Happy Europe Day! Although clearly the numbers of people happy with Europe have dropped sharply recently, so it's not likely that you will see many events celebrating it.
It's Europe Day in the European Year of Citizens, so it's probably appropriate to look at some of the issues surrounding EU Citizenship right now.
The European Citizens' Initiative, the big democratic innovation of the Lisbon Treaty, has come under attack recently for being too bureaucratic and inaccessible, though some ECIs have gained a lot of support - like Right2Water - or are using the ECI to push European Citizenship further with expanded political rights, such as Let Me Vote!
Speaking of citizenship and politics, after a successful campaign within the Party of European Socialists for primaries to select their candidate for Commission President for the 2014 elections, the PES has started the election run with a pretty tepid use of the primaries. Hopefully this initiative won't fade away - it could, after all, be used as an opportunity to bring party members into the debate on EU issues, and could be a good way of boosting party activity come election time.
On the legal front, EU Citizenship hasn't evolved much since the Zambrano case and the retreat of the ECJ afterwards in the McCarthy case and in subsequent other cases. I recommend the article over at European Law Blog on the European Court of Justice's approach to EU Citizenship. It can be a confusing area, with citizenship rights largely bound up in the exercise (and ability to exercise) free movement rights. A full definition of EU citizenship will likely only be decided by long years of court battles, it seems.
With all the social and economic problems confronting us today, and the difficulties in engaging with the EU and promoting change, it's hard to be in a celebratory mood from a citizen's perspective. However, with the ECI and the primaries, it's clear that there is a section of civil society out there that is trying to work for more participation and a more responsive EU. So here's to the people plugging away to make things better: that's where you see citizenship in action.
Showing posts with label ECJ. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ECJ. Show all posts
Thursday, 9 May 2013
Wednesday, 24 October 2012
European Stability Mechanism before the ECJ
Irish independent TD (MP) Thomas Pringle’s case against the European Stability Mechanism has reached the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, referred there for interpretation on 3 questions by the national court. The 3 questions, are:
(1) Whether the European Council Decision 2011/199/EU of 25th March 2011 [PDF] breaches the EU Treaties or general principles of EU law (i.e. is it valid law?);
(2) Whether Eurozone Member States are entitled to enter into extra-EU Treaties on the Euro, and if this infringes on the EU’s exclusive competence over the Euro; and
(3) If, should the European Council decision be ruled valid, Member States are only allowed to enter into (ratify) the ESM Treaty following its entry into force (1st January 2013)?
The case will be very important for 3 reasons. First, it will help decide if the stability mechanism is compatible with EU law; second, if non-EU treaties can be used to change the governance of the Eurozone or if the EU’s exclusive competence over the Euro means that the EU treaties would have to be changed; and third, the extent to which the European Council can amend the EU Treaties. All obviously important not just for solving the economic crisis, but for how the EU and the Eurozone is governed generally.
RTÉ has reported that all 27 of the court’s judges will sit on the panel for this case – an unprecedented for a case referred to the court by a national court. On the proceedings before the court, RTÉ reported:
(1) Whether the European Council Decision 2011/199/EU of 25th March 2011 [PDF] breaches the EU Treaties or general principles of EU law (i.e. is it valid law?);
(2) Whether Eurozone Member States are entitled to enter into extra-EU Treaties on the Euro, and if this infringes on the EU’s exclusive competence over the Euro; and
(3) If, should the European Council decision be ruled valid, Member States are only allowed to enter into (ratify) the ESM Treaty following its entry into force (1st January 2013)?
The case will be very important for 3 reasons. First, it will help decide if the stability mechanism is compatible with EU law; second, if non-EU treaties can be used to change the governance of the Eurozone or if the EU’s exclusive competence over the Euro means that the EU treaties would have to be changed; and third, the extent to which the European Council can amend the EU Treaties. All obviously important not just for solving the economic crisis, but for how the EU and the Eurozone is governed generally.
RTÉ has reported that all 27 of the court’s judges will sit on the panel for this case – an unprecedented for a case referred to the court by a national court. On the proceedings before the court, RTÉ reported:
“Michael Cush SC for Ireland said the ESM amendments were "fully compatible with the treaties".The ruling is expected by the end of the year in what could be a landmark judgment.
He countered that the ESM "will not affect the union's exclusive competence regarding monetary policy for the euro area nor will it increase the limited competence that it has in respect of the coordination of the member states' economic policy."
Thomas Henze, a lawyer for the German government, said there was no indication of any infringement of EU law.
He countered Mr Rogers' assertion that the ESM should not have been ratified when the relevant treaty, the Fiscal Treaty, did not come into force until January.
[...]
After three hours and 30 minutes of questioning, the ECJ Judges asked legal representatives to stand over their statements.
Most of the questioning of the bench was focused on the oral statements from the European Commission and the European Counsel, although Mr Rogers was called to clarify and justify his arguments on several occasions.”
Monday, 11 June 2012
Linguistic Complaints
BY CC umjanedoan.
As a lazy English-speaker, I can't complain when it comes to the EU and language: there's no doubt about it, I'm in the privillaged group when it comes to communication. So there's very little I can add to Martin Holterman's rebuttal of Quatremer's complaints on the decline of French in the EU, except to highlight that in European law, French is still the top dog.
A good example is the European Court of Justice,* where French is the first language. So much so, that the application forms for interns is only in French. Perhaps someone can correct me, but I'm not aware of an EU institution that only has an application form in English.
The truth is that French is a privileged language in the EU - sure, not as big as English, but it's streets ahead of the most widely-spoken native language in the EU (German), and light years ahead of any other language. So there isn't really any call for alarmism over the Commission's economic assessments being made in English. After all, wasn't the Lisbon Treaty first drafted in French...?**
*Ok, the Court of Justice of the European Union if you want to be technical.
** Leading to Grahnlaw comparing the French and English versions of the provisions on citizenship.
Thursday, 23 February 2012
ACTA referred to the European Court of Justice
The Commission has decided to refer the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement to the ECJ to assess its compatibility with EU law, including the fundamental rights guaranteed under EU law. Commissioner Karel de Gucht said:
However he goes on to say:
It seems odd to subject ACTA to judicial review when its provisions are open to national interpretation in places, while not reviewing the current IPR regime in the EU. After all, if the current regime has already largely introduced the ACTA system domestically, would a negative judgment by the Court result in a major investigation into the existing laws...?
This judicial review is mainly aimed at providing a visible counter to the accusations leveled at the Agreement by the European public. Because of the secret nature of the negotiations and the timing of the SOPA and PIPA legislative battles in the US, the Commission hasn't been able to effectively put its side of the story across, so it's relying on a court judgment to solve this problem. Given the vague nature of some of the provisions and the false accusations that have been flying around, the ECJ's judgment will be able to refute some of these. However this avoids the issue of whether we aren't balancing rights correctly through our intellectual property rights regime. The criticisms of the Treaty aren't just based on fundamental rights.
This balance has been pushed for a long time simply in the direction of ever stronger enforcement in a way that doesn't take into account the the issues raised by the internet age, particularly via the new focus on indirect "economic advantage" as opposed to commercial advantage. There are many uses of media now that are different from both their commercial use and the use of physical goods - from classic commercial activities which do need to be protected. We need to think more about the purpose of IPR and how far we should restrict "indirect economic advantage"; whether or not it should be punished at the same level as commercial advantages, or if different approaches should be used to reflect the social and economic value and impact of the relevant activity. And what about setting damages at the level of the retail price rather than the more proportionate level of the loss suffered?
This isn't a simple, headline grabbing fight over fundamental rights (although it raises some questions over how we want to balance them in practice), but also over the usefulness, proportionality and effectiveness of our IPR laws. I hope throwing out some of the wilder claims about ACTA does not puncture a necessary debate - will the EP measure up?
"We are planning to ask Europe’s highest court to assess whether ACTA is incompatible - in any way - with the EU's fundamental rights and freedoms, such as freedom of expression and information or data protection and the right to property in case of intellectual property.
As you are no doubt aware, within the EU institutional process, the European Commission has already passed ACTA to national governments for ratification. The Council has adopted ACTA unanimously in December and authorised Member States to sign it. The Commission has also passed on ACTA to the European Parliament for debate and a future vote.
That said, I believe the European Commission has a responsibility to provide our parliamentary representatives and the public at large with the most detailed and accurate information available. So, a referral will allow for Europe’s top court to independently clarify the legality of this agreement."
However he goes on to say:
"As I have explained before the European Parliament on several occasions, ACTA is an agreement that aims to raise global standards of enforcement of intellectual property rights. These very standards are already enshrined in European law. What counts for us is getting other countries to adopt them so that European companies can defend themselves against blatant rip-offs of their products and works when they do business around the world.
This means that ACTA will not change anything in the European Union, but will matter for the European Union.
[...]
So let me be clear: ACTA will change nothing about how we use the internet and social websites today – since it does not introduce any new rules. ACTA only helps to enforce what is already law today.
ACTA will not censor websites or shut them down; ACTA will not hinder freedom of the internet or freedom of speech.
Let's cut through this fog of uncertainty and put ACTA in the spotlight of our highest independent judicial authority: the European Court of Justice.
This clarity should help support a calm, reasoned, open and democratic discussion on ACTA - whether at the national or at the European level. We will also be in contact with the other European institutions to explain this step and why it would make sense that they make the same move."
It seems odd to subject ACTA to judicial review when its provisions are open to national interpretation in places, while not reviewing the current IPR regime in the EU. After all, if the current regime has already largely introduced the ACTA system domestically, would a negative judgment by the Court result in a major investigation into the existing laws...?
This judicial review is mainly aimed at providing a visible counter to the accusations leveled at the Agreement by the European public. Because of the secret nature of the negotiations and the timing of the SOPA and PIPA legislative battles in the US, the Commission hasn't been able to effectively put its side of the story across, so it's relying on a court judgment to solve this problem. Given the vague nature of some of the provisions and the false accusations that have been flying around, the ECJ's judgment will be able to refute some of these. However this avoids the issue of whether we aren't balancing rights correctly through our intellectual property rights regime. The criticisms of the Treaty aren't just based on fundamental rights.
This balance has been pushed for a long time simply in the direction of ever stronger enforcement in a way that doesn't take into account the the issues raised by the internet age, particularly via the new focus on indirect "economic advantage" as opposed to commercial advantage. There are many uses of media now that are different from both their commercial use and the use of physical goods - from classic commercial activities which do need to be protected. We need to think more about the purpose of IPR and how far we should restrict "indirect economic advantage"; whether or not it should be punished at the same level as commercial advantages, or if different approaches should be used to reflect the social and economic value and impact of the relevant activity. And what about setting damages at the level of the retail price rather than the more proportionate level of the loss suffered?
This isn't a simple, headline grabbing fight over fundamental rights (although it raises some questions over how we want to balance them in practice), but also over the usefulness, proportionality and effectiveness of our IPR laws. I hope throwing out some of the wilder claims about ACTA does not puncture a necessary debate - will the EP measure up?
Thursday, 12 May 2011
The Curious Case of Citizen McCarthy
In my previous post I've written about how the Court of Justice (that's the EU court based in Luxembourg) has been influenced by the cases that come before it when it comes to citizenship, and how it has shaped EU citizenship. Last week the Court handed down its McCarthy Judgment which complicates things. (This post is my immediate reaction to the ruling, which I've just read).
Again, these cases and the legal arguments that go into them really affect people's lives, and it's interesting to see how the different circumstances of a person can affect which side of the line they fall on.
As a recap, in Zambrano the question was how far EU citizens can rely on their EU citizenship rights in the Member State of their own nationality, when they have never moved to another Member State. The judgment was vague so I outlined two models of citizenship: either relying on EU citizenship in your own country is only available as an option where you've either used your free movement rights before or where you might be prevented from using them effectively in the future ("Back to the Future" model; or you have a right to reside in your own Member State independent of your national citizenship,* and therefore you can rely on EU citizenship simply if EU law applies to EU citizens in those cases. This second option means that Member States can't discriminate against their own citizens so that EU citizens are treated better than their own nationals ("reverse discrimination").
[* Member States control who gets their citizenship, and therefore who gets EU citizenship deriving from this.]
The problem in the McCarthy case is pretty much an issue I raised with the Back to the Future model (because I knew the case was coming up, and I know people the senario has affected in real life [for want of a better term]):
This is essentially what happened to McCarthy, who had never left the UK, nor been a worker under EU law. She applied for an Irish passport, which she got, and tried to assert her EU citizenship rights (based on her Irish citizenship) to bring her spouse from a third country (not an EU citizen himself) into the UK to live with her. Could she rely on her EU citizenship?
Though I stated that I thought the Court was using the "Back to the Future" model in Zambrano (the reasoning was vague), I thought that over time the Court would become more explicit in its reasoning and follow the separate right to reside reasoning. So I thought 3 outcomes were possible, in order of desending likelihood:
1. She could, because she had Irish citizenship, and therefore she could be said to be living in a Member State of another nationality despite never having moved. That she only applied for the Irish citizenship so this would be the case ("cherry picking" her legal rights in the words of Advocate General Kokott) doesn't matter as there is nothing wrong in making use of legal rights made available to you. This would not concern the Zambrano decision.
2. She could not rely on the Citizens' Directive (2004/38), because she is a national of the the UK. However, she has a right to reside due to her EU citizenship regardless of having such a right due to her nationality, and therefore the UK could not discriminate against her compared to EU citizens of non-UK nationality if they are in the same position. [Explicitly adopting the reasoning of AG Sharpston in the Zambrano case that was implicitly, but not clearly, endorsed].
3. As 2, but referring to the vague idea of the substance of EU citizenship rather than reasoning clearly. So as in Zambrano.
What the Court actually did, was rule that she did not have the protection of EU law as a citizen as she was a national of the Member State and had not exercised any free movement rights. Her Irish citizenship was irrelevant, and, in fact, there is no right of residence separate from the exercise of free movement rights. In other words, there is only the Back to the Future model.
To quote the Court (skippable if you're not interested in the technical legal reasoning of the Court):
There may still be some cases where EU citizens can rely on their Union citizenship against their own Member State on grounds of non-discrimination, but this makes it extremely difficult to argue if the Court refuses to acknowledge the significance of your Union citizenship in the first place. The judgment makes clear that in Zambrano the decisive factor was that the Union citizens would be required to leave the territory of their home country, and that of the whole Union as they were young children dependent on their non-EU national parents. We still don't know what the new idea of "substance of EU citizenship rights" is, but it doesn't mean what we thought it might mean - the Civis Europeus Sum that a more rational, unified idea of citizenship might bring.
It's obvious that the law on citizenship is messy - and, in my opinion, highly unsatisfactory. It is difficult for citizens to know when they are protected, and when they are not - and sometimes it can be based on a tiny detail of their life or how they might lead their life. Whether children are involved or not can also be a factor - perhaps this shows a certain sentimentality of the Court that it tries to rationalise through its case law. In any case, McCarthy is a blow for those supporting a more equal citizenship.
**(As an aside, the Court referred to Article 21 TFEU rather than Article 20 as it did in Zambrano - since they repeat each other to a certain extent makes the relevance unclear, but it's a debate best left to academic literature rather than this blog post).**
Again, these cases and the legal arguments that go into them really affect people's lives, and it's interesting to see how the different circumstances of a person can affect which side of the line they fall on.
As a recap, in Zambrano the question was how far EU citizens can rely on their EU citizenship rights in the Member State of their own nationality, when they have never moved to another Member State. The judgment was vague so I outlined two models of citizenship: either relying on EU citizenship in your own country is only available as an option where you've either used your free movement rights before or where you might be prevented from using them effectively in the future ("Back to the Future" model; or you have a right to reside in your own Member State independent of your national citizenship,* and therefore you can rely on EU citizenship simply if EU law applies to EU citizens in those cases. This second option means that Member States can't discriminate against their own citizens so that EU citizens are treated better than their own nationals ("reverse discrimination").
[* Member States control who gets their citizenship, and therefore who gets EU citizenship deriving from this.]
The problem in the McCarthy case is pretty much an issue I raised with the Back to the Future model (because I knew the case was coming up, and I know people the senario has affected in real life [for want of a better term]):
"Under UK law if a British national marries a third country national and wants to bring them home to the UK, and they haven't used their EU free movement rights, then they have to pay to get them into the country. So other EU nationals and British nationals who have used their free movement rights have preferential treatment over British nationals who never used their free movement rights. It is unlikely that, under the Back to the Future model, that that British citizen could claim that they wouldn't be able to use their EU rights effectively in the future if their spouse couldn't join them in the UK, so they wouldn't be covered by EU citizenship law."
This is essentially what happened to McCarthy, who had never left the UK, nor been a worker under EU law. She applied for an Irish passport, which she got, and tried to assert her EU citizenship rights (based on her Irish citizenship) to bring her spouse from a third country (not an EU citizen himself) into the UK to live with her. Could she rely on her EU citizenship?
Though I stated that I thought the Court was using the "Back to the Future" model in Zambrano (the reasoning was vague), I thought that over time the Court would become more explicit in its reasoning and follow the separate right to reside reasoning. So I thought 3 outcomes were possible, in order of desending likelihood:
1. She could, because she had Irish citizenship, and therefore she could be said to be living in a Member State of another nationality despite never having moved. That she only applied for the Irish citizenship so this would be the case ("cherry picking" her legal rights in the words of Advocate General Kokott) doesn't matter as there is nothing wrong in making use of legal rights made available to you. This would not concern the Zambrano decision.
2. She could not rely on the Citizens' Directive (2004/38), because she is a national of the the UK. However, she has a right to reside due to her EU citizenship regardless of having such a right due to her nationality, and therefore the UK could not discriminate against her compared to EU citizens of non-UK nationality if they are in the same position. [Explicitly adopting the reasoning of AG Sharpston in the Zambrano case that was implicitly, but not clearly, endorsed].
3. As 2, but referring to the vague idea of the substance of EU citizenship rather than reasoning clearly. So as in Zambrano.
What the Court actually did, was rule that she did not have the protection of EU law as a citizen as she was a national of the Member State and had not exercised any free movement rights. Her Irish citizenship was irrelevant, and, in fact, there is no right of residence separate from the exercise of free movement rights. In other words, there is only the Back to the Future model.
To quote the Court (skippable if you're not interested in the technical legal reasoning of the Court):
"39 Hence, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, in so far as the Union citizen concerned has never exercised his right of free movement and has always resided in a Member State of which he is a national, that citizen is not covered by the concept of ‘beneficiary’ for the purposes of Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38, so that that directive is not applicable to him.
40 That finding cannot be influenced by the fact that the citizen concerned is also a national of a Member State other than that where he resides.
41 Indeed, the fact that a Union citizen is a national of more than one Member State does not mean that he has made use of his right of freedom of movement.
[...]
The applicability of Article 21 TFEU
[...]
47 Indeed, the Court has stated several times that citizenship of the Union is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States (see Case C‑34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 41 and case-law cited). Furthermore, the Court has held that Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of that status (see Ruiz Zambrano, paragraph 42).
[...]
49 However, no element of the situation of Mrs McCarthy, as described by the national court, indicates that the national measure at issue in the main proceedings has the effect of depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights associated with her status as a Union citizen, or of impeding the exercise of her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, in accordance with Article 21 TFEU. Indeed, the failure by the authorities of the United Kingdom to take into account the Irish nationality of Mrs McCarthy for the purposes of granting her a right of residence in the United Kingdom in no way affects her in her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, or any other right conferred on her by virtue of her status as a Union citizen.
50 In that regard, by contrast with the case of Ruiz Zambrano, the national measure at issue in the main proceedings in the present case does not have the effect of obliging Mrs McCarthy to leave the territory of the European Union. Indeed, as is clear from paragraph 29 of the present judgment, Mrs McCarthy enjoys, under a principle of international law, an unconditional right of residence in the United Kingdom since she is a national of the United Kingdom.
51 The case in the main proceedings also differs from Case C‑148/02 García Avello [2003] ECR I‑11613. In that judgment, the Court held that the application of the law of one Member State to nationals of that Member State who were also nationals of another Member State had the effect that those Union citizens had different surnames under the two legal systems concerned, and that that situation was liable to cause serious inconvenience for them at both professional and private levels resulting from, inter alia, difficulties in benefiting, in one Member State of which they are nationals, from the legal effects of diplomas or documents drawn up in the surname recognised in the other Member State of which they are also nationals. [Own note: so EU law only applied since national law might prevent EU citizens from using their EU rights in the future].
[...]
53 Thus, in Ruiz Zambrano and García Avello, the national measure at issue had the effect of depriving Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of that status or of impeding the exercise of their right of free movement and residence within the territory of the Member States.
54 As stated in paragraph 49 of the present judgment, in the context of the main proceedings in this case, the fact that Mrs McCarthy, in addition to being a national of the United Kingdom, is also a national of Ireland does not mean that a Member State has applied measures that have the effect of depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of her status as a Union citizen or of impeding the exercise of her right of free movement and residence within the territory of the Member States. Accordingly, in such a context, such a factor is not sufficient, in itself, for a finding that the situation of the person concerned is covered by Article 21 TFEU."
There may still be some cases where EU citizens can rely on their Union citizenship against their own Member State on grounds of non-discrimination, but this makes it extremely difficult to argue if the Court refuses to acknowledge the significance of your Union citizenship in the first place. The judgment makes clear that in Zambrano the decisive factor was that the Union citizens would be required to leave the territory of their home country, and that of the whole Union as they were young children dependent on their non-EU national parents. We still don't know what the new idea of "substance of EU citizenship rights" is, but it doesn't mean what we thought it might mean - the Civis Europeus Sum that a more rational, unified idea of citizenship might bring.
It's obvious that the law on citizenship is messy - and, in my opinion, highly unsatisfactory. It is difficult for citizens to know when they are protected, and when they are not - and sometimes it can be based on a tiny detail of their life or how they might lead their life. Whether children are involved or not can also be a factor - perhaps this shows a certain sentimentality of the Court that it tries to rationalise through its case law. In any case, McCarthy is a blow for those supporting a more equal citizenship.
**(As an aside, the Court referred to Article 21 TFEU rather than Article 20 as it did in Zambrano - since they repeat each other to a certain extent makes the relevance unclear, but it's a debate best left to academic literature rather than this blog post).**
Wednesday, 9 June 2010
What Vodafone do not giveth, Vodafone cannot taketh away
The EU Law Blog has a great post explaining a recent ECJ judgment on the mobile phone roaming charges. The case concerned the legality of the regulation establishing the cap on roaming charges, and I'd recommend the article if you're interested or want to get a feel for how the ECJ decides such things.
Another interesting thing (though it's not very surprising) is the behaviour of Vodafone (and perhaps the others, but it's Vodafone that stuck in my mind). When the roaming charges legislation was passed and being announced on the news, it was noticable that Vodafone had quickly got advertising out pushing the idea that it was reducing roaming charges for its customers - as if it was an entirely voluntary decision for the good of its customers/the business. It's not surprising that Vodafone was a bit upset at loosing a nice stream of income, but the litigation proves how willingly it adopted the change.
Another interesting thing (though it's not very surprising) is the behaviour of Vodafone (and perhaps the others, but it's Vodafone that stuck in my mind). When the roaming charges legislation was passed and being announced on the news, it was noticable that Vodafone had quickly got advertising out pushing the idea that it was reducing roaming charges for its customers - as if it was an entirely voluntary decision for the good of its customers/the business. It's not surprising that Vodafone was a bit upset at loosing a nice stream of income, but the litigation proves how willingly it adopted the change.
Tuesday, 8 June 2010
Tobacco on Trial
EUobserver has reported that a Belgian Court has referred questions to the European Court concerning a case taken there by anti-smoking campaigners fighting to get a judicial ban on the sale of cigarettes and the collection of tax on their sale. The case is being referred to the European Court because the campaigners are relying on the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 in their case, so this case, if admitted, has the potential to have EU-wide effects. It's important to stress that this case has not yet been admitted, and if it is, it will be well over a year before there's a ruling. Still, the issue of tobacco bans and the EU reoccurs constantly.
Last year the Commission promoted a recommendation advocating an EU-wide ban on smoking in public places. I criticised this, because it was bandwagon politics: the EU does not have the power to legislate for such a ban. Worse, for the EU bandwagon politics backfires spectacularly, almost without fail: these kind of wishful, "wouldn't it be nice...?", recommendations devalue the perceived worth of the EU, and raise fears, or hopes, of European action that cannot be fulfilled, cumulatively leading to disillusionment and resentment of the EU that tars the European idea by implication.
So is the position different under the Lisbon-amended TFEU? The old Article 152 and the new (and renumbered) Article 168 both exclude the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States. Paragraph 5 of Article 168 states:
Case law also states that legislation cannot try to harmonise laws in an area that has been explicitly excluded from harmonisation in the Treaties by relying on a different article (say, on the free movement of goods). It's hard to see the Court circumventing this purely on the Lisbon-amended treaties to bring in such radical change.
When it comes to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the UN Convention, I'm unsure of which specific articles to look at as I haven't read the actual case that the campaigners are putting, and how far the Charter and Convention could be considered applicable. From a quick glance over the Charter, the articles dealing with health, child rights, private life, etc., are, as you would expect, general rights that don't give much scope for the positive interventionism that a smoking ban would imply. The Convention is not an integral part of EU law, but could be drawn on as a part of the legal culture of the Member States (though it's hard to see this having a huge bearing on any ruling - at least any ruling as decisive as that the campaigners are hoping for).
Health policy should largely stay at the Member State level: it consists of a large chunk of public expenditure and would be best dealt with at the national level - particularly as dealing with health policy on any scale beyond what is necessary to deal with cross border matters and low-level integration logically implies a shift to what would be a high level of social and economic integration (to eliminate inequality of health care between all EU citizens), and there simply isn't the political will or political engagement to support such a project. Banning smoking isn't of this scale necessarily, but it would entail a significant extension of EU law.
The health and taxing policies of Member States when it comes to drugs such as tobacco and alcohol, etc., are very culturally sensitive. There are different drinking and smoking cultures in different states; Ireland was the first EU state to adopt a smoking ban in public places and in the work place, and Sweden and Denmark have high alcohol taxes. If the European Court was to look at the legality of the sale and/or tax collection of these drugs as something the EU and EU law should deal with, it could set precedent for the expansion of EU competences (which could lead to a clash with the German Bundesverfassungsgericht).
I have not been able to read the cases lodged with the Court yet, and they will be very interesting to follow should they be admitted, but on first glance I cannot see anything approaching the radical imposition of a ban being the result. This is for 3 main reasons:
1. I think that the exclusion of harmonisation, and the supporting case law, is strong enough to prevent such extreme judicial activism - it would require too many stretches of judicial imagination and intellectual squaring of circles.
2. A ban, or a ruling that implies that the Court/EU has more rights in this area than would seem to be the case on the face of the Treaties could risk a backlash from the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which has renewed its claim to the right to police the competences of the EU in its ruling on the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty.
3. The area is just too radical for judicial activism. Surely the argument that this is a matter for law-makers rather than the judiciary will weigh heavily on how the case, if considered, would be decided. Laws and taxes on drugs are well debated and discussed; how justifiable could it be, for instance, that the European Court could make such decisions on drugs on health grounds, when their place in society is regularly debated in each Member State? What about the liberal drugs laws in the Netherlands? Could the work of public debate and cultural considerations be overturned by the extension of principles established under a radical tobacco ruling?
Again, it will be interesting to see how the court deals with the cases, should it be admitted, and perhaps I'm judging it too much on face value and it will become clearer to me upon a full reading, but I think that the Court would be wise to resist the radical wishes of the anti-smoking campaigners.
Last year the Commission promoted a recommendation advocating an EU-wide ban on smoking in public places. I criticised this, because it was bandwagon politics: the EU does not have the power to legislate for such a ban. Worse, for the EU bandwagon politics backfires spectacularly, almost without fail: these kind of wishful, "wouldn't it be nice...?", recommendations devalue the perceived worth of the EU, and raise fears, or hopes, of European action that cannot be fulfilled, cumulatively leading to disillusionment and resentment of the EU that tars the European idea by implication.
So is the position different under the Lisbon-amended TFEU? The old Article 152 and the new (and renumbered) Article 168 both exclude the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States. Paragraph 5 of Article 168 states:
"The European Parliament and the Council... may also adopt incentive measures designed to protect and improve human health... [highlights cross border issues]... and measures which have as their direct objective the protection of public health regarding tobacco and the abuse of alcohol, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States." [Emphasis mine].
Case law also states that legislation cannot try to harmonise laws in an area that has been explicitly excluded from harmonisation in the Treaties by relying on a different article (say, on the free movement of goods). It's hard to see the Court circumventing this purely on the Lisbon-amended treaties to bring in such radical change.
When it comes to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the UN Convention, I'm unsure of which specific articles to look at as I haven't read the actual case that the campaigners are putting, and how far the Charter and Convention could be considered applicable. From a quick glance over the Charter, the articles dealing with health, child rights, private life, etc., are, as you would expect, general rights that don't give much scope for the positive interventionism that a smoking ban would imply. The Convention is not an integral part of EU law, but could be drawn on as a part of the legal culture of the Member States (though it's hard to see this having a huge bearing on any ruling - at least any ruling as decisive as that the campaigners are hoping for).
Health policy should largely stay at the Member State level: it consists of a large chunk of public expenditure and would be best dealt with at the national level - particularly as dealing with health policy on any scale beyond what is necessary to deal with cross border matters and low-level integration logically implies a shift to what would be a high level of social and economic integration (to eliminate inequality of health care between all EU citizens), and there simply isn't the political will or political engagement to support such a project. Banning smoking isn't of this scale necessarily, but it would entail a significant extension of EU law.
The health and taxing policies of Member States when it comes to drugs such as tobacco and alcohol, etc., are very culturally sensitive. There are different drinking and smoking cultures in different states; Ireland was the first EU state to adopt a smoking ban in public places and in the work place, and Sweden and Denmark have high alcohol taxes. If the European Court was to look at the legality of the sale and/or tax collection of these drugs as something the EU and EU law should deal with, it could set precedent for the expansion of EU competences (which could lead to a clash with the German Bundesverfassungsgericht).
I have not been able to read the cases lodged with the Court yet, and they will be very interesting to follow should they be admitted, but on first glance I cannot see anything approaching the radical imposition of a ban being the result. This is for 3 main reasons:
1. I think that the exclusion of harmonisation, and the supporting case law, is strong enough to prevent such extreme judicial activism - it would require too many stretches of judicial imagination and intellectual squaring of circles.
2. A ban, or a ruling that implies that the Court/EU has more rights in this area than would seem to be the case on the face of the Treaties could risk a backlash from the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which has renewed its claim to the right to police the competences of the EU in its ruling on the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty.
3. The area is just too radical for judicial activism. Surely the argument that this is a matter for law-makers rather than the judiciary will weigh heavily on how the case, if considered, would be decided. Laws and taxes on drugs are well debated and discussed; how justifiable could it be, for instance, that the European Court could make such decisions on drugs on health grounds, when their place in society is regularly debated in each Member State? What about the liberal drugs laws in the Netherlands? Could the work of public debate and cultural considerations be overturned by the extension of principles established under a radical tobacco ruling?
Again, it will be interesting to see how the court deals with the cases, should it be admitted, and perhaps I'm judging it too much on face value and it will become clearer to me upon a full reading, but I think that the Court would be wise to resist the radical wishes of the anti-smoking campaigners.
Tuesday, 8 December 2009
Not all coverage of European News is that bad
I've complained about journalists confusing the ECJ and ECHR before, so I thought I'd just point out an article that caught my eye last week in the Irish Times:
"European Court to be told Irish abortion ban violates rights".
It caught my eye because it does make the distinction between the EU and the ECHR, and it brings up an interesting case before the ECHR which affects some of the politics of the religious right who sided with the No side campaign in the Lisbon Treaty referendums. The claim that the Treaty would affect Irish law on abortion was a false one, which makes the distinction between the two courts in the media all the more important if there's to be a clear and proper debate on it.
Also, the case is interesting in itself, since it will consider whether a case will be taken on by the court if it hasn't been through the entire national legal system first. So it could be an interesting case to watch out for, with the hearing beginning tomorrow.
I first mentioned this case here.
"European Court to be told Irish abortion ban violates rights".
It caught my eye because it does make the distinction between the EU and the ECHR, and it brings up an interesting case before the ECHR which affects some of the politics of the religious right who sided with the No side campaign in the Lisbon Treaty referendums. The claim that the Treaty would affect Irish law on abortion was a false one, which makes the distinction between the two courts in the media all the more important if there's to be a clear and proper debate on it.
"The court is to have a full hearing of the case before its grand chamber of 17 judges on December 9th.
Based in Strasbourg, the court, which is separate from the EU, adjudicates on human rights issues among all 47 member states of the Council of Europe. As a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights – now incorporated into Irish law – the Government is obliged to seek to implement whatever decisions are made by the courts.
The identities of the women, known as A, B and C, will remain confidential as the case proceeds.
They include a woman who ran the risk of an ectopic pregnancy, where the foetus develops outside the womb; a woman who received chemotherapy for cancer; and a woman whose children were placed in care as she was unable to cope.
They argue that the lack of any effective remedy at home means they have satisfied the requirement to exhaust domestic legal remedies. In addition, they say that taking a case would have been costly, futile and could have forced them to relinquish their anonymity.
The Government, however, contends that domestic legal remedies have not been exhausted by the women. It also robustly challenges suggestions by them that there is a lack of post-abortion care or counselling in Ireland. Among the questions the court will ask of the Government, and the the three women, include:
Have the applicants exhausted domestic legal remedies available?"
Also, the case is interesting in itself, since it will consider whether a case will be taken on by the court if it hasn't been through the entire national legal system first. So it could be an interesting case to watch out for, with the hearing beginning tomorrow.
I first mentioned this case here.
Sunday, 8 November 2009
The Observer, Europe and Blogging
Henry Porter's article in today's Observer is interesting for 2 reasons: (1) he repeats the mistake of confusing the ECHR and the EU and the role of the President of the European Council, and (2) he calls for a kind of enlightened scepticism of the EU's institutions - a good idea - that is undermined by the factors that bring about point (1). So I sent the Observer a letter (ok, email):
It's annoying to see that important political debates (over liberty versus security, and questions over the ECHR court case on cruifixes in Italy) being diverted off course by ingrained misinformation. The EU is mind-numbingly complex, and it can't just be explained in a short run up to European elections or each time there's a summit: there needs to be constant media scrutiny of the policies and political actors acting in the Brussels Bubble. Though I'd like to see the mainstream media improve it's journalism on the EU - and really open up a continuous debate on the issues and policies confronting the EU (as well as if the EU should confront them in the first place) - it'd be very naive to expect anything to change here.
So if the mainstream media won't do it, could there be a duty for civil society to step in? I'm generally sceptical of the power of blogging versus the mainstream media, although the mainstream media clearly doesn't always get it right, but could bloggers be said to have a certain duty in this instance?
Probably not. Bloggers are probably the most prickly of groups when it comes to independence and implying duties, and I can't see how you could convincingly say that people have a duty to investigate these things, except as, perhaps, the general and vague duty of voters who want to participate in the political process fully.
Still, I think that scrutinizing the polcies, actions and goals of the parties and fractions in the EU is vitally needed (despite the boring detail), and I'd encourage EuroBloggers out there to start looking into the Parties and holding them to account. EuroBloggers (and perhaps particularly myself) are guilty of focusing too much on the institutional/constitutional side of things, but hopefully that will change with the passing of the Lisbon Treaty.
It's certainly an area we'll be keen to look at on Chasing Brussels in the future.
Edit: Jon Worth has gotten wind of this journalistic mistake.
Henry Porter is convincing in his argument for a better scepticism when it comes to the EU institutions ("I saw the joy on German faces - but now I despair", 8th November). The need for civil society to debate and scrutinize European institutions is great, and the duty of the media to enable continuous debate is particularly strong. However, Henry Porter fell victim to a few assumptions that highlight the lack of media scrutiny in this area, and shows that without this scrutiny, it's hard to have an effective and informed scepticism.
Getting basic facts such as the difference between the European Court of Human Rights and the EU's European Court of Justice wrong (the ECHR belongs to the Council of Europe, a completely different organisation) can make such scepticism ill-informed and misdirected, since placing the blame at the EU's door for the ECHR's rulings would be ineffective. Similarly, the office of President of the European Council has been talked up to be a full-blown "President of the EU" (there's no such post), giving rise to fears of a powerful executive President who would be unelected - when, in fact, the post is one of chairman/woman who would only preside over the European summits, with no vote or veto on issues. The President would be more the role of a parliamentary speaker than a president, though with more publicity.
For such scepticism and political engagement to work, we need to not only see the EU as a set of institutions, but also take part in the political discussions at its heart - the EU isn't monolithic: there are many fractions in the Parliament and the Council arguing for different policies. We can't just blame "the EU" for faults and failings, we must identify who is in power (currently the centre-right EPP, with Barroso as Commission President), and what the opposition (Socialists and Democrats, the Greens, etc) is doing, and question their policies.
It is a demanding task to stimulate this kind of debate, but it's essential. The EU can try to open up all it wants (for example, the Commission President has to face a European version of PMQs before the European Parliament), but without the engagement of ordinary people and the media, it won't work. Will the Observer start scrutinizing the Brussels Bubble?
Conor Slowey
It's annoying to see that important political debates (over liberty versus security, and questions over the ECHR court case on cruifixes in Italy) being diverted off course by ingrained misinformation. The EU is mind-numbingly complex, and it can't just be explained in a short run up to European elections or each time there's a summit: there needs to be constant media scrutiny of the policies and political actors acting in the Brussels Bubble. Though I'd like to see the mainstream media improve it's journalism on the EU - and really open up a continuous debate on the issues and policies confronting the EU (as well as if the EU should confront them in the first place) - it'd be very naive to expect anything to change here.
So if the mainstream media won't do it, could there be a duty for civil society to step in? I'm generally sceptical of the power of blogging versus the mainstream media, although the mainstream media clearly doesn't always get it right, but could bloggers be said to have a certain duty in this instance?
Probably not. Bloggers are probably the most prickly of groups when it comes to independence and implying duties, and I can't see how you could convincingly say that people have a duty to investigate these things, except as, perhaps, the general and vague duty of voters who want to participate in the political process fully.
Still, I think that scrutinizing the polcies, actions and goals of the parties and fractions in the EU is vitally needed (despite the boring detail), and I'd encourage EuroBloggers out there to start looking into the Parties and holding them to account. EuroBloggers (and perhaps particularly myself) are guilty of focusing too much on the institutional/constitutional side of things, but hopefully that will change with the passing of the Lisbon Treaty.
It's certainly an area we'll be keen to look at on Chasing Brussels in the future.
Edit: Jon Worth has gotten wind of this journalistic mistake.
Wednesday, 4 November 2009
Conservative Party: the Ghost of Referenda to Come
Conservative Europe policy has just been announced (made?) in a speech by party leader David Cameron today. Throughout he took pains to outline the reasoning behind dropping the promise for a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty - it is no longer a Treaty but (from December 1st) an integral part of European law. Moving on to what the Tories meant by "not letting matters rest", Cameron outlined several areas for change:
1. Amendment of the European Communities Act 1972, so that any new Treaty transferring power to the EU is subject to a referendum (including any decision to enter the Euro). This politically does a lot of damage to the idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty while neatly keeping it at its base.
2. The introduction of a Sovereignty Act:
Interesting in that it's the first time I've heard the "unwritten" UK constitution being bemoaned as a weakness by UK politicians - of course, the Conservatives wouldn't propose a written constitution. The idea behind the Bill seems to be that there will be a constitutional court set up* (or powers given to the Supreme Court) to examine the constitutionality of EU measures (a role that's really reserved for the European Court of Justice in Treaty law). The argument runs that the German Bundesverfassungsgericht does this already, but I wonder if it will be an appellate court (i.e. cases have to be referred to it) or a legal body that politicians refer legislation to. The problem here is that, so far, the German Constitutional Court as deferred to the judgment of the ECJ and there is no procedure or plan for what would happen if the ECJ and this new court (or the German court) came into conflict. Citing the German Court as a model isn't really citing a stable or tested example.
It will be very interesting to see the wording of the legislation. (Also, it's notable as the one policy where the Tories are proposing an increase in judicial power, instead of maliciously interfering with the remit of the courts. I wish that the UK courts could test the constitutionality of UK law the way that the ECJ tests EU law...).
3. Parliament would have to assent to any use of Treaty clauses that permit a policy area to move from unanimity to Qualified Majority Voting (by an unanimous vote).
4. A Tory government will seek an opt-out on areas of social policy, criminal justice and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Setting aside the actual content of social policy and the usefulness of some criminal law co-operation in the context of a borderless common market, let's look at the Charter:
...Because human rights are for losers, right? This is consistent with Tory opposition to any regime of binding human rights (they want to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law). How exactly will the ECJ interpret (what exactly is "re-interpreting" law, Mr. Cameron?) in a way that the Tories fear? It's not exactly clear, apart from the general wailing and gnashing of teeth the Conservatives seem to give at the mere mention of "rights": rights are something to be feared in conservative political thought.
In any case, how practical and useful would a complete opt-out be? The Commission would draft laws with the Charter in mind, and the Council and EP must respect the Charter, so, unless they try to contravene the Charter, EU laws will mostly comply with it. So Charter compliance will ideally be the rule and not the exception of produced legislation. Regulations apply across the EU, so if the ECJ interprets a regulation into line with the Charter, would there be a different law for the UK? Or will it depend on whether or not the case comes from the UK or not, how the ECJ uses the Charter? The most practical use of the opt-out would be with national law that transposes Directives, but would this be complete enough for the Tory party?
Social Europe Journal has a good bit on the Tories' attitude to rights law in general:
1-3 are all achievable by a Tory government without having to negotiate with the other member states. #4 would require Treaty change and the assent of the other 26 member states. So what concessions will the Conservatives make (as one journalist asked Cameron)?
The answer seems to be "none". The Rebate? Untouchable in the minds of the Tories and the grassroots - it's viewed as something to be defended, not traded away. Integration in other areas seems to be out of the question. As for threats? A Tory government could oppose the accession of new member states, but the party is firmly committed to the policy of enlargement, and France and Germany would jump on it as an excuse to keep out Turkey.
Could there be another Empty Chair Crisis to bring back the Luxembourg Compromise? The cause of the original dispute (France not wanting the EP to have a say over the agricultural part of the EU budget) has only been cleared with the Lisbon Treaty.
This is a Tory party that has shed almost all association or common thought with continental Christian Democracy, has dropped its tradition of pragmatism and is suspicious and hostile towards the judiciary. I can only describe the Tory party as dangerously constitutionally illiterate.
* Which would only look at the EU, of course. It couldn't look at the UK constitution, because, in the UK, the politicians tell the courts what constitutional law is.
1. Amendment of the European Communities Act 1972, so that any new Treaty transferring power to the EU is subject to a referendum (including any decision to enter the Euro). This politically does a lot of damage to the idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty while neatly keeping it at its base.
2. The introduction of a Sovereignty Act:
"Because we have no written constitution, unlike many other EU countries, we have no explicit legal guarantee that the last word on our laws stays in Britain.
There is therefore a danger that, over time, our courts might come to regard ultimate authority as resting with the EU.
So as well as making sure that further power cannot be handed to the EU without a referendum, we will also introduce a new law, in the form of a United Kingdom Sovereignty Bill, to make it clear that ultimate authority stays in this country, in our Parliament."
Interesting in that it's the first time I've heard the "unwritten" UK constitution being bemoaned as a weakness by UK politicians - of course, the Conservatives wouldn't propose a written constitution. The idea behind the Bill seems to be that there will be a constitutional court set up* (or powers given to the Supreme Court) to examine the constitutionality of EU measures (a role that's really reserved for the European Court of Justice in Treaty law). The argument runs that the German Bundesverfassungsgericht does this already, but I wonder if it will be an appellate court (i.e. cases have to be referred to it) or a legal body that politicians refer legislation to. The problem here is that, so far, the German Constitutional Court as deferred to the judgment of the ECJ and there is no procedure or plan for what would happen if the ECJ and this new court (or the German court) came into conflict. Citing the German Court as a model isn't really citing a stable or tested example.
It will be very interesting to see the wording of the legislation. (Also, it's notable as the one policy where the Tories are proposing an increase in judicial power, instead of maliciously interfering with the remit of the courts. I wish that the UK courts could test the constitutionality of UK law the way that the ECJ tests EU law...).
3. Parliament would have to assent to any use of Treaty clauses that permit a policy area to move from unanimity to Qualified Majority Voting (by an unanimous vote).
4. A Tory government will seek an opt-out on areas of social policy, criminal justice and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Setting aside the actual content of social policy and the usefulness of some criminal law co-operation in the context of a borderless common market, let's look at the Charter:
"We must be absolutely sure that this [the Charter] cannot be used by EU judges to re-interpret EU law affecting the UK.
Tony Blair claimed that his Government obtained an opt-out from the Charter.
But what he got – as the Government have now admitted - was simply a clarification of how it works in Britain.
We will want a complete opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights."
...Because human rights are for losers, right? This is consistent with Tory opposition to any regime of binding human rights (they want to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law). How exactly will the ECJ interpret (what exactly is "re-interpreting" law, Mr. Cameron?) in a way that the Tories fear? It's not exactly clear, apart from the general wailing and gnashing of teeth the Conservatives seem to give at the mere mention of "rights": rights are something to be feared in conservative political thought.
In any case, how practical and useful would a complete opt-out be? The Commission would draft laws with the Charter in mind, and the Council and EP must respect the Charter, so, unless they try to contravene the Charter, EU laws will mostly comply with it. So Charter compliance will ideally be the rule and not the exception of produced legislation. Regulations apply across the EU, so if the ECJ interprets a regulation into line with the Charter, would there be a different law for the UK? Or will it depend on whether or not the case comes from the UK or not, how the ECJ uses the Charter? The most practical use of the opt-out would be with national law that transposes Directives, but would this be complete enough for the Tory party?
Social Europe Journal has a good bit on the Tories' attitude to rights law in general:
"David Cameron appears never to take any legal advice on, er, laws. His puffed up ‘British Bill of Rights’ would not in any way remove any law already passed because it represents an incorporation of the ECHR (to which we are signatories) into UK law, and this is the basis on which the case law is made. The law would remain, it would just be more expensive both for claimants (many of whom have suffered intolerable abuses) and the taxpayer (all of whom will face intolerable abuse as a result)."
1-3 are all achievable by a Tory government without having to negotiate with the other member states. #4 would require Treaty change and the assent of the other 26 member states. So what concessions will the Conservatives make (as one journalist asked Cameron)?
The answer seems to be "none". The Rebate? Untouchable in the minds of the Tories and the grassroots - it's viewed as something to be defended, not traded away. Integration in other areas seems to be out of the question. As for threats? A Tory government could oppose the accession of new member states, but the party is firmly committed to the policy of enlargement, and France and Germany would jump on it as an excuse to keep out Turkey.
Could there be another Empty Chair Crisis to bring back the Luxembourg Compromise? The cause of the original dispute (France not wanting the EP to have a say over the agricultural part of the EU budget) has only been cleared with the Lisbon Treaty.
This is a Tory party that has shed almost all association or common thought with continental Christian Democracy, has dropped its tradition of pragmatism and is suspicious and hostile towards the judiciary. I can only describe the Tory party as dangerously constitutionally illiterate.
* Which would only look at the EU, of course. It couldn't look at the UK constitution, because, in the UK, the politicians tell the courts what constitutional law is.
Thursday, 8 January 2009
Who Does What Now?
A very quick description of who does what in the EU. (Since the EU is currently divided into 3 areas, or "Pillars" and not every institution has the same amount of power in each, the question of "who does what" can get confusing...):
The European Commission: A cross between a government and a civil service. This is made up of unelected Commissioners, with one appointed by each member state every five years under the current system. It can propose laws but it can't pass them, and this power is also limited to certain areas and certain circumstances (mostly Pillar 1, which is mainly about the single market and other technical issues). It is supposed to enact EU legislation and/or make sure that those who should be doing this, are. So if you read that "the Commission has decided...", it very rarely gets to decide anything: its main function is suggesting and drafting laws.
The European Council: This is made up of the heads of government (who are also heads of state in some cases), and they meet at least twice a year. This body decides the big political issues. The presidency of this body is taken on by each of the member states in turn for 6 month long presidencies under the current system.
The Council of the European Union: the main legislator. Made up of national ministers from whatever area the issue in question involves (agriculture ministers if the issue is the CAP, etc), although the vast majority of the work is done by national civil servants. NO major legislation can be passed without this body's say-so. Can ask the Commission to draw up legislation. The main institution in all legislative areas.
The European Parliament: made up of directly elected MEPs. In most of Pillar 1 they have an equal say on legislation (amending, rejecting or passing it) as the Council of the European Union, but in Pillars 2 & 3 (foreign policy and home affairs) they have no real say. Can ask the Commission to draw up legislation under Pillar 1.
The European Court of Justice: a Court which decides on issues of EU (or "Community") law. This includes constitutional matters (which institution has the right to do what), and interpreting Community law for national courts. Has little to no role under Pillars 2 & 3, however.
The Court of Auditors: the accountants. They check and investigate the finances of the EU and its institutions.
Note: the Council of Europe has nothing to do with the EU. It was a body born out of the federalist movement, but it is an intergovernmental body and is most famous for the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
The European Commission: A cross between a government and a civil service. This is made up of unelected Commissioners, with one appointed by each member state every five years under the current system. It can propose laws but it can't pass them, and this power is also limited to certain areas and certain circumstances (mostly Pillar 1, which is mainly about the single market and other technical issues). It is supposed to enact EU legislation and/or make sure that those who should be doing this, are. So if you read that "the Commission has decided...", it very rarely gets to decide anything: its main function is suggesting and drafting laws.
The European Council: This is made up of the heads of government (who are also heads of state in some cases), and they meet at least twice a year. This body decides the big political issues. The presidency of this body is taken on by each of the member states in turn for 6 month long presidencies under the current system.
The Council of the European Union: the main legislator. Made up of national ministers from whatever area the issue in question involves (agriculture ministers if the issue is the CAP, etc), although the vast majority of the work is done by national civil servants. NO major legislation can be passed without this body's say-so. Can ask the Commission to draw up legislation. The main institution in all legislative areas.
The European Parliament: made up of directly elected MEPs. In most of Pillar 1 they have an equal say on legislation (amending, rejecting or passing it) as the Council of the European Union, but in Pillars 2 & 3 (foreign policy and home affairs) they have no real say. Can ask the Commission to draw up legislation under Pillar 1.
The European Court of Justice: a Court which decides on issues of EU (or "Community") law. This includes constitutional matters (which institution has the right to do what), and interpreting Community law for national courts. Has little to no role under Pillars 2 & 3, however.
The Court of Auditors: the accountants. They check and investigate the finances of the EU and its institutions.
Note: the Council of Europe has nothing to do with the EU. It was a body born out of the federalist movement, but it is an intergovernmental body and is most famous for the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
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