need be. The idea of a multi-speed or two-tier Europe isn't a fanciful idea, especially given the range of opt-outs and opt-ins there are already. Since the last 9 years have been focused on achieving a common agreement; if Lisbon is rejected without any clear path or solution for the way forward (i.e. do we know what we would want changed, and is it possible politically to change it?), then a multi-speed Europe can't be ruled out.
"Mr Reinfeldt said talks have been held about what to do if there is a No vote, particularly on how to comply with the Nice treaty provision that mandates an immediate reduction in size of the next European Commission.
...
Mr Reinfeldt said a “26 plus one option” was probably the best solution, whereby 26 states retain their commissioner and the 27th state is offered the post of high representative for foreign affairs instead. This would give all 27 countries a top EU job, while complying with the legal condition for an EU executive of less than 27 members, which is stipulated in the Nice treaty."
However, he also said that the time could come when the Commission needs to be reduced:
"But he said was still a question about the efficiency of having up to 30 commissioners in an EU executive if further enlargement occurred. “We might in the future get back to this discussion. What if we keep on enlarging? But for now it’s very important that this was a call from the Irish people and we have met it. I know this was a factor in the Irish referendum.”"
It's an issue that I've argued we can't duck forever, but it's clear that for the foreseeable future there will be attempts to keep the Commission as big as possible. That's not to say that this is a definite Plan B - Reinfeldt has only described it as an "option", and there's no written political commitment from the entire Council, in comparison with the Lisbon Treaty guarantees. Since the No side rejects the validity or trustworthiness of these guarantees, it's hard to see how they could (honestly) capitalise on this statement as a "guarantee" for the No side. There are still some states in favour of slimming down the Commission (particularly Germany), and the original Lisbon system of a member state having a Commissioner for 10 out of every 15 years could be revived in some form in the case of a No vote.
Still, a No vote represents political uncertainty when it comes to European constitutional reform. Even though amendments to the Treaties must be unanimously passed, the fact remains that the member states are still sovereign states who can decide to carry on in a different direction if need be. The idea of a multi-speed or two-tier Europe isn't a fanciful idea, especially given the range of opt-outs and opt-ins there are already. Since the last 9 years have been focused on achieving a common agreement; if Lisbon is rejected without any clear path or solution for the way forward (i.e. do we know what we would want changed, and is it possible politically to change it?), then a multi-speed Europe can't be ruled out.
Thursday, 3 September 2009
The 6-point Pro-Lisbon Argument on Workers' Rights
RTÉ's Prime Time tonight hosted a debate on workers' rights between Pat Cox and Joe Higgins. There wasn't a lot of time for a detailed debate, and, though Cox did better than many Pro-Lisbon spokespeople to state the Yes side's case, he was unable to land a killer blow - the argument is just too technical to do that.
I've already argued that the Lisbon Treaty is the best possible strengthening of workers' rights that can be achieved at this time (no matter what your stance on how far workers should have legally enshrined rights). Still, my argument was a lot one, and not really light reading, never mind being suited to a 10 minute TV debate or conversation.
So here's a 6-point Pro-Lisbon Argument on workers' rights:
1. Before Lisbon, under the current (Nice) status quo, the Charter of Fundamental Rights had no legal status, so it has no real bearing on the ECJ cases being quoted by the No side.
2. Ratifying the Lisbon Treaty will make the Charter part of Treaty law: in other words, part of the EU's fundamental law. Then they can be used in court cases (to do with EU law, not national law).
3. It doesn't matter that there's only going to be a Solemn Declaration supporting the Charter rather than a protocol - the Treaty gives the Charter direct legal effect in the first place!
4. If we vote No, this won't happen, and the status quo will continue. The ECJ's behaviour won't change, as the law will remain the same.
5. With the European Parliament dominated by the right after the elections in June, and with the vast majority of EU governments being right wing, there is no short-to-mid-term realistic chance of coming up with a stronger, legally binding Charter on workers' rights. Especially since the UK would block any such attempt, even under a Labour government.
6. In any case, secondary legislation could give extra rights; however, this requires that you can get enough votes and MPs/MEPs on a left-wing political programme to legislate in that way. Like, you know, parliamentary democracy?
So there's a 6-point argument that you can make that's relatively short and (hopefully) understandable enough without going into too much detail. You can even shorten it further if you need to.
I've already argued that the Lisbon Treaty is the best possible strengthening of workers' rights that can be achieved at this time (no matter what your stance on how far workers should have legally enshrined rights). Still, my argument was a lot one, and not really light reading, never mind being suited to a 10 minute TV debate or conversation.
So here's a 6-point Pro-Lisbon Argument on workers' rights:
1. Before Lisbon, under the current (Nice) status quo, the Charter of Fundamental Rights had no legal status, so it has no real bearing on the ECJ cases being quoted by the No side.
2. Ratifying the Lisbon Treaty will make the Charter part of Treaty law: in other words, part of the EU's fundamental law. Then they can be used in court cases (to do with EU law, not national law).
3. It doesn't matter that there's only going to be a Solemn Declaration supporting the Charter rather than a protocol - the Treaty gives the Charter direct legal effect in the first place!
4. If we vote No, this won't happen, and the status quo will continue. The ECJ's behaviour won't change, as the law will remain the same.
5. With the European Parliament dominated by the right after the elections in June, and with the vast majority of EU governments being right wing, there is no short-to-mid-term realistic chance of coming up with a stronger, legally binding Charter on workers' rights. Especially since the UK would block any such attempt, even under a Labour government.
6. In any case, secondary legislation could give extra rights; however, this requires that you can get enough votes and MPs/MEPs on a left-wing political programme to legislate in that way. Like, you know, parliamentary democracy?
So there's a 6-point argument that you can make that's relatively short and (hopefully) understandable enough without going into too much detail. You can even shorten it further if you need to.
Wednesday, 2 September 2009
You've gotta fight, for your right, to... have your Charter Rights applied by the ECJ (?)
Workers rights is an important issue in the politics of the anti-Lisbon party Sinn Féin (the only anti-Treaty party in the Dáil), and of Joe Higgins, the leader of the Socialist Party, and Ireland's only anti-Lisbon MEP since the European elections in June. It's also an issue in the upcoming referendum, with Pat Cox and Joe Higgins arguing across the pages of the Irish Times, and with the second largest union in Ireland, Unite, calling for a No vote on October 2nd.
The argument against the Treaty when it comes to workers rights is based on recent ECJ case law that has favoured employers over employees (Viking, Laval, Ruffert and Luxembourg), and the weakness of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which would become part of the EU's primary law should Lisbon come into force. While the Charter would mean that weight needs to be given to the rights it contains when applying EU law, it is argued that it doesn't go far enough, and that it will affect national law adversely by weakening existing national workers' rights/it won't affect national law enough, leaving workers with weak national law workers' rights.
Bernard Harbor, of the trade union Impact, countered that, by ratifying Lisbon and by making the Charter part of the EU's primary law, workers' rights would be strengthened. In his article he makes the common sense argument that if workers' rights aren't well enough protected under Treaty law, then surely making the Charter part of the primary law is a concrete step in the right direction, even if it doesn't tick every box on your wish list. And from the point of view that European market law has been anti-worker, the opportunity to enshrine social and workers' rights in Treaty law is (or should be) one to be taken.
Rejecting the Lisbon Treaty would just ensure that the status quo continues - and it's hard to see how a No result will advance the cause of workers' rights. It won't rid the single market of its four guiding legal freedoms that inform the ECJ's judgments: of goods, services, workers and capital; and it won't add to the rights of workers.
Is a stronger Charter possible? It's hard to see how the far left can seriously believe so.
First, it's always easier to water reform down than to force greater change, especially if you hope to force greater reform by obstructing a reform package.
Second, it's hard to force greater reform when it effects the basic legal make-up of the EU, when you've pushed for guarantees and opt-outs in other areas. Does Sinn Féin really believe that it will get the UK (among others) to agree to more workers' rights across the single market when Sinn Féin has strongly promoted the idea of sovereignty and veto rights in its rhetoric, and when Ireland has negotiated guarantees and protections against the extent (real and imagined) of EU law?
While the guarantees were negotiated by the government and not Sinn Féin (and Sinn Féin finds the guarantees unacceptable), they did want the treaty to be re-negotiated. In such circumstances it would be strange to see Sinn Féin defending sovereignty on tax matters in the face of the French government on the basis that it would adversely affect the Irish economy to have tax harmonisation, while at the same time arguing that the UK is wrong to reject a stronger binding Charter for economic reasons.
Which brings us to three: there simply isn't the political support for stronger/more detailed workers' rights to be enshrined in the treaty beyond the Lisbon Treaty reforms. Indeed, at the last European elections the cente-left PASD did badly across Europe while the conservative EPP remained in top position. And Sinn Féin and the Socialist Party belong to the much, much smaller far-left group GUE-NGL group. Both the European Parliament and the Council have right-wing majorities: indeed, the composition of the Council is especially important, given that it consists of the governments who would negotiate a new treaty. The Council has a massive right-wing majority with 18 EPP and Liberal governments to 7 PASD and European Left governments (with 2 independent governments that aren't likely to swing leftwards). In addition, the UK, Spanish and Portugese PASD governments support a second Barroso Commission Presidency - as Barroso is from the EPP political family, this doesn't bode well for the support a stronger treaty on workers' rights would receive from even the left-lending governments in the Council. And that's before considering the likihood of a Tory government in the UK during a re-negotiation, who are strongly against the Lisbon treaty, arguing that it goes too far - could the Irish far-left convince them to vote their way?
In short, the idea that Ireland, where the far left parties are a small minority, could force through such a reform through a No vote is fantasy.
Voting against the Lisbon Treaty because it isn't 100% perfect is a strange political position to take. The Treaty is a compromise between 27 states. As with any compromise we must ask ourselves: does it improve things, and does it represent the best improvement that can be achieved through compromise? So far the far-left have failed in putting forward any positive, pragmatic and achievable alternative vision.
The argument against the Treaty when it comes to workers rights is based on recent ECJ case law that has favoured employers over employees (Viking, Laval, Ruffert and Luxembourg), and the weakness of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which would become part of the EU's primary law should Lisbon come into force. While the Charter would mean that weight needs to be given to the rights it contains when applying EU law, it is argued that it doesn't go far enough, and that it will affect national law adversely by weakening existing national workers' rights/it won't affect national law enough, leaving workers with weak national law workers' rights.
Bernard Harbor, of the trade union Impact, countered that, by ratifying Lisbon and by making the Charter part of the EU's primary law, workers' rights would be strengthened. In his article he makes the common sense argument that if workers' rights aren't well enough protected under Treaty law, then surely making the Charter part of the primary law is a concrete step in the right direction, even if it doesn't tick every box on your wish list. And from the point of view that European market law has been anti-worker, the opportunity to enshrine social and workers' rights in Treaty law is (or should be) one to be taken.
Rejecting the Lisbon Treaty would just ensure that the status quo continues - and it's hard to see how a No result will advance the cause of workers' rights. It won't rid the single market of its four guiding legal freedoms that inform the ECJ's judgments: of goods, services, workers and capital; and it won't add to the rights of workers.
Is a stronger Charter possible? It's hard to see how the far left can seriously believe so.
First, it's always easier to water reform down than to force greater change, especially if you hope to force greater reform by obstructing a reform package.
Second, it's hard to force greater reform when it effects the basic legal make-up of the EU, when you've pushed for guarantees and opt-outs in other areas. Does Sinn Féin really believe that it will get the UK (among others) to agree to more workers' rights across the single market when Sinn Féin has strongly promoted the idea of sovereignty and veto rights in its rhetoric, and when Ireland has negotiated guarantees and protections against the extent (real and imagined) of EU law?
While the guarantees were negotiated by the government and not Sinn Féin (and Sinn Féin finds the guarantees unacceptable), they did want the treaty to be re-negotiated. In such circumstances it would be strange to see Sinn Féin defending sovereignty on tax matters in the face of the French government on the basis that it would adversely affect the Irish economy to have tax harmonisation, while at the same time arguing that the UK is wrong to reject a stronger binding Charter for economic reasons.
Which brings us to three: there simply isn't the political support for stronger/more detailed workers' rights to be enshrined in the treaty beyond the Lisbon Treaty reforms. Indeed, at the last European elections the cente-left PASD did badly across Europe while the conservative EPP remained in top position. And Sinn Féin and the Socialist Party belong to the much, much smaller far-left group GUE-NGL group. Both the European Parliament and the Council have right-wing majorities: indeed, the composition of the Council is especially important, given that it consists of the governments who would negotiate a new treaty. The Council has a massive right-wing majority with 18 EPP and Liberal governments to 7 PASD and European Left governments (with 2 independent governments that aren't likely to swing leftwards). In addition, the UK, Spanish and Portugese PASD governments support a second Barroso Commission Presidency - as Barroso is from the EPP political family, this doesn't bode well for the support a stronger treaty on workers' rights would receive from even the left-lending governments in the Council. And that's before considering the likihood of a Tory government in the UK during a re-negotiation, who are strongly against the Lisbon treaty, arguing that it goes too far - could the Irish far-left convince them to vote their way?
In short, the idea that Ireland, where the far left parties are a small minority, could force through such a reform through a No vote is fantasy.
Voting against the Lisbon Treaty because it isn't 100% perfect is a strange political position to take. The Treaty is a compromise between 27 states. As with any compromise we must ask ourselves: does it improve things, and does it represent the best improvement that can be achieved through compromise? So far the far-left have failed in putting forward any positive, pragmatic and achievable alternative vision.
Thursday, 20 August 2009
The Economics of Lisbon
There are 43 days left until Ireland votes again on the Lisbon Treaty, but it doesn't look like there's much campaigning by the main political parties on the issue. The politicians are on their holidays, but you would think that there would be more activity considering the vote is so vital (politically, at least, if nothing else).
And the arguments being made, when they are made, haven't been fantastic. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was on the radio earlier today speaking of the importance ratification has for Ireland's economy recovery. This message was reinforced by Intel, which has come out in favour of the Treaty:
Intel was heavily fined by the European Commission for anti-competitive practices in May.
I am uncomfortable with this line of argument being almost the sole argument for the Treaty. The Treaty in and of itself doesn't contain an economic strategy or anything, so it doesn't directly impact on Ireland's economics. On the other hand, politics does affect how businesses view a country and can inform their decision of whether or not to invest there. Since one of the major selling points of Ireland for foreign investment is that it can be a base for companies within the single market (from which they can sell products or services across the EU without facing trade barriers), Ireland's political position within the EU could affect its standing in business circles.
While there may be a political point behind this argument, this is not what the Treaty is about. So it shouldn't be the sole argument for voting Yes (as opposed to arguments merely against voting No). It's not enough to say that the Treaty won't damage Ireland's interests in certain areas; the Treaty itself must be "sold" to the public.
The Lisbon Treaty gives more say over EU legislation to the European Parliament, greater say to national parliaments, a right of petition to citizens, gives the Charter of Fundamental rights the status of primary law, and extends QMV in the Council as well as making Council votes public.
Another speech today by the Minister of Foreign Affairs did a better job; hopefully the quality of the Yes campaign will be better this time.
Or am I being too demanding in what I expect from the Yes side of the debate?
And the arguments being made, when they are made, haven't been fantastic. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was on the radio earlier today speaking of the importance ratification has for Ireland's economy recovery. This message was reinforced by Intel, which has come out in favour of the Treaty:
"Intel Ireland's General Manager said voting Yes to Lisbon would maintain Ireland's attractiveness to multi-national investors.
Jim O'Hara said US multi-nationals and international investors have viewed Ireland as playing a central role in Europe and it is one of the reasons why they have invested here.
He said anything that would enhance that perception would be a good thing and every time we create uncertainty and doubt it does not help us.
Mr O'Hara said the company's call for a Yes vote was an unusual move but he wanted to send a clear message that from a business perspective a Yes vote mattered to the future prosperity and growth of Ireland.
He said last time he and others did not speak up on this crucial issue as they believed a Yes vote was a foregone conclusion."
Intel was heavily fined by the European Commission for anti-competitive practices in May.
I am uncomfortable with this line of argument being almost the sole argument for the Treaty. The Treaty in and of itself doesn't contain an economic strategy or anything, so it doesn't directly impact on Ireland's economics. On the other hand, politics does affect how businesses view a country and can inform their decision of whether or not to invest there. Since one of the major selling points of Ireland for foreign investment is that it can be a base for companies within the single market (from which they can sell products or services across the EU without facing trade barriers), Ireland's political position within the EU could affect its standing in business circles.
While there may be a political point behind this argument, this is not what the Treaty is about. So it shouldn't be the sole argument for voting Yes (as opposed to arguments merely against voting No). It's not enough to say that the Treaty won't damage Ireland's interests in certain areas; the Treaty itself must be "sold" to the public.
The Lisbon Treaty gives more say over EU legislation to the European Parliament, greater say to national parliaments, a right of petition to citizens, gives the Charter of Fundamental rights the status of primary law, and extends QMV in the Council as well as making Council votes public.
Another speech today by the Minister of Foreign Affairs did a better job; hopefully the quality of the Yes campaign will be better this time.
Or am I being too demanding in what I expect from the Yes side of the debate?
Friday, 31 July 2009
Back Again
I'm back after a short break from blogging (though it seems to be pretty quiet generally due to the summer). So I'll be back blogging again - today or tomorrow, time depending - but for those who are interested in Lisbon II and the Irish blasphemy law:
Lisbon II - Stephen Spillane has been updating us here. Among other things, the Green Party has voted to campaign for a yes, which requires a super-majority of 2/3 of the party. Last time they were just under the 2/3 threshold, and members were free to campaign on whichever side they wanted.
On the blasphemy Act (or the Defamation Act 2009, to give it it's proper title), Dr. Eoin O'Dell of Trinity College Dublin has some brilliant posts on his blog cearta.ie setting out analysis and argument past the traditional free speech arguments you might hear condensed in the media. Read in particular this and this.
In other news, I've been selected to take part in the second round of Th!nk About It! The second round will be focused on climate change and the Copenhagen Conference this winter. I'm looking forward to the launch event in Copenhagen this September - hopefully I can pick up a few things to improve my blogging. I'm particularly interested in how climate change and environmental law is/will be dealt with in Stormont and Brussels, and on how agreement will (might?) be reached at Copenhagen. I can't see Stormont being up to speed on the environment (for a while we had an environment minister [Sammy Wilson] who publicly disagreed with the climate change policy of the Executive and his party, and who blocked climate change public broadcasts from being aired).
Lisbon II - Stephen Spillane has been updating us here. Among other things, the Green Party has voted to campaign for a yes, which requires a super-majority of 2/3 of the party. Last time they were just under the 2/3 threshold, and members were free to campaign on whichever side they wanted.
On the blasphemy Act (or the Defamation Act 2009, to give it it's proper title), Dr. Eoin O'Dell of Trinity College Dublin has some brilliant posts on his blog cearta.ie setting out analysis and argument past the traditional free speech arguments you might hear condensed in the media. Read in particular this and this.
In other news, I've been selected to take part in the second round of Th!nk About It! The second round will be focused on climate change and the Copenhagen Conference this winter. I'm looking forward to the launch event in Copenhagen this September - hopefully I can pick up a few things to improve my blogging. I'm particularly interested in how climate change and environmental law is/will be dealt with in Stormont and Brussels, and on how agreement will (might?) be reached at Copenhagen. I can't see Stormont being up to speed on the environment (for a while we had an environment minister [Sammy Wilson] who publicly disagreed with the climate change policy of the Executive and his party, and who blocked climate change public broadcasts from being aired).
Thursday, 16 July 2009
A strong President of the European Council?
There's been a sudden burst of activity across the EU-Bloggosphere over the re-emerging story that Tony Blair might run for the Presidency of the European Council (which is not the presidency of Europe) after Lady Kinnock slipped up by saying that the UK government is giving Blair full backing in his bid - as Charlemagne explains, Blair's not actually running (yet). There are many reasons why Blair should not get the job; they've been covered by Child of Europe, and very comprehensively by Crystals and Gaish.
But there's another issue here: should the post of President of the European Council be a weak or strong one? A weak one would be a "chairman" role, where the president merely organises the agenda and the meetings/summits and represents the positions that the Council makes to the world and the other institutions. A strong president would have more input in agenda-setting and he or she would have a more decisive role in setting the EU's agenda as a whole.
Do we want a strong presidency? We shouldn't. A strong presidency would strengthen the most intergovernmental institution of the EU while simultaneously weakening the intergovernmental flavour of the politics in the Council. Such a president may be able to give some good and strong leadership, but he or she would be less legitimate than the Commission: the president of the European Council will not be subject to the scrutiny of the European Parliament, so if this office becomes the leading office of the EU, accountability and transparency will suffer. For small states, a strong president would weaken their position in the same way that strengthening the Council tends towards weakening the smaller states: if you make a forum where state interests are the focus, and where the power of those state interests have the weight of their states behind them, then the bigger states will strengthen their position versus the smaller ones and can seek more privileged positions. Where positions and policies are debated and set along ideological right-left lines and states cannot get privileges due to their size, the set up is more equal.
At the same time, it's hard to see how a strong presidency would be possible. The president can't promise what the Council won't give him/her, and the president would have few political weapons to force the Council his/her way - political skill and reputation would be the most obvious weapon, but it weakens as things stop going exactly their way in the Council. The power of the president will be based on the Council, so there is little the president can do to counter the Council if it refuses to play along. So even with a strong candidate as president, they can only do what their office permits them to do. They will not be able to bestride the world stage like the US president or even the Russian president and the Chinese and Indian premiers. There may be moments when the president can provide Europe with a loud voice - but it will only be when, and if, the Council is united. The president won't be able to unite the Council because the presidency won't have the institutional power or democratic or political legitimacy to bludgeon the Council into following.
The European Council needs a permanent president who can provide a focus and organisational coherence that the Council has lacked for years. Having a president will strengthen the tendency to argue along the left-right dividing line and will make debate within the Council more "normal" in political terms (the need for more openness and transparency will be as great as ever). These are good changes. But we should not expect nor want a strong president in the Council. I don't think that it's remotely politically possible though - this is the same organisation that picked Barroso, after all.
What the European Council needs is a good and respected "Speaker of the House", not a strong executive figure.
But there's another issue here: should the post of President of the European Council be a weak or strong one? A weak one would be a "chairman" role, where the president merely organises the agenda and the meetings/summits and represents the positions that the Council makes to the world and the other institutions. A strong president would have more input in agenda-setting and he or she would have a more decisive role in setting the EU's agenda as a whole.
Do we want a strong presidency? We shouldn't. A strong presidency would strengthen the most intergovernmental institution of the EU while simultaneously weakening the intergovernmental flavour of the politics in the Council. Such a president may be able to give some good and strong leadership, but he or she would be less legitimate than the Commission: the president of the European Council will not be subject to the scrutiny of the European Parliament, so if this office becomes the leading office of the EU, accountability and transparency will suffer. For small states, a strong president would weaken their position in the same way that strengthening the Council tends towards weakening the smaller states: if you make a forum where state interests are the focus, and where the power of those state interests have the weight of their states behind them, then the bigger states will strengthen their position versus the smaller ones and can seek more privileged positions. Where positions and policies are debated and set along ideological right-left lines and states cannot get privileges due to their size, the set up is more equal.
At the same time, it's hard to see how a strong presidency would be possible. The president can't promise what the Council won't give him/her, and the president would have few political weapons to force the Council his/her way - political skill and reputation would be the most obvious weapon, but it weakens as things stop going exactly their way in the Council. The power of the president will be based on the Council, so there is little the president can do to counter the Council if it refuses to play along. So even with a strong candidate as president, they can only do what their office permits them to do. They will not be able to bestride the world stage like the US president or even the Russian president and the Chinese and Indian premiers. There may be moments when the president can provide Europe with a loud voice - but it will only be when, and if, the Council is united. The president won't be able to unite the Council because the presidency won't have the institutional power or democratic or political legitimacy to bludgeon the Council into following.
The European Council needs a permanent president who can provide a focus and organisational coherence that the Council has lacked for years. Having a president will strengthen the tendency to argue along the left-right dividing line and will make debate within the Council more "normal" in political terms (the need for more openness and transparency will be as great as ever). These are good changes. But we should not expect nor want a strong president in the Council. I don't think that it's remotely politically possible though - this is the same organisation that picked Barroso, after all.
What the European Council needs is a good and respected "Speaker of the House", not a strong executive figure.
Thursday, 9 July 2009
Referendum date set: 2nd October 2009
The 28th Amendment of the Constitution (Treaty of Lisbon) Bill 2009 (Initiated draft PDF) has been passed quickly by the Dáil yesterday. The date for the next referendum (in case you missed the title), is the 2nd of October, and the Referendum Commission has already been set up.
The Bill has probably already gained the assent of the Seanad (the Upper House), as it was due to vote on it when I was watching the Oireachtais Report earlier on. A video of the debate in the Dáil hasn't been uploaded on the Oireachtais website yet, but it hardly seemed a stimulating debate from the Report, with the 3 main parties mainly stressing the need to win the confidence of the people in the referendum campaign. Sinn Féin, the only anti-Treaty party in the Dáil, didn't have anything new to say either, from what I've seen. When it comes to Yes campaign unity, I haven't seen anything yet to make me optimistic on this score; some of the outspoken invokers of unity haven't always been great at putting across a good campaign message. Perhaps the new civil society groups will strengthen the coherence and argument of the Yes side this time around.
The Yes side has no excuses this time - it has plenty of ammunition against the arguments of the No campaign from last time around. The legal guarantees form a catch-all argument against various claims, the German Constitutional Court ruling has confirmed that the EU will have no say over the armed forces of the member states, and the Secretary-General of the UN Ban Ki-Moon has recently stated that Ireland's EU peace mission participation is compatible with its UN role (the UN is a key source of legitimacy in any international involvement for Ireland).
On top of this, the most successful anti-Lisbon group, Libertas, has lost its well-known leader Declan Ganley, and the representation of anti-Treaty MEPs from Ireland was halved in the June election (from 2 to 1) with the loss of Kathy Sinnot, the co-leader of the now defunct InDem group. Of course, many of these people and groups will continue to campaign against the Treaty - notably the new Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group will campaign against the treaty, though it hasn't got an EP seat in Ireland. The temptation of Yes campaigners to rubbish them and get caught up in ridiculous claims must be resisted, and they must focus on reasons why people should vote for the Treaty.
The Bill has probably already gained the assent of the Seanad (the Upper House), as it was due to vote on it when I was watching the Oireachtais Report earlier on. A video of the debate in the Dáil hasn't been uploaded on the Oireachtais website yet, but it hardly seemed a stimulating debate from the Report, with the 3 main parties mainly stressing the need to win the confidence of the people in the referendum campaign. Sinn Féin, the only anti-Treaty party in the Dáil, didn't have anything new to say either, from what I've seen. When it comes to Yes campaign unity, I haven't seen anything yet to make me optimistic on this score; some of the outspoken invokers of unity haven't always been great at putting across a good campaign message. Perhaps the new civil society groups will strengthen the coherence and argument of the Yes side this time around.
The Yes side has no excuses this time - it has plenty of ammunition against the arguments of the No campaign from last time around. The legal guarantees form a catch-all argument against various claims, the German Constitutional Court ruling has confirmed that the EU will have no say over the armed forces of the member states, and the Secretary-General of the UN Ban Ki-Moon has recently stated that Ireland's EU peace mission participation is compatible with its UN role (the UN is a key source of legitimacy in any international involvement for Ireland).
On top of this, the most successful anti-Lisbon group, Libertas, has lost its well-known leader Declan Ganley, and the representation of anti-Treaty MEPs from Ireland was halved in the June election (from 2 to 1) with the loss of Kathy Sinnot, the co-leader of the now defunct InDem group. Of course, many of these people and groups will continue to campaign against the Treaty - notably the new Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group will campaign against the treaty, though it hasn't got an EP seat in Ireland. The temptation of Yes campaigners to rubbish them and get caught up in ridiculous claims must be resisted, and they must focus on reasons why people should vote for the Treaty.
Monday, 6 July 2009
A short July Round-up
I was away for the weekend, so I've missed a few bits of news, so here's a short round-up:
1. Javier Solana has ruled himself out of the running for the High Representative of the CFSP post - or the replacement post if Lisbon is passed in the Irish Referendum. Solana has served as the CFSP chief for 10 years, as well as being the Secretary-General for the Council*; so he knew something about being in a "double-hatted" position, as the Lisbon HR's post would be (the HR would also be the vice president of the Commission). I wonder if this announcement is good news for Barroso or not. It means that there's one less Iberian to compete with if there's a multi-office package up for negotiation (Felipe González would probably be backed by Sarkozy who is reportedly dropping his support for Blair for the Presidency of the European Council). Barroso still has a chance that the EP could confirm him for the post before the Irish Lisbon vote.
*These posts aren't actually officially linked; he just happens to hold both of them at the same time.
2. The Bill for the 28th Amendment to the Irish Constitution has been published (see Stephen Spillane here and here and Irish Election - Irish Election has the full wording of the amendment).
So the second referendum campaign will start gearing up, and the campaign organisations Generation Yes and Ireland for Europe could become more active (Generation Yes has already been quite active). The Dáil will be closing for a long summer break soon, and I somehow doubt that TDs (Irish MPs) will spend it campaigning for the Lisbon Treaty - if they won't keep the Dáil open for longer during the worst economic crisis the state has had to face, then what are the chances of them doing some campaign work?
3. Barroso has been urging that the G8 accept the need for an 80% reduction in emissions by 2050. The Commission will attend the G8 in L'Aquila this week. The language of the article indicates that the Commission isn't asking that much of the G8 right now - "accepting the need" may turn out to be less significant than the European Council's "political backing" Barroso for a second term - but movements in policy this week could translate into more co-ordinated negotiations by the G8, and perhaps also the EU, come December's Copenhagen Climate Change conference. The significance of the G8 has in any case been downgraded politically by the rise of the G20, but the G8 may still reveal some of the changes in position in the diplomatic dance that will be ongoing between now and December.
At the moment, my expectations for the December Summit are quite low, given the economic crisis and the natural focus on getting the global economy going again. Some of the indications of the cost of fighting climate change are jaw-dropping, and it's hard to see how fiscally-pressed states will be able to stump up the cash. Sweden has a tough task ahead of it if it wants to boost the EU's green credentials. [The Swedish presidency has a page on EU environmental policy here].
Also worth looking out for is any sign of the press embarrassing Italy - which is Berlusconi's fear.
4. The US and Russia will probably agree on a new Treaty aimed at reducing their nuclear arsenal. It's good in terms of diplomacy and improving relations, but at the same time, it is probably one of the few areas in which they will find it easy to reach agreement. Georgia, NATO expansion, missle shields, etc. are much more sensitive diplomatic issues. Hopefully a deal on nuclear arms - and the inter-governmental commission that's mentioned - will throw up more opportunities for closer and better relations between the US (and EU) with Russia.
1. Javier Solana has ruled himself out of the running for the High Representative of the CFSP post - or the replacement post if Lisbon is passed in the Irish Referendum. Solana has served as the CFSP chief for 10 years, as well as being the Secretary-General for the Council*; so he knew something about being in a "double-hatted" position, as the Lisbon HR's post would be (the HR would also be the vice president of the Commission). I wonder if this announcement is good news for Barroso or not. It means that there's one less Iberian to compete with if there's a multi-office package up for negotiation (Felipe González would probably be backed by Sarkozy who is reportedly dropping his support for Blair for the Presidency of the European Council). Barroso still has a chance that the EP could confirm him for the post before the Irish Lisbon vote.
*These posts aren't actually officially linked; he just happens to hold both of them at the same time.
2. The Bill for the 28th Amendment to the Irish Constitution has been published (see Stephen Spillane here and here and Irish Election - Irish Election has the full wording of the amendment).
So the second referendum campaign will start gearing up, and the campaign organisations Generation Yes and Ireland for Europe could become more active (Generation Yes has already been quite active). The Dáil will be closing for a long summer break soon, and I somehow doubt that TDs (Irish MPs) will spend it campaigning for the Lisbon Treaty - if they won't keep the Dáil open for longer during the worst economic crisis the state has had to face, then what are the chances of them doing some campaign work?
3. Barroso has been urging that the G8 accept the need for an 80% reduction in emissions by 2050. The Commission will attend the G8 in L'Aquila this week. The language of the article indicates that the Commission isn't asking that much of the G8 right now - "accepting the need" may turn out to be less significant than the European Council's "political backing" Barroso for a second term - but movements in policy this week could translate into more co-ordinated negotiations by the G8, and perhaps also the EU, come December's Copenhagen Climate Change conference. The significance of the G8 has in any case been downgraded politically by the rise of the G20, but the G8 may still reveal some of the changes in position in the diplomatic dance that will be ongoing between now and December.
At the moment, my expectations for the December Summit are quite low, given the economic crisis and the natural focus on getting the global economy going again. Some of the indications of the cost of fighting climate change are jaw-dropping, and it's hard to see how fiscally-pressed states will be able to stump up the cash. Sweden has a tough task ahead of it if it wants to boost the EU's green credentials. [The Swedish presidency has a page on EU environmental policy here].
Also worth looking out for is any sign of the press embarrassing Italy - which is Berlusconi's fear.
4. The US and Russia will probably agree on a new Treaty aimed at reducing their nuclear arsenal. It's good in terms of diplomacy and improving relations, but at the same time, it is probably one of the few areas in which they will find it easy to reach agreement. Georgia, NATO expansion, missle shields, etc. are much more sensitive diplomatic issues. Hopefully a deal on nuclear arms - and the inter-governmental commission that's mentioned - will throw up more opportunities for closer and better relations between the US (and EU) with Russia.
Tuesday, 30 June 2009
Karlsruhe Constitutional Judgment on the Lisbon Treaty
The German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has ruled that the Lisbon Treaty is compatible with German Constitutional Law (Grundgesetz) in a landmark case today. You can read the judgment in German here, or as a detailed summary in English here.
I've been away from the computer all day, so this post has been outpaced by the speed of the bloggosphere, which has thrown up some good analyses - I especially recommend Nosemonkey, Grahnlaw and Julien Frisch.
The case involved 2 pieces of legislation: 1. the Act ratifying the Lisbon Treaty (verdict: constitutional); 2. an Act detailing the involvement of the German Parliament in the EU system (unconstitutional).
Julien Frisch has hit the nail on the head when it comes to the bottom-line in this judgment: the Lisbon Treaty was ruled constitutional, but national legislation was ruled unconstitutional for being insufficiently democratic. The effective thrust of the Court's reasoning is an attack on how the Council works with regard to Germany: the executive is too powerful here, and the Parliament should have more say over the German representation in the Council.
In many ways this judgment highlights how democratic oversight of the EU's legislative work is at the discretion of the member state, and that purely national measures can have a big impact on this: it's not the EU's competence to set the procedure or manner of parliamentary input into the Council. There will now be a revision of the unconstitutional law to bring it into line with the judgment (i.e. increase the Bundestag's influence over the German delegation to the Council). Until there is a national law satisfying the judgment, the Lisbon Treaty will not be completely ratified by Germany.
The Court also stated the legal position in several areas:
- The EU is a union of states, and its authority derives from the states via the principle of conferral.
- The EP has not developed enough politically to support a democratically legitimate government. (Though if the political requirements that the court mentions [basically effective party politics], then the court's opinion could change there).
- The Lisbon Treaty does not make the EU Constitutional Treaties (Rome and Maastricht) "self-amending".
- Turning the EU into a federation (rather than a federation of states - "Staatverbund" - which it currently is), would require constitutional change in Germany and a referendum.
- The member states' status of sovereignty is not affected by the Treaty of Lisbon.
- Further integration short of establishing a federation(and which leaves the member states in control of the development of social policy, etc., effecting citizens) is compatable with the constitution provided there's sufficient democratic involvement of the elected state institutions.
- The Lisbon Treaty does not give the EU a say over the deployment/use of armed forces.
Hopefully this judgment will have a positive influence on any future treaty reforms in pushing for increased democratization of the EU generally, but also in forcing the Council to be more open and accountable (at least to national parliaments). In many ways this judgment seems to have given the EU a better and more holistic and citizen-centred review than those who are negotiating and drawing up treaty reforms. If the rationale behind the EU is to benefit the states and citizens through economic integration, then reforms should be focused on making the decision making process more open and participatory. Any bets on that happening?
Update: The Bundesverfassungsgericht judgment could have an impact in the Irish Lisbon referendum; it should be noted that it effectively dismisses many of the No side's arguments from last time, especially the more alarmist ones. Also note that the judgment confirms that the guarantees that have been won for the next referendum are unnecessary in the legal sense (i.e. they restate the legal situation under the Lisbon Treaty as it was pre-guarantee). The only practical change for the second vote is that each member state will retain a Commissioner (as opposed to the legal position under the current Nice Treaty).
For a more in-depth analysis, Gavin Barrett, a lecturer in European Law at University College Dublin, has written an article on the subject here.
I've been away from the computer all day, so this post has been outpaced by the speed of the bloggosphere, which has thrown up some good analyses - I especially recommend Nosemonkey, Grahnlaw and Julien Frisch.
The case involved 2 pieces of legislation: 1. the Act ratifying the Lisbon Treaty (verdict: constitutional); 2. an Act detailing the involvement of the German Parliament in the EU system (unconstitutional).
Julien Frisch has hit the nail on the head when it comes to the bottom-line in this judgment: the Lisbon Treaty was ruled constitutional, but national legislation was ruled unconstitutional for being insufficiently democratic. The effective thrust of the Court's reasoning is an attack on how the Council works with regard to Germany: the executive is too powerful here, and the Parliament should have more say over the German representation in the Council.
In many ways this judgment highlights how democratic oversight of the EU's legislative work is at the discretion of the member state, and that purely national measures can have a big impact on this: it's not the EU's competence to set the procedure or manner of parliamentary input into the Council. There will now be a revision of the unconstitutional law to bring it into line with the judgment (i.e. increase the Bundestag's influence over the German delegation to the Council). Until there is a national law satisfying the judgment, the Lisbon Treaty will not be completely ratified by Germany.
The Court also stated the legal position in several areas:
- The EU is a union of states, and its authority derives from the states via the principle of conferral.
- The EP has not developed enough politically to support a democratically legitimate government. (Though if the political requirements that the court mentions [basically effective party politics], then the court's opinion could change there).
- The Lisbon Treaty does not make the EU Constitutional Treaties (Rome and Maastricht) "self-amending".
- Turning the EU into a federation (rather than a federation of states - "Staatverbund" - which it currently is), would require constitutional change in Germany and a referendum.
- The member states' status of sovereignty is not affected by the Treaty of Lisbon.
- Further integration short of establishing a federation(and which leaves the member states in control of the development of social policy, etc., effecting citizens) is compatable with the constitution provided there's sufficient democratic involvement of the elected state institutions.
- The Lisbon Treaty does not give the EU a say over the deployment/use of armed forces.
Hopefully this judgment will have a positive influence on any future treaty reforms in pushing for increased democratization of the EU generally, but also in forcing the Council to be more open and accountable (at least to national parliaments). In many ways this judgment seems to have given the EU a better and more holistic and citizen-centred review than those who are negotiating and drawing up treaty reforms. If the rationale behind the EU is to benefit the states and citizens through economic integration, then reforms should be focused on making the decision making process more open and participatory. Any bets on that happening?
Update: The Bundesverfassungsgericht judgment could have an impact in the Irish Lisbon referendum; it should be noted that it effectively dismisses many of the No side's arguments from last time, especially the more alarmist ones. Also note that the judgment confirms that the guarantees that have been won for the next referendum are unnecessary in the legal sense (i.e. they restate the legal situation under the Lisbon Treaty as it was pre-guarantee). The only practical change for the second vote is that each member state will retain a Commissioner (as opposed to the legal position under the current Nice Treaty).
For a more in-depth analysis, Gavin Barrett, a lecturer in European Law at University College Dublin, has written an article on the subject here.
Friday, 26 June 2009
Will Klaus be overruled?
President Klaus of the Czech Republic is holding out on signing the Lisbon Treaty, despite both houses of the Czech Parliament ratifying it - the only other head of state to do so is President Lech Kaczyński of Poland. Klaus has even stated that he'll be the last person to sign it.
But EUobserver has reported that Czech MPs (from the CSSD party) are getting tired of Klaus' antics (and presumably also of the ceremonial president ignoring the will of parliament), and may draw up a motion to override the President so caretaker prime minister Jan Fischer can sign the Treaty and complete the ratification process in the Czech Republic. If there is a vote, it is likely to only take place after the Czech Constitutional Court has dealt with the latest Lisbon Treaty complaints (which may be September, or, if the case is thrown out, mid-July). The motion would only need a simple majority in both houses to pass, so it would be easier to get through than the Treaty itself, but there's no guarantee that the motion would have enough support. At the moment the CSSD are only debating the option.
But EUobserver has reported that Czech MPs (from the CSSD party) are getting tired of Klaus' antics (and presumably also of the ceremonial president ignoring the will of parliament), and may draw up a motion to override the President so caretaker prime minister Jan Fischer can sign the Treaty and complete the ratification process in the Czech Republic. If there is a vote, it is likely to only take place after the Czech Constitutional Court has dealt with the latest Lisbon Treaty complaints (which may be September, or, if the case is thrown out, mid-July). The motion would only need a simple majority in both houses to pass, so it would be easier to get through than the Treaty itself, but there's no guarantee that the motion would have enough support. At the moment the CSSD are only debating the option.
Pat Cox for Europe?
A new pro-Lisbon group has been launched in Ireland, calling itself Ireland for Europe, and is lead by former Irish MEP and President of the European Parliament Pat Cox. Cox himself could have much to prove in the Lisbon campaign - he could be a great candidate for the next Commission, given his experience in the European Parliament and of European politics, the perception that he's not heavily partisan in Irish political terms, and the fact that his selection would not cause another by-election for the embattled government. (See the analysis by Honor Mahony in her EUobserver blog).
He would also be a credible enough candidate for a decent Commission post, or any Commission post if Lisbon isn't passed and the number of Commissioners is reduced - though, of course, he'd be in a weaker political position in that scenario. Brian Cowen can hardly afford to send any of his cabinet off to Brussels (not many of whom are seen as credible in Ireland), but there's a good list of other possible candidates by Frank Schnittger.
If the referendum is to be won by the pro-Lisbon side, then it probably has to be won by civil society groups such as Ireland for Europe and Generation Yes - I can't see the government putting across a good, clear argument for, and the pro-Lisbon opposition will probably still complain about the government not involving them enough.
He would also be a credible enough candidate for a decent Commission post, or any Commission post if Lisbon isn't passed and the number of Commissioners is reduced - though, of course, he'd be in a weaker political position in that scenario. Brian Cowen can hardly afford to send any of his cabinet off to Brussels (not many of whom are seen as credible in Ireland), but there's a good list of other possible candidates by Frank Schnittger.
If the referendum is to be won by the pro-Lisbon side, then it probably has to be won by civil society groups such as Ireland for Europe and Generation Yes - I can't see the government putting across a good, clear argument for, and the pro-Lisbon opposition will probably still complain about the government not involving them enough.
Tuesday, 16 June 2009
The Irish (Provisional) Guarantees
The guarantees for Ireland are coming ever closer to being finalized, with EU ambassadors scheduled to work through a draft text later today. You can read the draft text here (via RTÉ). The guarantees will be passed via Croatia's Accession Treaty, though there is a chance that it could be passed along with a Spanish proposal to amend the Treaties so that the extra MEPs it, along with Germany and others, would have had, had the Treaty been in place before the elections, could be elected without waiting for the next election in 5 years time.
Croatia's accession wasn't brought back on track after talks to get Slovenia to unblock the opening of several new acquis chapters after ministerial meetings in Luxembourg. Since Croatia has disputed borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina, if it is finally admitted, we might have to go through the whole process again in a few years time.
The guarantees are quite comprehensive on the first reading of the draft; it's interesting to read the provisional language for each area. The strongest language is reserved for the issue of defense, to counter the claims of Sinn Féin and neutralist groups of militarisation. It is stated that the Treaty creates no army; that there'll be no conscription; that there's no obligation to increase defence spending; that the clause concerning mutual solidarity doesn't impose an obligation to provide military aid; it guarantees the Triple Lock system; and that it doesn't affect Ireland's military neutrality. There's a categorical statement that the Treaty doesn't change the tax competence of the EU (this guarantee applies to all member states).
The Constitutional provisions concerning rights to do with life, the family and education are also guaranteed not to be affected.
The commitment to workers rights however (something the Labour party was keen to see emphasised), seems to be qualified by the sentence: "In doing so, it underlines the importance of respecting the overall framework and provisions of the EU Treaties." The provisional draft simultaneously underlines that there will be (under Lisbon) a positive obligation for the EU to consider the social effects of legislation and to guarantee a high level of social protection, as well as underlining the discretion of national and local authorities in setting standards. This wording, and the final wording, will try to seek a balance between the desire to ensure social standards, and safeguarding the right of member states to set lower standards. It will only apply to Ireland, but the balance is to prevent any worries of it affecting other member states.
This is the provisional draft, and, though the final guarantee will probably pretty much do the same thing (the general shape of these guarantees has been quite certain for a while now), it could be tweaked later today.
The most important part of the guarantee will be that of one commissioner per member state, as the other guarantees really just restate and clarify the situation under the Lisbon Treaty. There have been some ominous noises out of Germany that it could push for a drastically reduced Commission if the Lisbon Treaty isn't passed - from 27 to between 12 and 18 commissioners. Under the Nice Treaty the number of commissioners must be reduced for the next Commission to be lower than that of the number of member states.
(On a side note, I wonder if the number of Commissioners is reduced, would this create pressure from the small states to make the appointment of the Commission more directly the responsibility of the EP in order to lessen the influence of the big states in setting the agenda?)
Croatia's accession wasn't brought back on track after talks to get Slovenia to unblock the opening of several new acquis chapters after ministerial meetings in Luxembourg. Since Croatia has disputed borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina, if it is finally admitted, we might have to go through the whole process again in a few years time.
The guarantees are quite comprehensive on the first reading of the draft; it's interesting to read the provisional language for each area. The strongest language is reserved for the issue of defense, to counter the claims of Sinn Féin and neutralist groups of militarisation. It is stated that the Treaty creates no army; that there'll be no conscription; that there's no obligation to increase defence spending; that the clause concerning mutual solidarity doesn't impose an obligation to provide military aid; it guarantees the Triple Lock system; and that it doesn't affect Ireland's military neutrality. There's a categorical statement that the Treaty doesn't change the tax competence of the EU (this guarantee applies to all member states).
The Constitutional provisions concerning rights to do with life, the family and education are also guaranteed not to be affected.
The commitment to workers rights however (something the Labour party was keen to see emphasised), seems to be qualified by the sentence: "In doing so, it underlines the importance of respecting the overall framework and provisions of the EU Treaties." The provisional draft simultaneously underlines that there will be (under Lisbon) a positive obligation for the EU to consider the social effects of legislation and to guarantee a high level of social protection, as well as underlining the discretion of national and local authorities in setting standards. This wording, and the final wording, will try to seek a balance between the desire to ensure social standards, and safeguarding the right of member states to set lower standards. It will only apply to Ireland, but the balance is to prevent any worries of it affecting other member states.
This is the provisional draft, and, though the final guarantee will probably pretty much do the same thing (the general shape of these guarantees has been quite certain for a while now), it could be tweaked later today.
The most important part of the guarantee will be that of one commissioner per member state, as the other guarantees really just restate and clarify the situation under the Lisbon Treaty. There have been some ominous noises out of Germany that it could push for a drastically reduced Commission if the Lisbon Treaty isn't passed - from 27 to between 12 and 18 commissioners. Under the Nice Treaty the number of commissioners must be reduced for the next Commission to be lower than that of the number of member states.
(On a side note, I wonder if the number of Commissioners is reduced, would this create pressure from the small states to make the appointment of the Commission more directly the responsibility of the EP in order to lessen the influence of the big states in setting the agenda?)
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