Since Secretary Clinton had a question and answer session in the EP (sadly not with the MEPs), I thought that I'd watch it on EuroparlTV. (After all, it is there to show EP events).
You can watch it here, if you like, but it takes half an hour just to get to the main event, so have something to do in the meantime, unless you like watching a screen with "Awaiting Clinton/ H-G Poettering" on it, or audiences talking amongst themselves. (This is frankly unbelievable - have EuroparlTV never heard of editing?!).
It was interesting to watch, when I did eventually get to see it, with the Secretary of State making some very federalist noises ("reaching your full potential" as apposed to Dr. Rice's 'don't think you can equal us' rhetoric). Of course, it can be said that it's all just tailored to the audience, and it's not really of much value. In the end, how strong Europe is (and how we define a strong Europe) is up to us (if you'll allow me to restate the obvious).
One other thing: it'll be a proud day for the EP when it picks the Commission President, Mr. Poettering; you can't base a Parliament's good days on the sparse visits of high-ranking foreign dignitaries.
Saturday, 7 March 2009
Friday, 6 March 2009
Ireland-EU News Round-up
There have been several Europe-related developments in Ireland recently, so here's what I've noticed over the last few days:
Story 1: The Greens want Ireland to pull out of the EDA, apparently to placate their membership, as the Greens didn't get enough party support to campaign on the pro-Lisbon side in the June Referendum (I think they required 2/3 of party members to vote for a pro-Lisbon campaign strategy). Ireland's membership of the EDA was a stumbling block, it seems (I didn't hear about this at the time, but I may have missed it). Cowen has been reported as wanting some sort of compromise.
The EDA is supposed to make it cheaper for European governments to buy good quality military hardware. If you want to make the argument that it's good for arms dealers, so therefore it's bad, then that's up to you. Personally, I support the EDA - I find it hard to believe that the idea of getting the same defense at a lower cost (or better defense at the same cost) could be a bad thing. Since the Greens seem to be pushing this because they realise that it would be bad for Ireland to pull out of the ESDP, it looks like they just want to pull out of something, just to be seen to be doing something.
Story 2: Libertas are involved in yet more membership shenanigans, with the revelation that they may have offered an eurosceptic Swedish party almost €1 million for its support and some sort of joint platform in the European elections. No response to these allegations on their website yet; can they not get someone to run their website properly or deal with Libertas' online presence if they have as much support as they claim? It will be interesting to see how they respond - I can't see any way they have of turning this into a Brussels conspiracy. (Picked up here and here and here by Peoplekorps (apparently talks about the €1 million did take place...) and reported here by the Irish Times).
Story 3: Well, more of a continuation of one I've already written about. The Liberals in the EP are going to accept Fianna Fáil's application to join their group, and will assist them with money in the second Lisbon referendum if they need it. I'm not too happy with Watson's alarmist comments about the referendum being an in-or-out decision for Ireland. It's this kind of talk that comes across as scaremongering, which should be left to Libertas.
There's an interesting article about Ireland and Germany by the Irish Times here. I wonder if I can find Our Farm on the internet?
Story 1: The Greens want Ireland to pull out of the EDA, apparently to placate their membership, as the Greens didn't get enough party support to campaign on the pro-Lisbon side in the June Referendum (I think they required 2/3 of party members to vote for a pro-Lisbon campaign strategy). Ireland's membership of the EDA was a stumbling block, it seems (I didn't hear about this at the time, but I may have missed it). Cowen has been reported as wanting some sort of compromise.
The EDA is supposed to make it cheaper for European governments to buy good quality military hardware. If you want to make the argument that it's good for arms dealers, so therefore it's bad, then that's up to you. Personally, I support the EDA - I find it hard to believe that the idea of getting the same defense at a lower cost (or better defense at the same cost) could be a bad thing. Since the Greens seem to be pushing this because they realise that it would be bad for Ireland to pull out of the ESDP, it looks like they just want to pull out of something, just to be seen to be doing something.
Story 2: Libertas are involved in yet more membership shenanigans, with the revelation that they may have offered an eurosceptic Swedish party almost €1 million for its support and some sort of joint platform in the European elections. No response to these allegations on their website yet; can they not get someone to run their website properly or deal with Libertas' online presence if they have as much support as they claim? It will be interesting to see how they respond - I can't see any way they have of turning this into a Brussels conspiracy. (Picked up here and here and here by Peoplekorps (apparently talks about the €1 million did take place...) and reported here by the Irish Times).
Story 3: Well, more of a continuation of one I've already written about. The Liberals in the EP are going to accept Fianna Fáil's application to join their group, and will assist them with money in the second Lisbon referendum if they need it. I'm not too happy with Watson's alarmist comments about the referendum being an in-or-out decision for Ireland. It's this kind of talk that comes across as scaremongering, which should be left to Libertas.
There's an interesting article about Ireland and Germany by the Irish Times here. I wonder if I can find Our Farm on the internet?
Labels:
EU,
European elections,
Fianna Fáil,
Greens,
Ireland,
Libertas,
Lisbon,
Lisbon Treaty
Thursday, 5 March 2009
Red Tape Holds Europe Together
It's not meant as an insult, and it seems obvious, but it's true. And it's amazing to think that after all this time, the nature and need for European bureaucracy is so misunderstood. The standard calls by Eurosceptics for the end to the Brussels bureaucracy and for the EU to be turned into a free trade area, either don't understand the nature of the single market, or want less free trade. But some are waking up to the necessity for the EU, and the bureaucracy that it entails. That's not to say that I back all of the rules and regulations that come out of "Brussels", and I'm not supporting the equation of: bureaucracy is necessary, and therefore good, and therefore we need more.
Yet it's becoming clear that the EU is not equipped to deal with the crisis. The Commission's vague hints at a plan to help Europe, weak and ineffectual sounding even at the time, highlights the powerlessness of the EU to hold together and support its single market, which is the heart of the EU.
We need to dismiss this view that the single market is somehow equivalent to free trade areas in some way. It is so much more, and if we loose it now, we will all suffer. The single market is based on countries coming together to build a market between them which will be as integrated and free as domestic markets. This is clearly more than a free trade agreement, which merely deals with tariffs, but leaves other financial controls and non-tariff barriers in place. These restrict trade, and so for an effective single market there is a need for common rules to prevent national ones from distorting trade. Which requires common institutions and a common bureaucracy. The European bureaucracy is the life-support machine for the single market, and for the most free international trading system in the world.
The argument that the EFTA would be a good replacement is highly debatable. The success of the EFTA to date probably rests to a large extent with the success of the single market - EFTA members are buying into a more liberalised trading system without joining it: if the single market falls, then barriers to trade will rise up again, and an EFTA can't deal with this nor compensate for this. To tear the EU bureaucracy down, or diminish it now would be a grave mistake.
On the contrary, it needs to be strengthened, both in terms of power to deal with the crisis, and in democratic legitimacy. The current Commission is ineffective and without any power or imagination to lead in the crisis, rejecting proposals out of hand for fear of the member states' reaction, while the member states become more and more of a threat to the single market as they retreat into veiled protectionism and incoherence. Max Bergmann seems to hint that more political aspects are needed in the EU. I would agree with this, as far as democratic accountability is needed, both for its own sake (the single market economy affects us all, and should be more accountable) and to bring back confidence in the system. It will also give the EU the legitimacy to be pro-active in crisises.
This isn't political union, but the macro-economy needs to be dealt with at the macroeconomic level, and it should be accountable and effective. Europe needs good economic governance, and it needs it now. If we can't protect and support our single market, it will fall - and take us with it.
Yet it's becoming clear that the EU is not equipped to deal with the crisis. The Commission's vague hints at a plan to help Europe, weak and ineffectual sounding even at the time, highlights the powerlessness of the EU to hold together and support its single market, which is the heart of the EU.
We need to dismiss this view that the single market is somehow equivalent to free trade areas in some way. It is so much more, and if we loose it now, we will all suffer. The single market is based on countries coming together to build a market between them which will be as integrated and free as domestic markets. This is clearly more than a free trade agreement, which merely deals with tariffs, but leaves other financial controls and non-tariff barriers in place. These restrict trade, and so for an effective single market there is a need for common rules to prevent national ones from distorting trade. Which requires common institutions and a common bureaucracy. The European bureaucracy is the life-support machine for the single market, and for the most free international trading system in the world.
The argument that the EFTA would be a good replacement is highly debatable. The success of the EFTA to date probably rests to a large extent with the success of the single market - EFTA members are buying into a more liberalised trading system without joining it: if the single market falls, then barriers to trade will rise up again, and an EFTA can't deal with this nor compensate for this. To tear the EU bureaucracy down, or diminish it now would be a grave mistake.
On the contrary, it needs to be strengthened, both in terms of power to deal with the crisis, and in democratic legitimacy. The current Commission is ineffective and without any power or imagination to lead in the crisis, rejecting proposals out of hand for fear of the member states' reaction, while the member states become more and more of a threat to the single market as they retreat into veiled protectionism and incoherence. Max Bergmann seems to hint that more political aspects are needed in the EU. I would agree with this, as far as democratic accountability is needed, both for its own sake (the single market economy affects us all, and should be more accountable) and to bring back confidence in the system. It will also give the EU the legitimacy to be pro-active in crisises.
This isn't political union, but the macro-economy needs to be dealt with at the macroeconomic level, and it should be accountable and effective. Europe needs good economic governance, and it needs it now. If we can't protect and support our single market, it will fall - and take us with it.
The Inclusive(-ish) NATO Summit
Clinton has met European NATO ministers in Brussels yesterday, but many more were invited, including Finland, Sweden and Switzerland - all three of which are neutral states (and Switzerland isn't even in the EU).
So why weren't Ireland and Austria invited?
(....It's a pity that the US will miss out on Irish expertise on Iran and Tehranian power structures...)
In other news, the Guardian has a interesting article on Kremlin power struggles. Kremlinology is alive and well.
So why weren't Ireland and Austria invited?
(....It's a pity that the US will miss out on Irish expertise on Iran and Tehranian power structures...)
In other news, the Guardian has a interesting article on Kremlin power struggles. Kremlinology is alive and well.
Labels:
Austria,
EU,
EU foreign policy,
Euro-American relations,
Ireland,
NATO,
US
Wednesday, 4 March 2009
Don't worry, the Commission has a cunning plan
The Commission apparently has a plan to aid Eurozone countries that default, though it will not reveal them to the public. Though since there can be no buying up of national bonds or bailing out of defaulting governments, the balance of payments scheme seems to be the only mechanism available (that I know of - not being an economist, I can't say for definite). If that's true, it seems the amount of money that is involved is minuscule (unless the ceiling is raised significantly: at the moment the ceiling is €25 billion).
I'm not too impressed by the claim that they're "equipped intellectually, politically, and economically to face this crisis scenario", either. First of all, I would question the fact that the aid (under "The Plan") seems to be on offer only after the country has defaulted, or at least it is only spoken about in these terms. Second, the Commission's performance over the last few months hasn't been inspiring. If its defence of the single market, the heart of the EU, is so weak, then I don't expect much ambition in this area either. That the Commission has proved so inept in demonstrating the usefulness of the EU to the public by taking a pro-active stance is, in my opinion, the most damning aspect of Barroso's Commission.
Never mind the lack of political promotion and initiative during the referendum campaigns, etc. as highlighted by the Anyone But Barroso campaign, though these reasons are by themselves important - this failure to act effectively cannot be rationalised away with the idea that the Commission shouldn't be assertive in the national political arena; the crisis is huge, and the need for effective common plans and co-ordination has never been greater. If the Commission cannot summon up the courage and ambition to act in an area where it is so desperately needed, then I can only assume that this one has a death wish.
I'm not too impressed by the claim that they're "equipped intellectually, politically, and economically to face this crisis scenario", either. First of all, I would question the fact that the aid (under "The Plan") seems to be on offer only after the country has defaulted, or at least it is only spoken about in these terms. Second, the Commission's performance over the last few months hasn't been inspiring. If its defence of the single market, the heart of the EU, is so weak, then I don't expect much ambition in this area either. That the Commission has proved so inept in demonstrating the usefulness of the EU to the public by taking a pro-active stance is, in my opinion, the most damning aspect of Barroso's Commission.
Never mind the lack of political promotion and initiative during the referendum campaigns, etc. as highlighted by the Anyone But Barroso campaign, though these reasons are by themselves important - this failure to act effectively cannot be rationalised away with the idea that the Commission shouldn't be assertive in the national political arena; the crisis is huge, and the need for effective common plans and co-ordination has never been greater. If the Commission cannot summon up the courage and ambition to act in an area where it is so desperately needed, then I can only assume that this one has a death wish.
Catholicism, Ireland and the EU
Ireland is a much more liberal and secular country than it has been in the past, but religion still plays a bigger role in Ireland than in some other European countries (though it's debatable whether or not this is due to conservative religious views being widely held, or if religious conservatives are just well organised and good at promoting their message). The idea of "Christian Europe" is alive in some quarters (though my impression that defining Europe as Christian is limited to a few groups), and I have even heard Dana (who almost got to run for the Presidency, but didn't even have enough support to force an election) talking on RTÉ radio about how the EU "discriminates" against Christians. It was a very strange debate, with her opponents rightly rubbishing her claims, but they also pointed to the Catholicism of some of the EU's founding fathers, as if the EU can (and should) be claimed as some sort of Catholic creation.
I would stress that this is a very minor issue; most concerns are based on sovereignty issues (tax & defence) rather than religion - Coir didn't really mobilise many voters to the No side based on family law issues (a stance which directly contradicted the Church's position), though it was able to protray itself as a success in the light of a No victory.
(Still, I would have thought that the response to such arguments would be based more on the "faith should be divorced from the state" line, since Ireland hasn't exactly had a great experience under official and semi-official Churches, both Anglician and Catholic.)
Now the archbishop of Ireland has backed a more positive view of Europe, and even considers the duty of the Church to set right the misinformation of "fundamentalist Catholics" (his words). To be fair, the Church has generally been pro-to-neutral on Europe, but its silence when misinformation on family law is being spread has meant that the EU has been protrayed mostly by small groups as being hostile to Catholic interests (perhaps some form of religio-patriotism to boost the profile of the conservative side on family issues?).
So an ethical issue for those who believe in the separation of religion and politics (as hard as it is to do so): do religions have a duty to intervene in a political debate when groups outside their control are using misinformation of the facts and of the religion's position to influence politics?
And if the Catholic Church steps in to dismiss anti-Lisbon Treaty claims, will this have much impact on Libertas, which Ganley is turning increasingly into a right-wing traditionalist/religious political platform?
I would stress that this is a very minor issue; most concerns are based on sovereignty issues (tax & defence) rather than religion - Coir didn't really mobilise many voters to the No side based on family law issues (a stance which directly contradicted the Church's position), though it was able to protray itself as a success in the light of a No victory.
(Still, I would have thought that the response to such arguments would be based more on the "faith should be divorced from the state" line, since Ireland hasn't exactly had a great experience under official and semi-official Churches, both Anglician and Catholic.)
Now the archbishop of Ireland has backed a more positive view of Europe, and even considers the duty of the Church to set right the misinformation of "fundamentalist Catholics" (his words). To be fair, the Church has generally been pro-to-neutral on Europe, but its silence when misinformation on family law is being spread has meant that the EU has been protrayed mostly by small groups as being hostile to Catholic interests (perhaps some form of religio-patriotism to boost the profile of the conservative side on family issues?).
So an ethical issue for those who believe in the separation of religion and politics (as hard as it is to do so): do religions have a duty to intervene in a political debate when groups outside their control are using misinformation of the facts and of the religion's position to influence politics?
And if the Catholic Church steps in to dismiss anti-Lisbon Treaty claims, will this have much impact on Libertas, which Ganley is turning increasingly into a right-wing traditionalist/religious political platform?
Labels:
Catholic Church,
EU,
Ireland,
Libertas,
Lisbon Treaty,
religion and the state
Monday, 2 March 2009
Eastern Europe? What Eastern Europe?
Eastern Europe is a contested term: apart from the geographical questions of "where is central Europe" and "where is eastern Europe?" (which is related in turn to the even more contested question of where Europe's final frontier lies). Some eastern Europeans and bloggers are annoyed with the label of "eastern European", partly due to negative connotations of low levels of economic development. So it should be great news that the argument that each country should be seen more as an individual has won the day in Brussels. Though ironically, this argument was prepared by a pre-summit summit of eastern European countries.*
These new member states will be treated on a case by case basis. So I wonder, will this whole situation strengthen or weaken the cohesiveness, such as it is, of "eastern Europe" as a bloc within the EU? Their summit helped them get some of what they wanted, but what they wanted involved them being treated differently. Will the operation of any plans in practise cause rifts between these states? And will this effect the political alignments of other member states?
In the end I just hope that this won't be used as a way to limit aid to the new member states.
* I think that the EU is so big now in terms of member states that it's inevitable that there will be generalised regional images. This isn't limited to eastern Europe: "Mediterranean countries" and "Nordic countries" are also labels. The international presence of the big 3 prevents a very strong, single western European label; "eastern Europe" or "CEE" countries do have a shared recent history and has joined the EU at (pretty much) the same time. Western Europe has a shared recent history too, and western Europe exists as a label, but the bickering of the big 3 tends to paper over it. I would definitely agree that there needs to be a higher quality of reporting from the eastern EU member states, though.
These new member states will be treated on a case by case basis. So I wonder, will this whole situation strengthen or weaken the cohesiveness, such as it is, of "eastern Europe" as a bloc within the EU? Their summit helped them get some of what they wanted, but what they wanted involved them being treated differently. Will the operation of any plans in practise cause rifts between these states? And will this effect the political alignments of other member states?
In the end I just hope that this won't be used as a way to limit aid to the new member states.
* I think that the EU is so big now in terms of member states that it's inevitable that there will be generalised regional images. This isn't limited to eastern Europe: "Mediterranean countries" and "Nordic countries" are also labels. The international presence of the big 3 prevents a very strong, single western European label; "eastern Europe" or "CEE" countries do have a shared recent history and has joined the EU at (pretty much) the same time. Western Europe has a shared recent history too, and western Europe exists as a label, but the bickering of the big 3 tends to paper over it. I would definitely agree that there needs to be a higher quality of reporting from the eastern EU member states, though.
Labels:
eastern Europe,
economic crisis,
labelling,
summitry,
western Europe
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