Showing posts with label rule of law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label rule of law. Show all posts

Wednesday, 24 April 2013

Dalligate scandal deepens in Brussels



EUObserver is reporting that a confidential and highly damaging report on OLAF’s conduct of the investigation into allegations of corruption against Health Commissioner Dalli - by OLAF's own supervisors - has been sent to the European Parliament.

The "Dalligate" scandal has been rumbling on for a few months now in Brussels. Allegations of dodgy dealings on the part of Commissioner Dalli over his upcoming tobacco legislation and the snus (oral tobacco that is legal in Sweden but banned in the rest of the EU) industry led to his resignation in October last year. Dalli denies the allegations that he asked for bribes in return for legislative changes and hitout against Commission President Barroso, who effectively forced him in to resigning. Dalli is currently facing legal action in Malta.

In 2013 the scandal took an unexpected turn, however, when it was alleged that OLAF, the anti-fraud agency that launched the investigation against Dalli and published the report that led to his resignation, broke the law by acquiring communication information illegally (such as telephone information). It also came to light that the source of information for the meeting where Dalli supposedly asked for the bribe contacted OLAF to tell them that the meeting had never taken place, but OLAF allegedly told her to not tell the public. However Green MEP José Bové was told that Gayle Kimberley, the source, had not been to the meeting, driving OLAF back into the spotlight.

Despite the uproar over the handling of the case by OLAF and its head, Giovanni Kessler, with a proposal by the European Greens that the Parliament launch its own investigation (by setting up a committee of inquiry) into how the case was conducted. However the European Parliament dropped the idea on 11th April, with the EPP, S&D and ADLE groups against an inquiry – a blow for MEPs who had been calling for Kessler to resign.

But now the confidential report by the OLAF supervisors has breathed new life into the story. As EUObserver reports:


"[The report] accuses [Kessler's] office of conducting unlawful interrogations in Malta, of intercepting a private telephone conversation, of involving the help of Maltese authorities without a proper legal basis and of overlooking or rushing checks on the legality of its actions in order to speed up the outcome.

[...]

Given the complexity of the case, his [Kessler's] hastiness calls into question whether Olaf could have fulfilled all the necessary checks on the legality of its decision and on the credibility of the accusations, the report notes.

The supervisors add that commission President Jose Manuel Barroso wanted the investigation to get top priority.

In a violation of Olaf's duty to remain independent of Barroso's people, Kessler formally designated the commission as the source of the information on the basis of which he launched proceedings.

In a further violation of Olaf procedure, he made the designation despite the fact the information actually came from Swedish Match.

The supervisors also accuse Olaf of instructing the key Dalligate witness - a Maltese-based lobbyist called Gayle Kimberley - to lie."

With such a high-profile case (and a high-profile scalp in the form of a Commissioner), the serious questions over the handling of this case is deeply damaging to OLAF. While it's important to make sure that the court proceedings in Malta aren't interfered with, it's vital that there's a proper investigation into the conduct of this case. OLAF, as the anti-fraud office, is supposed to be irreproachable, and there has to be public confidence that it is able to carry out its functions independently, and in line with the rule of law. The European Parliament has to return to the issue of setting up a committee for inquiry.

Monday, 15 April 2013

Could Fidesz be expelled from the European People's Party?

Der Standard reported yesterday on a dinner of leading members of the EPP, including Joseph Daul and Commissioner Viviane Reding, to consider whether the ruling party in Hungary, Fidesz, should be expelled from the party:

"In der Europäischen Volkspartei (EVP) hat man die ungarische Mitgliedspartei Fidesz (Bund Junger Demokraten) Medienberichten zufolge zunehmend satt. Bei einem vertraulichen Abendessen im mondänen Klub der Festung Revelin bei Dubrovnik tauschten sich am vergangenen Donnerstag die Spitzen der EVP-Fraktion im Europaparlament, angeführt von Fraktionschef Joseph Daul, und die gleichfalls konservative EU-Justizkommissarin Viviane Reding über die jüngsten Verfassungsänderungen in Ungarn aus. Die Novelle festigt die Macht von Premier Viktor Orbán weiter auf Kosten von Justiz und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Sollte Orbán innerhalb einer Woche keinen Rückzieher machen, werde man "Fidesz aus der EVP hinauskomplimentieren", soll bei dem Dinner vereinbart worden sein.

[The European People's Party (EPP) has become increasingly tired of the media reports of their Hungarian member party, Fidesz (the Alliance of young Democrats). At a confidential dinner in the Revelin in Dubrovnik last Thursday, leading members of the EPP Group in the European Parliament and Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding discussed the recent constitutional changes in Hungary. These changes have further consolidated the power of the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the cost of the rule of law. The dinner concluded that if Orbán does not reverse course then Fidesz should be shown the door. (My Translation)]"

The EPP have rejected the story, but Der Standard's source for the story, a journalist from Új Magyar Szó (a Hungarian-language paper), says that Daul initiated the meeting. If the EPP is seriously thinking of expelling Fidesz, the party may try to join the European Conservatives and Reformists Group. That could be a boost to ECR numbers in the European Parliament, but it would be a controversial member to take on.

The pressure will be on Fidesz this week, with the constitutional situation up for debate in the European Parliament on Wednesday. Last week Barroso raised serious concerns over the latest change to the hungarian constitution, particularly because of interferences with the judiciary's powers, and it appears that the Commission is considering legal action:

"[Refering a Letter to Viktor Orbán:]

President Barroso indicates that, once the on-going legal analysis carried out by the Commission's services has been finalised, the Commission will have to take the necessary steps in order to start infringement procedures where relevant. "I strongly appeal to you and to your government to address these concerns and to tackle them in a determined and unambiguous way. This is without doubts in the best interest of Hungary and of the EU as a whole" – President Barroso says in the letter

The letter in particular refers to Commission concerns about the conformity with EU law of the new articles of the Hungarian Constitution on the clause on European Court of Justice judgements entailing payment obligations, the powers given to the President of the National Office for the judiciary to transfer cases and, subject to a more detailed analysis, the restrictions on the publication of political advertisements."

Concerns over Hungary's constitutional changes have been growing over the last few years. There was a blogging action over the new press laws and heavy criticism of the new constitution. Marco Dani, over at Verfassungsblog, highlights why these changes are important for the rest of us in an interesting piece on how the EU deals with these situations (and Article 7 TEU):

"[G]iven the interconnections between supranational and national decision-making, preserving national democratic processes from toxic elements is a way also of ensuring the democratic credentials of the EU institutions and political process. This is why Hungary matters not only for Hungarians but also for European citizens at large. And this is why, if European citizens are really affected by the authoritarian slide in one country, it is also up to them to react, especially when, as it is the case now, other institutional actors seem hesitant."

Friday, 21 September 2012

Justice Scorecards

Viviane Reding, the Justice Commissioner, has announced a Justice Scorecard. The concern over justice and the rule of law in Hungary and Romania lately prompted the move. Romania is subject to reports on the condition of its justice system.

On EUObserver:

""I am prepared to come once a year before this house to share with all of you the commission's assessment of the justice systems of the 27 member states," she told MEPs in Strasbourg.

The scoreboard would gauge the various strengths and weaknesses of each member state by benchmarking judicial "strength, efficiency and reliability.

People from Reding's department would probe the national set-ups and issue annual reports, paying particular attention to the independence of the judiciary.

[...]

Reding now wants to extend such annual reports [Romania is subject to annual reports] to the rest of Europe and claims to have the backing of several member state ministries, including Germany's foreign minister.

"We need such a new mechanism. Because our infringement procedures are too technical and too slow to react in situations of high risk to the rule of law," she said."

It's a good idea because the infringement procedures deal with the technical and narrow infringements of EU law, which is not set up to deal with broad rule of law and judiciary matters, but co-ordination in justice and home affairs between national justice systems. This means that the infringement proceedings don't actually address the core issue of the protection of the rule of law and fundamental rights, but national leaders can claim that their proposals and measures are compatible with European laws and values. I'd have preferred it if such reports were to be issued by the Fundamental Rights Agency to ensure more independence (and continuity - will these scorecards continue after Reding has left the department?), but this is a good start.

Friday, 31 August 2012

PES Congress to be moved from Bucharest to Brussels

Due to the political battles between the Romanian governing coalition of socialists and liberals and the conservative president, the Party of European Socialists (which sits in the Socialists and Democrats group in the European Parliament) will move its September congress from Bucharest to Brussels.

The leader of the S&D group in the European Parliament, Hannes Swoboda, says that the move came at the request of the Romanian Prime Minister (and PES member) Victor Ponta, but the change of venue is being interpreted as a result of political pressure and a desire of political leaders not to be seen with a government that's had its commitment to the rule of law so seriously questioned over the past few months.

From EurActiv:

"[Socialist sources from the European Parliament], who asked not to be named, said “only a couple of leaders” of the PES-affiliated parties across Europe had confirmed attendance at the Bucharest congress, the rest apparently being reluctant to be hosted by Ponta, who has been under fire since he took office this spring."

The loss of the congress may also be a blow to Ponta's image and electoral strategy for the autumn election:
 
"When the decision to hold the congress in Bucharest was taken last year, Ponta was in opposition. As Romania’s parliamentary elections are due in the autumn, the congress was designed to boost his international image ahead of the poll."

So EurActiv is (indirectly) calling the news of Ponta's request  out for what it is: a face-saving exercise:

"PES sources said that while leaders of centre-left parties didn’t want to be criticised at home for being hosted by such a controversial leader as Ponta, there were also concerns that he should not be weakened before the election.

It would be a sharp blow for Ponta, who will turn 40 on 20 September, if the congress is moved away from Bucharest, a Romanian PSD source told EurActiv.

In any case, it appears that a decision to move the congress to Brussels should be coupled with a face-saving reason to be used internally in Romania, a difficult exercise for the PES secretariat."

This shows that the PES is much more uncomfortable with its Romanian member's actions than its weak response to the political crisis on the floor of the European Parliament would suggest.

Friday, 13 July 2012

Romania and the rule of law in the EU

The EU is a strange creature: in order to join a country must respect democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law - a concept that is becoming ever more detailed and developed on the European stage - but the EU finds it incredibly difficult to ensure these standards are respected one a country is inside the club. There have been a few battles over the last few years: France's treatment of the Roma, Hungary's constitutional changes in the media and the courts, and now Romania.

In Romania there is a power struggle over the constitution and the presidency. The social democrat Prime Minister, Victor Ponta, wants to impeach the unpopular conservative president Traian Basescu and has tried to change the threshold necessary in the process to get it done. The Economist also lists a number of seriously worrying changes that the Romanian government wants to bring about:

"His government has replaced the ombudsman (the only brake on emergency government ordinances), grabbed control of the Monitorul Oficial, the official promulgator of laws and decrees, taken over the national cultural institute and threatened to fire the judges of the constitutional court."
These changes has provoked concern in Brussels (and Berlin) over the threat to the rule of law. There is a way of sanctioning Member States that break the values of the EU: under Article 7 TEU a country in breach of these values can be stripped of its voting rights. However it's a nuclear option, and one that is difficult to threaten, never mind enforce or enact. There are two linked reasons for this: one technical and one political.

Politically it is hard for Member States to condemn a fellow Member State, and if the government of the offending Member State is aligned to either the EPP or PES (sitting in the S&D group in the Parliament), then it could have a strong lobby in its favour. Both the S&D and EPP have acted in the Hungarian and Romanian cases in support of governments that they are aligned with, as the Financial Times Blog rightly points out. The tactic used is generally to call for time while the Commission launches an investigation. This brings us to the second problem: the Commission only can investigate on narrow technical grounds, which allows for governments to make some concessions on these matters to lessen political pressure, while the measure is largely passed intact.

The Commission is equipped as a guardian of the treaties, but not as a protector of fundamental rights. To change this and to create a better culture for fundamental rights protection, it would be better for the Fundamental Rights Agency* to be empowered to assess the state of fundamental rights and compliance with the rule of law and EU values. Then it could recommend in a report what needs to be changed to bring a government back into line.

It would still be up to the Commission, Council and Parliament how they should act and if they invoke Article 7 TEU. Still, it is important that we move away from the culture of hiding behind technical requirements and changes and to a culture of debating the substance of protecting rights and the rule of law in the EU and the Member States. Even now European approval - or lack of sanction - carries a certain moral authority and legitimacy. We should make sure this is put to good use and not twisted and hollowed out to provide cover for subverting the rule of law. *The FRA's remit would probably need to be expanded for this.

Thursday, 13 January 2011

He is subject, You are supreme, but I am Sovereign

The EU Bill is still trundling its way through the UK House of Commons. The Bill is aimed at creating safeguards against future transfers of power from the UK to the EU, mostly by making referendums in such cases compulsory (though, oddly, not when it comes to enlargement, which will stoke suspicions in other Member States as to political ultierior motives behind the Bill). Earlier this week, proposed amendments by Conservative MP Bill Cash and other were defeated; these amendments were aimed at creating a version of parliamentary sovereignty that could not be interpreted or challenged by the courts (or, perhaps more accurately, to entrench the current, not entirely strictly defined, version of parliamentary sovereignty beyond the reach of the courts). Parliamentary sovereignty is the UK legal doctrine that parliament has supreme legislative authority, and its Acts cannot be challenged by the courts - it can do whatever it wants, except limit the power of its successors (i.e. the next elected parliament(s)).

The debate* was a strange one, centering around clause 18, the sovereignty clause. As the clause stands, it basically reaffirms the UK legal position that EU law applies in the UK because UK law (in the form of the European Communities Act 1972) says so. The ultimate decision is parliament's, therefore parliament remains sovereign. However the debate obviously contains several competing strands and ideas which see sovereignty in their own ways. It's incredibily hard to define them and tease them out, as they seem to be mashed up. I'll briefly look at some of the points raised (or perhaps half-raised unknowingly by some parliamentarians).


Everyday Absolutists v Ultimate Absolutists.

PS was sometimes defined as "could the UK opt out/disapply an EU law it doesn't like"? The different contributions seemed to indicate 2 lines of thought. 1. Yes, as we can ultimately withdraw from the EU. 2. Yes, we could pass an explicit law disapplying whatever we don't like (in legal terms inserting a provision that the ECA 1972 didn't apply, and it was enacting something different to the EU law). Both, technically, are correct, but the second option would place the UK in breach of EU law and it would be liable to fines - with the matter only being finally settled by withdrawal or the UK accepting the EU law.

Sadly it was only MacShane MP who highlighted that compliance is supposed to be a reciporcal act, using the fact the French had to let in British beef under EU law during the mad cow disease crisis when Commonwealth countries were rejecting it. EU law is not meant to be a pick-'n'-mix affair.

In any case, neither position would have been affected by the amendements either way.


Political reality Constitutionalists v Common Law "radicals".

This was the big debate, and the reason for the introduction of the proposed amendments. Bill Cash is seemingly worried about the power of the judges regarding parliamentary sovereignty. The problem is that Parliamentary sovereignty isn't actually written down anywhere. Of course, it's often said that the UK has an unwritten constitution, but large parts of it are written down; just not in the same place.

There seem to be 2 schools of opinion on the matter. First is the Fundamental Constitutional Principle one, which considers the principle to be outside of the common law (judge-made law) because it was the result of historial events (essentially parliament fighting the monarchy and winning). The second school (increasingly dominant), considers the doctrine to be a common law principle. This matters because the Common Law is an evolving body of judge-made law, where judges interpret and adapt the law. So if PS is part of the Common Law, that means that judges can interpret and adapt it - which is what Cash is worried about, and why he wants to exclude judging from deciding this constitutional matter.

PS is under some preasure from the courts, though there has been little direct conflict yet. In Thoburn v Sunderland City Council, (decided in a relatively low court) it was suggested that some Acts of Parliament should be held to be higher than others (such as the Human Rights Act 1998 and the ECA 1972), so they cannot be affected by implied repeal, but would have to be expressedly repealed by Parliament. This wasn't part of the effective ruling, but obiter, but if accepted it would be a change to PS, as a more recent Act wouldn't impliedly repeal a "constitutional" Act if it conflicited. More recently, in A v Jackson, it was suggested (again in obiter) that PS was a general rule and no longer absolute. The ruling was in the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court), and it was considered that if Parliament breached the rule of law, the courts may not adhere to PS.

Cash wants to prevent the courts from changing the concept of PS, so he wants to set it out in statute. As the Bill is on the EU, and not a general sovereignty Bill, this can't be done in totality, so he attempted to start restricting the courts' role in PS in the area of EU law first.

In some ways I'm reminded of the debates surrounding the constitutional role of the French Parlements (which were big general courts) in the French constitution before the French Revolution. Some Parlementaires wanted to push the idea that they limited the power of the absolute monarchy. As Louis XV retorted:

"...authority can only be exercised in my name... and never be turned against me. For it is to me exclusively that the legislative power belongs without qualification or partition." [Taken from Simon Schama's Citizens, p.87-88.


Obviously it's nowhere near a neat parallel - the UK is a representative democracy, after all - but there does seem to be the idea, gaining ground in recent years, that the courts could limit the Parliament (which claims to be absolute) if it breached the rule of law. The rule of law is a vague concept, but it may have recently gained more legitimacy simply by being recognised as a pre-existing Common Law principle by Parliament in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. (Indeed, protecting the rule of law is key to judicial concerns, so I suspect that their tentative moves towards adapting the PS doctrine is more as a result of recent anti-terrorist legislation than any influence the EU may have had).

I've spent far too long today reading about this, but naturally the question is complicated and you would need to deeply research this before you could really take a stab at an answer. However, I think I'll give my - perhaps crudely formed - thoughts on this. I am pretty firmly in the Common Law Radicals camp. Though PS isn't rooted in case law or a Parliamentary Act, I have trouble accepting that it should simply be regarded as a Fundamental Constitutional Principle because it was a political reality once political power shifted from the monarch to the Parliament (or, more accurately, from the Crown to the Crown-in-Parliament). It doesn't rest easily with me that the fundamental constitutional principle should be rooted in the argument "might makes right", or even "political reality makes right", with no reference to law - can there be a fundamental constitutional principle that's beyond the law?

More satisfying for me is the idea that PS is part of the Common Law. Courts have, after all, made pronuncements on PS, and if the suggestions in Thoburn or A v Jackson were accepted, then the courts would be changing and shaping the principle. (Ironically many MPs for the amendments cited Lord Justice Laws in Thoburn as supporting their side of the debate because he made it clear that the appliability of EU in the UK was a matter for EU law, yet his obiter thoughts would imply that PS is a Common Law principle!).

Having PS as a Common Law principle raises the problem that judges would have influence over such an important area of the law, but then is having a whipped Parliament in sole, unchecked, charge a better option? In my opinion it is not. A qualified principle of supremacy would mean that the judiciary would be a stronger check on Parliamentary power - but it wouldn't mean that the judiciary takes over all legislative power. Ideally the UK would adopt a constitution vesting sovereignty in the people rather than the Parliament - which brings us to the final strand.


Parliamentary Sovereignists v Popular Sovereignists.

The Bill is intended to make referendums on transfers of power to the EU mandatory. This goes against PS in that it makes the decision the people's, and not Parliament's, and it is intended to be a permanent feature of the constitution - in other words binding its successors (though Parliament could repeal the legislation if it wanted). This shows the political confusion over PS: some politicians obviously equate Parliamentary Sovereignty with popular sovereignty (where the people are sovereign), when they are politically and legally distinct ideas. Indeed, this part of the Bill could cause adaptation of the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty by the courts! To quote Professor Paul Craig, who was one of the legal academics who gave submissions to the European Scrutiny Committee (of which Cash is the chair), at page 23 (PDF):

"How far is a decision whether or not to hold a referendum a legal question, amenable to judicial review,
and how far a political question? The relevant considerations in answering this question are as follows.

(a) The EU Bill is framed in mandatory language. The holding of a referendum is not a matter within the
discretion of the government. It must be held where mandated, [...]

(b) The principal difficulty is that if Parliament enacts a statute approving the Treaty amendment or Article 48(6) Decision without holding a referendum then any judicial review action would be challenging this primary statute. A legal action would run into traditional sovereignty reasoning: the courts do not review the validity of primary statutes in the UK. There are nonetheless two possible ways to surmount this objection.

(i) An aggrieved citizen or MP might try to frame an HRA case, arguing that denial of the referendum violated one of the Convention rights brought into UK law by the HRA. The court would then review the Act of Parliament approving the Treaty amendment without the referendum pursuant to HRA sections 3–4.

(ii) An alternative would be to argue that while the courts will not review the validity of primary statute on substantive grounds, they can do so in relation to arguments of manner and form. This is the “New View” of sovereignty advocated by writers such as Jennings, Heuston and Marshall, who contend that if, for example, an Act of Parliament specified that it could only be amended or repealed by a two thirds majority, then a later statute that made such change by a simple majority should not be recognized by the courts because it did not comply with the conditions for its enactment. It might be argued that the referendum requirement in the EU Bill is, by analogy, a manner and form condition, such that if a later statute were enacted without a positive vote in a referendum then the later Act of Parliament should not recognized by the courts. This reasoning is reinforced because of the wording of Clauses 2(2) and 3(2). The UK courts have not directly pronounced on the reasoning underlying the New View in relation to a case concerned solely with the UK."


This Bill probably highlights tha problems and pressures of having (and trying to maintain) a point of absolute power within a system of devolved government and within the context of supranational and international law. It will be interesting to see if the British constitution can successfully evolve to deal with the legal and political challenges of the modern world, and a modern Europe, or if a more radicial break with the past is needed.

*[Hat tip to Nosemonkey for the debate link].

Wednesday, 21 October 2009

Think2 Post: "Judging Europe"

I've written another post on the Th!nk2 platform - a bit of analysis of the EU approach to climate change, going into a bit more detail than on the new ThinkCast episode Waldo Vanderhaeghen, Joe Litobarski and I participated in (give it a listen!).

Extract:

[...][...Introducing the ThinkCast Episode...][...]

In this episode - moderated by Waldo Vanderhaeghen, with Joe and I as panelists - we discussed the EU's record on climate change, and the prospects of its climate policy both at and post-Copenhagen. It was a good debate (20 minutes long), and I think we covered quite a bit of ground (thanks to Waldo's questioning). There was some difference of opinion between Joe and I over how the EU should be judged/seen when it comes to climate change - though, since it was never really explicit in the podcast, I could be off the mark on this. I think that Joe's right that the EU should be seen as a unit to some degree - on it's performance on environmental legislation and it's overall effectiveness and impact, for example - but the member states retain an enormous amount of power and responsibility in this area. When we heard about Samso, the energy-independent Danish island, most of us were struck - and inspired - by the level of community involvement and ownership over the project. But there was another side to it - the sheer scale of investment from the community, the private sector/banks and the government/EU. And the fact is, that the EU cannot play this role on a European scale: the EU doesn't have the budget or taxing and redistributive powers to make large enough investments to revolutionize the European energy market - that's up to the member states, who will largely choose their courses of action within the limits set internationally and at the European level.

That's not to downplay the importance of the EU - the political and legal culture it provides is invaluable to fighting climate change, and it can be instrumental in some investments - but I just wanted to highlight that power and responsibility is shared and spread out across the European political system. Which makes it very hard when it comes to judging Europe.

I think we were all agreed on the importance of the legal basis for acting on climate change.

During the Th!nk2 launch event, we were told that good, solid legal mechanisms for tackling climate change would be the best outcome at COP15, and it's not hard to imagine why: introducing binding targets introduces the rule of law, making political ducking of the issue much harder (and in principle, impossible without consequences). In the Th!nkCast, Waldo asked me if the EU should seek to export its Emissions Trading Scheme model to the rest of the world - while I raised some criticisms of the scheme, I generally think it's a good mechanism, and agree with Joe that the problems with the scheme are largely due to it being an experiment in climate change legislation. But if the EU were to export the fundamental principles of its environmental legislation, then it would be politically quite revolutionary.

Should the EU export its climate change model? Yes - though it is a tough task, because it really requires projecting the European project onto the world stage. I was reminded of an FT article I read recently: Europe's plot to take over the world - where the argument was that the European countries were taking over by "Europeanizing" the G20. Meetings, bureaucracy, aims, targets, agreements... Basically extending the culture and machinary of the EU and the rule of law into the international sphere. We still have to see if it will work with the financial sector and the G20 (though it'd never reach the scale of the EU itself); could it work with climate change?

It's a big question, because it challenges the old ideas of national sovereignty and the "softness" of international law in a way that's mundane and normal for most Europeans (surely it's common sense to pull together and agree on shared rules and principles?, we might say) but it's a big step for everyone else, and you can bet on a lot of resistance to the idea. Will it happen? Could it work? Success here will be even harder to judge...