The Curious Case of Citizen McCarthy

In my previous post I've written about how the Court of Justice (that's the EU court based in Luxembourg) has been influenced by the cases that come before it when it comes to citizenship, and how it has shaped EU citizenship. Last week the Court handed down its McCarthy Judgment which complicates things. (This post is my immediate reaction to the ruling, which I've just read).

Again, these cases and the legal arguments that go into them really affect people's lives, and it's interesting to see how the different circumstances of a person can affect which side of the line they fall on.

As a recap, in Zambrano the question was how far EU citizens can rely on their EU citizenship rights in the Member State of their own nationality, when they have never moved to another Member State. The judgment was vague so I outlined two models of citizenship: either relying on EU citizenship in your own country is only available as an option where you've either used your free movement rights before or where you might be prevented from using them effectively in the future ("Back to the Future" model; or you have a right to reside in your own Member State independent of your national citizenship,* and therefore you can rely on EU citizenship simply if EU law applies to EU citizens in those cases. This second option means that Member States can't discriminate against their own citizens so that EU citizens are treated better than their own nationals ("reverse discrimination").

[* Member States control who gets their citizenship, and therefore who gets EU citizenship deriving from this.]

The problem in the McCarthy case is pretty much an issue I raised with the Back to the Future model (because I knew the case was coming up, and I know people the senario has affected in real life [for want of a better term]):

"Under UK law if a British national marries a third country national and wants to bring them home to the UK, and they haven't used their EU free movement rights, then they have to pay to get them into the country. So other EU nationals and British nationals who have used their free movement rights have preferential treatment over British nationals who never used their free movement rights. It is unlikely that, under the Back to the Future model, that that British citizen could claim that they wouldn't be able to use their EU rights effectively in the future if their spouse couldn't join them in the UK, so they wouldn't be covered by EU citizenship law."

This is essentially what happened to McCarthy, who had never left the UK, nor been a worker under EU law. She applied for an Irish passport, which she got, and tried to assert her EU citizenship rights (based on her Irish citizenship) to bring her spouse from a third country (not an EU citizen himself) into the UK to live with her. Could she rely on her EU citizenship?

Though I stated that I thought the Court was using the "Back to the Future" model in Zambrano (the reasoning was vague), I thought that over time the Court would become more explicit in its reasoning and follow the separate right to reside reasoning. So I thought 3 outcomes were possible, in order of desending likelihood:

1. She could, because she had Irish citizenship, and therefore she could be said to be living in a Member State of another nationality despite never having moved. That she only applied for the Irish citizenship so this would be the case ("cherry picking" her legal rights in the words of Advocate General Kokott) doesn't matter as there is nothing wrong in making use of legal rights made available to you. This would not concern the Zambrano decision.

2. She could not rely on the Citizens' Directive (2004/38), because she is a national of the the UK. However, she has a right to reside due to her EU citizenship regardless of having such a right due to her nationality, and therefore the UK could not discriminate against her compared to EU citizens of non-UK nationality if they are in the same position. [Explicitly adopting the reasoning of AG Sharpston in the Zambrano case that was implicitly, but not clearly, endorsed].

3. As 2, but referring to the vague idea of the substance of EU citizenship rather than reasoning clearly. So as in Zambrano.

What the Court actually did, was rule that she did not have the protection of EU law as a citizen as she was a national of the Member State and had not exercised any free movement rights. Her Irish citizenship was irrelevant, and, in fact, there is no right of residence separate from the exercise of free movement rights. In other words, there is only the Back to the Future model.

To quote the Court (skippable if you're not interested in the technical legal reasoning of the Court):

"39 Hence, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, in so far as the Union citizen concerned has never exercised his right of free movement and has always resided in a Member State of which he is a national, that citizen is not covered by the concept of ‘beneficiary’ for the purposes of Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38, so that that directive is not applicable to him.

40 That finding cannot be influenced by the fact that the citizen concerned is also a national of a Member State other than that where he resides.

41 Indeed, the fact that a Union citizen is a national of more than one Member State does not mean that he has made use of his right of freedom of movement.

[...]

The applicability of Article 21 TFEU

[...]

47 Indeed, the Court has stated several times that citizenship of the Union is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States (see Case C‑34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 41 and case-law cited). Furthermore, the Court has held that Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of that status (see Ruiz Zambrano, paragraph 42).

[...]

49 However, no element of the situation of Mrs McCarthy, as described by the national court, indicates that the national measure at issue in the main proceedings has the effect of depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights associated with her status as a Union citizen, or of impeding the exercise of her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, in accordance with Article 21 TFEU. Indeed, the failure by the authorities of the United Kingdom to take into account the Irish nationality of Mrs McCarthy for the purposes of granting her a right of residence in the United Kingdom in no way affects her in her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, or any other right conferred on her by virtue of her status as a Union citizen.

50 In that regard, by contrast with the case of Ruiz Zambrano, the national measure at issue in the main proceedings in the present case does not have the effect of obliging Mrs McCarthy to leave the territory of the European Union. Indeed, as is clear from paragraph 29 of the present judgment, Mrs McCarthy enjoys, under a principle of international law, an unconditional right of residence in the United Kingdom since she is a national of the United Kingdom.

51 The case in the main proceedings also differs from Case C‑148/02 García Avello [2003] ECR I‑11613. In that judgment, the Court held that the application of the law of one Member State to nationals of that Member State who were also nationals of another Member State had the effect that those Union citizens had different surnames under the two legal systems concerned, and that that situation was liable to cause serious inconvenience for them at both professional and private levels resulting from, inter alia, difficulties in benefiting, in one Member State of which they are nationals, from the legal effects of diplomas or documents drawn up in the surname recognised in the other Member State of which they are also nationals. [Own note: so EU law only applied since national law might prevent EU citizens from using their EU rights in the future].

[...]

53 Thus, in Ruiz Zambrano and García Avello, the national measure at issue had the effect of depriving Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of that status or of impeding the exercise of their right of free movement and residence within the territory of the Member States.

54 As stated in paragraph 49 of the present judgment, in the context of the main proceedings in this case, the fact that Mrs McCarthy, in addition to being a national of the United Kingdom, is also a national of Ireland does not mean that a Member State has applied measures that have the effect of depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of her status as a Union citizen or of impeding the exercise of her right of free movement and residence within the territory of the Member States. Accordingly, in such a context, such a factor is not sufficient, in itself, for a finding that the situation of the person concerned is covered by Article 21 TFEU."

There may still be some cases where EU citizens can rely on their Union citizenship against their own Member State on grounds of non-discrimination, but this makes it extremely difficult to argue if the Court refuses to acknowledge the significance of your Union citizenship in the first place. The judgment makes clear that in Zambrano the decisive factor was that the Union citizens would be required to leave the territory of their home country, and that of the whole Union as they were young children dependent on their non-EU national parents. We still don't know what the new idea of "substance of EU citizenship rights" is, but it doesn't mean what we thought it might mean - the Civis Europeus Sum that a more rational, unified idea of citizenship might bring.


It's obvious that the law on citizenship is messy - and, in my opinion, highly unsatisfactory. It is difficult for citizens to know when they are protected, and when they are not - and sometimes it can be based on a tiny detail of their life or how they might lead their life. Whether children are involved or not can also be a factor - perhaps this shows a certain sentimentality of the Court that it tries to rationalise through its case law. In any case, McCarthy is a blow for those supporting a more equal citizenship.




**(As an aside, the Court referred to Article 21 TFEU rather than Article 20 as it did in Zambrano - since they repeat each other to a certain extent makes the relevance unclear, but it's a debate best left to academic literature rather than this blog post).**

Citizen Zambrano

Eurocrats: reviled faceless creatures that have no sense of fellow human feeling, right? Well it actually seems that a lot of them are softies whose conscience can influence the outcome of their decisions. Even the European Court of Court of Justice in Luxembourg (not to be confused with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which is part of the confusingly, similarly named Council of Europe), critised by the European left for the Laval and Viking decisions on union action, can be swayed by the human stories that come before them. In fact, there's a good case to be made that the development of the law on European citizenship owes a lot to the stories of families and individuals in difficult situations.

In early March the ECJ ruled in just such a case, in what is a milestone case on citizenship, in Zambrano. Not that you would have read about it in the media. In fact I only read about it in The Irish Times, which covered the case and the subsequent reaction of the Irish Government. The excellent Verfassungsblog covered it in German. Zambrano is a landmark case as it strikes a blow against reverse discrimination (the idea that Member States can give fewer rights to their own citizens than to EU ones from other Member States), and it could have an effect on immigration and national citizenship laws. So here are my own belated thoughts on the case - as with all court stories, it will require some side-stories to give it context, but I hope the human interest element will keep it interesting, and that it will provide some insight into how the Court can act and think.


Citizen Zambrano

Ruiz Zambrano and his wife , Moreno, left their home country of Colombia in 1999 for Belgium. They were looking for asylum as Ruiz had been subjected to 2 years of extortion demands, backed up by death threats, by private militias, and had witnessed assaults on his brother and his 3-year-old son had been kidnapped for a week in January 1999. Their application for asylum was refused, but a non-refoulement condition was attached - Belgian authorities could not send them home as the civil war situation in Colombia was too dangerous. Ruiz Zambrano worked in Belgium without a work permit, but he paid taxes and social security contributions. He was fired from his job as he didn't have a work permit, and he wasn't allowed unempolyment benefit as the work he had done, and contributions he paid wouldn't count as he never had a work permit. In addition, with the deportation order hanging over the family's head, it took years of legal challenges to get even a temporary residence permit. In the meantime the couple had 2 children, who had Belgian citizenship (and therefore EU citizenship) under Belgian law.

If the 2 children had been EU citizens from another Member State, they would have been protected by EU law, and their parents would have been allowed to live and work there while they were still children without permits. Even as Belgian citizens, they could have the protection of EU law if they had used their free movement rights (e.g. moving to another EU country for a while) at some point in the past, but as they had never left the country of their nationality, it appeared that Belgian law would discriminate against its own citizens. So the Belgian court essentially asked the ECJ: does EU law protect against such discrimination, and if so, would the Zambrano parents be entitled to stay and work in Belgium without the relevant permits as the carers of EU citizens?

Yes, the ECJ said, since without the right to live and work in Belgium, they (the children with citizenship) could be removed from the Union to remain with their parents if they were ejected from the country. By being removed from Belgium (or risking that removal), the children:

"... [would be deprived] of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by the virtue of their status as citizens of the Union." [paragraph 42]

A victory for equality of all EU citizens before the law! Um, well, actually, not necessarily. In fact, it's a bit unclear how far reverse discrimination has been ruled illegal. What is the "substance of citizenship rights"? The ECJ hasn't mentioned it before, and it didn't explain it in its judgment. There were also 2 arguments that would have had the same effect for the Zambrano family, but different effects for other EU citizens, and it's not clear which one the ECJ accepted.


Back to the Future Citizenship

Here's where EU citizenship becomes more messy and complicated. There's a Citizen's Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC), which grants rights to EU citizens living in another Member State other than their own, and which expressly says that it does not apply to citizens living in their own Member State. The ECJ has got around this in the past by finding an EU law angle. So in Surinder Sigh, a non-EU national married a British citizen, and they then moved to Germany to live and work there until they moved back to the UK. When they moved back, his wife wanted to divorce him, and the UK tried to deport him before they were divorced. The ECJ said that it would render the right to move and work in other Member States unattractive if the spouses of citizens could be deported when they came back - however, once the divorce is final, then third country nationals no longer enjoy the rights of a spouse of an EU citizen.

In the Zambrano case there was no movement, but the ECJ may be protecting the potential exercise of EU rights by the children citizens. It's done this before in Rottmann, where an Austrian citizen living in Germany lost his citizenship of Austria when he gained German citizenship. The problem was that he hadn't disclosed all the necessary information on his application for German citizenship, and the German authorities decided to remove German citizenship from him - which would have left Janko Rottmann stateless. The ECJ stepped in and said that it was up to the Member States to decide when citizenship was granted, but they re prevented by EU law from unilaterally withdrawing it (and therefore Rottmann's German citizenship in this case) were it would result in a citizen not being able to exercise any of his or her rights. So a citizen could rely on their EU citizenship to protect thagainst their own Member State if they would be deprived of all potential future use of those rights.

The problem with the "Back to the Future Citizenship" is that it's messy and unclear when someone is covered and when they're not. Under UK law if a British national marries a third country national and wants to bring them home to the UK, and they haven't used their EU free movement rights, then they have to pay to get them into the country. So other EU nationals and British nationals who have used their free movement rights have preferential treatment over British nationals who never used their free movement rights. It is unlikely that, under the Back to the Future model, that that British citizen could claim that they wouldn't be able to use their EU rights effectively in the future if their spouse couldn't join them in the UK, so they wouldn't be covered by EU citizenship law.


Civis Europeus Sum - I am a European Citizen

While the Citizen's Directive doesn't apply to EU citizens living in their own country, the Treaty articles on citizenship and the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality (Articles 18 & 20 TFEU) are, in legal jargon, "directly effective". This means people can rely on them without extra laws being passed by the EU or Member States.

Article 20 TFEU gives EU citizens the right to "move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States". The second method is perhaps an example of law being almost laughably technical, because it depends on how that "and" is interpreted. If you have to both move and reside, then you have to use free movement rights and the Back to the Future model applies. If you have 2 separate rights - to move and to reside - then citizens living in their own Member State would have a right to reside there under both their national citizenship, and their European citizenship. Then the non-discrimination clause would mean that they could not be "reverse discriminated" against by their own Member State!

This is the method proposed by British Advocate-General Eleanor Sharpston in her Opinion on the case. It would mean that just by living in the EU - anywhere in the EU - a citizen would be under the same protection as other EU citizens, and rights would not be dependent on complicated legal reasoning.


What was the Court thinking?

You can't really tell which of these the Court supported in it judgment, but it still wanted to help the Zambranos. It's not good enough, however for a Court to be so unclear about what the law is. As the Court cannot give the separate reasonings of the different judges, but only a single court judgment, there may have been a compromise to fudge the issue and not take Sharpston's more radical proposal.

However, I don't want to leave you with the impression that it's only the ECJ that influences the development of EU citizenship. The only reason a Belgian court asked the ECJ in the first place is that the Belgian constitutional court had held that reverse discrimination was not permitted, setting how EU law should work in the area into doubt.

Zambrano was a big step for EU citizenship, but it will be a long time before we know what it really means.

Who Does What Now?

A very quick description of who does what in the EU. (Since the EU is currently divided into 3 areas, or "Pillars" and not every institution has the same amount of power in each, the question of "who does what" can get confusing...):

The European Commission: A cross between a government and a civil service. This is made up of unelected Commissioners, with one appointed by each member state every five years under the current system. It can propose laws but it can't pass them, and this power is also limited to certain areas and certain circumstances (mostly Pillar 1, which is mainly about the single market and other technical issues). It is supposed to enact EU legislation and/or make sure that those who should be doing this, are. So if you read that "the Commission has decided...", it very rarely gets to decide anything: its main function is suggesting and drafting laws.

The European Council: This is made up of the heads of government (who are also heads of state in some cases), and they meet at least twice a year. This body decides the big political issues. The presidency of this body is taken on by each of the member states in turn for 6 month long presidencies under the current system.

The Council of the European Union: the main legislator. Made up of national ministers from whatever area the issue in question involves (agriculture ministers if the issue is the CAP, etc), although the vast majority of the work is done by national civil servants. NO major legislation can be passed without this body's say-so. Can ask the Commission to draw up legislation. The main institution in all legislative areas.

The European Parliament: made up of directly elected MEPs. In most of Pillar 1 they have an equal say on legislation (amending, rejecting or passing it) as the Council of the European Union, but in Pillars 2 & 3 (foreign policy and home affairs) they have no real say. Can ask the Commission to draw up legislation under Pillar 1.

The European Court of Justice: a Court which decides on issues of EU (or "Community") law. This includes constitutional matters (which institution has the right to do what), and interpreting Community law for national courts. Has little to no role under Pillars 2 & 3, however.

The Court of Auditors: the accountants. They check and investigate the finances of the EU and its institutions.


Note: the Council of Europe has nothing to do with the EU. It was a body born out of the federalist movement, but it is an intergovernmental body and is most famous for the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.