EMU fatally undermined by the Koenigstedt Declaration

Has all the progress over the last 6 months been undone? The painfully slow summitry of the European Council has proven to be an inadequate firefighter, but there had been some movement towards a banking union and a working economic union. The biggest criticism was that European leaders were putting in the safeguards against the next crisis rather than trying to deal with the crisis we're currently in, but in last June's Euro Area Statement, the European Council finally seemed to have got it (PDF):

"We affirm that it is imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.

[...]

When an effective single supervisory mechanism is established, involving the ECB, for banks in the euro area the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly."

Finally! Banking union and economic union are based on this logic: that the financial markets are too big for the Eurozone Member States to deal with on their own, and that there needs to be a common regulatory policy, and the means to deal with problems posed by the banks. The statement even signalled support for breaking the link between sovereigns and existing banking debt as a way of  lessening the debt burden for crisis-hit states (especially Ireland and Spain, who stuck to the Stability and Growth Pact criteria):

"The Eurogroup will examine the situation of the Irish financial sector with the view of further improving the sustainability of the well-performing adjustment programme. Similar cases will be treated equally."

However Germany, Finland and the Netherlands have not only set out to turn back the clock on this progress, but to fatally undermine the rationale behind banking union as a concept. In Koenigstedt the three countries declared not only that there will be no deal on existing banking debts that have been taken on by European sovereigns, but that national sovereigns will have to take on banking debt until they have reached their capacity before the ESM should step in to fund the banks directly:

"We agreed that the implementation of the European Semester, including budgetary discipline and targets, in all countries remains key to ensuring financial stability; the ESM and the other crisis mechanisms can only play a supplementary role to these policies that are decided at the national level.

[...]

 Regarding longer term issues, we discussed basic principles for enabling direct ESM bank recapitalisation, which can only take place once the single supervisory mechanism is established and its effectiveness has been determined. Principles that should be incorporated in design of the instrument for direct recapitalization include: 1) direct recapitalisation decisions need to be taken by a regular decision of the ESM to be accompanied with a MoU; 2) the ESM can take direct responsibility of problems that occur under the new supervision, but legacy assets should be under the responsibility of national authorities; 3) the recapitalisation should always occur using estimated real economic values; 4) direct bank recapitalisation by the ESM should take place based on an approach that adheres to the basic order of first using private capital, then national public capital and only as a last resort the ESM.

[Emphasis mine]"

 Far from breaking the link between banking debts and the sovereign, this reinforces it. It states that the order of debt responsibility in the Eurozone is: private, national sovereigns, then the ESM, creating an order for future crises that follows our current debt and banking crisis. Far from pointing towards a sustainable solution for the crisis and a workable Eurozone, this wilfully ignores the lessons of the past 4 years and tries to cement the current Eurozone order.

Why then should we have a banking union at all? The idea behind the banking union is that the financial sector is truly European (and global), and that it needs to be regulated and controlled in common - national authorities are too small and weak to deal with the sector own their own anymore. If it is to be a national responsibility for now and all time - the Konigstedt direction - then why bother with European regulation and oversight? Where is the added value or common purpose to this?

Why this step? Is it because of the ECB's open commitment to bond-buying, and the (current) creditor states want to seize back as much control and initiative as possible? Whatever the reason, it's hard to see this unilateral redirection of the Eurozone as any help for any sense of common purpose at European summits. What's the point of Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain waiting for summit time to try and shift the consensus constructively if other Member States start undermining the process of common negotiation? At this rate, they should start holding summits and economic seminars of their own to promote their alternative vision of economic union and crisis resolution - after all, Germany et al have shown their contempt for common decision-making.

It's truly mind-boggling to think how self-absorbed the ministers at this Koenigstedt meeting must be. Not content with vague signals and behind-the-scenes work, they've simply decided to wreck all agreement up 'til now. Diplomacy is not the word.

Dutch Elections: "The Political Centre is Back!"

The centre is back is the news out of The Netherlands today - from De Volkskrant:

"De PvdA en de VVD boeken vandaag allebei een enorme verkiezingsoverwinning. Samen met het CDA en D66 behalen de middenpartijen maar liefst 106 zetels. Het politieke midden is terug. En Europa is de grote winnaar van de avond.

[Own translation: 'Today Labour and the Party of Freedom and Democracy (right-wing liberals) have had a enormous election win . Together with the Christian Democrats and Social Liberals, the parties of the centre hold up to 106 seats. The political centre is back. And Europe is the biggest winner this evening.]"

At the time of writing with constituencies still to be declared, the results are (Europarty/seat change in brackets):

VVD (ELDR): 41 (+10). [This is the party of the outgoing Prime Minister Mark Rutte].
PvdA (PES): 39 (+9).
SP (GUE-NGL): 15 (0).
PVV (None): 15 (-9).
CDA (EPP): 13 (-8).
D66 (ELDR): 12 (+2).
GroenLinks (European Greens): 3 (-7).
Christen Unie (ECR): 5 (0).
SGP (EFD): 3 (+1).
PvdD (None): 2 (0).
50Plus (None): 2 (+2).

De Volkskrant is predicting a coalition of the centre and notes that the old coalition of VVD-CDA with support from Geert Wilders' anti-Islam and anti-Europe PVV  would not have enough seats to form a majority (now around 69 seats) and that governments of the left and right blocks are only "theoretically possible". Clearly despite the big gains for the centre right and left the Dutch political system is still quite fragmented. If a grand coalition is formed it will be interesting to see if the return to the political centre will continue, or if the extremes will grow in opposition. The head-to-head race between the VVD and PvdA with different outlooks on key policy areas has probably been a big factor in attracting voters to the political centre, and now compromises need to be made to form a government. 76 seats are needed for a majority.

The election confirms the centre-right liberals (VVD) as the dominant party of the right in The Netherlands, with the formerly dominant Christian Democrats (CDA) continuing to decline. On the left, Labour (PvdA) has not only retained its position, but the far-left Socialist Party has failed to make the inroads widely expected at the start of the campaign. The SP had been doing well in the polls, but a poor performance in the leaders' debates (which were widely seen to have been won by Labour's Diederik Samsom) meant that they couldn't keep up their electoral momentum.

The result is a big boost for the pro-European parties. Geert Wilders, who pulled the plug on the last government, wanted to make the election into a referendum on Europe (and against austerity and EU membership) and the SP were also Eurosceptic on the left (against further bail-outs).

The next challenge will be for the VVD and PvdA to form a coalition government.

Rutte's Dutch government falls

The Dutch government has collapsed with the minority Liberal (VVD) - Christian Democrat (CDA) coalition government unable to agree an austerity budget with the far-right PVV led by Geert Wilders. The so-called Gedoogcoalitie ("Tolerance Coalition") relied on the votes of the anti-Islamic Partij voor Vrijheid (Party for Freedom) and had been discussing the budget, which would have delivered around €16 billion in cuts to bring the Netherlands into line with the EU's 3% deficit rule, when Wilders stormed out at the last moment.

Wilders said (from De Volkskrant):

"Ik accepteer niet dat ouderen moeten betalen voor onzinnige Brusselse eisen. Als ik hier ja tegen had gezegd, had ik de kiezers met het schaamrood op de kaken tegemoet moeten treden.

['I do not accept that the elderly must pay for Brussels' nonsensical rules. If I had agreed (to the budget), I would have to face the voters with shame' (own translation)]"

It seems odd that Wilders has decided to pull the plug on the government now since his PVV has gone down in the polls recently while the party of the Dutch PM, the right-wing liberal VVD, has been doing well in the polls. However the Socialist Party has overtaken the Labour Party in the polls, and is against the 3% rule, so perhaps Wilders has calculated that by avoiding endorsing the austerity measures (and campaigning on a more populist anti-EU line) will be better for him and the PVV in the long run, rather than buying into the establishment and damaging the PVV's populist appeal (where the SP might be a challenger in an anti-EU austerity campaign at a later date).

In any case the fragility of the Dutch government in adopting austerity measures while its economy has been performing comparatively well in Eurozone terms strikes a strange image. This is, after all, the Netherlands that has waged its finger at other Eurozone countries and told them to fix their budgets. Even the Commission has picked up on this theme:

"For their part, EU commission spokespeople retorted by saying the rules were not invented in their institution, but instead agreed among EU governments in meetings chaired by no other than the Dutch authorities. "The three-percent target comes from the Stability and Growth Pact agreed in Amsterdam in June 1997, under the Dutch EU presidency. It is perhaps good to remind everyone the history of the deficit target," commission spokesman Olivier Bailly said during a press conference."

For the near future it doesn't look like the Dutch political scene will simplify in terms of political parties any time soon, so a certain level of instability might remain even after elections...

Happy 3rd of October!

It's Leiden's Ontzet and Germany's reunification day (or day of German unity). Have a great day!

Schengen Wars 2

Romania and Bulgaria's Schengen aspirations are being put on hold again, with the Netherlands and Finland opposing the phased introduction of the two countries into the border-free zone due to concerns over their levels of corruption. Before the vote, Romania blocked tulips from being imported across its border. Their accession was blocked earlier this year in January, which also saw inept diplomacy by Romania.

So are the concerns over the levels of corruption in Bulgaria and Romania justified? The Commission helps and monitors the reform and implementation of changes in the justice system required by EU membership through the "Co-operation and Verification Mechanism" (or CVM). The latest reports on Bulgaria (PDF) and Romania (PDF) were delivered in July. Both reports documented progress, but there's still a long way to go.

The Bulgarian report raises concerns over corruption and over accountability of the judiciary (p.3-4):

"Since last summer, a number of acquittals in cases involving high-level corruption, fraud and organised crime have exposed serious deficiencies in judicial practice in Bulgaria. These deficiencies have not been properly analysed or followed up by the leadership of the judiciary, the Supreme Judicial Council, the General Prosecutor and the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation. Although the revised Judicial System Act adopted in December strengthens the judiciary's accountability, the law has not yet been implemented as intended. The quality and transparency of several important appointments within the judiciary since the beginning of this year have been questioned, leading to unprecedented public protests and a debate on possible constitutional amendments. In addition, allegations of corruption within the judiciary are still not pursued in a systematic way as recommended by the Commission.

[...]

Judicial appointments still lack the necessary level of transparency and credibility. An important senior appointment by the Supreme Judicial Council in November 2010 raised concerns as regards the lack of transparency and competitive character. The entry into force of the newly amended provisions of the Judicial Systems Act in
January 2011, has unfortunately not yet improved the situation as regards senior appointments, which have been still carried out under the old rules and lacked real assessment of the professional qualifications, managerial skills and personal integrity of candidates. Furthermore, a recent nomination was followed by allegations of conflict of interest and procedural irregularities in an ongoing trial handled by the successful candidate. As a protest, two members of the Supreme Judicial Council resigned and criticised the appointment decisions as pre-determined. The subsequent mobilisation of professional associations of magistrates and civil society calling for reform of the Supreme Judicial Council sends an important signal of support for judicial reform. Recommendations by civil society to hold public debates and announce the names of candidates at an earlier stage are laudable. The appointment of highly competent and motivated magistrates of unquestionable integrity via transparent procedures, in particular for the new specialised court for organised crime, is indispensable to successfully implement judicial reform.

[...]

Criminal investigations against magistrates are still not systematically launched by the
prosecution upon allegations of corruption. The decision of the Supreme Judicial Council in June to involve a magistrate with a disciplinary record in the recruitment panel for the new specialised criminal court raises serious concerns. Overall, there is a lack of consistent disciplinary practice. These problems remain a major factor undermining public trust in the judiciary."

Policing in the area of organised crime is also an area of concern (p.5):

"In spite of persevering police actions to tackle organised crime, the overall results need to be significantly improved. Although the joint team on organised crime achieved several indictments related to important organised crime-groups and some convictions have been rendered, other important cases have been concluded with acquittals since the Commission's last annual report. In appeal, severe detention sentences have been pronounced but not yet enforced in one emblematic organised crime case. Weaknesses exist in the collection of evidence, the protection of witnesses as well as in investigative strategies, comprehensive financial investigations and the securing of assets. The General Prosecutor should systematically analyse the reasons for acquittals in high level cases, make recommendations for the handling of future cases when shortcomings in the procedure have been identified and appeal the acquittal decisions when it appears that the Courts did not properly assess the evidence provided."

The report notes a lack of "convincing results" regarding corruption, with cases against former ministers and MPs, and cases involving fraud of EU funds ending in acquittal (p.6):

"The analysis of some of these cases by the Commission and independent experts demonstrated serious weaknesses in judicial and investigative practice. These weaknesses mainly concern the collection of evidence, the protection of witnesses and the general lack of investigative strategies, comprehensive financial investigations and securing of assets. Coordination within the prosecution and between the prosecution and the police should be improved. These weaknesses are compounded by an out-dated Penal Code. Court practice is permissive and excessively cautious, overly attentive to procedures at the expense of delivering justice. While the revision of the Penal Code is advancing, immediate corrective measures, such as the use of interpretative rulings by the Supreme Court of Cassation or legislative amendments should be considered, since the new Penal Code cannot be expected to enter into force before late 2013."

The Romanian report shows some significant improvements, as well as highlighting areas that need a lot of progress. I won't quote from the report to the same extent as the Bulgarian one - I'd recommmend reading both to get a fuller picture of the situation in both countries - but I'll quote to summary paragraphes from the start (p.3):

"Since the Commission's last annual report, Romania took significant steps to improve the efficiency of judicial procedures and continued preparations for the entering into force of four new codes which are the foundation for a modern judicial process. In advance of the implementation of the new codes, the Small Reform Law has brought improvements for the celerity of the judicial process. Romania also responded swiftly to the Commission’s recommendation by adopting a new legal framework for the National Integrity Agency. The National Integrity Agency has been operational under this new legal framework and started to re-establish its track record of investigations. Although not part of the CVM benchmarks, the authorities decided to carry out reviews of the judicial system and of public procurement and to make an evaluation of anti-corruption policy. During the same period, the National
Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) showed a continuously convincing track record in the investigation of high-level corruption cases.

Despite this progress since July 2010, consistency and results in a number of areas remain a challenge. Progress in the fight against corruption still needs to be pursued. Several important high-level cases remain delayed in court for several years and have also seen little movement during this period. Urgent action must be taken to accelerate these trials and prevent them being struck down because of reaching statute-barred periods. The fight against corruption should remain a top priority and be coordinated with the help of a new comprehensive and robust anti-corruption strategy. Urgent measures are needed to improve the recovery of the proceeds of crime, the pursuit of money laundering and protection against conflict of interest in the management of public funds. Better results should be demonstrated in the confiscation of unjustified assets and in delivering dissuasive sanctions for incompatibilities."

Though the domestic reasons for blocking Romania and Bulgaria's phased entry into the Schengen Zone may have more to do with political pressure from the far-right, there are real concerns over the handeling of corruption in romania and Bulgaria. It's true that both countries meet the technical requirements for entry, and that adding this judicial and policing requirements is moving the goalposts, but these issues do need to be tackled as obligations of EU membership. While the politicking might be distasteful - and condemned by both the EPP and the S&D groups in the European Parliament - there is truth to the contention that it's harder to get EU Member States to comply with EU conditions once they're in the club.

Geert Wilders: Not Guilty

Geert Wilders, the leader of the PVV party in the Netherlands (Partij voor de Vrijheid or Party for Freedom) has been found not guilty of hate speech and discrimination. The court action wasn't one the public prosecuter wanted to take - it was only after civil society groups challenged the public prosecuter's refusal to take Wilders to court was the complaint lodged. The result was a strange case where the prosecuters didn't really want Wilders to be found guilty, and the danger of the PVV benefiting from the case.

On winning the case, Wilders said:

"“I’m incredibly happy with this acquittal on all counts," Mr Wilders said outside the court. "It’s not only an acquittal for me, but a victory for freedom of expression in the Netherlands. Fortunately, you’re allowed to discuss Islam in public debate and you’re not muzzled in public debate. An enormous burden has fallen from my shoulders.”"

Although the court tagged on some disapproving language to its judgment:

"The court found that Mr Wilders’ rhetoric was “on the edge of what is legally permissible” but not illegal. The judge described statements about a “tsunami” of immigrants as “crude and denigrating”, but legally legitimate given the wider context and his acknowledgement that those who integrate are acceptable and do not call for violence."

It was likely to be a win-win situation for Wilders in any case: had he been found guilty, he could protray himself as a martyr for freedom of speech; now that he's been acquitted he can present his rhetoric as being perfectly within the bounds of reasonable political debate (even though the court didn't rule it to be "reasonable", just not illegal).

There are some cases where using the law to limit free speech is a good thing. In a democratic society we take certain level of tolerance and mutual understanding for granted, but hate speech and incitement to violence can have a very toxic effect on a democratic culture, even if they are not acted on. Apart from these extreme cases, it's generally better to fight extremist rhetoric openly. Otherwise court cases will just have the effect of giving such movements a greater dose of the oxygen of publicity.

Schengen Wars

After France and Germany sent a letter to the EU opposing the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen zone (a decision each Schengen member state has a veto on), Romania has hit back with suggestions that it will delay Croatian accession (or that the CVM [Co-operation and Verification Mechanism] that applies to it and Bulgaria should be applied to Croatia as well), and that it might delay ratifying the Protocol allowing the 18 Lisbon MEPs from taking their seats in the European Parliament. France and Germany are blocking the expansion of the Schengen zone to include Romania and Bulgaria because of their failure to make good progress in combating corruption and organised crime. However, technically both Bulgaria and Romania have met the criteria for acceding to the Schengen zone, and the two sets of criteria are supposed to be separate.

Romania's fight-back has been couched in the language of the rights of small states against the power of the Franco-German core. Ironically, a few days before EUobserver reported the Franco-German letter, I heard this policy being held up as an example of successful small state diplomacy - the Netherlands was extremely reluctant to let Romania and Bulgaria join, and wanted to put pressure on them to speed up justice reform. (Justice, immigration and law and order are policy areas the Dutch government is very keen on). Though the Netherlands has a veto in this area, using the "nuclear option" isn't a great diplomatic technique, and it's much better to get wider support for their position, so the Dutch lobbied the other states (particularly France) on the issue. (Yet another example of the veto not being a practical tool in European politics, I think).

In any case there's the question of whether or not it's right to move the goalposts like this. Wikileaks, as the EUobserver reported, has shown the considerable frustration in the EU over the the failure of the 2007 accession states to effectively fight corruption. The EU has been lax and hasty in its enlargement, and there's little incentive for states to reform after they've joined. It is hard to see how corruption and organised crime can be divorced from the burden Romania and Bulgaria would have to assume in becoming the EU/Schengen zone's border. Would border controls be or remain effective?

It may be unfair to tie these issues together after the fact, and the EU should have perhaps linked them more closely earlier, but these issues aren't optional for Romania, Bulgaria or the EU, and we have to find some way of ensuring that they will be tackled. There is a big question over big states versus small states rights, but this is not the most glorious way of fighting the small states' fight - because in the end this is about Romania and Bulgaria living up to the commitments of membership, which will benefit them and and EU.


UPDATE: Romania has given up on this strategy. Also worth reading is Kosmopolito's critque of Romania's brand of EU politics.

When would Zwarte Piet arrive?

When I arrived in the Netherlands, I was already aware of two of the most striking aspects of living here: the monthly air raid siren test and the Zwarte Pieten; but it tends to be the minor things that make you wonder what exactly you're supposed to do, or how you should react in a certain situation.

But first the striking things. The monthly air raid siren is pretty much what it sounds like. It's sounded at 11 o'clock on the first Monday of every month, and is strangely musical, unlike the building wail of the sirens during the London Blitz that you might imagine. Zwarte Piet ("Black Pete") is a bit harder to explain. He's the mischievous helper of the Dutch version of Father Christmas or Santa Claus, "Sinterklaas", and though I knew about Zwarte Piet, it's still strange to see Zwarte Piet on TV or in the flesh - because people playing Zwarte Piet have to paint their faces black and wear Renaissance style clothes. There's naturally been soul-searching over the representation of Zwarte Piet, but apart from an experiment on Dutch TV of having different coloured Pieten, the traditional blackface appearence has remained.

As Sinterklaas lives in a castle in Madrid (he travels to the Netherlands every year in the middle of November by steamboat), two questions have been idlely floating around my mind.* First, why does Spain still have such a hold on the Dutch imagination when the country has been independent from them for centuries, and they don't neighbour each other, and secondly, I have been wondering whether Dutch families ever visit Sinterklaas in Spain, like the Santa's Grotto in Lapland? So far I've just been told that Sinterklaas kidnaps bad children and takes them back to his Spanish castle, so I suppose it's not necessarily somewhere you would want to visit. Although there is a YouTube video claiming to have spotted him in Madrid:



So far things have been pretty straight-forward, however. Though it becomes more complicated when you're dealing with an international group when it comes to arranging a night out in a pub. It's hard to know exactly what people's conception of time is. On Monday arrangements were made to go out at 8:30pm. At home, the starting time seems to be purely theoretical, and the word "about" is usually included as recognition of this. "We'll be out at about 9". Nobody would arrive at 9, and only a few would turn up within half an hour of that time; nearly everyone will have arrived after an hour and a half. So sometimes the best way is to find out when other people are themselves planning to go out (the reply inevitably features another "about" which signifies a 30 minute margin), and then arrive at the time when most of the "abouts" overlap.

So on Monday evening it struck me that I didn't know just how late to arrive: an important question when you don't want to spend 30 minutes sitting on your own in a pub.

The "problem" was easily solved by meeting up with someone before going to the pub, and most people arrived within an hour. I was told that the Bulgarian rule is: after the meeting time, you wait 5 minutes out of obligation, and another 5 minutes out of courtesy. And though I didn't quite overthink the situation as I might have written it in this post, I'm wondering now: what are the different cultural rules for meeting up across Europe?



*The steamboat might be the more obvious thing to wonder about; I think the reason is that most Sinterklaas traditions originated in the 19th Century. My idle thoughts don't seem to be very consistent in what they wonder about.

The Shape of Dutch EU Policy

This article has been rattling around my head for a while - since before the official formation of the Dutch government - but I never got around to writing it. At the very end of September, I attended a lecture by Wepke Kingma, Chief Director for European Integration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the challenges facing Dutch European policy. Of course, this was before the new government came in (though we were pretty sure about how the coalition would turn out), but it was very interesting to hear about how the Dutch government generally sees itself in the EU.

The Dutch EU role:

When it comes to how the Dutch government view the changes in the EC/EU over the decades and how the power structures affect its influence, it sounded familiar to me. I've often argued that increased power for the Council (or European Council) is counter to the interests of small states, and that the supranational aspect of the EU generally serves small states better. This seemed to be the Dutch experience, with worries over the growing power of the European Council as the Commission is weakened, as well as enlargement. Vetos are of little use as they are a "nuclear option" in negotiations and make you unpopular and less influential in future negotiations; also, it benefits big states more as smaller states are more easily pressured under a unanimous voting system. The Dutch strategy for dealing with enlargement and the "big 3" is to have well-developed positions on all European policies to ensure that the Netherlands is a reliable negotiating partner; and this also feeds into coalition-building on issues. I was a bit surprised that coalitions in the Council are very stable, but it makes sense as it is hard and time consuming to constantly form new voting/negotiating coalitions.

One aspect of the Dutch relationship with the EU that is different from Ireland, and perhaps other small states, is the "founding member" status of the Netherlands. Enlargement seems to be seen as a dilution of identity and influence - the original 6 were described as a "nuclear family", and I couldn't help thinking of the Dutch word "gezellig", which is a bit untranslateable, but means something lke "cozy". Money and the dilution of identity seem to be at the core of Dutch worries over the direction of the EU. However, it seems important to note how integration and supranationalism is seen as an important way of defending the influence and role of small states in the EU struture. While sovereignty may be viewed as being lost through the ending of the veto and supervision by the Commission, small states seem to view this as (generally, though it depends on the area), as protecting their position and opening up new opportunities to influence Europe's direction. Supranationalism can be a goal of nationally-minded member state governments too, it seems.


Multi-annual budget:

This is a big issue as it will be decisive in the EU's capabilities over the next few years (and therefore also decisive on how new Lisbon institutions such as the EEAS develops, and it is being decided in an atmosphere of austerity. Though there's undoubtedly a large element of self-interest in the EP's defence of the budget, and lobbying for increases, there is a good argument that you cannot increase the responsibilities of the EU institutions without having the money available to effectively carry out its duties.

The Dutch position seems to be that they are quite happy to continue paying as a net contributor, as the internal market is so important to the Netherlands, but CAP and the Cohesion Funds are areas where the Netherlands wants to see cuts and reforms. They want the EU budget to be set at around 1% GNI, and have priorities for the EU: Frontex (immigration control at the EU border), energy & climate, and the EEAS, among others. Therefore they want cuts in CAP and Cohesion funds to pay for increases elsewhere. The Dutch seem to view agriculture spending as necessary to aid declining villages and for the maintanence of the countryside ("landscape preservation"), but are otherwise looking for the CAP section of the budget to be reduced heavily. Cohesion funds are viewed as a good policy to help make the poorer member states wealthier, and therefore more able to buy more goods from the richer member states (the thought also occured to me that this is also a good strategy to steadily increase the number of net contributors; or rather slowly spread the burden of contributions). However, cohesion funds should focus on the poorer member states and not be directed to the wealthy countries' poor regions as well. There was a mention of asking for a rebate if the Netherlands didn't get its way, but this was heavily downplayed (my impression was that they viewed it as a childish strategy that wouldn't win them any friends and would be counter-productive in their coalition-building strategies).

My own thoughts on this are that CAP clearly needs to be reformed (as Kingma pointed out, the newer member states will soon join the CAP fully and this will add to the strain on the budget), but I doubt that restricting cohesion funds to only the poorer countries is a good idea in the long run. Perhaps I'm biased because I come from a poorer region, but I think that all member states need to be involved in the cohesion fund, and that if you break their link with it (in that they feel that they're not getting anything out of it), it will come under increasing pressure for cuts despite its value for the good of the internal market. What is clear is that the EU is definitely a "transfer union" and always has been. It consists of a number of different policies transfering money for different projects to help out poorer regions and areas, as richer areas benefit from larger and freer markets. I would personally defend this transfer union as being a social and economic good, though it could do with reform. Still, the battle over the budget is likely to be vicious, as the EU is in some ways a rudimentary welfare state for states, and battle lines have already been quite firmly drawn.

Introducing rebates into the equation would be highly damaging, as rebates are paid for by other countries (I'm reminded of a story of the Polish government asking the British government how much more they would need to pay to join the EU because of the British rebate [it was a sore point obstructing enlargement negotiations]. That image of a poorer country asking how much it would need to pay a richer country - and a champion of enlargement at that - due to its own obstructionism of the budget is something that sticks with me as a symbol for just how selfish and immoral rebates are).


Immigration and asylum:

With Geert Wilders' PVV supporting the minority coalition government, this is obviously a big issue in the Netherlands today. Justice and Home Affairs may be a big European focus for this Dutch government, as Kingma suggested that JHA was an area where the Netherlands wanted to see more action. The Lisbon Treaty moved JHA firmly into our "Union method", so this area could see a leap in activity. The challenge for the Netherlands here is to convince the other member states that they don't want to re-nationalise immigration, but to toughen the rules on illegal immigration. Immigration is such a big issue across many member states that they might be able to win some support for changing the system. Also, there are lots of "Dublin cases" before the European Court of Human Rights on the current system, and this could generate pressure for refrorm as well (the Dublin system is where immigrants into the EU are sent back to the country they first entered so that they can't "shop around" the member states - there have been complaints particularly about the Greek processing of applications).


Enlargement:

This touches on the identity, money and influence concerns of the Netherlands. The Dutch government wants tougher enforcement of the enlargement conditions to ensure that there is the legal and institutional change necessary to join, and that the EU moves away from the old practice of giving in to pressure to enlarge quickly. Kingma raised the prospect that a Dutch parliament may end up refusing to give the green light to enlargement if it felt that the candidate country hadn't fully reformed.

Naturally Turkey is a big topic, but it wasn't really directly addressed on its own. However, in the question-and-answer session, it was suggested - but not directly said - that the Netherlands may be negotiating or hoping that the Turkish government would accept some conditions on its voting weight. I stress that this was not directly or explicitly said, and that I am getting this impression from something said by someone talking in their second language rather than their mother tongue. Still, enlargement has seen restrictions on the free movement on workers and access to CAP funds, so if a "privillaged relationship with the EU" is unacceptable for Turkey and other member states, then I wouldn't be surprised if the idea of gradual integration and gaining of rights in the institutions hadn't surfaced in some national administration. If such an idea has surfaced, I hope it will be resisted.

Extreme Europe

How should we deal with the rise of the far-right in European politics? It was a question that was debated over in the UK following the election of 2 MEPs from the British National Party in the 2009 European elections, and it is increasingly pressing across Europe. Jobbik in Hungary, the politics of the place of the Roma in France, Thilo Sarrazin and the integration of immigrants (particularly those who come from countries with an Islamic majority), and of course Wilders in the Netherlands. The PES has issued a proposal for dealing with the far-right and is challenging the EPP and ALDE parties to join them in this strategy. (PDF).

They propose the following code of conduct:

"- Condemn all racist, xenophobic, discriminatory or nationalistic statements or actions.
- Not get into a ruling coalition or electoral alliance with a Party inciting or attempting to stir up
racial or ethnic prejudices and racial hatred, at European or national levels.
- Refuse an implicit support from a Party inciting or attempting to stir up racial or ethnic prejudices
and racial hatred to form a government.
- Fight the legitimization of the discourses of such Parties by refusing to engage into their terms of
the debate, by not taking up their ideas into its political platforms nor in the policies it implements
when in government.
- Isolate its members not respecting those principles."

The other side to this strategy of isolation is PES-specific: the party places some of the blame in the court of the Conservative and Liberal parties for their obsession with cutting the deficits across Europe and not paying attention to jobs and growth. I tend to agree to some extent, in that fiscal conservatism needs to be married with some overarching ideology and approach to the state and society - whether left-wing or right-wing. Unprincipled cutting of the welfare state on the altar of deficit reduction is alienating to the public; it is simply the elites tending to the public finances without regard to the public.

Though I disagree with the Tory vision of the state, Labour's charges of ideological cuts strikes me as purely politik. Both parties would make ideological cuts and revisions to the tax system, and it's healthy to have a debate about what sort of society and conception of the state there should be. So far, while Labour has spoken out about the cuts being unfair, I think they should give a clearer idea about what role they think the state should play. The left-wing arguments of fairness will start to ring hollow against the right-wing version if they let it go unchallenged. The key, though, is to have the debate and to make sure that politics matters beyond the mere management of the state. Otherwise mainstream politics will appear to be distant and disconnected.

So the challenge is for parties to be more challenging and engaging in a way that avoids the terms and rhetoric styles of the far-right. The proposal not to accept support from the far-right is a principled and right approach, though it comes with dangers too.

In the Netherlands, the new government is a minority coalition with support from Geert Wilders' PVV party. An alternative coalition would look more like a Grand Coalition, as parties more to the left of the VVD (Liberals) or the CDA (Christian Democrats) would have to join. Under the current arrangement, the danger is that the PVV's policies could be legitimised to a degree by the association with the government, while it could also play as an opposition party and try to have it both ways at the next election. Those who claim that Wilders will become more moderate when faced with the realities of power have to remember that the PVV doesn't have to take the responsibility for bad decisions by the government. On the other hand, a Grand Coalition would limit the scope for mainstream political debate and could permit Wilders to set himself up as the main opposition. The governing parties would have to try and maintain their own distinct identities and arguments, which the LibDems in the UK have found hard to do.

On balance, I think that the Grand Coalition approach is better if done well, and it is certainly the more principled option. However, it may depend on the conduct of the parties which approach will turn out to be the best in each case. A completely different question, of course, is whether the approach or recommendations of the Europarties will make any difference to the actions of the national parties. I can't see it figuring in their day-to-day political action.

In other news, the Public Prosecution Department in the Netherlands has recommended that Wilders be found not guilty of inciting hatred towards Muslims or of discriminating against them. They were forced to take up the case after a High Court ruling, but the political consequences will likely be contrary to what the anti-racism campaigners originally wanted.

ELDR Conference 2010

ELDR, the pan-European Liberal party that is part of ALDE in the European Parliament (and counts the UK Liberal Democrats, Irish Fianna Fáil and Dutch VVD among its ranks), is holding its last day of its annual congress in Helsinki today. I've only found out about it today, due to a blog post disappointed that the pro-European Liberal Democrats have not sent some MPs to the congress, and EUobserver's reporting of ELDR unease with the VVD-led government's reliance on Geert Wilders' PVV party in the Dutch Parliament. Recently I haven't been that attentive to Twitter, so I may have missed any party buzz from it, but a quick look at the ELDR Twitter account shows that there have only been 12 Tweets since the start of the congress, at the time of writing.

Still, now that I had discovered the ELDR Congress, I went to their website to check up on any news. So far there have been 3 news articles - on the opening of the congress, on the increased turnout at the congress, and one congratulating the VVD on becoming the senior governing party in the Netherlands. Not only is there no press release so far on discussions about the congress's theme - Demographic Change - but there seems to be no mention of the congress on the party's blog, or any of the blogs linked on its blog page, apart from a short descriptive one in Swedish.

The theme of the congress is one that's very relevant today, as immigration and welfare state reform in the face of the economic crisis are clearly the major issues, so it's disappointing that so far little has emerged on the Eurozone economy, the welfare state, or immigration. It's important to have a coherent position on this, given the free movement of workers within the EU, and that the Lib Dems in the UK and (more pressingly) the VVD in the Netherlands have to deal with demands for restrictions on immigration. Indeed, Geert Wilders has supposedly vetted the new Dutch immigration minister. The ELDR leader, Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, said that she was sure that the VVD would stick to liberal principles, but also supported the mooted banning of the burqa in the Netherlands (Neyts-Uyttebroeck is from Belgium) - something that I consider to be an illiberal position.

The last day isn't over yet, and some news and party positions - or even a clearer overview of what was discussed - might emerge after the Congress ends. It seems unlikely that anything very interesting will suddenly come to light when everyone has packed up and gone home, however. Even if interest in the ELDR Congress would have been low even if it was more open and accessible, ELDR have missed a chance to promote themselves as a party online, and I wonder at the political will of a party that seems to not even bother to reach out with such an event.

[In other news, I've just noticed that ALDE's website has undergone a redesign].

Leiden, stad van mijn hart...

The major anniversary in Europe on the 3rd of October may have been the Tag der deutschen Einheit ("Day of German Unity"), but the small city of Leiden marked the anniversary of Leidens Ontzet in a big way this weekend.





Leidens Ontzet.


Leidens Ontzet, of the Relief of Leiden, marks the relief of the city over 400 years ago when it was besieged by the Spainish during the Dutch struggle for independence. As a reward for the Leideners' courage in resisting the Spanish, they were given a choice of exemption from taxes or a university, and they chose a university, so the anniversary is an important date in the University's history too. This year the 3rd fell on a Sunday, so the celebrations were spread out over the weekend, with Monday as a holiday for the city.

The scale and duration of the festival was impressive. The kermis (fun fair) was open during Friday and Saturday, and was crammed into the area surrounding the train station, taking up any available space. On Saturday bars and stages were set up all over the city, so when night fell the city turned into a strange mix of overlapping discos, complete with lights and a worrying over-use of smoke machines. The remaining space was filled with stalls selling sweets, snacks and, well, pretty much everything as a Christmas market array of goods was put on sale - DVDs, clothes, art...

Of course, you had to eat Hutspot at some point. Hutspot is the traditional Leiden Ontzet dinner. It's made of potato, onions and carrot mashed together with some meat (usually sausage, but mine had beef). There seem to be a few versions of the Hutspot story. The most simple explanation is that it was what the people ate to stave off starvation during the siege, but other stories involve a boy who was sent out to check that the Spanish had left when the siege broke. The boy either discovered the Hutspot bubbling away in a pot the Spanish had left behind, or the food he gathered into the pot he brought back with him was used in the meal. In any case, De Lakenhal has a pot on display that is supposed to be the origin of the Hutspot. It's not exactly the most visually attractive dish, but it doesn't taste as bad as it looks!

On Sunday, marching bands ruled Leiden, putting on shows and, naturally, playing music. On Monday, Leideners gathered beside the townhall (Stadhuis) at 6.30am to sing songs before eating raw herring and white bread (food that the relieving Dutch troops brought to Leiden). Lots of people turned up for the event and lyrics were handed out so everyone could sing along as dawn broke. I was surprised how serious people must take the festival to turn up in such numbers early in the morning (and probably after a festivally unhealthy amount of alcohol), but there was lots of chatting, with bursts of singing as the musical cues radiated out from the centre (I was quite close to the edge of the gathering). The singing was ended by a procession through the town (lead by a marching band, of course), and marching bands generally played throughout the city for the rest of the morning and afternoon. I didn't get to try the raw herring and white bread (haring en wittebrood) since by the end of the singing there was already a long queue snaking halfway down the road along the canal. The day ended with a colourful fireworks display.






Dutch & Leiden identity.

A friend from England happened to be visiting during the celebrations, and she wondered if the Dutch were very nationalistic given the large celebration of what was a civic and not a national anniversary. Having only been here a short while, I don't think I have really got a sense of how the Dutch view their identity yet, but the celebration seemed to be an indiction of how seriously the Dutch take organising a party. It was also a very civic celebration, even though it had an event in the history of Dutch independence at its heart; Leiden flags easily outnumbered Dutch ones (not that there seemed to be very many flags), and today all flags seemed to have disappeared (even from the Stadhuis). At the moment it feels like a controlled and well-organised burst of civic clebration and identity that hasn't really carried over (bar hangovers) to the 5th October. On the other hand, identity issues are undoubtedly an important issue in the Netherlands today, with the PVV (Geert Wilders' party) now big enough to be in the position of supporting the minority coalition government.

Over the next year I'll try to pick up more of the Dutch culture and language, and try to follow the interesting political situation here.