Arguing with the "Facts".

I've already written why I think opinion polls are unhelpful due to the difficulty in interpreting them for policy formulation. But I want to write down a few ideas on the Eurobarometer poll. (If you're interested in Eurobarometer analysis, Grahnlaw is writing a series on it).

When it comes to the interpretation of the results, I find myself caught between the pro-integrationists and Eurosceptics. My lasting impression is that there is a wide "middle ground" to be fought over EU action on the economic crisis. The 75% support for EU action has been critised (rightly) by Open Europe as giving a misleading impression of overwhelming support. Not only is it a combination of the replies of "very effective" or "fairly effective", but it doesn't show support for specific policies, and we cannot guess exactly what kind of co-operation people want.

However, Grahnlaw is right to point out that Open Europe has missed a trick here. For, while Open Europe repeat their outraged "do they take us for fools?!" line, the fact is that 75% think that EU action on the crisis would be fairly effective, and the 26% that replied "very effective", puts the EU in the position of being the organisation with the highest percentage of "very effective" replies (versus IMF, national governments, the US, the IMF, etc.). Though it should be noted that when 26% is the highest number, it indicates a fairly wide spread. That it does not indictate overwhelming support for a particular form of cooperation is correct, but it shows that people are very much open to arguments for economic governance. It's a pity that Open Europe focused only on the spin and did not feel it necessary to engage in a battle of ideas over what economic governance should mean, or why it is the wrong choice. We are treated, instead, to a declaration of what the general opinion is (or an interpretation of it), and expected to evaluate the legitimacy of our ideas - or what is politically possible - in light of them.

It seems to me odd to adopt this attitude.



What support means.

The second big battle is over the loss of trust in the EU means. The two are linked. Eurosceptics argue that the loss of trust should mean that the EU slows down and should not try and "act big" on the economic crisis. Supporters of closer EU co-operation point to the above argument that the high level of openness shows that we should press ahead. My position as an integrationist is well known to readers of this blog, so my interpretation comes with a health warning - however, I want to offer a few counter-arguments and ideas to show that the "battlefield of ideas" is still open.

First of all the argument that the drop means that the EU should not act further (or, more extreme, be abolished) based on the trust ratings is a strange argument. First of all, the trust rates for national governments are over 10% lower, and nobody is suggesting that national governments should stop mooting ideas or bringing forward policies (or, in the other extreme, being abolished to allow for more government from the "more trusted" EU level of governance). In terms of drops in support, national governments also faced a similar 6% fall in support between Eurobarometer 71.1 (Jan-Feb 2009) and 71 (September 2009), though this may be seen as a blip, given that it rose between Autumn 2008 and Jan-Feb 2009 (trust rose from 34% to 38% before falling to 32%) [see Eurobarometer 71, page 74 (PDF)]. The point is that further Eurobarometers can give more contezt, and that drops in support are not alien to national governments.

Second, the argument that the drop shows that people are "waking up to the Eurosceptic view as the reality" is also dubious to me. Between Eurobarometers 70, 71.1, and 71 (covering Spring 2008-9) shows the level of trust in the EU remaining steady at 47% (see EB 71, page 124). This was during a period where it was clear that the Lisbon Treaty was going to face a second referendum in Ireland, a fact frequently used in Eurosceptic argument of the untrustworthiness of the EU, yet at a time when the governance of the EU was so clearly highlighted, it appears the trust levels held. Looking further back, the level was at 48% in Autumn 2007, and briefly jumped up to 50% before falling to 47% (see page 31, PDF). Context is needed, and we can't link such results for non-specific questions to particular arguments easily.

So my feeling is that the Greek Eurocrisis was the main reason for the fall (but, again, it's hard to say - maybe unemployment and other economic reasons are a cause or additional causes). There are 2 arguments here. The failure of the Eurozone made people loose trust in the way the economy of the EU was being handled at an EU level, so there should be less co-operation. The lack of solidarity and the bad feeling generated by "bail-outers" and "bailees" shows that further co-ordination shouldn't be pursued. Or, that the lack of solidarity and decisiveness lead people to loose trust in the EU to help their country if the crisis hit them, or to prevent the crisis spreading to countries entailing their country to bail others out, and therefore closer and clearer co-operation and governing structures are needed.

I think both have a valid basis - though I am on the side of the latter argument, the former argument cannot just be ignored. Personally, I would say that the openness of people to EU action, as shown by the recent Eurobarometer results, indicates that it's still all to play for, and that nothing is settled.

No National European Vision

In the EUobserver today, there's an article on Barroso's response to the Eurobarometer results. Barroso says that the member state governments have failed to defend the European project during the crisis:

""I admit that we should do more together in order to give confidence to citizens and consumers. But I also want to tell the truth: We won't solve the problems unless each nation sees the European project as its own," the Portuguese politician said.

"In fact this is not the case now. When things go well it's their merit and when they go wrong it's Brussels' fault," he added."

It's a tough position for the EU institutions, because it is hard for them to communicate with the public - hard to get information and debate on what's going on in the institutions into the mass media. The long process of passing legislation that is often technical does not help win column space in the newspapers. So I appreciate the difficulty that the institutions have in informing people about what the EU does, and the dependence of the EU on the member states to inform their citizens about the EU. However, I agree with Gawain Towler that it's not really the member states' role to promote the EU (though I don't agree with his other conclusions).

It would be nice if the national governments were candid about the good and bad work they do around the Council table, but it is unlikely to happen. Member state governments don't fall or get re-elected based on their Council voting record. Apart from that, national parties aren't designed for European politics and issues - quite simply, national parties are designed to get members elected to national office. A conflict negotiation lecturer I had in university highlighted this through referendums - generally civil society is better at running referendum campaigns because parties are more suited to getting people elected on broad policy platforms. Which is another reason why I support the PES Primaries Campaign: because making executive elections matter forces the issues of policy more clearly, and the transnational party bodies (and their national member-parties) have a clearer interest in explaining their voting records and policies. Though it is, in a way, simplistic to target institutional conditions, if these aren't changed, there will remain an in-built disincentive for explanation and debate over policy.

That's one way of promoting a "national European vision" and encouraging people to discuss what kind of policies and cooperation they want, if indeed they want it. It's all very well saying that national parties need to promote the European project - but, let's face it, it hasn't happened yet, and if things stay the same it will remain unlikely. Less blame, more ideas, please.

Spin, Damn Spin, and Statistics*

The latest Eurobarometer is out (PDF), charting the changes in public opinion in the EU (plus a few non-member states) over the last six months. (For some reason I imagine it delivered phone-directory-like, in a plastic coated bundle across Brussels and posted out to rare subscribers). I wasn't going to comment on it, because while I think the Eurobarometers are good for showing trends and indications of public opinion, I distrust reading into such polls as support for X policy or Y general philosophical outlook on the EU (or anything else, for that matter).

So Eurobarometer Day arrives (it's a public holiday in La Réunion, you know), and bloggers, Tweeters, and perhaps even journalists, look into the entrails of public opinion, to divine the way forward. Support for the EU is down by an average of 6% (42%, down from 42%; distrust now at 47%): proof that the public's patience with the EU project is approaching its end, say Eurosceptics. But distrust in national governments is at 66%, compared to a 47% distrust in the EU, say opponents (distrust in national parliaments averages at 62%). Now, the sharp drop in support for the EU is a concern - and indeed, the very low levels of trust in national institutions should be of great concern, given the (thankfully on the whole so far limited) rise in extreme right-wing rhetoric - but it's hard to say exactly what should be done about it. Because it's a steep drop, sudden, the reasons must be recent. Is it the Eurozone crisis (and does it mean people want more/less co-ordination, or were just disappointed/disillusioned with the heads of state/government arguing and hesitating over a solution?) or do they expect the EU to do more/less/something different to what its doing now? Is it the start of a trend, or purely a reaction to current events? We just don't know.

It's impossible to say, because the Eurobarometer is trying to measure satisfaction, trust, and concern for certain issues in people's lives. So it is by definition, vague. We can only say that there are certain issues that people want addressed, and that they are open to European co-operation on these. Beyond that, policy makers and supporters will have to make the cases for their ideas and try and win support for them. We can't tell if the EPP, PES or even the EFD would win the EP elections on their policy platforms (or even what theoretical policy platform would win), so let's stop pretending that this Eurobarometer is proof for support for X.

So, given that my take on the Eurobarometer, was "I don't think we can take much from this", I wasn't really going to write anything about it. But then I saw this post by Open Europe, criticising the Commission for holding up the Eurobarometer results as proof of support for stronger economic governance, and it annoyed me. Strange, perhaps, since I agree with Open Europe that the results cannot be read to automatically translate into support for economic governance, but the whole subsequent argument - that if the question of Commission scrutiny of national budgets, or of economic governance had been asked, then the opposite would most likely be the case - got to me.

That's right, instead of basing policy on survey questionaire results, we should act instead on what the results might have been like had other questions been asked. Not exactly an improvement, in my opinion.

However, I doubt that questions such as "should there be more economic governance" or "should there be an EU tax" would necessarily be very revealing. After all, the term "economic governance" hasn't been defined yet, so the responce is hardly going to reveal much in the way of support for or opposition to different forms of economic governance. And what sane person would say that asking "do you think there should be another tax", independent of specifics, context or a public debate of the advantages and disadvantages would produce a result which would provide a good basis for taxation policy? (Yet note the useful spin that can be generated for attacking the spin of another party, while suggesting that other vague and hypothetical questions would have produced your favoured result...).

This use of statistics - and worse yet, theoretical statistics - is what annoys be about these types of polls.** So while "only 26%" favour EU action (the highest percent, compared to national governments, the USA and the IMF***), can't tell us whether we should integrate more, or disintegrate more when it comes to economic policy (or how to do either), it does show that there is room for the arguments of closer integration (or the opposite) to be made.

In other words, let's debate our options, rather than look to the statistical entrails of Europe for a modern mandate from heaven. If you asked me, we'd be at least 46% better off if we did.



* Sorry for the bad pun of an over-used cliché. It was all I could think of as a title.

** And survey questioners. If you answer them, they can steal your soul, you know.

*** If you really want to know, the institutions people think are most able to tackle the crisis are: EU (26%), IMF (14%), USA (7%), G20 (14%), National governments (19%), None (6%) [not an official option], Other (1%) [not an official option], Don't Know (13%). So a nice spread of results allowing people to read into them what they want. Though I doubt that anyone running on a "Don't Know" ticket will be elected any time soon.