Today Open Europe argues, on their blog and in The Telegraph, that the Norwegian model is a bad model for the UK to pursue, and that the British government should try to negotiate better terms within the EU rather than leaving to join the looser EEA. In arguing this, Open Europe take the argument of those who support either the status quo or further integration - that EEA membership or a Swiss model relationship with the EU would lead to a loss of political influence but require high levels of acceptance of rules decided in Brussels - and uses it to support the argument that the UK can get a special relationship within the EU. The UK, the argument goes, is such an important market, and Germany and other northern countries want the UK to remain inside the EU as part of a market-liberal alliance, that the UK can win a place as a member of the internal market, but opt-out of pretty much everything else.
This misses the point of what the internal market - and the EU - actually means to the rest of the Member States.
Back in the winter, when David Cameron wielded the British veto on treaty change, there was a political storm over whether Cameron negotiated well or not, but also a wide acceptance that what the UK asked for was reasonable. I argued that it wasn't, given that it was reversing integration in the internal market and that it would run counter to even the interests of the more traditionally UK-aligned Member States. In the UK the EU is portrayed as a free trading agreement that has run out of control, but the internal market itself is more than that, and the fact is that the rest of the EU needs to exist to politically support the internal market.
The internal market goes beyond a free trade agreement and a customs union because it's not just about getting rid of tariffs at the borders, but about creating an economic and legal space where businesses and people can move and work and provide goods and services without obstacles being thrown up by different regulatory systems. This means that there needs to be some harmonisation and some mutual recognition of rules and standards.
Which brings us to the "European Social Contract". Yes, despite all the fallout and arguments of the Eurozone crisis, I would argue that there is a basic social contract at the heart of the EU, which is also important to ensuring that the internal market has the political legitimacy to exist. The internal market covers a massive economic space and its regulation has social, economic and environmental consequences. Given the post-war social contract in Europe - essentially that the state has a place in ensuring the social welfare of the people both as a moral duty (it's seen as part of "what the government does", and in order to provide a bulwark against extremism and social instability - and a crude deregulation of markets within a European space would threaten national societies and their identities. The social and environmental legislation and the elements of redistribution that exist in the EU are an attempt to preserve this social settlement while unlocking the economic potential of such a large continental market (we'll ignore the history of integration being seen as a way of ensuring peace).
While the internal/single/common market has been elevated to an article of faith in the UK, really it relies on the social, regional developmental, redistribution-orientated and environmental faces for its political legitimacy. Would the other Member States not only be willing to give the UK full access to the internal market and let it leave the areas that sustain its political legitimacy, but also let it retain its political influence in votes in Brussels? It's a hard bargain to drive to say that you will have full benefits in the areas you like, but opt out of all other obligations. I don't think other Member States would be willing to open up their markets fully to a country that will not accept its part of the European Social Contract. It's up to Britain if it wants to reduce workers rights and social and environmental protection, but why should the other Member States provide the UK with unfettered access to the internal market if it does?
This is not asking for second or third tier membership, this is asking for Free-Rider Status.
The argument that the UK is too important to the more market liberal Member States to let Britain leave - as has been argued elsewhere too - also forgets to touch on the UK's political weight and influence as a Free-Rider Nation. The UK - and probably its MEPs - would not have a say in the areas that the UK opts out of. What use is the UK as an ally here if it doesn't have a vote? This is another aspect of the UK's negotiating position that is just not recognised in the British debate: the more the UK opts out or talks about opting out, the less valuable and reliable it is as an ally for the other Member States. After all, why should you put your political capital on the line for a country that's half out the door and in little position to help you in return?
There's no such thing as a free lunch, and in the EU there can be no such thing as a Free-Rider Nation.
UPDATE: The Centre for European Reform explores the Norwegian and Swiss options in more detail.
Showing posts with label Open Europe. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Open Europe. Show all posts
Wednesday, 11 July 2012
Thursday, 2 September 2010
Arguing with the "Facts".
I've already written why I think opinion polls are unhelpful due to the difficulty in interpreting them for policy formulation. But I want to write down a few ideas on the Eurobarometer poll. (If you're interested in Eurobarometer analysis, Grahnlaw is writing a series on it).
When it comes to the interpretation of the results, I find myself caught between the pro-integrationists and Eurosceptics. My lasting impression is that there is a wide "middle ground" to be fought over EU action on the economic crisis. The 75% support for EU action has been critised (rightly) by Open Europe as giving a misleading impression of overwhelming support. Not only is it a combination of the replies of "very effective" or "fairly effective", but it doesn't show support for specific policies, and we cannot guess exactly what kind of co-operation people want.
However, Grahnlaw is right to point out that Open Europe has missed a trick here. For, while Open Europe repeat their outraged "do they take us for fools?!" line, the fact is that 75% think that EU action on the crisis would be fairly effective, and the 26% that replied "very effective", puts the EU in the position of being the organisation with the highest percentage of "very effective" replies (versus IMF, national governments, the US, the IMF, etc.). Though it should be noted that when 26% is the highest number, it indicates a fairly wide spread. That it does not indictate overwhelming support for a particular form of cooperation is correct, but it shows that people are very much open to arguments for economic governance. It's a pity that Open Europe focused only on the spin and did not feel it necessary to engage in a battle of ideas over what economic governance should mean, or why it is the wrong choice. We are treated, instead, to a declaration of what the general opinion is (or an interpretation of it), and expected to evaluate the legitimacy of our ideas - or what is politically possible - in light of them.
It seems to me odd to adopt this attitude.
What support means.
The second big battle is over the loss of trust in the EU means. The two are linked. Eurosceptics argue that the loss of trust should mean that the EU slows down and should not try and "act big" on the economic crisis. Supporters of closer EU co-operation point to the above argument that the high level of openness shows that we should press ahead. My position as an integrationist is well known to readers of this blog, so my interpretation comes with a health warning - however, I want to offer a few counter-arguments and ideas to show that the "battlefield of ideas" is still open.
First of all the argument that the drop means that the EU should not act further (or, more extreme, be abolished) based on the trust ratings is a strange argument. First of all, the trust rates for national governments are over 10% lower, and nobody is suggesting that national governments should stop mooting ideas or bringing forward policies (or, in the other extreme, being abolished to allow for more government from the "more trusted" EU level of governance). In terms of drops in support, national governments also faced a similar 6% fall in support between Eurobarometer 71.1 (Jan-Feb 2009) and 71 (September 2009), though this may be seen as a blip, given that it rose between Autumn 2008 and Jan-Feb 2009 (trust rose from 34% to 38% before falling to 32%) [see Eurobarometer 71, page 74 (PDF)]. The point is that further Eurobarometers can give more contezt, and that drops in support are not alien to national governments.
Second, the argument that the drop shows that people are "waking up to the Eurosceptic view as the reality" is also dubious to me. Between Eurobarometers 70, 71.1, and 71 (covering Spring 2008-9) shows the level of trust in the EU remaining steady at 47% (see EB 71, page 124). This was during a period where it was clear that the Lisbon Treaty was going to face a second referendum in Ireland, a fact frequently used in Eurosceptic argument of the untrustworthiness of the EU, yet at a time when the governance of the EU was so clearly highlighted, it appears the trust levels held. Looking further back, the level was at 48% in Autumn 2007, and briefly jumped up to 50% before falling to 47% (see page 31, PDF). Context is needed, and we can't link such results for non-specific questions to particular arguments easily.
So my feeling is that the Greek Eurocrisis was the main reason for the fall (but, again, it's hard to say - maybe unemployment and other economic reasons are a cause or additional causes). There are 2 arguments here. The failure of the Eurozone made people loose trust in the way the economy of the EU was being handled at an EU level, so there should be less co-operation. The lack of solidarity and the bad feeling generated by "bail-outers" and "bailees" shows that further co-ordination shouldn't be pursued. Or, that the lack of solidarity and decisiveness lead people to loose trust in the EU to help their country if the crisis hit them, or to prevent the crisis spreading to countries entailing their country to bail others out, and therefore closer and clearer co-operation and governing structures are needed.
I think both have a valid basis - though I am on the side of the latter argument, the former argument cannot just be ignored. Personally, I would say that the openness of people to EU action, as shown by the recent Eurobarometer results, indicates that it's still all to play for, and that nothing is settled.
When it comes to the interpretation of the results, I find myself caught between the pro-integrationists and Eurosceptics. My lasting impression is that there is a wide "middle ground" to be fought over EU action on the economic crisis. The 75% support for EU action has been critised (rightly) by Open Europe as giving a misleading impression of overwhelming support. Not only is it a combination of the replies of "very effective" or "fairly effective", but it doesn't show support for specific policies, and we cannot guess exactly what kind of co-operation people want.
However, Grahnlaw is right to point out that Open Europe has missed a trick here. For, while Open Europe repeat their outraged "do they take us for fools?!" line, the fact is that 75% think that EU action on the crisis would be fairly effective, and the 26% that replied "very effective", puts the EU in the position of being the organisation with the highest percentage of "very effective" replies (versus IMF, national governments, the US, the IMF, etc.). Though it should be noted that when 26% is the highest number, it indicates a fairly wide spread. That it does not indictate overwhelming support for a particular form of cooperation is correct, but it shows that people are very much open to arguments for economic governance. It's a pity that Open Europe focused only on the spin and did not feel it necessary to engage in a battle of ideas over what economic governance should mean, or why it is the wrong choice. We are treated, instead, to a declaration of what the general opinion is (or an interpretation of it), and expected to evaluate the legitimacy of our ideas - or what is politically possible - in light of them.
It seems to me odd to adopt this attitude.
What support means.
The second big battle is over the loss of trust in the EU means. The two are linked. Eurosceptics argue that the loss of trust should mean that the EU slows down and should not try and "act big" on the economic crisis. Supporters of closer EU co-operation point to the above argument that the high level of openness shows that we should press ahead. My position as an integrationist is well known to readers of this blog, so my interpretation comes with a health warning - however, I want to offer a few counter-arguments and ideas to show that the "battlefield of ideas" is still open.
First of all the argument that the drop means that the EU should not act further (or, more extreme, be abolished) based on the trust ratings is a strange argument. First of all, the trust rates for national governments are over 10% lower, and nobody is suggesting that national governments should stop mooting ideas or bringing forward policies (or, in the other extreme, being abolished to allow for more government from the "more trusted" EU level of governance). In terms of drops in support, national governments also faced a similar 6% fall in support between Eurobarometer 71.1 (Jan-Feb 2009) and 71 (September 2009), though this may be seen as a blip, given that it rose between Autumn 2008 and Jan-Feb 2009 (trust rose from 34% to 38% before falling to 32%) [see Eurobarometer 71, page 74 (PDF)]. The point is that further Eurobarometers can give more contezt, and that drops in support are not alien to national governments.
Second, the argument that the drop shows that people are "waking up to the Eurosceptic view as the reality" is also dubious to me. Between Eurobarometers 70, 71.1, and 71 (covering Spring 2008-9) shows the level of trust in the EU remaining steady at 47% (see EB 71, page 124). This was during a period where it was clear that the Lisbon Treaty was going to face a second referendum in Ireland, a fact frequently used in Eurosceptic argument of the untrustworthiness of the EU, yet at a time when the governance of the EU was so clearly highlighted, it appears the trust levels held. Looking further back, the level was at 48% in Autumn 2007, and briefly jumped up to 50% before falling to 47% (see page 31, PDF). Context is needed, and we can't link such results for non-specific questions to particular arguments easily.
So my feeling is that the Greek Eurocrisis was the main reason for the fall (but, again, it's hard to say - maybe unemployment and other economic reasons are a cause or additional causes). There are 2 arguments here. The failure of the Eurozone made people loose trust in the way the economy of the EU was being handled at an EU level, so there should be less co-operation. The lack of solidarity and the bad feeling generated by "bail-outers" and "bailees" shows that further co-ordination shouldn't be pursued. Or, that the lack of solidarity and decisiveness lead people to loose trust in the EU to help their country if the crisis hit them, or to prevent the crisis spreading to countries entailing their country to bail others out, and therefore closer and clearer co-operation and governing structures are needed.
I think both have a valid basis - though I am on the side of the latter argument, the former argument cannot just be ignored. Personally, I would say that the openness of people to EU action, as shown by the recent Eurobarometer results, indicates that it's still all to play for, and that nothing is settled.
Saturday, 28 August 2010
Spin, Damn Spin, and Statistics*
The latest Eurobarometer is out (PDF), charting the changes in public opinion in the EU (plus a few non-member states) over the last six months. (For some reason I imagine it delivered phone-directory-like, in a plastic coated bundle across Brussels and posted out to rare subscribers). I wasn't going to comment on it, because while I think the Eurobarometers are good for showing trends and indications of public opinion, I distrust reading into such polls as support for X policy or Y general philosophical outlook on the EU (or anything else, for that matter).
So Eurobarometer Day arrives (it's a public holiday in La Réunion, you know), and bloggers, Tweeters, and perhaps even journalists, look into the entrails of public opinion, to divine the way forward. Support for the EU is down by an average of 6% (42%, down from 42%; distrust now at 47%): proof that the public's patience with the EU project is approaching its end, say Eurosceptics. But distrust in national governments is at 66%, compared to a 47% distrust in the EU, say opponents (distrust in national parliaments averages at 62%). Now, the sharp drop in support for the EU is a concern - and indeed, the very low levels of trust in national institutions should be of great concern, given the (thankfully on the whole so far limited) rise in extreme right-wing rhetoric - but it's hard to say exactly what should be done about it. Because it's a steep drop, sudden, the reasons must be recent. Is it the Eurozone crisis (and does it mean people want more/less co-ordination, or were just disappointed/disillusioned with the heads of state/government arguing and hesitating over a solution?) or do they expect the EU to do more/less/something different to what its doing now? Is it the start of a trend, or purely a reaction to current events? We just don't know.
It's impossible to say, because the Eurobarometer is trying to measure satisfaction, trust, and concern for certain issues in people's lives. So it is by definition, vague. We can only say that there are certain issues that people want addressed, and that they are open to European co-operation on these. Beyond that, policy makers and supporters will have to make the cases for their ideas and try and win support for them. We can't tell if the EPP, PES or even the EFD would win the EP elections on their policy platforms (or even what theoretical policy platform would win), so let's stop pretending that this Eurobarometer is proof for support for X.
So, given that my take on the Eurobarometer, was "I don't think we can take much from this", I wasn't really going to write anything about it. But then I saw this post by Open Europe, criticising the Commission for holding up the Eurobarometer results as proof of support for stronger economic governance, and it annoyed me. Strange, perhaps, since I agree with Open Europe that the results cannot be read to automatically translate into support for economic governance, but the whole subsequent argument - that if the question of Commission scrutiny of national budgets, or of economic governance had been asked, then the opposite would most likely be the case - got to me.
That's right, instead of basing policy on survey questionaire results, we should act instead on what the results might have been like had other questions been asked. Not exactly an improvement, in my opinion.
However, I doubt that questions such as "should there be more economic governance" or "should there be an EU tax" would necessarily be very revealing. After all, the term "economic governance" hasn't been defined yet, so the responce is hardly going to reveal much in the way of support for or opposition to different forms of economic governance. And what sane person would say that asking "do you think there should be another tax", independent of specifics, context or a public debate of the advantages and disadvantages would produce a result which would provide a good basis for taxation policy? (Yet note the useful spin that can be generated for attacking the spin of another party, while suggesting that other vague and hypothetical questions would have produced your favoured result...).
This use of statistics - and worse yet, theoretical statistics - is what annoys be about these types of polls.** So while "only 26%" favour EU action (the highest percent, compared to national governments, the USA and the IMF***), can't tell us whether we should integrate more, or disintegrate more when it comes to economic policy (or how to do either), it does show that there is room for the arguments of closer integration (or the opposite) to be made.
In other words, let's debate our options, rather than look to the statistical entrails of Europe for a modern mandate from heaven. If you asked me, we'd be at least 46% better off if we did.
* Sorry for the bad pun of an over-used cliché. It was all I could think of as a title.
** And survey questioners. If you answer them, they can steal your soul, you know.
*** If you really want to know, the institutions people think are most able to tackle the crisis are: EU (26%), IMF (14%), USA (7%), G20 (14%), National governments (19%), None (6%) [not an official option], Other (1%) [not an official option], Don't Know (13%). So a nice spread of results allowing people to read into them what they want. Though I doubt that anyone running on a "Don't Know" ticket will be elected any time soon.
So Eurobarometer Day arrives (it's a public holiday in La Réunion, you know), and bloggers, Tweeters, and perhaps even journalists, look into the entrails of public opinion, to divine the way forward. Support for the EU is down by an average of 6% (42%, down from 42%; distrust now at 47%): proof that the public's patience with the EU project is approaching its end, say Eurosceptics. But distrust in national governments is at 66%, compared to a 47% distrust in the EU, say opponents (distrust in national parliaments averages at 62%). Now, the sharp drop in support for the EU is a concern - and indeed, the very low levels of trust in national institutions should be of great concern, given the (thankfully on the whole so far limited) rise in extreme right-wing rhetoric - but it's hard to say exactly what should be done about it. Because it's a steep drop, sudden, the reasons must be recent. Is it the Eurozone crisis (and does it mean people want more/less co-ordination, or were just disappointed/disillusioned with the heads of state/government arguing and hesitating over a solution?) or do they expect the EU to do more/less/something different to what its doing now? Is it the start of a trend, or purely a reaction to current events? We just don't know.
It's impossible to say, because the Eurobarometer is trying to measure satisfaction, trust, and concern for certain issues in people's lives. So it is by definition, vague. We can only say that there are certain issues that people want addressed, and that they are open to European co-operation on these. Beyond that, policy makers and supporters will have to make the cases for their ideas and try and win support for them. We can't tell if the EPP, PES or even the EFD would win the EP elections on their policy platforms (or even what theoretical policy platform would win), so let's stop pretending that this Eurobarometer is proof for support for X.
So, given that my take on the Eurobarometer, was "I don't think we can take much from this", I wasn't really going to write anything about it. But then I saw this post by Open Europe, criticising the Commission for holding up the Eurobarometer results as proof of support for stronger economic governance, and it annoyed me. Strange, perhaps, since I agree with Open Europe that the results cannot be read to automatically translate into support for economic governance, but the whole subsequent argument - that if the question of Commission scrutiny of national budgets, or of economic governance had been asked, then the opposite would most likely be the case - got to me.
That's right, instead of basing policy on survey questionaire results, we should act instead on what the results might have been like had other questions been asked. Not exactly an improvement, in my opinion.
However, I doubt that questions such as "should there be more economic governance" or "should there be an EU tax" would necessarily be very revealing. After all, the term "economic governance" hasn't been defined yet, so the responce is hardly going to reveal much in the way of support for or opposition to different forms of economic governance. And what sane person would say that asking "do you think there should be another tax", independent of specifics, context or a public debate of the advantages and disadvantages would produce a result which would provide a good basis for taxation policy? (Yet note the useful spin that can be generated for attacking the spin of another party, while suggesting that other vague and hypothetical questions would have produced your favoured result...).
This use of statistics - and worse yet, theoretical statistics - is what annoys be about these types of polls.** So while "only 26%" favour EU action (the highest percent, compared to national governments, the USA and the IMF***), can't tell us whether we should integrate more, or disintegrate more when it comes to economic policy (or how to do either), it does show that there is room for the arguments of closer integration (or the opposite) to be made.
In other words, let's debate our options, rather than look to the statistical entrails of Europe for a modern mandate from heaven. If you asked me, we'd be at least 46% better off if we did.
* Sorry for the bad pun of an over-used cliché. It was all I could think of as a title.
** And survey questioners. If you answer them, they can steal your soul, you know.
*** If you really want to know, the institutions people think are most able to tackle the crisis are: EU (26%), IMF (14%), USA (7%), G20 (14%), National governments (19%), None (6%) [not an official option], Other (1%) [not an official option], Don't Know (13%). So a nice spread of results allowing people to read into them what they want. Though I doubt that anyone running on a "Don't Know" ticket will be elected any time soon.
Monday, 28 June 2010
Conclusive proof that Van Rompuy is now too powerful
I've just read conclusive proof that Van Rompuy has become so powerful that he has eclipsed the rotating presidency of the Council via Open Europe: apparently, neither he or Barroso thanked the Spanish presidency for its work during the last European Council meeting.
Oh noes!
Obviously, this is an attempt to avoid embarrassing discussion about Spain, or something similarly nefarious or insulting to the pride of member states:
Or it could be a mistake or omission.
The short article seems to be very lazy and over-sensitive and it's a wonder that anyone took the time to write anything on it at all without anything more substantial. What substantive evidence is there that Van Rompuy is becoming over-powerful versus the rotating presidency? It's hard to measure this because the argument is neither defined nor backed up. Those who feared that the permanent presidency would sideline the rotating one? The aim of the permanent post was to give greater continuity and voice to the European Council, so how should we examine the "fear" that Open Europe had and the reality? If the rotating presidency went on as before, then Open Europe and others would (justifiably) be shouting that the permanent post was unnecessary and costly. If it does fulfil its role, then it would necessarily be more prominent than the rotating presidency, so where do you draw the line and say that the permanent post has infringed on the role of the rotating one?
So far, there have been no reports of Van Rompuy chairing Council formation meetings - despite all the European Council meetings to address the economic crisis and the eurozone crisis, I haven't heard anything about Van Rompuy chairing the Ecofin Council formation, which is the meeting of EU finance ministers. Van Rompuy has proposed chairing an economic task force, and other reforms to deal with the crisis, though this seems to me to be over-shadowing Barroso and the Commission. After all, the member states have not shied away from giving their own two eurocents on what reforms are needed (France and Germany unsurprisingly being the most vocal). Perhaps what holds Spain back in being vocal here is its own domestic crisis - in which case the question is, "if a permanent presidency can keep things going politically, and not just administratively, is that not a good thing to have?"
Again, it should be pointed out that neither Van Rompuy nor the Spanish rotating presidency could get these things done without the consent of the European Council/Council. Which consists of the member states. The member states are not co-opted or bullied by presidents into doing things; negotiation between them is the key aspect here.
Given that Madrid has ensured that there have been EU meetings held in Spain and not all in Brussels, and the willingness to promote its leadership role domestically and abroad (mostly to the detriment of the High Representative Aston), I don't think that the rotating presidency is dead or meaningless yet.
But it's good to know that Think Tanks like Open Europe are spending their time coming up with constructive policy proposals and not just wading through pages of information to pick up on irrelevant details to push a political message.
UPDATE: here's a link to an article on Ideas for Europe "President Paradox" which argues the opposite. As you can see from the comments, there are powerful counter-arguments to the article's reasoning (I largely agree with the counter-arguments), but at least the arguments and reasoning here is clear: clear arguments with a target, not just a lazy assertion.
"Those who worried that the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of a permanent EU president would sideline the rotating presidency held by national governments have been proved right. Spanish Daily El Mundo notes that during a speech in the European Parliament yesterday, neither President Herman Van Rompuy, nor President Barroso mentioned or thanked Spain’s EU Presidency for its role in last week’s European Council summit. It seems that even the fact that Van Rompuy sat next to Spaniard Diego Lopez Garrido..., the secretary of state for the EU, failed to remind the officials of Spain’s role. Barroso managed to find the time, however, to thank Catherine Ashton, the Parliament, the Commission, and the Council."
Oh noes!
Obviously, this is an attempt to avoid embarrassing discussion about Spain, or something similarly nefarious or insulting to the pride of member states:
"The incident could be part of a larger EU effort to avoid any discussion of Spain, hoping people will forget it may be the next eurozone domino to fall. Or perhaps it demonstrates that the Brussels elite have little time for national governments..."
Or it could be a mistake or omission.
The short article seems to be very lazy and over-sensitive and it's a wonder that anyone took the time to write anything on it at all without anything more substantial. What substantive evidence is there that Van Rompuy is becoming over-powerful versus the rotating presidency? It's hard to measure this because the argument is neither defined nor backed up. Those who feared that the permanent presidency would sideline the rotating one? The aim of the permanent post was to give greater continuity and voice to the European Council, so how should we examine the "fear" that Open Europe had and the reality? If the rotating presidency went on as before, then Open Europe and others would (justifiably) be shouting that the permanent post was unnecessary and costly. If it does fulfil its role, then it would necessarily be more prominent than the rotating presidency, so where do you draw the line and say that the permanent post has infringed on the role of the rotating one?
So far, there have been no reports of Van Rompuy chairing Council formation meetings - despite all the European Council meetings to address the economic crisis and the eurozone crisis, I haven't heard anything about Van Rompuy chairing the Ecofin Council formation, which is the meeting of EU finance ministers. Van Rompuy has proposed chairing an economic task force, and other reforms to deal with the crisis, though this seems to me to be over-shadowing Barroso and the Commission. After all, the member states have not shied away from giving their own two eurocents on what reforms are needed (France and Germany unsurprisingly being the most vocal). Perhaps what holds Spain back in being vocal here is its own domestic crisis - in which case the question is, "if a permanent presidency can keep things going politically, and not just administratively, is that not a good thing to have?"
Again, it should be pointed out that neither Van Rompuy nor the Spanish rotating presidency could get these things done without the consent of the European Council/Council. Which consists of the member states. The member states are not co-opted or bullied by presidents into doing things; negotiation between them is the key aspect here.
Given that Madrid has ensured that there have been EU meetings held in Spain and not all in Brussels, and the willingness to promote its leadership role domestically and abroad (mostly to the detriment of the High Representative Aston), I don't think that the rotating presidency is dead or meaningless yet.
But it's good to know that Think Tanks like Open Europe are spending their time coming up with constructive policy proposals and not just wading through pages of information to pick up on irrelevant details to push a political message.
UPDATE: here's a link to an article on Ideas for Europe "President Paradox" which argues the opposite. As you can see from the comments, there are powerful counter-arguments to the article's reasoning (I largely agree with the counter-arguments), but at least the arguments and reasoning here is clear: clear arguments with a target, not just a lazy assertion.
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