Why isn't there a group for small states?

Yesterday I noted that in Ireland:

"All the political parties involved have trouble articulating a vision on Europe, and on making alliances to achieve their vision."

It annoys me that not only is the EU political universe centred on the Franco-German engine, but that politically, this is simply accepted. The economic crisis has made this alliance - the erstwhile "Merkozy" - even more influential than ever in recent years, and is justifiably a cause for concern in smaller states to see the EU institutions sidelined and the direction of the EU set via summitry. I'm not so well placed to talk about other small states, but in Ireland there seems to be a certain fatalism on the part of both the government and the opposition: the government never seems to think much about forming alliances or advocating at least a general vision for the EU that it wants to see, and the opposition, which often point to the similarities of self-interest between Ireland and the rest of the EU Member States/Irish people and the ordinary people of Europe, never outline a realistic political strategy for building an alliance/coalition around their ideas. (Indeed, it seems that the Governor of the Central Bank in Ireland is the only one advocating a vision of European Union - yesterday he proposed a "Banking Union").

There is an informal grouping of states called the Visegrád group - made up of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. It may not be as visible or as influential as the Franco-German alliance, but it does have some cohesiveness on the EU stage (such as its own Battlegroup). So why, now that there are so many small states, given the number of small states and the increasing political weight of the big states?

A grouping of small states could give them a bigger voice on key issues and help ensure that the institutional balance is fair to states of all sizes. Static groupings of states might only be suitable for certain basic positions such as state equality - it would be hard to maintain coherent political positions between small states such as Finland and Portugal on the way forward in the Eurozone, for instance - but it would be a good step in securing the place of smaller countries in the political life of the Union. While Hollande's comments rejecting the Franco-German duopoly probably indicate a willingness to lead an occasional counter-German alliance rather than a complete break from the alliance, smaller Member States should be making the most of the opening to see how far a new fluidity in the politics of the Council will go.

For Ireland especially this could prove a good starting point: it's time to start thinking not just about what kind of EU we want, but how we need to work with others to achieve it. We need to have a more pro-active approach.

European Faultlines

Last year I blogged about the European outlook of the Dutch government. With the Eurozone crisis still rumbling on, some of the faultline themes are well established: the degree of fiscal union and the role of the ECB, the core versus the perciphery, austerity versus stimulus, Eurozone members versus non-Eurozone members, etc. Apart from the left-right question of austerity versus stimulus, most of the major questions are about integration and institutions: how much do we integrate, how do we integrate, and what will be the consequences of integration. So a lot of the old instutitional debates are being revived in the background.

First, intergovernmentalism and supranationalism remains a big question. The influence of France and Germany in the crisis is obvious, and in some ways justified given the financial commitment they are making on behalf of their citizens, but it does means that the debate on the solutions to the crisis are incredibly narrow. It may be better for Greece to remain in the Eurozone deal despite the devestating effects of austerity than to default and bring in an automatic and deeper austerity as the Greek government fails to be able to finance its government spending. However it's not necessarily the best policy for Greece or for the Eurozone: yet it remains up to discussions in certain Member States to come to that conclusion before anything changes rather than an open pan-Eurozone debate permitting a more dynamic an informed action. This is particularly the case as the deepening crisis in Italy and elsewhere is connected to the need for recapitalising and reforming Europe's banking and financial sector.

The European Council has gone some way to tackling this crisis, but the constant summits has meant that the Commission and Parliament are being sidelined. Since the treaties don't really provide for the EFSF (and the EFSF is probably contrary to the treaties, but sovereign states are quite practised at rewriting the rules), the Commission and Parliament are very limited in what they can do. But it would be a mistake to think that only the Commission and Parliament want more power for themselves: it is in the interest of many Member States for treaty changes to transfer powers to the Union more properly to deal with these crises. For small Member States, majority voting and a strong Parliament and Commission are safeguards against the overpowering influence of the big Member States, while for non-Eurozone Member States, it is better to anchor the Eurozone within the wider EU in order to prevent a core Eurozone from driving internal market and other policy. This level of integration would require a new treaty with sufficient fiscal and political union elements to work - if the institutions can't deal with the crisis even with a treaty change, then the European Council, dominated by the big Member States, would again step in.

Second, the European Council as an institution is asserting itself over the Commission, in a way that has similar big-versus-small states implications, as well as challenging the newly empowered Parliament. (We're lucky that Tony Blair didn't get the European Council Presidency) The Commission and Parliament will probably continue to grow closer together (or, the Commission will try to co-opt the Parliament in its battle with the Council, while the Parliament tries to co-opt the Commission in its battle with the Council).

Third, there is the Eurozone/Non-Eurozone divide. It's not a clear divide between those states, but a divide on whether or not to include them and how far to include them. The fear is that closer integration within the Eurozone will mean that non-Eurozone countries will have less say within the EU generally, as Eurozone countries co-ordinate more. Ireland, the Netherlands and Finland want to include the rest of the EU as much as possible: for the Netherlands and Ireland this is about including more free market-orientated countries, but it's also about diluting the influence of France and Germany and strengthening the position of the small states. For non-Eurozone countries to secure the position, it would be better to ensure that new institutional changes are committed to the treaties in a way that limits the consequences of the change to the Eurozone as much as possible (though multispeed Europe will mean that some Member States will end up with more political say than others). As long as the changes are reached ad hoc through the European Council and the Eurozone Group, the more exclusive the decision making will remain.

However the UK may be the spanner in the works. While ensuring the position of the non-Eurozone members means that the focus on treaty change should be on limiting the scope for Eurozone decisions to affect the internal market without some general EU involvement, the UK moves to gain further opt-outs could push Eurozone members to make any new treaty Eurozone-only. The UK may find that it cannot count on non-Eurozone countries for support in getting new opt-outs if they feel it could damage their chances of securing their positions in the EU.

The Irish Finance minister has given a speech at the IIEA last week outlining some of the Irish positions on the EU and the Eurozone which reflect some of these faultlines:

Schengen Wars

After France and Germany sent a letter to the EU opposing the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen zone (a decision each Schengen member state has a veto on), Romania has hit back with suggestions that it will delay Croatian accession (or that the CVM [Co-operation and Verification Mechanism] that applies to it and Bulgaria should be applied to Croatia as well), and that it might delay ratifying the Protocol allowing the 18 Lisbon MEPs from taking their seats in the European Parliament. France and Germany are blocking the expansion of the Schengen zone to include Romania and Bulgaria because of their failure to make good progress in combating corruption and organised crime. However, technically both Bulgaria and Romania have met the criteria for acceding to the Schengen zone, and the two sets of criteria are supposed to be separate.

Romania's fight-back has been couched in the language of the rights of small states against the power of the Franco-German core. Ironically, a few days before EUobserver reported the Franco-German letter, I heard this policy being held up as an example of successful small state diplomacy - the Netherlands was extremely reluctant to let Romania and Bulgaria join, and wanted to put pressure on them to speed up justice reform. (Justice, immigration and law and order are policy areas the Dutch government is very keen on). Though the Netherlands has a veto in this area, using the "nuclear option" isn't a great diplomatic technique, and it's much better to get wider support for their position, so the Dutch lobbied the other states (particularly France) on the issue. (Yet another example of the veto not being a practical tool in European politics, I think).

In any case there's the question of whether or not it's right to move the goalposts like this. Wikileaks, as the EUobserver reported, has shown the considerable frustration in the EU over the the failure of the 2007 accession states to effectively fight corruption. The EU has been lax and hasty in its enlargement, and there's little incentive for states to reform after they've joined. It is hard to see how corruption and organised crime can be divorced from the burden Romania and Bulgaria would have to assume in becoming the EU/Schengen zone's border. Would border controls be or remain effective?

It may be unfair to tie these issues together after the fact, and the EU should have perhaps linked them more closely earlier, but these issues aren't optional for Romania, Bulgaria or the EU, and we have to find some way of ensuring that they will be tackled. There is a big question over big states versus small states rights, but this is not the most glorious way of fighting the small states' fight - because in the end this is about Romania and Bulgaria living up to the commitments of membership, which will benefit them and and EU.


UPDATE: Romania has given up on this strategy. Also worth reading is Kosmopolito's critque of Romania's brand of EU politics.

The Shape of Dutch EU Policy

This article has been rattling around my head for a while - since before the official formation of the Dutch government - but I never got around to writing it. At the very end of September, I attended a lecture by Wepke Kingma, Chief Director for European Integration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the challenges facing Dutch European policy. Of course, this was before the new government came in (though we were pretty sure about how the coalition would turn out), but it was very interesting to hear about how the Dutch government generally sees itself in the EU.

The Dutch EU role:

When it comes to how the Dutch government view the changes in the EC/EU over the decades and how the power structures affect its influence, it sounded familiar to me. I've often argued that increased power for the Council (or European Council) is counter to the interests of small states, and that the supranational aspect of the EU generally serves small states better. This seemed to be the Dutch experience, with worries over the growing power of the European Council as the Commission is weakened, as well as enlargement. Vetos are of little use as they are a "nuclear option" in negotiations and make you unpopular and less influential in future negotiations; also, it benefits big states more as smaller states are more easily pressured under a unanimous voting system. The Dutch strategy for dealing with enlargement and the "big 3" is to have well-developed positions on all European policies to ensure that the Netherlands is a reliable negotiating partner; and this also feeds into coalition-building on issues. I was a bit surprised that coalitions in the Council are very stable, but it makes sense as it is hard and time consuming to constantly form new voting/negotiating coalitions.

One aspect of the Dutch relationship with the EU that is different from Ireland, and perhaps other small states, is the "founding member" status of the Netherlands. Enlargement seems to be seen as a dilution of identity and influence - the original 6 were described as a "nuclear family", and I couldn't help thinking of the Dutch word "gezellig", which is a bit untranslateable, but means something lke "cozy". Money and the dilution of identity seem to be at the core of Dutch worries over the direction of the EU. However, it seems important to note how integration and supranationalism is seen as an important way of defending the influence and role of small states in the EU struture. While sovereignty may be viewed as being lost through the ending of the veto and supervision by the Commission, small states seem to view this as (generally, though it depends on the area), as protecting their position and opening up new opportunities to influence Europe's direction. Supranationalism can be a goal of nationally-minded member state governments too, it seems.


Multi-annual budget:

This is a big issue as it will be decisive in the EU's capabilities over the next few years (and therefore also decisive on how new Lisbon institutions such as the EEAS develops, and it is being decided in an atmosphere of austerity. Though there's undoubtedly a large element of self-interest in the EP's defence of the budget, and lobbying for increases, there is a good argument that you cannot increase the responsibilities of the EU institutions without having the money available to effectively carry out its duties.

The Dutch position seems to be that they are quite happy to continue paying as a net contributor, as the internal market is so important to the Netherlands, but CAP and the Cohesion Funds are areas where the Netherlands wants to see cuts and reforms. They want the EU budget to be set at around 1% GNI, and have priorities for the EU: Frontex (immigration control at the EU border), energy & climate, and the EEAS, among others. Therefore they want cuts in CAP and Cohesion funds to pay for increases elsewhere. The Dutch seem to view agriculture spending as necessary to aid declining villages and for the maintanence of the countryside ("landscape preservation"), but are otherwise looking for the CAP section of the budget to be reduced heavily. Cohesion funds are viewed as a good policy to help make the poorer member states wealthier, and therefore more able to buy more goods from the richer member states (the thought also occured to me that this is also a good strategy to steadily increase the number of net contributors; or rather slowly spread the burden of contributions). However, cohesion funds should focus on the poorer member states and not be directed to the wealthy countries' poor regions as well. There was a mention of asking for a rebate if the Netherlands didn't get its way, but this was heavily downplayed (my impression was that they viewed it as a childish strategy that wouldn't win them any friends and would be counter-productive in their coalition-building strategies).

My own thoughts on this are that CAP clearly needs to be reformed (as Kingma pointed out, the newer member states will soon join the CAP fully and this will add to the strain on the budget), but I doubt that restricting cohesion funds to only the poorer countries is a good idea in the long run. Perhaps I'm biased because I come from a poorer region, but I think that all member states need to be involved in the cohesion fund, and that if you break their link with it (in that they feel that they're not getting anything out of it), it will come under increasing pressure for cuts despite its value for the good of the internal market. What is clear is that the EU is definitely a "transfer union" and always has been. It consists of a number of different policies transfering money for different projects to help out poorer regions and areas, as richer areas benefit from larger and freer markets. I would personally defend this transfer union as being a social and economic good, though it could do with reform. Still, the battle over the budget is likely to be vicious, as the EU is in some ways a rudimentary welfare state for states, and battle lines have already been quite firmly drawn.

Introducing rebates into the equation would be highly damaging, as rebates are paid for by other countries (I'm reminded of a story of the Polish government asking the British government how much more they would need to pay to join the EU because of the British rebate [it was a sore point obstructing enlargement negotiations]. That image of a poorer country asking how much it would need to pay a richer country - and a champion of enlargement at that - due to its own obstructionism of the budget is something that sticks with me as a symbol for just how selfish and immoral rebates are).


Immigration and asylum:

With Geert Wilders' PVV supporting the minority coalition government, this is obviously a big issue in the Netherlands today. Justice and Home Affairs may be a big European focus for this Dutch government, as Kingma suggested that JHA was an area where the Netherlands wanted to see more action. The Lisbon Treaty moved JHA firmly into our "Union method", so this area could see a leap in activity. The challenge for the Netherlands here is to convince the other member states that they don't want to re-nationalise immigration, but to toughen the rules on illegal immigration. Immigration is such a big issue across many member states that they might be able to win some support for changing the system. Also, there are lots of "Dublin cases" before the European Court of Human Rights on the current system, and this could generate pressure for refrorm as well (the Dublin system is where immigrants into the EU are sent back to the country they first entered so that they can't "shop around" the member states - there have been complaints particularly about the Greek processing of applications).


Enlargement:

This touches on the identity, money and influence concerns of the Netherlands. The Dutch government wants tougher enforcement of the enlargement conditions to ensure that there is the legal and institutional change necessary to join, and that the EU moves away from the old practice of giving in to pressure to enlarge quickly. Kingma raised the prospect that a Dutch parliament may end up refusing to give the green light to enlargement if it felt that the candidate country hadn't fully reformed.

Naturally Turkey is a big topic, but it wasn't really directly addressed on its own. However, in the question-and-answer session, it was suggested - but not directly said - that the Netherlands may be negotiating or hoping that the Turkish government would accept some conditions on its voting weight. I stress that this was not directly or explicitly said, and that I am getting this impression from something said by someone talking in their second language rather than their mother tongue. Still, enlargement has seen restrictions on the free movement on workers and access to CAP funds, so if a "privillaged relationship with the EU" is unacceptable for Turkey and other member states, then I wouldn't be surprised if the idea of gradual integration and gaining of rights in the institutions hadn't surfaced in some national administration. If such an idea has surfaced, I hope it will be resisted.

The Commission bravely missed a good opportunity to stay quiet

"This is not how you speak to a major power like France," said France's junior EU minister, echoing Chirac's comments on the support of some eastern European member states for the Iraq War: "It is not really responsible behavior. It is not well brought-up behavior. They missed a good opportunity to keep quiet."

It was a response to yesterday's strong position taken by Commissioner Reding on the treatment - the mass deportations - of the Roma in France:

"My patience is wearing thin. Enough is enough," Ms Reding said, while pounding her fist on the pulpit.

France will be taken to court by the Commission for breaching EU law, which does not permit mass explusions based on ethnicity, which seems to be have been explicit French policy according to a French memo on the policy. Though the explusions were taking place too quickly for a case-by-case approach (which would have been permitted), French officials had been reassuring the Commission that they would deport people on a case-by-case basis. This deception by French officials empowered to discuss the matter in Brussels has upset Reding too.

I'm glad the Commission is finally taking a strong, outspoken stance on the issue. Reding had made an earlier statement, but this goes much further and has rightly attracted more attention, and is a welcome counter to attempts to make the explusions respectable by Europeanising the issue.

France's response highlights the government's view on Europe: as a place where a privillaged few major powers are treated differently to the smaller member states. This is a destructive attitude for the EU, since it erodes the confidence of small states and of citizens in the Commission when this vision is played out. When Paris feels that it can issue a lettres de cachet and not be effected by the rule of law, it naturally strikes at the heart of a system backed up only by the rule of law. It is easy for the Commission to become trapped between the big states and to play down its voice when they verge on breaking the law, so it's great to see the Commission bravely miss an opportunity to remain quiet.

You can watch Reding's statement here.

Blairs' Backers are making a Fundamental Error

Media attention is back on the possibility of Tony Blair becoming the President of the European Council. Many arguments surround his - possible - candidacy: his supports think he will be a strong, recognisable figure who would give the EU a greater voice on the world stage, and shape the office into an agenda-setting focal point in the EU's institutional structure. His opponents oppose him simply because they consider that Blair just isn't the right man for the job given his attachment to the US over the EU and the failure to make the pro-European case in the UK.

Blair's personal background and qualities can be (and have been) picked over: a good speaker and deal maker, experienced on the global stage, has a reputation burdened by a war legacy, is generally pro-European in outlook, failed to bring the UK into the Schengen and Euro zones, comes from a major yet largely Euroskeptic member state... However, while this is an important debate, behind it lurks the idea that the post can really become a strong executive post - and it can't.

It's not really a surprise that this impression has surfaced - the EU is incredibly fond of creating presidential titles. The heads of the Commission, Council, Parliament, ECB, etc, are all Presidents. The European Parliament even has a Council of Presidents (the party group leaders) who collectively agree on the Parliament's agenda. The European Council is also the highest level of the most powerful institution in the EU, the Council, so in many ways it's natural to assume that any presidential role emerging from this institution could become quite powerful. But while it's true that a strong first President could make the post stronger and more influential, he or she won't be able to force his or her decisions through or play a strong executive role.

First of all, the role will be that of a chairperson. There's no doubt that this could be an influential position; the Parliament has its president, so it can present an institutional voice, even if the political sands are constantly shifting in the chamber itself. In some ways the Council, by virtue of its sheer power, doesn't really need a strong spokesperson. However, a rotating presidency and the intermittent attention of member states to some issues mean that a chairperson could significantly boost its coherence. Being able to organise agenda and shape the debate will make the role important and influential - but not strongly executive.

Institutional arrangements will prevent the emergence of an overpowering President. The Commission retains the power of legislative initiative, and the Parliament has been strengthened under Lisbon so laws require a high degree of support across the EU institutions to pass. Within the Council, it's important to note that the rotating presidency doesn't disappear - when the Council is in it's "committee" forms (agriculture, etc.), it will still be chaired by the rotating presidency, except for the foreign relations circle, which will be chaired by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs (who will also be the Vice President of the Commission). So the President of the European Council is more likely to emerge in a similar (but slightly stronger) form to the US Vice President: influential and visible, but with limited institutional reach.

The desire for a strong European Council Presidency is quite strange when it comes from the member states. Barroso's main strength in getting nominated by the Council in July was his relative subservience to state interests - is it really politically likely that member states will weaken counterbalancing leadership roles in the EU only to set up a rival in their own institutional backyard? The President of the European Council won't be able to act without the backing of the Council, so it's likely that any President to tries to be too activist would be cut down to size.

A strong Presidential role would be undesirable for several reasons: it would favour big states at the expense of smaller states who depend on the Commission to ensure the equality of states, the post wouldn't be under the scrutiny of the European Parliament unlike the Commission President, it would diminish transparency and accountability. But the fundamental error of Blair's backers is that they seek to change the office to be more than it can be; an exercise that could end up obstructing law-making when the Lisbon was supposed to streamline EU decision-making.

Blair has a well-known ability to shape the office he occupies - he was famous for his "sofa government" in the UK. An over-activist President like Blair would continuously clash with the Commission and the semi-Commission-semi-Council High Representative. A drawn out political battle for influence, while it my draw more attention to EU politics, will hinder progress on issues that actually matter. And in the end, the style of Council Presidency may end up effecting the power relationships outside the Council more than the position of the Presidency itself, since the war for influence isn't one the Presidency can win outright. How would the High Representative, Commission President and the European Parliament react to such an activist President? Would the European Parliament and Commission draw closer to offset the Council? Would the High Representative be a Trojan horse for the Council or for the Commission - or would he or she play at both? Would Barroso try to concentrate power in the Commission in his hands further?

Blair is not just the wrong man for the job, but the vision of a Presidency that he represents is simply wrong for the office. Trying to create a strong President won't create a strong EU.

A strong President of the European Council?

There's been a sudden burst of activity across the EU-Bloggosphere over the re-emerging story that Tony Blair might run for the Presidency of the European Council (which is not the presidency of Europe) after Lady Kinnock slipped up by saying that the UK government is giving Blair full backing in his bid - as Charlemagne explains, Blair's not actually running (yet). There are many reasons why Blair should not get the job; they've been covered by Child of Europe, and very comprehensively by Crystals and Gaish.

But there's another issue here: should the post of President of the European Council be a weak or strong one? A weak one would be a "chairman" role, where the president merely organises the agenda and the meetings/summits and represents the positions that the Council makes to the world and the other institutions. A strong president would have more input in agenda-setting and he or she would have a more decisive role in setting the EU's agenda as a whole.

Do we want a strong presidency? We shouldn't. A strong presidency would strengthen the most intergovernmental institution of the EU while simultaneously weakening the intergovernmental flavour of the politics in the Council. Such a president may be able to give some good and strong leadership, but he or she would be less legitimate than the Commission: the president of the European Council will not be subject to the scrutiny of the European Parliament, so if this office becomes the leading office of the EU, accountability and transparency will suffer. For small states, a strong president would weaken their position in the same way that strengthening the Council tends towards weakening the smaller states: if you make a forum where state interests are the focus, and where the power of those state interests have the weight of their states behind them, then the bigger states will strengthen their position versus the smaller ones and can seek more privileged positions. Where positions and policies are debated and set along ideological right-left lines and states cannot get privileges due to their size, the set up is more equal.

At the same time, it's hard to see how a strong presidency would be possible. The president can't promise what the Council won't give him/her, and the president would have few political weapons to force the Council his/her way - political skill and reputation would be the most obvious weapon, but it weakens as things stop going exactly their way in the Council. The power of the president will be based on the Council, so there is little the president can do to counter the Council if it refuses to play along. So even with a strong candidate as president, they can only do what their office permits them to do. They will not be able to bestride the world stage like the US president or even the Russian president and the Chinese and Indian premiers. There may be moments when the president can provide Europe with a loud voice - but it will only be when, and if, the Council is united. The president won't be able to unite the Council because the presidency won't have the institutional power or democratic or political legitimacy to bludgeon the Council into following.

The European Council needs a permanent president who can provide a focus and organisational coherence that the Council has lacked for years. Having a president will strengthen the tendency to argue along the left-right dividing line and will make debate within the Council more "normal" in political terms (the need for more openness and transparency will be as great as ever). These are good changes. But we should not expect nor want a strong president in the Council. I don't think that it's remotely politically possible though - this is the same organisation that picked Barroso, after all.

What the European Council needs is a good and respected "Speaker of the House", not a strong executive figure.

Depressing Proportionality?

Julien Frisch's recent article on Scottish Representation in the EP (in English; auf Deutsch) shows that, while the proportion of citizens to MEPs is the same in Scotland as elsewhere in the UK (except perhaps NI?), Scotland is underrepresented in comparison to small states of a similar population size such as Finland, which has 14 MEPs - more than double Scotland's share with 6 MEPs.

An independent Scotland within the EU would have more representation in both the Council and the EP, though I doubt that Scotland would get 14 MEPs in this scenario - most likely that the number of seats for other states would go down to fit in with the current cap of EP seats (736 is it?). Under Lisbon a similar system applies with the seat cap at 751 MEPs.

Grahnlaw responded with a post about the representation of citizens in the EP, which are based on degressive proportionality - small states are over-represented to the extent that the weight of your vote varies wildly depending on which country you are in. So if you live in Malta or Luxembourg, your vote counts more than that of a citizen in Germany.

Grahnlaw is right that this is all about representing the states rather than about finding a way of representing the citizens on the one citizen, one vote model. It is probably also true that with the system set up this way it will be almost impossible to reform it into line with this model. However, since the EU is primarily an Union of states rather than of peoples, I can't see much of an alternative to the way it started except a radical straight-to-federation Union, which still isn't politically possible.

That representation is tied up with representation in the Council makes the whole thing more complicated, but I don't think the fact that the two are linked is in itself bad or irrational. It's part of the debate in any federal or quasi-federal structure: what should be the representational balance between big and small states, and how should citizens be represented? My personal feeling is that there should be a minimum representation for states in the EP: national and state identity matter very much, and, though the Council is the proper place for national representation, there should not be the sense that small countries are being pushed out of the EP, which is one of, if not the, most legitimate institutions of the Union.

It would not be good if the people of small states became less trusting of the EP, and felt that it didn't represent them.

That said, "the one citizen one vote" argument is powerful, and needs to be addressed - here, I would say that as states become more equal in the Council (of course, veto thresholds would need to be raised), seats in the EP should be distributed more fairly, with the minimum allowance for MEPs per state cut down - e.g. to 2 per state. After all, if states' votes in the Council were less weighted according to population, then it would be more logical to make EP seat distribution more fair.

I should note that an important question here is one of identity, and of national representation versus individual representation - which is linked to ideas of national versus individual sovereignty, which I've mused about here and here. Since I come down so much on the side of individual sovereignty in my mini series so far, it might be surprising that I've stressed the need for some recognition of national identity in the EP. While I wanted to show with my first two posts that it is a mistake to nationalise notions of sovereignty and legitimacy (and that there can be adverse effects to concentrating these concepts into one identity), I still think that national identity is of great value - just that it shouldn't be of paramount value. Identities do matter in representation, and this should be allowed for in the EP and the overall EU structure (just not in the overpowering way it is now - I agree that citizens should be the most important group, rather than states).

And then, of course, representation in the Commission is another queston...



Edit: I've posted a few more follow up comments here. Sorry to divide things up like this.